A natural death or the death of the natural: towards a legal critique of death in Ireland by Hanafin, Patrick John
A Natural Death Or The Death Of The Natural: Towards 
A Legal Critique Of Death In Ireland.
by
Patrick John Hanafin B.A.
Thesis submitted 02/05/1995 in satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
This work was completed at Dublin City University 
Business School, under the supervision of Dr. David 
Tomkin. The thesis is based on the candidate's own 
work.
DECLARATION
I hereby certify that this material which I now 
submit for assessment on the programme of study 
leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy, is
entirely my own work and 
the work of others save 
such work has been cited
has not been taken from 
and to the extent that 
and acknowledged within
ID No.: 93701039
11
DEDICATION
To the memory of my father. 
"Media vita in morte sumus".
111
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the following for their 
help during the course of this thesis: Dr. David 
Tomkin, for his dedicated supervision of this 
work; Dublin City University Business School; Dr. 
Alan Dignam, for his guidance and generous 
assistance; the staff of the Medical Library of 
University College Dublin; the staff of the
Library of the University of Sussex, and in
particular, the Humanities Librarian, Mr. David 
Kennelly, to the Trustees of The Irish Legal 
Research and Education Trust for financial 
assistance with the preparation of this thesis;
and to Mr. Bald de Vries and Ms. Brona McNally
for their generosity and support.
I V
ABSTRACT
Death has been viewed in cultural terms in 
Ireland more as rite than right. Engrained in the 
collective consciousness is the conception of 
death as part of nature's course, a societal rite 
of passage. This in turn is influenced by the 
peculiar Irish attitude to nature and the natural 
which has found legal expression in the 
Constitution of 1937 with its homage to the 
ideals of natural law. The way in which 
successive governments have approached the issues 
spanning the natural cycle: contraception, birth, 
education, marriage and sexuality has borne the 
imprint of a pre-modern approach to social, 
ethical and legal dilemmas. The right to die is 
as much part of the debate over the right to life 
as is the status of the unborn. Chapter one is an 
introductory chapter which outlines in greater 
detail the extent of the question to be broached 
and the method of its answer. In the second 
chapter, the issue of defining death is studied. 
The relationship between both legal and ethical 
definitions of this concept and the practice of 
medicine is examined. In chapter three the topic 
of pregnancy termination is examined, with 
special reference to the legal and ethical 
problems which arise in this area of medical 
practice. Chapter four examines the problem 
raised by the issue of treatment withdrawal or 
passive euthanasia and proposes a framework for 
its resolution. Chapters five and six deal with 
the issues raised by active intervention to end 
life in the medical context. Chapter five 
examines the issue of active euthanasia and 
chapter six analyses the related but discrete 
area of assisted suicide. Chapter seven contains 
the review and conclusions, and tentatively 
suggests that a more patient-oriented approach be 
taken by the law in resolving such dilemmas.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.
[H]e was overwhelmed by the belated 
suspicion that it is life, more than 
death, that has no limits.1
1.0 Introduction to Statement of Problem m  Thesis.
This thesis examines the application of law and ethics
to the issue of death and dying. Is it possible
successfully to apply legal and ethical principles to the 
everyday problems which arise in the care of the terminally 
ill or incurable patient? The thesis proceeds to discuss 
the appropriateness of legal intervention in this area of 
clinical practice. What role should the law play in this 
field? Is there a consensus between the law's approach to 
this topic and that of the health care provider?
A central theme of this thesis is the idea of
resolving the conflicting interests of the individual 
patient and the medical professional. In resolving any 
particular dilemma one must decide how much importance to 
give, on the one hand, to the autonomy of the individual 
patient and, on the other, to the freedom of the medical 
professional to intervene. Thus, the question can be framed 
in terms of the competing values of autonomy and the 
professionally perceived best interests of the individual.
The thesis shall centre on certain areas of the 
doctor-patient relationship m  an attempt to examine the
1 Garcia Marquez, (1988, p.352).
foregoing questions. Thus, the thesis takes as its focus 
issues revolving around the topic of death, and perhaps 
more specifically, the means which people employ to attain 
such a state. It may seem particularly morbid to speak of 
attaining a state of not being, when the majority of human 
beings strive assiduously to avoid it. However, there are 
members of the human race for whom life is no longer an 
attractive alternative. The terminally ill person may 
consider death to be a release from a life consisting of 
pain and frustration. The individual who commits suicide 
has chosen death over a life which is filled with pain.* 
Moreover, the person in a persistent vegetative state 
though insentient and unable to choose, may, while
conscious, have expressed a wish to die if he ever entered 
such a state.
In such instances, whether the person is competent or
not, a decision must be made which will either lead to
death or to continuing to live. This decision cannot be 
made in a vacuum. In arriving at the decision, one must 
take into account the legal and ethical consequences
involved.
The thesis begins with an analysis of the way in which 
death is perceived in society, and how the institutions of 
medicine and the law have shaped our perception of death 
and how it should be confronted. The competing viewpoints 
on how far the law should impinge on individual autonomy 
are analyzed in an attempt to discover the limits of legal 
intervention. From this general discussion the work then
2
moves on to the more specific application of law to the 
various aspects of death in the clinical context. Is it 
possible to discover particular ethical stances being 
reflected in legislation and judicial decisions in this 
ajrea and, if so, to what extent does this affect the 
doctor-patient relationship?
The theoretical model on which this thesis is based is 
that of the ethical understanding of a right to life and in 
what circumstances, if ever, that right may be waived. When 
one speaks of the taking of life, one may initially think 
of equating it with such emotive synonyms as 'killing7 and 
'homicide7. Yet this is too simplistic a generalisation of 
the issue. There may be particular extenuating 
circumstances, depending on the context in which the taking 
of life occurs. One cannot apply the same standards to the 
cold-blooded taking of life by, for example, a terrorist 
who places a bomb in a crowded shopping centre to the 
doctor who withdraws life-sustaining medical treatment from 
a patient in a persistent vegetative state based on the 
previously expressed wishes of the patient when he was in 
a sentient state.
However, there are those who will say that the taking 
of all human life, no matter at what stage of development, 
is murder.2 This thesis attempts to evaluate the competing 
arguments of those who are opposed to the taking of human 
life in all circumstances, and those who believe that there 
should be exceptions where the taking of life may be
2 Grisez and Boyle, (1979, pp.1-15).
justified.3
The particular ethical model which one adopts in 
relation to the right to life will thus have implications 
for the legal regulation of such areas of medical practice 
a^ pregnancy termination, euthanasia, suicide and the 
definition of death for clinical purposes. Indeed, as will 
be seen, this area is riddled with contradiction and 
uncertainty. For example, the adoption by the legislatures 
of the United States of a legal definition of death based 
on the whole brain standard recognizes the idea that the 
patient is not dead until all activity in both the higher 
and lower brain have ceased. Notwithstanding this, many 
state courts have approved the termination of treatment of 
patients in a persistent vegetative state4 who are still
3 See Femberg, (1977, p.121), where he provides an 
example of such a view:
[t]he right to die is simply the other side 
of the coin of the right to live. The basic 
right underlying each is the right to be 
one's own master, to dispose of one's lot as 
one chooses, subject of course to the limits 
imposed by the like rights of others. Just 
as my right to live imposes a duty on others 
not to kill me, so my right to die, which it 
entails, imposes a duty on others not to< 
prevent me from implementing my choice of 
death, except for the purpose of determining 
whether that choice is genuinely voluntary, 
hence truly mine. When I choose to die by my 
own hand, I insisit upon my claim to the 
non-interference of others. When I am unable 
to terminate my own life, I waive my right 
to live by exercising my right to die, which 
is one and the same thing as releasing at 
least one other person from his duty not to 
kill me.
4 See for example, In Re Quinlan 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) 
(1976) and In Re Torres 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
4
alive according to the whole brain death standard, as it is 
only their higher brain function, which controls thought 
and consciousness, which is permanently damaged, while the 
brain-stem, that part of the lower brain that regulates 
such functions as breathing, blood pressure and 
temperature, continues to function. Such patients can 
remain alive in the biological sense with the aid of 
artificial hydration and feeding.
Thus, the task of the following sections in this 
chapter is to place the various arguments in relation to 
the concept of the taking of life in a general moral 
framework. The purpose of this exercise is to link the 
various policy stances and attitudes which shall be 
encountered in the ensuing chapters to particular moral or 
philosophical models of society. To fully understand why 
there is such a deep division in many societies over the 
question of life, death, and dying, one must be acquainted 
with the ethical models which influence these diverse 
viewpoints. In carrying out such an investigation, perhaps, 
one may also find some means of reconciling these diverse 
models, as indeed Ronald Dworkin has proposed.5
The work proceeds to look at the issues which arise 
after the death of the individual. How does the law regard 
the corpse? Is there a residual respect for the former 
person or does the law collaborate in the view of the 
corpse as a mere source of spare parts? This shall 
demonstrate that the problem of consent and respect for the
5 Dworkin, (1993, pp.3-29).
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individual do not cease to be pertinent on the death of an 
individual.
The work shall then concentrate on specific areas in 
the practice of medicine where conceptions of life and 
death are of particular relevance. The issue of pregnancy 
termination which raises passionate debate on both sides of 
the argument, is examined from an ethical and legal 
viewpoint. In particular, the discussion analyses to what 
extent ethical views on the issue are reflected in 
legislative initiatives. The question of why such an 
intimate area of human activity should be regulated by the* 
criminal law is examined. The issue is also examined in the 
context of reproductive autonomy. To what extent is the way 
in which this issue is treated by the legislature and the 
judiciary a reflection of the legal attitude to female 
autonomy? What lessons can be learned from the public and 
legal debate on this aspect of the right to life for the 
equally contentious issue of euthanasia?
The topic of euthanasia is then examined. How far does 
the autonomy of the individual extend? Can citizens be said 
to be truly autonomous if they are forbidden from 
exercising a right to die? Does such a right exist, and if 
so, in what circumstances may the individual exercise it? 
This issue allows one to examine the role of the health 
professional m  contemporary society and to what extent the 
Hippocratic tradition of life preservation may now be 
altered in the light of advances in medical technology.
Suicide is another topic which provokes emotional
6
responses. Societal and legal attitudes to the taking of 
one's life are examined. The discussion then focuses on the 
question of physician-assisted suicide and legal responses 
to it.
In the review and conclusions, the work suggests that 
a more patient-oriented approach should be taken by the law 
in the resolution of medical dilemmas. This would require 
a shift on the part of the law towards a model which views 
individual autonomy as being more important than the 
interests of the common good. An integral part of this 
development is the development of a more open and equal 
dialogue between all those concerned in this area of 
medical practice, health care providers, patients and 
policy-makers.
1.1 Introduction.
This chapter focuses on the varying models which one 
may apply to the question of the taking of life and how and 
to what extent these models influence public policy in the 
area of death and dying. The remainder of the chapter 
analyses the way in which death is perceived m  cultural 
terms and how the medicalization of death has led to the 
legal appropriation of death.
1.2 The Natural Law Model and the Taking of Life.
This model holds that all instances of deliberate
7
killing of an innocent human being are morally wrong. This 
conception of killing falls into what Ronald Dworkin has 
referred to as a duty-based moral view.6 This model, 
however, allows for certain exceptions where the taking of 
life may be deemed to be justified. Thus, acts which do not 
have as their primary motivation the killing of another, 
but nonetheless lead to his death, may be justified. This 
category of exceptions includes such acts as killing in 
self-defence7 and pregnancy termination which results 
indirectly from attempts to save the life of the mother who 
is suffering from uterine cancer. This argument was later' 
to be adapted by Roman Catholic theologians to form the
6 Dworkin, (1984, p.171).
7 Aquinas, (1975, question 64, article 7, reply, 
p.43), provides the following justification for killing in 
self-defence:
we can see that an act of self-defence may 
have two effects: the saving of one's own 
life, and the killing of the attacker. Now 
such an act of self-defence is not 
illegitimate just because the agent intends 
to save his own life, because it is natural 
for anything to want to preserve itself in 
being as far as it can. An act that is 
properly motivated may, nevertheless, become 
vitiated if it is not proportionate to the 
end intended. And this is why somebody who 
uses more violence than is necessary to 
defend himself will be doing something 
wrong. On the other hand, the controlled use 
of counter-violence constitutes legitimate 
self-defence, for according to the law it is 
legitimate to answer force with force 
provided it goes no further than due defence 
requires. Moreover a person is not obliged 
under pain of loss of eternal life to 
renounce the use of proportionate counter­
force in order to avoid killing another, for 
a man is under a greater obligation to care 
for his own life than for another's.
8
basis of the doctrine of double effect.8 The doctrine of
double effect would allow for an exception to the natural 
law model of the right to life when it can be determined 
that the intention of the actor was not to kill but to 
bring about some other result such as the curing of pain. 
Thus, for example, Roman Catholic Church moral teaching 
would allow for an exception to the moral prohibition on 
killing in a case where a doctor intended to alleviate a 
patient's pain by administering a pam-killing drug, but 
this intentional act had the unintended side effect or 
double effect of killing the patient.9 A second category of 
exceptions is based on the idea that the intentional taking
8 Mangan, (1949, pp.41-48).
9 See, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, (1980, pp.2-3), wherein it is stated:
[b]ut the intensive use of painkillers is 
not without difficulties, because the 
phenomenon of habituation generally makes it 
necessary to increase their dosage in order 
to maintain their efficacy. At this point it 
is fitting to recall a declaration by Pius 
XII, which retains its full force. In answer 
to a group of doctors who had put the 
question: 'Is the suppression of pain and
consciousness by the use of narcotics... 
permitted by religion and morality to the 
doctor and the patient (even at the approach 
of death and if one foresees that the use of 
narcotics will shorten life)?'
The Pope said 'If no other means exist, 
and if, in the given circumstances, this 
does not prevent the carrying out of other 
religious and moral duties: 'Yes''. In this 
case, of course, death is in no way intended 
or sought even if the risk of it is 
reasonably taken; the intention is simply to 
relieve pain effectively, using for this 
purpose painkillers available to medicine.
See in addition, Glover, (1990, p.87) and Tomkin and
Hanafin, (1995, pp.149-154).
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of life in certain circumstances may be justified. Thus, in 
the case of capital punishment, the execution of a murderer 
is seen as justified on the grounds that he has 
transgressed a basic moral principle and has therefore 
forfeited his right to life.10 Moreover, in the case of 
killing in war, the defence of one's country or some 
justifiable cause is seen as sufficient justification for 
the intentional killing of others.11
Thus, this approach to the question of taking life 
tends to an absolutist view, leaving aside the exceptions 
which are included in the model. Thus, the element of 
individual choice or autonomy has no place in this moral 
view. As Dworkin has written, m  adverting to the general 
category of duty-based moral theories, such a model is 
concerned with the moral quality of an individual's acts 
and supposes "that it is wrong, without more, for an
10 Aquinas, (1975, question 64, article 2, reply,
p.23), states that:
every part is related to the whole precisely 
as imperfect to perfect, which is the reason 
why every part is naturally for the sake of 
the whole. If, therefore, the well-being of 
the whole body demands the amputation of a 
limb, say in the case where one limb is 
gangrenous and threatens to infect the 
others, the treatment to be commended is 
amputation. Now every individual person is 
as it were a part of the whole. Therefore if 
any man is dangerous to the community and is 
subverting it by some sin, the treatment to 
be commended is his execution in order to 
preserve the common good, for a little 
leaven sours the whole lump.
11 Aquinas, (1972, question 40, article 1, reply,
pp.81-85).
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individual to fail to meet certain standards of 
behaviour" ,12
However, on the surface, the approach of classical
natural law theory to killing may seem inconsistent. If, as
this moral view holds, the taking of another life is
immoral and one has a duty not to kill, why then are there
so many exceptions to this general rule? Germain Gnsez,
arguing from the perspective of natural law theory, has
attempted to examine these inconsistencies with the aim of
developing "a consistent, but not excessively rigid,
natural law ethics of killing".13
Grisez has attempted to criticise and reformulate the
original argument of Aquinas on killing. He takes issue
with the stance taken by Aquinas in relation to capital
punishment and the justification of killing in war.
Grisez's arguments against the justifications put forward
by Aquinas for capital punishment are threefold. Firstly,
if, as Aquinas argues, the preservation of the common good
is adequate justification for killing those who kill, why
could it not be used as adequate justification for the
killing of the 'innocent'?14 Grisez notes that Aquinas:
ignores the possibility that the innocent can 
endanger the common good, but the diseased part 
of the body which threatens the life of the whole 
certainly need not be regarded as morally
guilty.15
12 Dworkm, (1984, p. 174).
13 Grisez, (1970, p.64).
14 Ibid., p.67. For Grisez, such examples of the
taking of 'innocent' life would include abortion and 
euthanasia.
15 Ibid. 11
Secondly, Grisez argues that capital punishment is not 
strictly necessary to protect the common good. Rather, a 
less dramatic form of action may serve to protect the 
common good from those who attempt to interfere with it. 
Thus, for example, imprisonment may prove to be as 
effective and not as morally repugnant. Finally, according 
to Grisez, Aquinas is mistaken in drawing an analogy 
between society and the human body. Aquinas argued that 
just as a diseased member of the body affects the whole, so 
does a wrongdoer in society affect the common good. As a 
result he must be disposed of through capital punishment 
just as a diseased member is amputated. However, Grisez 
believes that the principal difficulty with this argument 
is:
that the individual person is not a part of the 
community in the way that members of a body are 
parts of the whole organism. 'Wholeness', 'common 
good', and 'subordination of parts' are not 
univocal. Aquinas surely was aware that he was 
arguing by analogy, but he apparently did not 
carefully consider how weak the analogy is.16
For Grisez, the fact that someone has perpetrated an
evil does not justify the state in perpetrating a further
evil to punish this wrongdoer. By executing the wrongdoer
one is also destroying human life which for Grisez is an
intrinsic good:
[e]ach good that is intrinsic to the human person 
participates in the dignity of the person, a 
dignity that is beyond calculable price and 
measurable worth. Goods for man can be priced; 
goods in man can only be prized.17
16 Ibid., p.68.
17 Ibid. , p.69.
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one is also interfering with that greater good which he
shares with the rest of humanity; human life. On this model
of the sanctity of life the capital punishment exception
cannot be countenanced. As Grisez states;
[w]e may be right in feeling that a wrongdoer is 
not worthy of life, but such a feeling attests to 
the fact that life itself is a good of the 
personal order. If we attack the life of the 
wrongdoer, we destroy that which remains good - 
his human life. Perhaps we do so in order to 
indirectly attack in him the moral evil we hate 
and fear. If so, it seems we are willing to do an 
evil by destroying a good in order that we may
achieve the good of destroying an evil.18
Grisez then proceeds to take issue with the Aquinian
justification of killing in war. The view of Aquinas that
killing in war can be justified on the basis that one is
fighting for a just cause is viewed by Grisez as a weak
argument. He counters this argument in the following terms:
[p]erhaps one side can know that the other has 
done an injustice worth fighting about, but no 
one using military force can be confident that 
the enemy personnel he kills are guilty of 
anything. In fact, one can be confident that many 
enemy personnel sincerely believe their side is 
just. Such individuals can hardly be viewed as 
criminals, abandoning (as it were) human dignity, 
and subjecting themselves to the condition of 
brute animals...
Even if an enemy power is as such guilty of 
injustice and even if we can know it to be so, 
still only a fiction can distribute the guilt of 
injustice to each individual among the enemy's 
military personnel, all of whom nevertheless are 
considered fair victims for deadly action until 
they are no longer able to fight.19
Grisez, however, favours the justification proposed by
Thus, for Grisez, by depriving the wrongdoer of his life
18 Ibid., p.70.
19 Ibid., pp.71-72.
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Aquinas for killing in self-defence, as a valid exception
to the general rule against the taking of life. Thus, he 
justifies this exception on the grounds of the actor's 
intention:
if one intends not the death of another but only 
the safety of his own life, then one need not 
identify himself as a killer. One's attitude 
toward human life itself and toward everything 
related to it can remain that of a person 
unwilling to take human life.20
This justification is based on Gnsez's interpretation of
the doctrine of double effect. As understood by Grisez this
doctrine would allow for a 'good' end to be brought about
by an 'evil' means:
a good effect which in the order of nature is 
preceded in the performance by an evil effect 
need not be regarded as a good end achieved by an 
evil means, provided that the act is a unity and 
only the good is within the scope of intention.
Means and end in the order of human action do not 
necessarily correspond to cause and effect in the 
order of nature, because a means must be an 
integral human act. If the unity of action is 
preserved and the intention specifying the action 
is good, whether the good or evil effect is prior 
in the order of nature is morally irrelevant.21
In practical terms, Gnsez's model would not lead to 
all taking of life as being regarded as morally 
împermissiblè. Under this amended model of double effect 
Grisez would extend the traditional range of exceptions to 
the traditional natural law prohibition on abortion. In 
addition to the traditional exceptions where a termination 
was brought about due to the removal of a cancerous uterus
20 Ibid., p.76.
21 Ibid., pp.89-90.
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or m  the case of an ectopic pregnancy, he would add the 
following:
when the pregnancy itself was dangerously 
overloading an ill mother's heart and kidneys. In 
such a case, I think the foetus may be removed, 
because although it will certainly die, the very 
same act (through a humanly indivisible process) 
lessens the strain on the mother and contributes 
to the mother's safety, which alone need be 
intended by an upright agent.
Another example would be the crushing of a 
baby stuck in the birth canal. The very act of 
crushing and removing the baby, an act m  fact 
destructive of its life, saves the mother from 
otherwise perhaps inevitable death. On the same 
principle, one would be equally justified in 
cutting away the mother to rescue the baby. Of 
course, if the baby is crushed more than 
necessary to relieve the mother or if the mother 
is cut more than necessary to release the baby, 
the excess damage would lie within the scope of 
intention and the act would be evil.22
This model holds true only for those who believe that there
exist objectively 'good' and 'evil' acts. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that when the intention is- to abort to
save the life of the mother or to treat a cancerous uterus,
the double effect principle is conveniently applied.
However, when the intention is to avoid a pregnancy brought
about as the result of a rape or to prevent the birth of a
deformed child, then in Gnsez's model the abortion
suddenly becomes a bad means to a good end. This
casuistical approach is hardly consistent, as Gnsez hopes
it to be. It is rather an arbitrary means of justifying
killing m  certain cases (usually where the person to be
killed is a sentient human being) rather than others.
22 Ibid., p.94.
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Alan Donagan23 provides us with another duty-based
account of the morality of killing. For Donagan, the moral
base line is that "no man may at will kill another".24
However, like Aquinas and Gnsez, he accepts that this
moral precept is not absolute and that it is subject to
certain exceptions. Thus, for Donagan, if it is reasonably
believed necessary to kill an attacker to save a potential
victim, the attacker not only may be killed but ought to
be.25 In Donagan's opinion, an actor who uses violence on
others forfeits his own right not to have violence done
unto him. Thus:
the immunity to violence to which everybody 
consequently has a moral right is obviously 
conditional; and perhaps its most obvious 
condition is that one not further one's own ends 
by resorting to violence or threatening it. If 
anybody, m  furthering his own ends, resorts to 
violence or threatens it, he ceases to satisfy 
the condition of his right to immunity and may be 
forcibly withstood. By violating the immunity of 
others, he forfeits his own.26
Similarly, Donagan holds that the killing of enemy
combatants in a just war is a valid exception to the rule
against the taking of life. Thus, he would hold that it is:
plausible that the danger to be apprehended from 
the enemy's armed services are permissible at any 
time; and that the deaths of noncombatants who 
are killed in direct attacks on military 
installations are to be deemed accidental, on the 
ground that it is the enemy's fault that 
noncombatants are there. Accordingly, in a just 
war it is accounted permissible to kill and
23 Donagan, (1977, pp.83-87).
24 Ibid. , p. 83 .
25 Ibid. , p.87.
26 Ibid. , p. 85.
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disable enemy combatants who are not at the time 
attacking anybody, and to bombard installations 
even when it will result m  the deaths of 
noncombatants. What is forbidden is directly to 
attack noncombatants or nonmilitary 
installations.27
As for abortion, Donagan, like Grisez, regards it as 
a question of killing an innocent life. However, he is 
prepared m  certain instances to allow it to occur. Unlike 
Grisez, his justification for the exceptional cases of 
permissible abortion are not premised on a version of the 
doctrine of double effect, but on a principle which bears 
to it a striking resemblance. Rather, he looks to another 
principle which has its roots m  the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, what he refers to as the Pauline principle. 
Donagan defines the Pauline principle in the following 
terms:
[i]t is impermissible to do evil that good may 
come of it, to which, because of Saint Paul's 
much-quoted formulation of it in Romans 3:8, I 
shall refer as 'the Pauline principle'.28
This principle underpins his moral outlook on killing. Even
to this principle exceptions exist. Just as in the case of
a just war or in the case of self-defence there are
instances in which the act of terminating a pregnancy may
not be looked upon as being morally impermissible. Thus, he
argues:
[i]t follows that the principle it is 
impermissible for anybody at will to use force 
upon another applies to adult and child alike, to 
born and unborn. However, just as it is 
legitimate to use force on children for purposes
27 Ibid., p.87.
28 Ibid., p.149.
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for which it would not be legitimate to use it on 
adults, so very difficult questions are raised 
about the extent to which it is legitimate to use 
force upon an unborn child.29
Donagan's response to these difficult questions fits
broadly into the duty-based model even if the method he
uses is not identical to that used by Gnsez. Rather than
taking the doctrine of double effect as his justificatory
basis, he appeals instead to the Pauline principle:
[t]he duty of bringing up one's children well, 
and of promoting a reasonable balance between 
population and terrestrial resources, are duties 
of beneficence, and contain the qualification 'by 
all means in one's power'. The duties not to 
commit abortion or infanticide, and not to 
mutilate oneself by sterilisation, are all 
absolute prohibitions. Hence it is not 
inconsistent with the duty to bring up one's 
children adequately, or to contribute to the 
limitation of the population, to refuse to adopt 
unlawful means of doing so. Evil is not to be 
done that good may come of it.30
Applying his argument that the rational actor who forfeits
his right not to have violence used against him by
attacking another to the case of the unborn, Donagan
argues:
[a] man is entitled to return the fire of a 
hunter who, thinking him to be a deer, innocently 
shoots at him, if only to save himself; and on 
the same ground he may kill somebody who strictly 
speaking is not acting at all, for example a 
berserk or drugged assailant. The crux is that a 
mother, to whom her unborn child owes its very 
life, is not obliged to submit to being killed by 
labour m  childbed; and bystanders are called 
upon, unless she direct otherwise, to save her 
life by removing from her body the child that is 
killing her, treating it as an involuntary 
pursuer. An analogous case would be shooting to 
kill an insane child who only so can be prevented
29 Ibid., p.83.
30 Ibid., p. 167.
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from cutting his mother's throat. In all these 
cases, what matters is not the innocence of the 
assailant but what is due to the victim. And in 
any threat to a mother's life arising out of her 
pregnancy, her status as victim is beyond serious 
question.31
The primary source of Irish law, Bunreacht na hEireann 
1937, owes a large debt to this view of morality, for it is 
from such a duty-based moral view that the Constitution 
derives its theoretical underpinning.32 One need look no 
further than the Preamble to the Constitution to discover 
its Thomist nature. Thus, the Constitution is enacted in 
the name of: "the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all
authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both
of men and states may be referred".
As one commentator has noted, the Preamble makes 
clear:
that the Constitution and the laws which owe ' 
their force to the Constitution derive, under 
God, from the people and are directed to the 
promotion of the common good. If a judicial 
decision rejects the divine law or has not as its 
object the common good, it has not the character 
of law. This idea is no strange addition to the
common law; it is as old as Coke.33
The implications of such a philosophical model for the way
in which the law views the taking of life are of
fundamental importance to this thesis. In subsequent
chapters the practical legal ramifications of this
philosophical stance for issues such as treatment
31 Ibid. , p. 163 .
32 For further analysis see, Clarke, (1993, pp.177- 
178); Costello, (1956, pp.403-407); Keogh, (1987, pp.4-6) 
and O'Hanlon, (1993a, pp.8-11).
33 Henchy, (1962, p.557).
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withdrawal, active euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide is examined. One aspect of the taking of life which 
has been the subject of judicial examination, pregnancy 
termination, is also examined in order to discover if the 
presence in the Constitution of such a philosophical model 
has had a bearing on the way in which this issue is dealt 
with in practice.
It is submitted that the argument against taking the 
life of the unborn may be applied mutatis mutandis to the 
question of the taking of life in the case of the
terminally ill or incurable patient. As with abortion, the 
natural law model admits of exceptions to this general
prohibition, again based on a variant of the doctrine of 
double effect, where, for example, the doctor intended a 
'good' end, the easing of pain, but in the process
'indirectly' caused the death of the patient.
The attitude which one adopts to the place of the 
natural law in Irish jurisprudence will have implications 
for individual autonomy in areas which fall within the 
category of the taking of life. Due to the special
significance afforded to the right to life in duty-based 
moral views, the scope for individual autonomy in relation 
to the taking of life in the medical context will be 
severely curtailed.
Thus, if as certain commentators claim,34 all positive 
laws must ultimately defer to the supremacy of the natural
34 See, Costello, (1956, pp.403-405); Henchy, (1962, 
p.557) and O'Hanlon, (1993a, pp.8-10).
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or divine law, then the outcome in practical legal terms
will be a severe curtailment on the right to die and to the
right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.35 As one of those
commentators, Costello J., pointed out, while writing
extra-judicially, that if it is necessary for the court to
determine the nature of the individual who is the subject
of certain constitutional rights, then:
the courts can properly ascertain that nature in 
the light of the Christian revelation which the 
Constitution proclaims the people to have 
accepted. . . it can clearly be inferred that the 
Constitution rejects legal positivism as a basis 
for the protection of fundamental rights, and 
suggests instead a theory of natural law from 
which these rights can be derived.36
Such an argument assumes that the Constitution as enacted
in 1937 recognises the superiority of the divine or natural
law and as such any legal provisions or for that matter
constitutional amendments which conflict with the ideals of
natural law are invalid even if they are technically in
agreement with the provisions of the Constitution.
This was the argument put forward by Roderick
O'Hanlon, another member of the judiciary arguing extra-
judicially, when he claimed that the constitutional
mechanism of consulting the people on issues of
constitutional importance may not be entirely appropriate
in all circumstances.37 He was advancing this argument
35 O'Hanlon, (1993a, p.10).
36 Cited by Sheehy, (1992, p. 22).
37 Article 46.1 of Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 provides
that:
[a]ny provision of this Constitution may be
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against the backdrop of the decision of the Supreme Court 
m  the case of Attorney-General v X and Others38 and the 
subsequent referendums on the issues of pregnancy 
termination, the right to travel and the right to 
information. O'Hanlon J. framed the question m  theoretical 
terms :
[i]s there any limitation on the power in Article 
46.1 of the Constitution by which '[a]ny 
provision of this Constitution may be amended'?
This question goes to the root of the nature 
of law. It obliges us to consider the 
relationship between basic human rights and the 
process of political resolution of issues of 
public controversy.39
The manner m  which O'Hanlon J. answers this question is
influenced by his conception of law, a conception which
fits quite comfortably into the natural law model. He is
thus able to claim that the Constitution is based on
precepts of natural law and, as such, these precepts should
be adhered to "so long as they remain part of the
amended, whether by way of variation, 
addition, or repeal, in the manner provided 
by this Article.
Article 46.2 outlines the mechanism for such amendments:
[e]very proposal for an amendment of this 
Constitution shall be initiated in Dail 
Eireann as a Bill, and shall upon having 
been passed by both houses of the 
Oireachtas, be submitted by Referendum to 
the decision of the people in accordance 
with the law for the time being in force 
relating to the Referendum.
Article 47 sets out the procedure for such referendums.
38 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
39 O'Hanlon, (1993a, p.8).
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subject matter of this thesis in that they constitute a
major argument against the liberalisation of laws in
relation to the treatment of the terminally ill or
incurable patient. His conception of rights tends to view
the right to life as absolute, except in a number of
exceptional circumstances which accord with Roman Catholic
teaching (the doctrine of double effect and the act-
omission distinction).41 If one were to accept his argument
that the Constitution may only be interpreted in the light
of natural law doctrine, and in particular, the classical
model of this doctrine as espoused by Thomas Aquinas and
adopted by the Roman Catholic Church, then one limits the
autonomy of the individual to choose to act in accordance
with his own wishes rather than in accordance with a moral
code. Thus, O'Hanlon J. is able to arrive at the following
conclusions as to which rights are to be valued m  society:
[i]t is universally accepted that the most 
fundamental of all human rights is the right to 
life. The most elementary and universal aspect of 
this right is the right not to be killed for the 
sake of another or for some further end. This 
right is enjoyed equally by all human beings at 
all times. It is attacked whenever abortion, 
murder or euthanasia are practised.42
A number of observations may be made on this point.
Firstly, O'Hanlon J. argues that the right to life is the
40 Ibid.
41 For a practical legal exegesis of these arguments 
see, Chapters Four and Five of this thesis.
42 O'Hanlon, (1993, p.10).
Constitution".40
O'Hanlon J.'s conclusions are of relevance to the
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most fundamental of all rights. However are not all rights 
fundamental? Is it logical to say that any one right is in 
theory more fundamental than any other? O'Hanlon J. seems 
to be saying here that such a right is absolute, yet in the 
next sentence he goes on to qualify this right by saying 
that it involves a right not to be killed for the sake of 
another or for some further end. Is it not logical to infer 
from this statement that one can have one's life taken in 
circumstances where it is not being taken for the sake of 
another or for some further end? Does this not contradict 
even the exceptions to the right to life put forward by 
Aquinas? That is to say, in the case of capital punishment 
(the other end being punishment), self-defence (the life 
here is taken both for the sake of another, the victim, and 
for another end, to prevent the death of the victim), and 
in time of a just war (the other end being the defence of 
a just cause or of a country).
The argument that any piece of legislation, 
constitutional amendment or judicial decision which was m  
conflict with the natural or divine law would be invalid 
seems to depart entirely both from legal reality and logic. 
Thus, a statute such as the Criminal Justice (Sexual 
Offences') Act 1993 which decriminalized homosexual acts 
between consenting males over the age of seventeen, the 
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Attorney- 
General v X and Others43 and the subsequent amendments to 
the Constitution on the rights to travel and information
43 [ 199 2 ]  1 I .R .  l .
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are all invalid according to O'Hanlon J.'s vision of the 
protection of human rights and of law m  general. For 
someone who is quite attached (when it suits his argument) 
to the rhetoric of fundamental rights this is quite a 
dubious outcome. Thus, according to his conception of 
individual rights it is quite acceptable to treat 
individuals differently m  the eyes of the law because of 
their sexual orientation, to brand them as criminals 
because of what they are and tacitly endorse discrimination 
against such individuals, to prevent individuals from 
moving freely outside of the jurisdiction, and to prevent 
individuals from obtaining access to information which is 
freely accessible in other states and which may affect 
other rights such as their right to privacy and their right 
to medical treatment? Would such a conception of rights 
prevent a minor who has been the victim of rape from having 
a pregnancy termination?
One could extend this view further to other aspects of 
personal autonomy which come into conflict with the right 
to life as understood by the natural law model. Thus, under 
O'Hanlon J.'s view of human rights, an incurably ill 
patient could be prevented from being assisted to die by 
his medical practitioner, from requesting that his life be 
terminated by lethal injection to cut short the indignity 
of lying in his own excrement and being fed through a drip.
Moreover, an incurably ill patient could be prevented 
from exercising his right to travel out of this 
jurisdiction to a country where the practice of physician-
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assisted suicide or active voluntary euthanasia is not 
outlawed. For someone who speaks so boldly of universally 
recognized rights, why does he not recognize the 
universally recognized rights which his model would render 
inoperative in practice? Thus, from the foregoing examples, 
O'Hanlon J. does not recognize fundamental rights which are 
recognized as norms of international law by the majority of 
democratic states, namely the right to privacy, the right 
to freedom of movement, the right to equality, and the 
right to medical treatment.
In practice we have seen that the courts and 
Parliament have not been so literalist in their respective 
interpretations of the spirit and meaning of the 
Constitution. This seems to lead one to the tentative 
conclusion that the interpretation of a constitution is not 
as clear-cut as O'Hanlon J. would have us believe and that 
m  accepting the philosophical bases of the Constitution 
one does not have to accept blindly a set of moral dogma 
into the bargain. This is to be plainly construed from the 
interpretation of the American Constitution which was also 
inspired by the ideals of natural rights.44 However this 
fact did not constrict the Supreme Court m  the United 
States adopting a model of constitutional interpretation 
which was far from absolutist or literalist. Did the 
framers of the United States Constitution envisage that one 
day the document which they produced would be used to 
champion the cause of individual rights?
44 See, White, (1978, pp.1-10).
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of the American Constitution the franchise did not extend
beyond property owning males and that slave-ownership was
condoned. Are we to remain constricted in our efforts to
improve the lot of humanity by adhering to a petrified
constitutional document? Or are we to allow such a document
to be expressive of the rights and interests of all
citizens equally? As David Feldman has so aptly put it m
the context of the American Constitution but which is
equally valid when talking of the Irish Constitution:
[d]uring the nineteen eighties, American 
conservatives gained the ascendency over the 
liberals: pro-life groups made headway at the
expense of pro-choice groups; evangelical 
religious fundamentalism advanced against 
nineteen sixties humanism; and judicial activism 
retreated in the face of changes. One aspect of 
the growth of religious and constitutional 
fundamentalism - both characterized by a largely 
uncritical commitment to a sacred text - was that 
the focus of constitutional inquiries changed. 
Instead of asking questions about the legitimate 
range of underlying rights, such as privacy, in 
a constitution committed to individual freedom, 
the new conservative judges asked questions about 
surface rights, such as whether the Constitution 
entrenches a fundamental right to carry on the 
particular activity under consideration. Any 
right which is not apparent in the Constitution 
became, at best, a liberty to be protected only 
by the partial shield of due process.45
One could conclude that the meaning of a constitution
is dependent on the theoretical model which is applied to
it by the reigning polity (including the judiciary). Under
the model proposed by O'Hanlon J., one can see what Feldman
has referred to as an "uncritical commitment to a sacred
text", and what Ronald Dworkm has referred to as a
One must remember that at the time of the introduction
45 Feldman, (1993, p.364).
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'constitution of detail'.46 Thus, the right to life is seen 
as more fundamental than other equally valid rights and is 
adhered to even when it would interfere greatly with the 
autonomy of the individual. This is the traditional Irish 
model. This is also the view adopted by religious and 
conservative thinkers who claim that there exists a certain 
natural order of things which must be adhered to. Any form 
of behaviour which does not conform with this ideal is 
immediately viewed as suspect.
This, however, is not the only model of the 
Constitution. As Feldman's critique implies there are 
equally valid theoretical models which may be used as the 
basis for our conceptualization of the role of law in 
society. It is important to examine these alternative 
models because their ramifications for the way in which we 
view the issue of the taking of life are radically 
different to the model proposed by those who adhere to the 
natural law's duty-based view.
1.3 The Utilitarian Model and the Taking of Life.
This model is an example of what Ronald Dworkin 
refers to as a goal-based moral view.47 Such a moral view 
has been described by one commentator m  the following 
terms :
it views morality as concerned with the
46 Dworkin, (1993, p.119).
47 Dworkin, (1984, p. 171).
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production of desirable or valuable states of 
affairs or experiences - commonly human 
happiness, welfare or desire satisfaction; their 
production is the goal of morality. Human actions 
are morally evaluated m  terms of their tendency 
to promote these goals, and right action is that 
action which, among the alternatives open to an 
agent, maximizes these valuable consequences for 
any and all persons affected.48
Legal positivism attempts to divorce laws from societal or
divine norms. It is therefore antithetical to the
deontological nature of natural law theory. Thus, the
natural law model as propounded by O'Hanlon J. which would
view all laws or judicial decisions which did not conform
to certain moral norms as being invalid could be countered
using the positivist critique which would view all laws
which were validly passed and enacted by Parliament as
being valid irrespective, of whether they conformed with
some notional ideal of morality. As McCoubrey has
suggested:
[t]his amounts to the proposition that 
legislation which is morally defective is not 
thereby formally invalidated or unenforceable.49
A forceful advocate of the idea of positivism was
Jeremy Bentham,50 who developed a critique of law which
assumed that rights did not flow from some divine or
natural law but were derived from positive legislation.51
As one commentator has concluded in referring to Bentham's
utilitarian perspective on law:
48 Brock, (1993, p.96) .
49 McCoubrey, (1987, p. 84).
50 See for example, Bentham, (1823, pp.1-25).
51 See further, Hart, (1982, pp.2-20).
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Bentham's positivism had a liberating political 
influence, m  that it enabled law, as a system of 
rules posited and so open to amendment by a 
politically sovereign body, to become a tool m  
the hands of social reformers.52
The underlying principle of utilitarianism allows one to
judge a particular act not by whether it is in conformity
with some moral code but on the basis of the amount of
pleasure or pain which the act would cause. Acts are thus
judged on their consequences. Behaviour is therefore
neither absolutely right nor wrong. The consequences of
such behaviour must be analyzed in order to decide on the
way in which one should act under this theory. As Peter
Singer has noted:
[t]he classical utilitarian regards an action as 
right if it produces as much or more of an 
increase in the happiness of all affected by it 
than any alternative action, and wrong if it does 
not.
The consequences of an action vary according 
to the circumstances in which it is performed.
Hence a utilitarian can never be properly accused 
of a lack of realism, or of a rigid adherence to 
ideals in defiance of practical experience.53
Applying the utilitarian model to the taking of life,
one does not automatically arrive at a consistent answer in
every possible case. Rather the answer one gets to the
question "is it right to take life in this case?" will vary
from case to case depending on the amount of good or bad
consequences which the taking of life would produce. In the
words of Dan Brock:
[i]n this goal-based view, killing a human being 
is morally justified if and only if doing so
52 Feldman, (1993, p.26).
53 Singer, (1993, p.3).
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maximizes the production of the goals of the 
theory, however they are specified, and is 
morally wrong if it does not; killing is morally
evaluated according to its production of the
goals the theory specifies as valuable.54
In order to further evaluate the utilitarian
perspective on the taking of life, it will be necessary to
analyze the critique of killing advanced by utilitarian
theorists. The aim of this task is twofold. Firstly, to
present the application of utilitarian theory to the
subject matter of this thesis and secondly to discover the
benefits or otherwise of adopting such a model.
The writings of the Australian ethicist Peter Singer
provide one with a detailed critique of the taking of life
in its many contexts from a utilitarian perspective.55
54 Brock, (1993, p.96).
55 As a utilitarian, Singer takes the view that m  
relation to the taking of life, one should act in a manner 
which maximizes the satisfaction of the interests of the 
person affected. Singer does not believe that killing is 
wrong in all circumstances. He is of the opinion that an 
action is morally wrong if it runs counter to a person's 
desires. Thus, if a person has a desire to live, then to 
kill that person is wrong. However this does not exclude all 
instances of the taking of life. Singer and Kuhse, (1993, 
p.159), suggest that:
we regard the lives of self-conscious beings 
as in some way like ardous and uncertain 
journeys, at different stages, in which 
various amounts of hope and desire, as well 
as time and effort have been invested in 
order to reach particular goals and 
destinations. We might regard a decision not 
to bring an infant into the world as akin to 
preventing a journey from getting under way, 
but this is not in itself seriously wrong, 
for the voyager has made no plans and set no 
goals. Gradually, as goals are set, even if 
tentatively, and a lot is done in order to 
increase the probability of the goals being 
reached, the wrongness of bringing the 
journey to a premature end increases.
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Singer though following broadly in the utilitarian
tradition is not a classical utilitarian in the mould of
Bentham,56 or Mill.57 Rather, he falls into the category
of what is known as a preference utilitarian. This
influences the stance he takes on particular moral issues.
As a preference utilitarian, Singer would hold that:
an action contrary to the preference of any being 
is, unless this preference is outweighed by 
contrary preferences, wrong.58
The views of the classical utilitarian vary to a certain
degree. Thus, as Singer has pointed out, the classical
utilitarian such as Bentham would judge actions:
by their tendency to maximise pleasure or 
happiness and minimise pain or unhappiness. Terms 
like 'pleasure' and 'happiness7 lack precision, 
but it is clear that they refer to something that 
is experienced, or felt - in other words, to
states of consciousness. According to classical 
utilitarianism, therefore, there is no direct
significance in the fact that desires for the 
future go unfulfilled when people die. If you die 
instantaneously, whether you have any desires for 
the future makes no difference to the amount of 
pleasure or pain you experience.59
For a preference utilitarian the taking of the life of
a person who prefers to continue living is wrong. However
this does not amount to an absolute prohibition on the
Towards the end of life, when most things 
that might have been achieved have either 
been done, or are now unlikely to be 
accomplished, the loss of life may again be 
less of a tragedy than it would have been at 
an earlier stage of life.
56 See further, Bentham, (1823, pp.5-15).
57 See, Mill, (1972, pp.18-25).
58 Singer, (1993, p.94).
59 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
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utilitarianism. Thus, as Singer adds:
[e]ven for preference utilitarianism, the wrong 
done to the person killed is merely one factor to 
be taken into account, and the preference of the 
victim could sometimes be outweighed by the 
preferences of others.60
Thus, to take an example of the taking of life in the
medical context, active euthanasia, it may be possible to
justify such an act both within the model of classical and
preference utilitarianism. As Singer argues, a classical
utilitarian could claim that since self-conscious beings
"are capable of fearing their own death, killing them has
effects on others".61
However, this will not always hold true. Thus, as
Singer observes:
[t]he classical utilitarian objection does not 
apply to killing that takes place only with the 
genuine consent of the person killed. That people 
are killed under these conditions would have no 
tendency to spread fear or insecurity, since we 
have no cause to be fearful of being killed with 
our own genuine consent. If we do not wish to be 
killed, we simply do not consent. In fact, the 
argument from fear points in favour of voluntary 
euthanasia, for if voluntary euthanasia is not 
permitted we may, with good cause, be fearful 
that our deaths will be unnecessarily drawn out 
and distressing.62
Similarly, the claim by the preference utilitarian that the
desire of the person to go on living would count as an
argument in favour of the prohibition of killing does not
hold true in this case either. However:
taking of life. One must remember that this is a species of
60 Ibid., p.95.
61 Ibid., p. 194.
62 Ibid.
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[j]ust as preference utilitarianism must count a 
desire to go on living as a reason against 
killing, so it must count a desire to die as a 
reason for killing.63
Singer can justify the utilitarian account of the 
taking of life in this particular context in the following 
terms:
although there are reasons for thinking that 
killing a self-conscious being is normally worse
than killing any other kind of being, in the
special case of voluntary euthanasia most of 
these reasons count for euthanasia rather than 
against. Surprising as this result might at first 
seem, it really does no more than reflect the 
fact that what is special about self-conscious 
beings is that they can know that they exist over 
time and will, unless they die, continue to
exist. Normally this continued existence is 
fervently desired; when the foreseeable continued 
existence is dreaded rather than desired however, 
the desire to die may take the place of the
normal desire to live. Thus the case for 
voluntary euthanasia is arguably much stronger 
than the cases for non-voluntary euthanasia.64
Thus, the issue of the taking of life, on the preference
utilitarian view, is quite straightforward in relation to
this aspect of medical treatment. However, how for example
is a preference utilitarian going to evaluate the position
of those beings who are unable to hold preferences? Such
beings would include the severely handicapped neonate, the
foetus, or perhaps the patient in a persistent vegetative
state.
On this point one can begin to see even more 
fundamental differences between the natural law model of 
the taking of life and the utilitarian model. More
63 Ibid., p.195.
64 Ibid., pp. 195-196.
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fundamental in that it adverts to the understanding of the 
very term life itself. As shall be demonstrated in Chapter 
Three this definitional difference has proved divisive. The 
traditional natural view would see all forms of human life 
including pre-sentient human life as sacred. As a result 
all taking of life as thus understood is morally 'wrong', 
except of course for the recognized exceptions to this rule 
as discussed in the previous section. For a utilitarian 
such as Singer the definition of the term 'life' is quite 
different.
Singer makes a distinction between those beings who 
can have preferences or desires or who can conceive of 
themselves as distinct entities existing over time. Such 
beings are given the appellation of persons. A person could 
thus be described as a sentient human being, for example. 
What then of those living beings who are not sentient and 
who do not thus fall into a category of complete 
personhood?
How is the taking of the lives of such beings to be 
evaluated under the preference utilitarian model? In 
approaching this question, Singer takes his cue from 
Michael Tooley who is one of the foremost advocates of the 
personhood thesis. According to Tooley there is a direct 
correlation between the desires or preferences a being is 
capable of having and the rights that the being can be said 
to have. Tooley6S has argued that:
having a right to life presupposes that one is
65 Tooley, (1972, pp.37-40).
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capable of desiring to continue existing as a 
subject of experiences and other mental states.
This m  turn presupposes both that one has the 
concept of such a continuing entity and that one 
believes that one is oneself such an entity. So 
an entity that lacks such a consciousness of 
itself as a continuing subject of mental states 
does not have a right to life.66
Tooley is aware of the problems which arise for instance in
the case of a sleeping being or an unconscious being:
[d]oes an individual in such a state have any 
desires? People do sometimes say that an 
unconscious individual wants something, but it 
might be argued that if such talk is not to be 
simply false it must be interpreted as actually 
referring to the desires the individual would 
have if he were now conscious. Consequently, if 
the analysis of the concept of a right proposed 
above were correct, it would follow that one does 
not violate an individual's right if one takes 
his car, or kills him, while he is asleep.67
In a later reformulation of his argument68 Tooley
addressed this problem. He amended his original proposition
in relation to those who could hold rights by stating that
it is only those beings who have or have had in the past
the concept of having a continued existence who can have a
right to life. Thus only such beings would have a continued
interest in existing. This would allow one to include
within the domain of personhood the unconscious or sleeping
being.
One can therefore conclude on this basis that if a 
being is not capable of conceiving of its continued 
existence, it cannot possess a right to life. Thus,
66 Ibid., p.49.
67 Ibid., p.48.
68 Tooley, (1983, pp.6-18).
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according to Tooley's model, abortion and infanticide would
be morally permissible. He does not advocate an unlimited
policy of infanticide. He argues that:
a newborn baby does not possess the concept of a 
continuing self, any more than a newborn kitten 
possesses such a concept. If so, infanticide 
during a time interval shortly after birth must 
be morally acceptable.69
However, Tooley does believe that a line must be drawn, but
states that such a process should not be difficult:
m  the vast majority of cases in which 
infanticide is desirable, its desirability will 
be apparent within a short time after birth.
Since it is virtually certain that an infant at 
such a stage of its development does not possess 
a serious right to life, there is excellent 
reason to believe that infanticide is morally 
permissible in most cases where it is otherwise 
desirable. The practical moral problem can thus 
be satisfactorily handled by choosing some period 
of time, such as a week after birth, as the 
interval during which infanticide will be 
permitted. This interval could then be modified 
once psychologists have established the point at
which a human organism comes to believe that it
is a continuing subject of experiences and other 
mental states.70
This view, it will be observed, is antithetical to the
natural law view of life as sacred. The concept of life as
understood in that model encompasses all biological human
life, including the foetus.
In placing an emphasis on the requirement of
personhood, one is enabled to argue, as Tooley has done,
that the taking of the lives of non-persons is morally
justified. As will be seen in subsequent chapters this view
will have practical implications for the manner in which
69 Tooley, (1972, p.63).
70 Ibid., p.64.
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one approaches the questions of pregnancy termination and 
treatment withdrawal. On this model, one could argue that 
the foetus or the patient in a persistent vegetative state 
are not persons. The above mentioned beings would not 
fulfil the requirements of personhood and therefore would 
not possess a right to life. Buchanan has collated the 
following indicators of personhood, none of which a foetus 
or a patient in a persistent vegetative state possess:
(a) the ability to be conscious of oneself as 
existing over time - as having a past and a 
future, as well as a present;
(b) the ability to appreciate reasons for or 
against acting; being (sometimes) able to inhibit 
impulses or inclinations when one judges that it 
would be better not to act on them;
(c) the ability to engage in purposive sequences 
of actions.71
Thus, the moral status of the being in question is another 
factor which the utilitarian takes into account in deciding 
whether the taking of life is morally justified in any 
particular instance.
Finally, Singer also takes into account the principle 
of autonomy. Unlike other ethical models such as, for 
example, the rights model, respect for individual autonomy 
is not of primordial importance for utilitarians. As Singer 
observes:
[ujtilitanans do not respect autonomy for its 
own sake, although they might give great weight 
to a person's desire to go on living, either in 
a preference utilitarian way, or as evidence that 
the person's life was on the whole a happy one.
But if we are preference utilitarians we must 
allow that a desire to go on living can be 
outweighed by other desires, and if we are 
classical utilitarians we must recognise that
71 Buchanan, (1988, p. 284).
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people may be utterly mistaken in their 
expectations of happiness. So a utilitarian, in 
objecting to the killing of a person, cannot 
place the same stress on autonomy as those who 
take respect for autonomy as an independent moral 
principle.72
Thus, autonomy is only one factor which is to be weighed in 
the balance when deciding on the justifiability of the 
taking of human life under the utilitarian model.
1.4 The Rights Model and the Taking of Life.
The rights-based moral view differs from the natural
law view in that the focus is on individual rights rather
than duties.73 According to Dworkm, rights-based models
are concerned with:
the independence rather than the conformity of 
individual action. They presuppose and protect 
the value of individual thought and choice.74
As Brock has noted:
[r]ights function differently than duties in that 
they delineate areas in which the person 
possessing the right is at liberty to act as he 
sees fit and to act in his own interest as he 
understands it, as opposed to delineating 
specific constraints to which he must conform.75
Moreover within the rights model the individual is deemed
to be free from interference in the exercise of his right.
It could therefore be looked upon as a model which respects
above all else the principle of individual autonomy. Thus,
72 Singer, (1993, pp.99-100).
73 Dworkm, (1984, p. 171).
74 Ibid. , p. 172.
75 Brock, (1993, p. 97) .
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as Brock observes:
[rJights-based views emphasize a view of persons 
as capable of forming purposes, of making plans, 
of weighing alternatives according to how well 
they fulfil those plans and purposes, and of 
acting on the basis of this deliberation. Rights 
protect our exercise of these, capacities whose 
exercise is often associated with the notion of 
autonomy, independent of how doing so promotes 
goals specified as valuable.76
Applying this model to the question of the taking of life,
one can state that an individual has a right to life unless
and until he waives that right. However m  waiving that
right the individual must act voluntarily and be capable of
waiving that right. Thus, on a rights analysis the taking
of life is morally wrong when that life is taken without
the right-holder having waived that right.
However, if the right-holder has validly waived his
right not to be killed then the rights view will not hold
the taking of life in such circumstances to be morally
wrong. Brock77 outlines the possible consequences of
applying the rights model by detailing two different
scenarios in the medical context. In the first scenario, a
patient is suffering from a terminal and incurable disease,
as a result of which, he is unable to lead a normal life.
He is expected to die from this disease within a year. In
addition he has no friends or relatives who care about him.
He makes it known that everything be done to keep him alive
for as long as possible, despite the expense of this
treatment. Due to certain unique features of his condition,
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., pp.99-100.
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if he is killed now it is likely that new medical knowledge
will be obtained that will enable the suffering of similar 
patients to be alleviated.78 In applying the rights-based 
model to this scenario, Brock concludes that the taking of 
the life of this patient would be morally wrong as he has 
neither waived, forfeited or failed to exercise his right 
not to be killed.79
In the second scenario Brock cites the following 
facts:
Smith has terminal, incurable cancer. It 
completely prevents him from leading a normal 
life, causes him considerable though not 
unbearable pain and suffering, and he is expected 
to die from it in roughly a year. His treatment 
is expensive, but such that his family can afford 
it without undue stress. Smith is fully in 
control of his rational faculties, has given long 
and serious thought to his situation, and has 
decided he wants to die because life in his 
present condition is not worth living. He is 
unable, in his present situation, to bring about 
his own death, and requests another... to do so.
He will only die if steps directly intended to 
kill him are taken.80
If one were to apply the rights-based model to this case
then it would be morally permissible to take Smith's life.
This is so because Smith has waived his right not to be
killed by asking for his life to be terminated, and is
competent so to do.
Therefore, it can be seen that the particular model
which one adopts m  approaching the topic of the taking of
life in the medical context will have a practical bearing
78 Ibid., p.99.
79 Ibid. , p. 100.
80 Ibid., p. 99.
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on the decision arrived at in each particular case. The 
implications of each of these models for patient autonomy 
are examined in the chapters which follow.
1.5 The Medicalization of Death.
The genesis of scientific medicine in the nineteenth 
century prompted the transformation of the process of dying 
from an individual confrontation with mortality to an 
increasingly impersonal experience controlled by third 
parties in the form of health care professionals. The 
individual no longer took the leading role in this tragedy. 
Instead, death became the preserve of the professional. The 
doctor now took the leading role in this battle with the 
inevitable, with the doctor as hero, death as the villain, 
and the dying patient now relegated to the role of a mere 
conduit.
This monumental cultural shift from natural death to 
technological death has been described by Aries81 as the 
move from the 'tame' death to the 'invisible7 death. The 
'tame7 death is seen by Aries as part of a natural process. 
Death was accepted as part of the cycle of life. Death is 
expected and accepted. Once the individual knows that his 
death is near, he does not rail against it but bows to the 
inevitable. There is no heroic struggle against a powerful 
enemy. Aries takes as his model of the 'tame7 death, the 
death of the knights of the Round Table. The knights,
81 Aries, (1981, pp.5-20).
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do not die just anyhow. Death is governed by 
familiar ritual that is willingly described. The 
common, ordinary death does not come as a 
surprise, even when it is the accidental result 
of a wound or the effect of too great an 
emotion.82
This death is marked by certain characteristics.
Firstly, it announces its arrival in the form of a sign.
Death is impending and cannot be escaped. Thus:
King Ban has been badly hurt falling off his 
horse. Ruined, driven from his land and his 
castle, he runs away with his wife and son. He 
stops to watch the castle 'which had been his 
great consolation7 burning in the distance. He 
cannot overcome his grief: 'King Ban thought
about these things. He put his hands over his 
eyes, and a great sorrow seized him and oppressed 
his heart. He could not shed a tear, his breath 
stopped, and he fainted. He fell off his palfrey 
so hard...7
When King Ban regained consciousness, he 
observed that bright red blood was issuing from 
his mouth, nose, and ears. 'He looked up at 
heaven and said as well as he-eould... O Lord 
God... help me, for I see and I know that my end 
has come7. I see and I know.83
Once the individual has been made aware of his
impending death a routine ritual took place. What Aries
describes as the 'familiar simplicity7 of this routine is
the second characteristic of the 'tame7 death. The
individual, forewarned of his death, now goes about the
uncomplicated process of dying:
[a]fter the regret for life, the dying man of the 
Middle Ages goes on to perform the customary 
rites: he asks forgiveness of his friends, takes 
his leave of them, and commends them to God.84
according to Aries:
82 Ibid., p.6.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 16.
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The third characteristic of the 'tame7 death is the
public character of such a way of dying. Death is viewed as
a shared experience. The actor does not die alone in a
hospital room. Rather, as Aries points out:
[d]eath was always public. Hence the profound 
significance of Pascal's remark that one dies 
alone, for at that time one was never physically 
alone at the moment of death. Today his statement 
has lost its impact, for one has a very good 
chance of literally dying alone, in a hospital 
room.85
The dying of the individual was thus a communal experience.
Thus, death was ritualized, routinized and a
collective experience:
[t]he social group had been stricken by death, 
and it had reacted collectively, starting with 
the immediate family and extending to a wider 
circle of relatives and acquaintances. Not only 
did everyone die in public... but the death of 
each person was a public event that moved, 
literally and figuratively, society as a whole.
It was not only an individual who was 
disappearing, but society itself that had been 
wounded and that had to be healed.86
This model of death and dying was applicable in 
Ireland until relatively recent times.87 However, today the 
tradition of 'waking' the dead has all but disappeared. 
This development has been ascribed variously to opposition 
from the Roman Catholic clergy88 and the growth of the 
commercialisation of death in the shape of the professional
85 Ibid., p.19.
86 Ibid. , p. 559 .
87 See further, Sheehy, (1994, pp.494-503).
88 See, O'Suilleabham, (1976, pp.1-12).
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mortician.89 Sheehy has outlined the advantages for the
wider society in adhering to the model of the 'tame' death.
The advantages accrue both to the bereaved and to the wider
societal group:
[f]or the bereaved, traditional mourning rites 
and practices of bereavement constitute a 
socially sanctioned and meaningful way of 
externalising the grief, frustration, anxiety and 
related responses experienced on the death of 
another. For the social group, it ensures that 
the psychologically disturbed state of the 
individual is rendered less harmful for the 
integrity of the ongoing social order by 
permitting the bereaved person to indulge in what 
would otherwise be viewed as 'deviant' or 
unacceptable behaviour.90
Sheehy also notes that Irish culture has adopted a
model of life as being endowed by a spiritual agent.
Certain stages m  the life of an individual are of marked
symbolic importance. There exists a natural cycle whereby
life is regarded as coming from a sacred source, only to
return to that source when life ends.
Irish culture shares with many others a view that 
the life of an individual consists of a 
progression from a sacred, through a secular, to 
a sacred realm once more... Fundamental life 
crises have been ritualised m  religion to a 
point where the primary ones are raised to the 
importance of highly significant social and 
spiritual events. Within Roman Catholic doctrine, 
for instance, five of the seven sacraments relate 
directly to times of transition m  the life 
cycle...
The ecclesiastic authority and symbolic role 
of the priest in the performance of these rituals 
is considerable. The part he plays and the 
symbols he manipulates are of the highest 
religious importance, since he validates the 
'passage rites' with the absolute power of divine 
presence. In this way, the divine elements
89 See, Sheehy, (1994, p.500).
90 Ibid., p.503.
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validate significant transitions, including 
death, through the social order.91
The secularisation of Irish society m  recent times does
not appear to have weakened the desire of individuals to
engage m  death ritual, albeit m  a less intense manner
than heretofore. Thus, as Sheehy concludes:
[t]he secularisation of Irish society and the 
commensurate weakening of institutionalised 
religion has changed the content and performance 
of death ritual but appears not to have 
diminished a commitment to it. The symbolic rites 
which integrate the culture of the living with 
the immutable ancestral culture of the dead... 
provide part of a social contract among the 
living in which death is given meaning through a 
reassurance of continued existence after dying, 
within the cultural and spiritual lineage of the 
dead and the vitality of the surviving order.92
The second model of death put forward by Aries is that
of the 'invisible' death of contemporary society. This is
the way we die today, intubated, unconscious in a hospital
bed, divorced from our community. Death is viewed almost as
a stigma, an evil to be avoided at all costs. This death
has been facilitated by the advances in medical technology
whereby the medical professional strives to overcome the
reality of death using a technological armoury. This is the
death which has brought m  its wake the increased interest
of the legal actor, whether it be the courts in deciding
whether a patient m  a persistent vegetative state should
be allowed to die or the legislature in introducing
statutes to define death in a legal sense. Thus, as Aries
sees it, the locus of death has been shifted from the home
91 Ibid. , p.502.
92 Ibid., pp. 505-506.
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to the hospital, and with this geographical shift has come
a shift in our conception of death:
[b]y a swift and imperceptible transition someone 
who was dying came to be treated like someone 
recovering from major surgery. This is why, 
especially in the cities, people stopped dying at 
home...
The time of death can be lengthened to suit 
the doctor. The doctor cannot eliminate death, 
but he can control its duration, from the few 
hours it once was, to several days, weeks, 
months, or even years...
Sometimes this prolonging of life becomes an 
end in itself, and hospital personnel refuse to 
discontinue the treatments that maintain an 
artificial life.93
The medicalization of death is the first step towards 
the need for legal intervention m  this area. In the days 
of the 'tame' death it was quite straightforward. The 
individual died in the bosom of his community free from the 
interventions of third parties who used his body as a 
battleground m  their war against-mortality. Now, medicine 
has the ability to postpone the moment of death. This 
development has been accompanied by myriad legal 
complications which have brought the patient into another 
alien environment, that of the courtroom. Now that one can 
determine death by measuring brain waves, one has had to 
redefine death. Now that people live longer due to advances 
in disease control death does not come swiftly but is often 
slow and lingering. This leads to individuals asking to be 
relieved of this burden through active euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide. But is this not murder in the 
eyes of the law? Now that artificial respiration can keep
93 Aries, (1981, pp.584-585).
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accident victims alive indefinitely, the problem of when
such intervention should cease arises. Is such cessation of
treatment illegal? Death has been taken out of the hands
of the dying. Instead as Aries has put it:
[d]eath no longer belongs to the dying man, who 
is first irresponsible, later unconscious, nor to 
the family, who are convinced of their
inadequacy. Death is regulated and organized by 
bureaucrats whose competence and humanity cannot 
prevent them from treating death as their
'thing7, a thing that must bother them as little 
as possible in the general interest.94
1.6 The Legal Appropriation of Death.
As adverted to in the preceding section, with the 
medicalization of death came attendant legal problems. The 
focus of inquiry came to be placed on the surrounding 
circumstances of the actor's death rather than on the issue 
of death itself. It was no longer a simple question of 
knowing that you were about to die and accepting it calmly. 
Now that his destiny was in the hands of the medical 
profession it did not matter largely what the individual 
thought or knew, the medical professional always knew 
better. If an individual or a family tried to assert their 
independence in the matter by expressing a desire to be 
relieved of this prolonged life sentence, they were plunged 
into the even more clinical world of the legal 
professional. Despite the fact that the individual was 
employing the law as a means of obtaining what had
previously been his death-right, the law further reified
94 Ibid., p.588.
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the individual. The locus was shifted to the even more 
alien and impersonal environment of the courtroom and the 
gap between the individual and his death was further 
widened by legal bureaucracy. The individual's access to 
his own death had now to be secured through the 
instrumentality of legal actors making death an even more 
impersonal and remote experience. Even though the law was 
establishing a right to die, one must ask oneself two 
questions. Why did one, in the age of medicalized death, 
have to establish a right which had heretofore been well 
established in a cultural sense? Secondly why was the legal 
process used to secure this right?
These questions may sound rather basic but they 
conceal far more than they reveal about the nature of 
individual autonomy in the context of medical death and the 
role of law in society. We can answer these questions 
superficially by saying that m  such a case there is a 
conflict of values and opinions and that in such a 
conflictual situation the natural adjudicator is the judge. 
However, this does not answer the question of why in a 
society which values individual autonomy, the individual 
has become so alienated from his body that he can no longer 
control his own death. Nor does it answer the question of 
the true role of law in society. Should law in effect be 
concerned with intervening in a conflict so fundamental to 
individual autonomy as control over one's own life or 
death? In an ideal society the answer would be clear, the 
individual should be allowed to die naturally without the
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vain intervention of technology. However, we do not live in 
an ideal society and issues even as fundamental as this 
must be dealt with by surrogates, in this case the legal 
actors, rather than the individual himself. In turn, the 
way in which law and policy actors deal with such issues is 
informed by the particular moral view which they hold, thus 
further clouding what was hitherto a simple issue.
Daniel Callahan95 has attempted to place this 
conundrum m  a legal perspective. He picks up the gauntlet 
offered by Aries of whether it is possible ever to return 
to the model of the 'tame' death?96 Callahan while not 
altogether disagreeing with the way in which the law was 
used to (re)establish a right to die, is not at the same 
time, altogether happy with this approach. He believes 
that:
we have discovered in the language of choice and 
rights still another kind of evasion... Faced 
with the possibility of going in different 
directions with death in the nineteen sixties and 
nineteen seventies, we collectively chose to add 
still another barrier between ourselves and a 
steady look at death; we chose 'choice7 about 
death, rather than death itself, as the new, 
supposedly liberating focus. This was, at the 
time, a perfectly reasonable response. Many 
people were in fact being denied a right to have 
treatment terminated, and a corrective was 
needed. It also served most effectively to 
stimulate public interest and discussion.
Death was, in a sense, taken out of the
95 Callahan, (1993, pp.11-22).
96 Aries, (1974, p.107), posed the following question:
[m]ust we take for granted that it is 
impossible for our technological culture 
ever to regain the naive confidence m  
destiny which had for so long been shown by 
simple men when dying?
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closet. But instead of being put forward for 
common thought and probing, it was put into the 
courtroom, turned into a matter of grand human 
rights.97
[
Callahan instead calls for a different response to the
problem. Instead of placing the solution entirely m  the
hands of the law, cognisance must be taken of other aspects
of society such as morality and cultural values. He thus
points out that:
there is an ever-present hazard in a culture that 
too easily mistakes the limited purpose of law 
for the broader and deeper demands of morality.
It is that the aim of overcoming obstacles to 
choice to make way for meaning will be taken as 
the end of the matter, the latter task forgotten 
and slighted, culturally starved of the means of 
sustenance.98
Callahan proposes that the establishment of legal rights in 
the area of death is but a tiny contribution to the overall 
resolution of the problem. He is arguing for a context or 
a backdrop against which these rights can be exercised. He 
wants such rights to be "undergirded by rich cultural and 
moral resources, and incentives to exercise that right 
wisely".99
He is, m  effect, arguing for the reinstatement of 
some form of moral coda m  society which gives, in his 
terms, another dimension to choices about death and dying. 
This dimension is the moral dimension. He notes that in 
abandoning the collective idea of a common destiny typical 
of the era of the 'tame' death, we have robbed death of its
97 Callahan, (1993, p.35).
98 Ibid. , p. 36 .
99 Ibid.
51
cultural significance and have been unable to find an
enduring replacement. Thus, he claims:
we do not have the shared sense of destiny that 
Phillipe Aries identified as central to the 
possibility of a tame death in an earlier time.
We have tried, to be sure, to find substitutes, 
but in each case they turn out to be ways of 
better mastering and controlling death, not of 
finding a common way to seek and share its 
meaning and accept its inevitability.100
Callahan acknowledges that it may be rather difficult to
return to such a model but urges that we at least try. He
sees a need to re-evaluate the medical interpretation of
death, to divest ourselves of what he terms 'technological
monism', by which he means:
the tendency to erase the difference between 
human action as a cause of what happens in the 
world, and independent, natural biological 
processes, those old-fashioned causes of disease 
and death.101
It is in this idea of 'technological monism' that we 
can begin to see the reason why law has become increasingly 
involved in the treatment of the dying. The move from 
seeing nature as the culpable party in the death of the 
individual to seeing the individual medical actor as 
culpable, has inevitably brought law, with its ideas of 
fault and responsibility, into the scenario. As Callahan 
puts it:
[w]here once we human beings as moral agents 
stood helpless in the face of nature, whose 
workings were outside the range of our 
responsibility, now everything is m  some sense 
thought to be our responsibility. Causality and 
culpability have been collapsed together'. The
100 Ibid., p.225.
101 Ibid., p.67.
doctor who cannot save a patient faults her lack 
of skill, or medicine's lack of a cure; it might 
have been otherwise. The nurse who watches a 
feeding tube removed from a hopelessly ill 
patient thinks the patient is being killed by the 
removal, not by the disease that made the tube 
necessary. The euthanasia advocate holds that, by 
our adherence to a fictitious notion of 'allowing 
to die' from an underlying disease, we wilfully 
condemn a patient to needless suffering; direct 
killing would be more merciful, and the act of 
killing no different in any case from that of 
allowing to die. The euthanasia opponent, wary of 
badly motivated people using nature and its ways 
as an excuse, comes to see culpability in the 
movement to make allowing to die easier.102
On this analysis it can be seen that the move from the
'tame' death to the invisible or medicalized death has
brought with it the need for greater legal involvement in
the dying process.
The involvement of the law is twofold. Firstly there
is the intervention of constitutional law with its notions
of individual rights. This is used to establish within the
new model of death a right to die, employing terms such as
a right to privacy or autonomy or choice. Secondly there is
the intervention of the criminal law, with its notions of
fault and responsibility. This is used to regulate the
behaviour of the individual medical actor, based on the
premise that it is the actions of the medical actor, and
not the disease as was previously the case, which cause the
death of the individual patient. The thesis examines the
way m  which law intervenes in the medical treatment of
death and dying in order to establish whether, and to what >
extent, such intervention is either necessary or effective.
102 Ibid.
Should we merely view death as a question of rights or 
is there some other way m  which the conflict between a 
'tame' death and medical intervention can be resolved? 
Moreover, is the intervention of the criminal law m  this 
area based on a mistaken premise? Is there any need for 
such intervention m  the area of medical treatment? If not, 
what alternative models should be applied? In addition it 
will be necessary to analyse the various practical 
ramifications of the theoretical models which have informed 
the legal debate on the taking of life to date, with a view 
to testing their validity and the contribution, if any, 
which they can make to the resolution of the problem.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS DEATH? - DEFINITIONS
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.
Medical judgments are informed by 
philosophical presuppositions, whether 
or not the latter are explicitly 
formulated. The diagnosis of , any 
illness may be clinical and empirical, 
but it would be lacking in significance 
if there were no underlying concepts of 
health and disease. Whether a patient 
is classified dead or alive depends on 
our understanding of the relevant 
concept of death.1
2.0 Introduction.
Death as a cultural phenomenon has changed m  nature, 
as has been discussed in Chapter One. This chapter surveys 
the parallel shift in the legal nature of death. The
medicalization of death has had profound implications for 
the way in which death is perceived. One of these
implications has been the increasing involvement of the law 
in shaping the definitional boundaries of death. Why has 
the law played such an instrumental role in the definition 
of what was previously a natural process? Is the legal 
interpretation of death the correct one? In defining death, 
is law confirming an agreed understanding of death or is it 
providing a particular interpretation which is not shared 
by the wider society? This chapter is an attempt to examine 
the limits of legal language in defining a cultural 
concept, over which there is no common accord.
This discourse on the meaning of death is not without
1 Lamb, (1988, p.9).
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practical importance. As will be seen in this chapter the
area of organ transplantation is affected to a greater or
lesser degree by the manner in which we choose to interpret
death. As one leading commentator on this aspect of medical
practice has stated:
[t]he history of the determination of death on 
the basis of the condition of the brain has been 
interconnected with the history of organ 
transplantation. Any explanation of the former 
requires some familiarity with the latter. The 
connection, which was established historically, 
retains considerable contemporary relevance and 
it is likely that the determination of death and 
organ transplantation will remain intertwined in 
the future.2
2.1 Beginnings and Ends - Definitional Boundaries on Death.
The concept of death has always been the subject of
varied interpretation. The debate over the exact point at
which a person can be regarded as dead is not one which has 
emerged as a result of the introduction of new medical 
techniques and technology such as organ transplants and 
artificial ventilation. Rather, the debate in contemporary 
society on the idea of death tends to focus on these areas, 
as they provide graphic illustrations of the need to define 
a satisfactory concept of death.
The debate about the determination of human life has 
been an ongoing one which may not even today have generated 
a satisfactory response or a response which is acceptable 
to all the participants in this debate. One would be
2 McCullagh, (1993, p.l), but see, contra. Lamb,
(1993, p.209).
56
mistaken in thinking that the diagnosis of death has always 
been a medical function. Indeed m  the classical period the 
physician's role in relation to the terminally ill or dying 
patient was to inform the patient and next-of-kin of the 
prognosis of death. This role did not extend to the need to 
actually diagnose the death of the patient when that 
eventuality transpired or indeed to certify this death.3 
However, on the theoretical plane, the classical physician 
tended to the opinion that the heart was the organ which 
was of greatest significance in determining the death of 
the individual. Thus, the dividing line between the states 
of living and death was heartbeat.4
The traditional approach to defining biological death 
was based on the irretrievable cessation of heart and lung 
function. However, there were those who questioned this 
approach. Thus, certain commentators believed that the only 
certain indicator of death was putrefaction.5 Another 
concern of many writers and thinkers m  the period to the 
nineteenth century was the phenomenon of premature burial.6 
This fear seemed to reach a height of intensity after the 
discovery of artificial respiration in the eighteenth 
century.7 The idea that one could be revived from the 
seemingly irretrievable state of death alarmed many.
3 See further, Robbins, (1970, pp.282-283).
4 See, Ackerknecht, (1968, pp.19-21).
5 See further, Garrison, (1929, p.272).
6 See further, Aries, (1981, pp.376-378).
7 See for example, Winslow, (1748, pp.1-10).
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However, this fear was to a large extent dissipated by the 
latter part of the nineteenth century by advances in 
medical technology. One of the most important developments 
was the introduction of the stethoscope in 1819.8 This
enabled the physician to detect with greater certainty 
heart and lung activity. The introduction of technology 
into medical practice was to have profound implications for 
the way in which death was perceived.
2.2 Advances in Medical Technology and the Definition of 
Death.
The development of artificial respirators in the
nineteen fifties led to a need to amend pre-existing 
notions of death. This development led to the medical
professional being able to' keep the body alive even though 
brain function had ceased. Thus, if such an individual were 
to be judged on the existing heart-lung criterion of 
diagnosing death, he would be regarded as being alive. A 
new definition of death was thus needed to provide for this 
eventuality.
The development of a definition of death based on
brain function began in France in 19599 when two 
neurologists wrote of the coma deoasse. In this state, the 
patient was in an irreversible coma and had lost the 
capacity to breathe. The patient can continue to live in
8 See further, Reiser, (1981, pp.20-32).
9 Mollaret and Goulon, (1959, pp.3-6).
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this condition only with the aid of an artificial 
ventilator. However, outside France the idea of coma 
depasse gained little acceptance. It was not until 1968 
that the English speaking world began to recognise the use 
of brain function as a means of diagnosing death.10 The 
Harvard criteria for brain death were the absence of 
cerebral responsiveness; the absence of induced or 
spontaneous movement; the absence of spontaneous 
respiration and the absence of brain-stem and deep tendon 
reflexes. Thus, the traditional heart-lung criterion of 
death came to be superseded by the whole brain criterion of 
death as set out in the Harvard Report. The idea of whole 
brain death takes into account the functions of both the 
higher and lower brain. The higher brain or cerebrum 
controls consciousness, thought, language, memory and 
feeling. The lower brain or bram-stem controls functions 
such as temperature, respiration and blood pressure. The 
Report recommended that, except in cases involving 
hypothermia and the use of depressant drugs, death is to be 
declared when the patient exhibits unreceptivity and 
unresponsiveness; no spontaneous movements or breathing and 
no reflexes. Such tests should be repeated after a period 
of twenty-four hours had elapsed.11
In the wake of the Harvard Report states in the United 
States began to formulate statutory definitions of death 
based on the whole brain death formulation. The state of
10 Beecher, (1968, pp.337-338).
11 Ibid.
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1970.12 This statute however, did not replace the former
cardio-respiratory definition of death but rather provided
alternative definitions. In other words the Kansas statute
did not come down firmly on either the side of the
traditional definition of death or on the side of the whole
brain death formulation. It provided that a person may be
pronounced dead for legal and medical purposes if:
(i)... based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, there is the absence of spontaneous 
respiratory and cardiac function and, because of 
the disease or condition which caused, directly 
or indirectly, these functions to cease, or 
because of the passage of time since these 
functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are 
considered hopeless; and, in this event, death 
will have occurred at the time these functions 
ceased; or
(li) if... there is the absence of spontaneous 
brain function; and if based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, during reasonable 
attempts to either maintain ' or restore 
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function 
in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it 
appears that further attempts at resuscitation or 
supportive maintenance will not succeed, death 
will have occurred at the time these conditions 
first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before 
artificial means of supporting respiratory and 
circulatory function are terminated and before 
any vital organ is removed for the purposes of 
transplantation.
The statute has been the subject of a number of 
criticisms. Ian Kennedy in 197113 argued that under the 
Kansas statute an individual may be deemed to be 
simultaneously dead and alive. This stems from the apparent 
connection between the diagnosis of death and organ
Kansas was the first state to introduce such legislation in
12 Determination of Death Act 1970, Kansas Session Laws 
Ch. 378 (1970).
13 See, Kennedy, (1971, pp.946-947).
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transplantation m  the Kansas statute. This point was
further developed by Capron and Kass who stated that 
although:
there is nothing in the Act itself to indicate 
that physicians will be less concerned with 
safeguarding the health of potential organ 
donors, the purposes for which the Act was passed 
are not hard to decipher, and they do little to 
inspire the average patient with confidence that 
his welfare (including his not being prematurely 
declared dead) is of as great concern to medicine 
and the [s]tate of Kansas as is the facilitation 
of organ transplantation... One hopes that the 
form the statute takes does not reflect a 
conclusion on the part of the Kansas legislature 
that death occurs at two distinct points during 
the process of dying. Yet this inference can be 
derived from the Act, leaving open the prospect 
that X at a certain stage m  the process of dying 
can be pronounced dead, whereas Y, having arrived 
at the same point, is not said to be dead.14
As a result of their dissatisfaction with the existing
statutory definitions of death, Capron and Kass proposed a
single concept of death which provided that:
[a] person will be considered dead if in the
announced opinion of a physician, based on 
ordinary standards of medical practice, he has 
experienced an irreversible cessation of
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory 
functions. In the event that artificial means of 
support preclude a determination that these 
functions have ceased, a person will be 
considered dead if in the announced opinion of a 
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, he has experienced an irreversible 
cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death 
will have occurred at the time when the relevant 
functions ceased.15
The Capron-Kass proposal does not contain alternative
definitions of death, as was the case m  the Kansas
14 Capron and Kass, (1972, pp.579-580).
15 Ibid. , p. 580.
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statute. Instead it proposes two sets of criteria which 
they claim are "predicated upon the single phenomenon of 
death".16
Thus, if it is possible to base the diagnosis of death
on cardio-respiratory criteria this will suffice, but if
this is not possible due to a patient receiving artificial
ventilation, then brain activity shall be used as the
relevant indicator. They rationalise this by stating that
the proposal:
does not leave to arbitrary decision a choice 
between two apparently equal yet different 
'alternative definitions of death'. Rather, its 
second standard is applicable only when 
'artificial means of support preclude7 use of the 
first. It does not establish a separate kind of 
death, called 'brain death7. In other words, the 
proposed law would provide two standards gauged 
by different functions, for measuring different 
manifestations of the same phenomenon. If cardiac 
and pulmonary functions have ceased, brain 
functions cannot continue; if there is no brain 
activity and respiration has to be maintained 
artificially, the same state (death) exists.17
This model statute as conceived by Capron and Kass was
subsequently adopted by the state legislatures of a number
of American states including Michigan,18 West Virginia,19
16 Ibid. , p. 581.
17 Ibid.
18 Determination of Death Act 1975, Michigan Compiled 
Laws section 336.8b (1975).
19 Determination of Death Act 1975, West Virginia Code 
section 16-19-lc (1975), later replaced by the model 
outlined in the Uniform Brain Death Act 1978, 12 Uniform 
Laws Annotated 17 (Supp. 1985), Uniform Brain Death Act 
1980, West Virginia Code sections 16-10-1 to 16-10-3 (1980).
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A further important development in the legal
definition of death came about as a result of the
publication in 1981 of a Report compiled by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.23 Included in the
Commission's Report was a proposed Uniform Determination of
Death Act 198024 which stated that:
[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) 
irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or (2)irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain-stem, is dead. A 
determination of death must be made in accordance 
with accepted medical standards.25
The model proposed is similar to the Capron-Kass model in 
that it provides for both the traditional cardio­
respiratory criterion for death as well as for the whole 
brain formulation. The Commission justified the retention
Louisiana,20 Iowa21 and Montana.22
20 Determination of Death Act 1976, Louisiana Revised 
Statutes Annotated section 9:111 (1976).
21 Determination of Death Act 1976, Iowa Code Annotated 
section 702.8 (1976).
22 Determination of Death Act 1977, Montana Session 
Laws Ch. 377 (1977), later replaced by the model outlined 
in the Uniform Determination of Death Act 1980, 12 Uniform 
Laws Annotated 271 (Supp. 1985), Uniform Determination of 
Death Act 1983. Montana Revised Code Annotated section 50- 
22-101 (1983).
23 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
(1981, pp.1-2).
24 12 Uniform Laws Annotated 271 (Supp. 1985).
25 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
(1981, p.2).
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[t]he conservative nature of the reform here 
proposed will be more apparent if the statute 
refers explicitly to the existing cardio­
pulmonary standard for the determination of 
death. The brain-based standard is, after all, 
merely supplementary to the older standard, which 
will continue to be adequate in the overwhelming 
majority of cases in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, of all the hospital deaths at four acute 
hospitals in the Commission's survey, only about 
eight per cent could have been declared dead by 
neurological criteria prior to cardiac arrest.
The study clearly illustrates that the use of 
cardio-pulmonary criteria predominates. In the 
first place, the brain-based criteria are 
relevant only to a limited patient population 
(i.e. comatose patients on respirators). Even 
among this population, only one-fourth of those 
who died at the four acute centres in the 
Commission's study met the brain-based criteria 
before meeting the cardio-pulmonary standard.26
Nonetheless, this compromise, it may be argued,
detracts from the theoretical soundness of the report.
Thus, the problem remains, that there exists more than one
criterion for defining death. This leads to a situation
which is fraught with both theoretical and practical
problems. In defining death, surely, clarity should be the
primordial requirement. Allowing two standards to co-exist
is hardly a precursor to intellectual clarity. Why did the
Commission choose this far from satisfactory route? The
justification proffered by the Commission was that:
'whole brain' signs of life and death are less 
well comprehended by non-specialists... The heart 
and lungs move when they work; the brain does 
not. Thus, since any incorporation of brain- 
oriented standards into the law necessarily 
changes somewhat the type of measures permitted, 
a statute will be more acceptable the less it
of the heart-lung standard in the following manner:
26 Ibid., p.59.
64
otherwise changes legal rules.27
This seems to suggest that the Commission was aiming for
the lowest common denominator in arriving at a formulation
of death. However, in attempting to define death in terms
which the average American citizen can understand, one is
leaving all scientific method at the door. Why should the
Commission go to such lengths to produce a formulation of
death which was susceptible to easy understanding? Rather,
should not the legal definition of death be based on the
latest and most accurate scientific formulations of the
diagnosis of death? In general, if one were only to
formulate legislation on the premise that it must be
readily understandable to the average citizen then many
pieces of necessarily complex legislation would never be
adopted. This is not an elitist argument of the variety
that only lawyers should understand the law, but rather a
recognition that in many areas of legal regulation it is
necessary to introduce legislation based on complex
scientific and technical issues.
Lamb believes that the Commission by defining death in
such terms has created a situation where:
an outmoded concept of death is promoted for 
legal pragmatic purposes rather than out of a 
desire for conformity with theoretical and 
clinical requirements. It may be the case that a 
peasant community in the backwoods will not have 
access to mechanical ventilation and cardiac 
resuscitation facilities and that, for all 
practical purposes, death is inevitable with the 
onset of irreversible cardio-respiratory arrest.
But the death of the organism as a whole does not 
occur, either in the backwoods or in the most
27 Ibid., pp.58-59.
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expensively equipped university hospital, until 
the brain, the critical system, is no longer 
capable of integrating the vital subsystems.28
However, the model statute as outlined by the Commission
has not been the subject of universal criticism. Indeed, a
number of states in the United States have adopted this
model statute in state legislation governing the diagnosis
of death.29 Thus, while the whole brain death formulation
has been accepted in legislation, it is as an adjunct to
the traditional heart-lung definition of death. This
perhaps reflects an unwillingness on the part of
legislators to adopt a more radical approach to the
definition of death which reflects actual advances in
medical technology. A more radical approach of adopting a
sole criterion of death based on brain function has been
advocated by a number of commentators. These proposals
shall now be examined.
In 1975, the American Bar Association adopted a single
definition of death based on brain function which stated:
[f]or all legal purposes, a human body with
irreversible cessation of total brain function, 
according to usual and customary standards of 
medical practice, shall be considered dead.30
Other bodies in the United States have advocated a single
whole brain definition of death. In 1978, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed
28 Lamb, (1988, p.27).
29 See further, Smith, (1986, pp.850-888).
30 See, Anonymous, (1975, p.463).
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the Uniform Brain Death Act 1978.31 This model statute
provides that:
[f]or legal and medical purposes, an individual 
who has sustained irreversible cessation of all 
functioning of the brain, including the brain­
stem, is dead. A determination under this section 
must be made in accordance with reasonable 
medical standards.32
This proposal was subsequently adopted by the state of West
Virginia in its statute pertaining to the definition of
death.33 Similarly, in Canada, the Law Reform Commission34
recommended a definition of death based solely on the
irreversible cessation of all brain functions.
The advantage of such definitions lies in their
conceptual clarity. Rather than adopting the compromise
solution of the President's Commission, these definitions
recognise the scientific reality of the phenomenon of
death. As Culver and Gert35 have observed:
[t]hroughout history, whenever a physician was 
called to ascertain the occurrence of death, his 
examination included the following important 
signs indicative of permanent loss of functioning 
of the whole brain: unresponsivity; lack of
spontaneous movements including breathing; and 
absence of pupillary light response. Only one 
important sign, lack of heartbeat, was not 
directly indicative of whole brain destruction.
But since the heartbeat stops within several 
minutes of apnoea, permanent absence of the vital 
signs is an important sign of permanent loss of
31 12 Uniform Laws Annotated 17 (Supp. 1985).
32 Section 1.
33 Uniform Brain Death Act 1980, West Virginia Code 
sections 16-10-1 to 16-10-3 (1980).
34 Law Reform Commission of Canada, The, (1981, pp. 3-
7 ) .
35 Culver and Gert, (1982, pp.187-194).
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whole brain functioning. Thus, in an important 
sense, permanent loss of whole brain functioning 
has always been the underlying criterion of 
death.36
As a consequence, Culver and Gert draw a distinction 
between the criteria for determining death, that is, when 
the brain is dead, and tests which predict death, for 
example, the irreversible cessation of heart and lung 
functions.37 This argument is supported by Lamb when he 
states that:
[i]t is necessary to recognise (1) that the 
concept of brain death does not represent a new 
way of being dead; (2) that the concept of death 
does not lend itself to antithetical criteria, 
and (3) that there is only one way of being dead 
and that is when the brain is dead. Tests for 
spontaneous cessation of cardio-respiratory
functions are consequently only predictive of 
death. They amount to a necessary, but not
sufficient, indicator of death.38
Green and Wikler39 point out that what is at issue is not
whether the person is dead or not but whether the person in
such a state should be kept alive. They argue that there
36 Ibid., p. 187.
37 Ibid., p.194. See in addition, Bernat, Culver and 
Gert, (1981, p.393), wherein they state:
[a] person will be considered dead if in the 
announced opinion of a physician, based on 
ordinary standards of medical practice, he 
has experienced an irreversible cessation of 
all brain functions. Irreversible cessation 
of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory 
functions shall be considered sufficient 
proof for the irreversible cessation of 
brain functions in the absence of any 
medical evidence to the contrary. Death will 
have occurred at the time when brain 
functions have irreversibly ceased.
38 Lamb, (1988, p.30).
39 Green and Wikler, (1980, pp.105-117).
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is:
little real argument of any kind for regarding 
the brain dead as dead...
We have only to realize that the moment of 
pulling the plug need not be the moment of death 
to see that defining death is a different job 
from deciding when it is best to remove life- 
support systems. The heart-lung definition of 
death did not, and could not, itself, have 
required pointless maintenance of the brain dead.
That severe’ prescription emerges only when we add 
the premise that the living must not be 
abandoned. What the moral arguments show, then, 
is not that the brain dead are dead but that the 
brain dead need not be cared for. The moral 
argument addresses a moral issue which is, 
unfortunately confused by many with the task of 
defining death.40
However, this is not to say that a singular whole brain
definition is the definitive answer to the problem of
defining death. The whole brain definition has been
subjected to criticism from two opposing camps. On the one
hand are those who believe it is too radical and, on the
other, are those who believe that it does not go far
enough.
Those who object to the complete abandonment of the 
traditional model of diagnosis of death in favour of a sole 
criterion based on whole brain death do so for a variety of 
reasons.
The Mind-Body Dualism Objection.
There are those who believe that the concentration on 
brain activity as the basis for the diagnosis of death is 
rather too reductionist as it denies, in their view, the
40 Ibid., pp. 116-117.
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These commentators state that such a position creates a
division or dualism of the cerebral and corporeal aspects
of the human being. Hans Jonas,41 for example, argues that:
[m]y identity is the identity of the whole 
organism, even if the higher functions of 
personhood are seated in the brain. How else 
could a man love a woman and not merely her 
brains? How else could we lose ourselves in the 
aspect of the face? Be touched by the delicacy of 
a frame? It's this person's and no one else's. 
Therefore, the body of the comatose, so long as - 
even with the help of art - it still breathes, 
pulses, and functions otherwise, must still be 
considered a residual continuance of the subject 
that loved and was loved, and as such is still 
entitled to some of the sacrosanctity accorded to 
such a subject by the laws of God and men.42
Similarly, Grisez and Boyle proceed on the premise that
mind-body dualism is false. They conclude that:
human activities, including those which seem most 
distinctively personal, those which no one denies 
to be intrinsic constituents of human 
flourishing, are not separate from a person's 
life. Life is not a characteristic of one part of 
a whole, and these activities properties of some 
other part of it. Rather, life pervades these 
activities or they lack reality - unless one 
supposes them to have reality altogether apart 
from the living body one also calls 'mine'. And 
one's human life includes one's activities. They 
perfect oneself, but they are not distinct from 
one's life as an end is distinct from an 
instrument used to realize it.43
On this view, the body and the mind are inextricably 
intertwined and the death of only one part of the human
importance of the rest of the body to human identity.
41 See, Jonas, (1974, pp.135-140).
42 Ibid., p.139.
43 Grisez and Boyle, (1979, pp.377-378).
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body is not consistent with the death of the person.44 This 
view is the antithesis of the Cartesian conception of the 
human body and the human mind being distinct entities. The 
Cartesian claims that the pure mind or consciousness 
maintains the body during life. On this view, at death, the 
pure mind or soul survives the body.45 The Cartesian view 
is not accepted by many religions, including Judaism, Islam 
and Christianity46 which see mind and body as indivisible.
44 But see, contra. Stacy, (1992, pp.516-517), where he 
states that:
[0]ne must recognize the inherent limits of 
this criticism. This criticism cannot mean 
that a consciousness-based concept of death 
renders the body irrelevant. Because certain 
bodily functions, including 'extracerebral' 
functions, are necessary to sustain 
consciousness, a consciousness-based concept 
requires the death of certain crucial 
aspects of the body. Even under the heart- 
centred definition of death that Jonas 
defends death still occurs though biological 
activity persists for some time. Both heart- 
centred and consciousness-centred 
definitions require the death of only 
certain aspects of the body. They merely 
select different aspects.
45 See further, Cohen, (1984, pp.7-27) and Spicker, 
(1970, pp.3-23).
46 See for example, Lamb, (1988, p.58), where he 
observes:
[1]n this case, however, it is not necessary 
to engage in conflict with the major 
religious movements. Brain-related criteria 
for death are only crudely reductionist if 
it is insisted that the person is nothing 
more than his brain. Obviously there is more 
to a person than a brain. But to say that a 
person will not be unless endowed with a 
brain is not to say that a person is his 
brain. A person will not be without a head, 
but we do not say that a person is a head.
There is nothing in brain-related criteria 
for diagnosing death that commits one to
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The fine)Quality of Life Argument.
Certain writers object to a singular brain-based
definition of death as it might lead to certain beings,
notably the unconscious, being treated in a less humane
fashion than others. They argue that considerations such as
quality of life may be used as the basis for rationing
treatment. Thus, they might argue, people in a persistent
vegetative state or the permanently unconscious may be
deprived of life because their life, such as it is, is not
considered worth continuing. Thus, for example, Grisez and
Boyle lament that:
[h]uman life in itself no longer has sanctity.
What is important is the quality of life, the 
extent to which an individual's life contributes 
instrumentally to the attainment and enjoyment of 
specifically human and personal values. Whenever 
some human individual's life is not of sufficient 
quality - whether measured from the individual's 
own perspective or from the perspective of 
society or both - that life becomes a disvalue.
Such a life is unwanted because it is useless; it 
is evil because it is unwanted; it must be 
destroyed because it is evil...
It is hard to believe that a society which 
has committed itself so heavily to social welfare 
could turn about and systematically seek to limit 
and reduce the burden of welfare by mass killing.
But the legalization is fact. And abortion has 
been legalized on the basis that the unborn are 
not persons and can be destroyed if they are 
unwanted by the women who bear them and by 
society at large. Others who are unwanted differ 
but little from the unborn.47
This hyperbolic style of writing is symptomatic of
reductionism. One might even point out that 
traditional criteria for death never reduced 
a person to his or her lungs or heart.
47 Grisez and Boyle, (1979, p.13).
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many of the proponents of this argument. Indeed as Stacy 
points out:
[m]uch of the criticism of the breadth of the 
consciousness-based definition comes from 
opponents of abortion. They find a consciousness- 
based concept of human life uncongenial because 
it implies that the foetus is not actual human 
life earlier in its development... Abortion's 
opponents desire a concept of life broad enough 
(and a concept of death narrow enough) to support 
the conclusion that the foetus is an actual 
person from the moment of conception.48
Thus, the (ine) quality of life, or sanctity of life,
argument holds that all human life is inherently valid and
should not be terminated. This respect for life is not
extended to non-human animals. In effect the proponents of
this argument tend to have a particular agenda, the
prohibition of abortion and euthanasia. Is this not a
little too arbitrary? Is it not even hypocritical that one
could, having argued for the protection of all life, then
add the exception that such a definition should not include
animal life. Grisez and Boyle answer this charge in the
following manner:
[d]rawing the line at this point is not at all 
unreasonable. As Rawls and others have pointed 
out, the legal system is made by humans for 
humans. By it human individuals regulate their 
relationships to each other so that these 
relationships reflect not merely the interests 
which humans share with other animals but the 
peculiarly human ideals of liberty and justice in 
which other animals do not participate. Still, to 
qualify for legal personhood, and to have one's 
basic rights protected, in particular one's right 
to life, nothing beyond the common property of 
species membership can be required, or else the 
problems of quality which varies by degrees will
48 Stacy, (1992, p.510).
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However, it could be argued that by excluding certain 
species from the category of lives which are deserving of 
protection the proponents of this argument are guilty of 
the very selectivity of which they accuse their opponents.
The Slippery Slope Argument.
This argument holds, in the context of defining death,
that, if one were to allow a definition of death based
solely on the whole brain death criterion then this would
just be the beginning of a descent down a slippery slope
where the definition would become increasingly narrow.
Thus, opponents of this development argue that once whole
brain death was accepted then it would only be a short step
to a definition of death based on the irreversible function
of higher brain function, and eventually certain persons
who lacked consciousness such as anencephalic neonates
would be included in the scope of the definition. Thus,
Kamisar argues:
[d]oes anyone really believe that if a number of 
states expanded their definition of 'death' to 
include permanently unconscious patients, that 
would be the end of it? Does anybody really doubt 
that ten or twenty years down the road the 
definition would be expanded again? The next time 
around, the definition of 'death' would, at 
least, embrace elderly incompetent patients who, 
though in extreme states of disability, are 
conscious.50
emerge.49
49 Grisez and Boyle, (1979, pp.237-238).
50 Kamisar, (1991, p.1232).
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However, there are those who believe that the whole brain
formulation of death will not lead to a descent down the
slippery slope. Thus, Walton states that:
[b]ecause the case for whole brain death admits 
of well-established, and widely corroborated 
criteria, with a clear clinical picture of 
pathological destruction that irreversibly and 
inevitably leads to death in a short time, we can 
see how it is much less open to the slippery 
slope refutations than the case for cerebral 
death.51
Walton's use of language in the above paragraph has
been criticised and exploited by Lamb in arguing against
this thesis. Lamb focuses on Walton's reference to the
whole brain definition as a state which "irreversibly and
inevitably leads to death". He interprets this as meaning:
that whole brain death is not death, but a state 
prior to death. Drinking a litre of sulphuric 
acid will lead inevitably to death. So will 
leaping out of an aeroplane without a parachute.
These are not states of death; they are preludes 
to death. The point of whole brain formulations 
is that they are intended to determine the state, 
not the imminence of death. For this reason the 
slippery slope argument is highly relevant when 
applied to the slipshod equating of 'going to 
die' with 'not going to recover', and 'virtually 
dead' with 'is dead'. Patients suffering 
permanent damage to the cerebral hemispheres may 
not recover, and from some ethical standpoints 
may be 'virtually dead', but they may not
actually be dying, and provided they still 
possess a viable brain-stem they are certainly 
not dead.52
The slippery slope argument appears to rest on the
premise that by allowing, for example, abortion or
euthanasia, then society will become increasingly immune to 
death and suffering to the extent that the value or
51 Walton, (1980, p.51).
52 Lamb, (1988, pp.109-110).
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sanctity of life is diminished. However, there are those 
who believe that this belief is incorrect. Thus, Friedman 
argues that:
[a]11 slippery slope arguments rest on some 
asserted empirical evidence indicating that a 
future slide is likely... such fears are 
primarily fuelled by the intuition that where no 
natural stopping point exists along a continuum 
the possibility of future encroachment is greater 
than in cases where a well-defined boundary can 
be identified. However, this belief is incorrect.
The flaw in such reasoning can be demonstrated by 
examining the bases underlying the slippery slope 
argument. Part of its strength lies in the 
linguistic imprecision which necessarily 
accompanies all legal formulae devised by 
society. The imprecision may arise either 
intentionally, unavoidably, or negligently. In 
any case, the advocate making the slippery slope 
argument claims that any move from the current 
state of affairs to the instant case will 
eventually lead to the danger case because of the 
inherent looseness in the rule created to address 
the instant case.53
2.3 Beyond Whole Brain Death: Neocortical or Higher Brain 
Death.
On the other hand, there are those commentators who 
believe that the diagnosis of death should be based on the 
irreversible cessation of the functioning of the higher 
brain. Such a formulation of death is based on the loss of 
consciousness and cognition in the patient. On this 
definition, a patient whose brain-stem continues to 
function but whose higher brain functioning has ceased 
would be considered to be dead. Thus, for example, patients 
in a persistent vegetative state could on this standard be
53 Friedman, (1990, pp.975-976).
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declared dead.54 Such patients are capable of existing
without the aid of a respirator.55 Yet, as Youngner and
Bartlett point out:
[d]espite the continued ability to spontaneously 
integrate vegetative functions, a patient who has 
irreversibly lost the capacity for consciousness 
and cognition is dead. What remains alive is only 
a mindless organism.56
However, Green and Wikler argue that if the loss of mental
capacity which occurs at brain death constitutes death, it
54 Smith, (1986, pp.857-858), points out that:
[a] person may suffer an irreversible loss 
of consciousness and cognition, the earmarks 
of higher brain activity, without losing 
brain-stem functions. Under a neocortical 
definition, a patient in this non-cognitive 
persistent vegetative state is dead. The 
patient would not be considered dead under 
a whole brain death standard because the 
brain-stem, the portion of the lower brain 
that regulates vegetative functions such as 
breathing, blood pressure, temperature, and 
neuroendocrine control would continue to 
function. For example, victims of cardiac or 
respiratory arrest, asphyxiation, stroke, or 
head trauma may become neocortically dead 
but not whole brain dead. This condition can 
occur when deprivation of circulatory or 
respiratory functions occurs for a period of 
time brief enough to spare the brain-stem 
but long enough to cause permanent damage to 
the cerebrum. Vegetative patients who are 
neocortically dead can remain biologically 
alive with intravenous feeding and 
antibiotics for much longer periods of time 
than patients who have sustained whole brain 
death. Although heart and lung functions 
typically cease within hours or a few days 
after whole brain death, cardiopulmonary 
activities can continue for many years in 
neocortically dead patients. Karen Ann 
Quinlan's situation is the most familiar 
example of this phenomenon.
55 See further, Jennett and Plum, (1972, pp.734-737).
56 Youngner and Bartlett, (1983, p.254).
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is neither for moral or biological reasons but for
ontological reasons.57 They conclude that:
a given person ceases to exist with the 
destruction of whatever processes there are which 
normally underlie that person's psychological 
continuity and connectedness. We know these 
processes are essentially neurological, so that 
irreversible cessation of upper brain functioning 
constitutes the death of that person. Whole brain 
death is also death for persons, but only because 
whole brain death is partly comprised of upper 
brain death. Tests for either will be tests for 
death.58
Thus, for Green and Wikler, it is loss of upper brain
function which marks the person's death. They also strive
to frame an argument which is free from moral premises.
They therefore do not engage in an analysis of personhood
and whether persons are the only beings who may possess
rights. Rather they claim that the:
most likely account of personal identity serves 
to show that after brain death the person who 
entered the hospital has literally ceased to 
exist. Our claim that the person has died, of 
course, follows immediately from this. The 
account of personal identity uses as 'data' 
determinations of the identities of persons and 
bodies in certain circumstances, but involves no 
testing of moral intuitions.59
Others, however, are not as morally neutral in their 
analysis of the issue. Such theorists claim that without 
consciousness the individual cannot think and choose for 
himself and as such is unable to function as a person. It 
has been argued that only those who possess desires and
57 Green and Wikler, (1980, p.118).
58 Ibid., p. 127.
59 Ibid., p.132.
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interests may possess rights.60 Thus, the possession of
consciousness and self-awareness allows one to distinguish
between persons and human beings. Human beings may be
defined as being the issue of a member of the species homo
sapiens. As Friedman has observed "persons can be viewed as
a subset of humanity".61
What distinguishes persons from the generality of
humanity is the possession of certain characteristics such
as self-awareness and sentience. These characteristics
enable persons to have interests and as a result rights.
Thus, for example, the patient in a persistent vegetative
state would not be capable of having rights per se. As
Feinberg has argued:
[w]hat if, nevertheless, we think of the 
catatonic schizophrenic and the vegetating 
patient with irreversible brain damage as 
absolutely incurable? Can we think of them as 
possessed of interests and rights too, or is this 
combination of traits a conceptual impossibility? 
Shocking as it may at first seem, I am driven 
unavoidably to the latter view. If redwood trees 
and rose bushes cannot have rights, neither can 
incorrigible human vegetables. The trustees who 
are designated to administer funds for the care 
of these unfortunates are better understood as 
mere custodians than as representatives of their 
interests since these patients no longer have 
interests. It does not follow that they should 
not be kept alive as long as possible: that is an 
open moral question not foreclosed by conceptual 
analysis. Even if we have duties to keep human 
vegetables alive they cannot be duties to them.
We may be obliged to keep them alive to protect 
the sensibilities of others, or to foster 
humanitarian tendencies in ourselves, but we 
cannot keep them alive for their own good, for 
they are no longer capable of having a 'good' of 
their own. Without awareness, expectation,
60 See further, Feinberg, (1974, pp.159-184).
61 Friedman, (1990, p.952).
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belief, desire, aim and purpose, a being can have 
no interests; without interests, he cannot be 
benefited; without the capacity to be a 
beneficiary, he can have no rights.62
Smith63 has advocated a move towards a new definition
of death based on the loss of higher brain function. He
cites the case of vegetative patients who are neocortically
dead but are not considered to be dead under the existing
whole brain definition. If one were to base the definition
of death on the loss of higher brain function, then such
patients would be considered dead for legal purposes. This
move would have profound implications for the way in which
we now deal with the patient in a persistent vegetative
state. This model would provide a different solution to the
problem of treatment withdrawal for the patient in such a
state. As Smith points out:
[w]hich justification for terminating treatment 
of the irreversibly unconscious makes more sense: 
withholding feeding or 1ife-support because the 
patients are already dead, or terminating therapy 
to living persons because relatives believe that 
the patients' lives should end because substitute 
decision-makers suspect that the patients would 
have wanted this result...
If neocortical death is the death of the 
human being, however, the 'substituted judgement' 
test becomes an unnecessary mind trip, a profound 
leap into the dark work of the permanently 
insentient. Worse, the current use of the 
'substituted judgement' model creates procedural 
and legal presumptions against withholding or 
terminating treatment or nourishment. The 
'substituted judgement' approach unreasonably 
burdens families, physicians, and courts with the 
agonizing decision of whether to 'play God' and 
'let the patient die', even though, rightly 
viewed, human death has already occurred. 
Finally, the desire to obtain the legal results
62 Feinberg, (1974, p. 177).
63 See, Smith, (1986, pp.850-888).
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of death (insurance benefits, inherited property, 
favourable date of death tax valuations, or 
remarriage) may motivate relatives or guardians 
to terminate a patient's biological existence or 
deliberate, precisely as to when death should be 
doled out.64
Smith also saw the implications of this new model of 
death for organ transplants. He was of the opinion that 
since a neocortically dead patient could be maintained for 
years, as opposed to the current situation where a whole 
brain dead patient could only be maintained for a matter of 
hours or days, the possibility of being able to obtain an 
increased supply of useable organs for transplantation 
purposes arose under the neocortical death model.65 This 
would lead to a situation where the patient in a persistent 
vegetative state who had been declared dead for legal 
purposes could then be used as an organ transplant resource 
to be dipped into when necessary. Smith stresses the need 
for the consent of the relatives of the deceased or the 
prior consent of the deceased.
2.4 Brain Death and Organ Transplantation.
The question of organ transplantation is often linked 
to the issue of determination of death, although for 
ethical purposes the two issues should be regarded as being 
entirely separate. Nonetheless, it is necessary to explain 
why these two areas of medical practice are often perceived
64 Ibid., pp.871-872.
65 Ibid. , pp.883-885.
81
to be complementary, and to discuss the practical 
implications of adopting a particular model of death for 
the issue of organ transplantation.
Ireland does not have specific legislation in relation 
to the donation and transplant of human organs. In its 
absence, the general legal principles which govern the 
individual's capacity to consent to medical procedures is 
applicable to this aspect of medical practice. In addition, 
the Medical Council has adopted articles 13, 14 and 15 of 
the Principles of Medical Ethics in Europe66 as a guide to 
practice in this area. Article 13 provides that in a case 
where it is impossible to reverse the terminal processes 
leading to the cessation of a patient's vital functions 
which are being artificially maintained, doctors will 
satisfy themselves that death has occurred.
At least two doctors acting independently of each 
other should take meticulous steps to verify this situation 
and record their findings in writing. They shall be 
independent of the team which is to carry out the 
transplantation. Article 14 provides that doctors removing 
an organ for transplantation may give particular treatment 
designed to maintain the condition of that organ. The 
doctors must also take all practical steps to satisfy 
themselves that the donor had not expressed an opinion, or 
left instructions, on the matter either in writing or with 
his or her family. Article 15 provides that doctors 
removing organs for transplantation, should take all
66 Medical Council, The, (1994, p p . 37-38).
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practical steps to satisfy themselves that the donor had 
not expressed an opinion, or left instructions, on the 
matter either in writing or with his family.
The transplantation of regenerative tissue such as 
bone marrow and also of blood would appear to be legally 
valid so long as the donor is capable of giving legally 
valid consent to the procedure. Thus, the general common 
law principles in relation to consent to medical treatment 
are applicable here.67 However, problems may arise where 
the donor is not capable of giving consent such as in the 
case of a cadaver, a foetus, or an anencephalic neonate. 
This is not to say that the legal rights in each case are 
the same. The first example raises issues of property 
rights and the remaining examples raise issues in relation 
to the giving of consent by proxy.
It must be stated that the development of the brain 
death standard was not a response to the need to obtain 
useable organs for transplantation purposes and should not 
be thought of in such terms.68 However, the issues have
67 See for example, Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 D.L.R. 
(3d) 1; Walsh v Family Planning Services Ltd. [1992] 1 I.R. 
496.
68 Lamb, (1993, p.209), points out that:
[i]n the interests of both scientific 
accuracy and ethical propriety it is 
essential to separate questions relating to 
the need to obtain organs for 
transplantation from questions related to 
the conceptual and factual aspects of 
determining death. Greater demand for more 
donors is inevitable. Under these 
circumstances physicians can be subjected to 
conflicting moral demands when the organs of 
one patient can be used to save the life of
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development of transplant science and the use of brain dead
patients as sources of organs. The moral question which
requires to be answered here is whether in using brain dead
patients as organ sources we are respecting the sanctity of
those patients' lives or are in fact, as some would argue,
hastening their death to obtain much needed bodily parts.
Certain commentators argue, despite evidence to the
contrary, that the primary purpose of definitions of death
based on brain function is to allow surgeons to obtain more
useable organs for the purposes of transplantation surgery.
Josef Seifert cogently advances the argument in favour of
this proposition. Arguing against the brain death standard
for determining death, he advances the following
proposition in relation to the presumed relationship
between brain death and organ transplantation:
[i]t is widely recognized that doctors who are 
interested in transplantations may be easily 
influenced in their diagnoses of brain death in 
concrete cases by their own or their colleague's 
practical purposes.69
Having made such a dramatic and grave allegation, Seifert
does not attempt to provide documentary evidence of this
tendency, nor does he allude to the various ethical
guidelines set down by professional medical bodies. Thus,
become mistakenly related, due to the rapid pace of
another. To avoid potential conflicts 
between the attending physician and the 
needs of the transplant team, practices have 
been consolidated which ensure that the 
donor's physician should have no role in the 
transplantation procedure itself.
69 Seifert, (1993, p . 193).
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as discussed above, stipulates that the medical team
involved in the diagnosis of death and the transplant team
should be entirely separate. Moreover, when new standards
for the determination of death were being developed,
transplant surgery was still in a relatively experimental
phase of development. As Lamb has noted:
it should be stressed that in the nineteen 
fifties, long before cardiac transplantation, 
when renal transplantation was highly 
experimental, conducted only on genetically 
identical twins with near total irradiation of 
the recipient, there were profound ethical 
discussions concerning the value of ventilation 
to asystole, when treatment for patients in 
irreversible apnoeic coma was obviously futile 
and increasingly gruesome. Advances in 
resuscitative technology and intensive care made 
it inevitable that attention would focus upon 
neurological integration rather than on the 
maintenance of the cardiac pump, whether or not 
transplantation was involved.70
Seifert also supports his contention by reference to 
the alleged phenomenon of patients having woken from brain 
death. He claims that "such cases are well documented".71 
However the evidence to the contrary seems to invalidate 
his claim. In 1980, a BBC Panorama programme investigated 
the phenomenon of patients who had recovered after 
prolonged periods of unconsciousness.72 Medical reaction to 
the programme demonstrated that the patients who were the 
subjects of the documentary had not met the criteria
article 13 of the Principles of Medical Ethics in Eu r o p e .
70 Lamb, (1993, p.209) .
71 Seifert, (1993, p. 193).
72 See, Bradley and Brooman, (1980, pp.1258-1259).
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required for diagnosis of brain death.73 As one leading
commentator has observed:
[t]o the extent that the existence of brain death 
as a factual state and the reliability of 
measures used to diagnose it have been challenged 
on the grounds of subsequent recovery of 
consciousness in patients satisfying brain death 
criteria, the absence of any reliable reports of 
such recovery strongly supports both existence of 
the state and reliability of the diagnostic 
measures. An argument has sometimes been
presented to the effect that, if recovery has 
been observed following a diagnosis of brain 
death, the concept itself is spurious... There do 
not appear to have been any adequately 
authenticated incidents in which subjects meeting 
all the criteria of brain death have recovered.74
Seifert does not mince his words in spelling out the
perceived moral consequences of transplanting organs from
the brain dead:
[r ]ecognizing the distinction between 
mathematical-metaphysical certainty and moral 
certainty, we must say that we do not possess any 
moral certainty, not even a moral probability, 
that brain death is actually death...
... different kinds of action demand different 
degrees of moral certainty... To commit an action 
which risks killing a person, however, takes the 
highest degree of moral certainty. And such a 
certainty is not only completely absent in the 
case of brain death but all the evidence points 
in the opposite direction.75
It is clear from the tone of his argument that Seifert 
supports an absolutist moral viewpoint similar to that of 
the sanctity of life argument or the formulations to be 
found in classical natural law doctrine. Thus, for him 
there is only moral certainty, despite convincing arguments
73 See further, McCullagh, (1993, pp.34-35).
74 Ibid.
75 Seifert, (1993, p.195).
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conclusion that:
even if the defenders of the brain death 
definitions were theoretically right, they would 
still be morally wrong.76
Seifert's equating of the taking of organs from a patient
who has been pronounced brain dead, with manslaughter seems
to lack any foundation in legal reality. In a 1972 case in
the state of Virginia, Tucker v Lower.77 a court was faced
with such a contention. In that case the question to be
determined was whether the medical practitioners who
removed a brain-dead patient from a respirator and then
transplanted his heart into a patient who was dying of
cardiac failure were guilty of wrongful death. The jury was
directed in the following terms:
[i]n determining the time of death you may 
consider the following elements.. . among them the
time of complete and irreversible loss of all
function of the brain.78
The attitude of Seifert and those who criticise the 
use of brain dead subjects as organ donors has a deeper
significance. As Paris79 has demonstrated, this thinking is
common to diverse groupings who have in common a naturalist 
or creationist view of society and humanity. Examples of
to the contrary. This would explain his casuistical
76 Ibid.
77 Richmond, Virginia L. and Eq. Ct., Unreported, 23 
May, 1972, cited by Paris, (1989, p.37).
78 Ibid.
79 Pans, (1989, pp.38-40).
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such groups range from right to life groups80 to certain 
orthodox Jewish groups.81 In addition, Paris draws a link
80 Paris, (1989, p.38), cites the following examples of 
the right to life stance:
[f]or example, the Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned For Life... testified at a 
legislative hearing that 'it opposes not 
only brain death legislation but any imposed 
definition of death'. Such an action, 
contends Mary Winter, president of People 
Concerned for the Unborn Child, a powerful 
Pittsburgh-based anti-abortion group, 'would 
be the first step to the 'dehumanization' of 
the critically ill and to euthanasia'.
People Concerned's memorandum attacking 
the U .D .D .A . [ The Uniform Determination of
Death Act ,1980] shows the thinking behind 
their position. It begins by 'exposing' 
support for the legislation by 'euthanasia- 
prone' groups and then articulates their 
true worry: 'As pro-lifers, we hold that 
science has proven that human life begins at 
fertilisation. A definition of death which 
refers to brain function is anti-life 
because in the early stages of human 
development there is no brain... A statute 
equating brain function with life would 
further legally dehumanize the unborn'.
While the anti-abortion stance is admirable, 
the statement fails to distinguish those 
with future potential for brain function 
from those who have exhausted that capacity.
81 Paris, (1989, pp.38-39), has discovered only one 
orthodox Jewish spokesman who has publicly denounced the 
brain-based definition of death:
Rabbi David Bleich of Yeshiva University 
opposes brain death standards on the ground 
that independent cardiac activity still 
occurs... He articulated [this view] at a 
1977 conference on Biomedical Ethics in the 
Perspective of Jewish Teaching, when he 
stated 'Dysfunction of the brain should not 
be confused with destruction of the brain.
Only destruction of the brain can be 
entertained as a possible definition of 
death'. Rabbi Moses Tendler (Rabbi Bleich's 
colleague at Yeshiva University), Rabbi 
Seymour Siegal, and Dr. Isaac Franck took 
issue with his interpretation of the 
criteria for the determination of death.
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between the views held by these groups and certain academic 
opponents of brain death, revealing that the motivations of 
such commentators are more than purely academic. They also 
have a moral message to communicate through their 
arguments. He cites the case of the attack on the brain 
death standard by Byrne, O'Reilly and Quay in their 1979 
article.82
Paris demonstrates the influence of traditional
thinking on the authors of this article. In the article,
the authors claim that the destruction of the brain is
necessary for death. Paris adds:
[l]est there be any doubt as to their standard 
for irreversible function, the authors provide 
examples of evidence of death: 'If someone's head 
has been completely crushed by a truck or 
vaporized by a nuclear blast, or if his brain has 
been dissolved by a massive injection of 
sulphuric acid.83
Such extreme examples mirror the extreme views of the
authors on the topic. Such views, Paris points out are
informed by their particular world view:
Dr. Byrne and Father Quay are not content to 
state their position. They claim that a brain- 
function criterion 'stands in flat contradiction 
to the religious beliefs of Christians, Jews, 
Moslems, Hindus and many others'.84
However, Paris, after a search of the available literature
could find no evidence of the above assertion:
[a] thorough search of the literature finds no 
Catholic moral theologian, no Protestant 
ethicist, and but one Orthodox Jewish spokesman
82 See, Byrne, O'Reilly and Quay, (1979, pp.185-190).
83 Paris, (1989, p.38).
84 Ibid.
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supporting their contention.85
2.5 Legal Regulation of Oraan Transplantation.
Introduction.
As already stated, Ireland lacks a statutory framework 
for the regulation of organ transplants. This aspect of 
medical practice is thus regulated by the common law 
doctrine of consent and the ethical guidelines laid down by 
the relevant professional regulatory bodies. This situation 
is far from satisfactory given the many legal difficulties 
which surround this area. It is doubtful that the present 
form of regulation will be sufficient to deal with the 
potential problems which may arise in this particular area 
of the physician-patient relationship. The following 
section identifies the potential areas of difficulty in 
this area and the legislative policies which have been 
adopted by certain other common law jurisdictions to fill 
the interstices in the common law regulatory framework. In 
doing so, my intention is to both stress the need for 
legislative intervention in this field and to analyze the 
possible alternative models available to Irish legislators.
The American Model.
The legislative basis for organ transplantation in the
85 Ibid.
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amended in 1987.87 This legislative model was endorsed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association in 1968 as a response
to the shortage of suitable organs for transplant. The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968 was intended to codify and
make readily accessible the law in relation to organ
transplantation. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968
provides that competent persons of eighteen years or over
may donate a bodily part by will, donor card or other
document.88 Such donation becomes effective on the death of
the donor. Section 1(e) of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
1968 defines a bodily part as:
organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, 
other fluids and any other portions of a human 
body.
The confusion that may arise as to whether the wishes 
of the next-of-kin are to be respected in relation to the 
transfer of the bodily parts of the deceased is dispelled 
by the fact that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968 does 
not require the consent of surviving family members. The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968 does however specify that 
the next-of-kin may authorize a donation only in the 
absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the
United States is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968,86 as
86 8A Uniform Laws Annotated 16 (1983).
87 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1987, 8A Uniform Laws 
Annotated 2 (Supp. 1989).
88 Section 2(a).
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deceased.89 In addition the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
1968 delimits the class of persons or institutions who may 
become valid donees of gifts of bodies or parts of bodies. 
These are outlined as follows in section 3:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for 
medical or dental education, research, 
advancement of medical or dental science, 
therapy, or transplantation; or
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, 
college or university for education, research, 
advancement of medical or dental science or 
therapy; or
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or 
dental education, research, advancement of 
medical or dental science, therapy or 
transplantation; or
(4) any specified individual for therapy or 
transplantation needed by him.
While improving the situation in relation to the 
availability of suitable organs for donation, the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act 1968 did not provide a complete 
solution to the problem of the shortage of supply in 
transplantable organs. As Childress has noted:
89 Section 2(b). Where the deceased has not specified 
his intentions in relation to the use of his bodily parts 
on death, section 2(b) also sets out which members of the 
surviving family take priority in making the decision:
[w]here the decedent has not previously made 
her wishes known the following persons, in 
order of priority stated... may give all or 
any part of the decedent's body for any 
purpose specified in section 3:
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) the guardian of the person of the 
decedent at the time of his death,
(6) any other person authorized or under 
obligation to dispose of the body.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1987 amended this list to 
include "a grandparent of the decedent" after "(4) an adult 
brother or sister" and eliminates the former number (6).
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[o]pinion polls indicate that individuals are 
more willing to donate the organs of family 
members and even of their own children than they 
are to donate their own organs by signing donor 
cards. In a series of polls, over eighty per cent 
of the respondents indicated that they were very 
or somewhat likely to donate the organs of family 
members... A cynical interpretation of these 
results would be mistaken. When put in the 
context of the stated reasons for reluctance to 
sign donor cards, the opinion polls suggest 
rather that the individuals who donate family 
members' organs can view themselves as buffers or 
barriers between the untrustworthy system and the 
potential source of organs... When there is a 
signed donor card, people cannot see a protective 
buffer or barrier because the donation in 
principle, though not in practice, has already 
occurred unless the donor changes his or her mind 
before incompetence or death.90
In practice only a tiny percentage of those who are used as
organ donors actually have in their possession a donor card
on their being pronounced dead.91 It is thus open to the
next-of-kin to make the decision in relation to the
donation of the deceased's bodily parts.
Another difficulty is the misplaced fear on the part
of many physicians of legal action. Thus, even in cases
where the deceased is carrying an organ donor card at the
time of his death, many doctors will not remove a bodily
part without first requesting the permission of the
surviving relatives.92 In addition, there is a certain
90 Childress, (1989, pp.93-94). See also, Prottas, 
(1993, pp.137-150).
91 Anonymous, (1990, p. 1619).
92 See, Task Force on Organ Transplantation, (1986, 
p.30), where it is stated that despite:
the recovery of organs from thousands of 
donors annually for more than a decade and 
increasing litigation throughout the health 
care system, law suits arising out of organ
93
reluctance among some medical personnel to remove organs
from beating heart donors, such as those patients who have
been declared brain dead. This delay is fatal in terms of
obtaining a salvageable organ. To prevent injury to the
recipient of the transplant organ, organs must be removed
when the brain function has ceased but while the heart and
lungs are being maintained by means of artificial
respiration. As one commentator has put it:
[tjhere still remains an uneasiness about the 
provision of meticulous care to a human being who 
may be physiologically stable but legally dead, 
and this is enhanced by the fact that 
sophisticated medical care is suddenly and 
irrevocably withdrawn once organs are harvested 
from such patients.93
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ 
Transplantation Act 198494 in an effort to encourage 
greater donations of useable organs. The National Organ 
Transplantation Act 1984 provided for a means of grant- 
aiding organ procurement agencies and created a national 
organ procurement and matching network. The 1984 Act also 
specifically criminalized the purchase and sale of all 
human organs for transplant. However, in policy terms these 
legislative models have not produced the desired effect, an 
equilibrium between organs supplied and organs required. In 
fact, the number of those awaiting organ donations far 
outstrips the number of available organs. This has led to
procurement are almost unknown.
93 Cited in McCullagh, (1993, p.81).
94 42 United States Code Annotated section 273 (c) 
(West Supp. 1989).
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further policy initiatives in this area in an attempt to 
strike a balance between supply and demand. These 
initiatives shall now be discussed.
Presumed Consent Laws.
In the United States, a number of states have 
introduced presumed consent laws which allow the removal of 
organs on the basis of the presumed consent of the deceased 
or the deceased's surviving relatives in the absence of an 
expressed desire not to have his or her organs harvested on 
death. These laws generally pertain to either corneal 
tissue or pituitary glands.95 The presumed consent laws 
generally apply when a body is under the jurisdiction of a 
coroner.96 The laws allow the coroner to authorize the 
removal of corneal tissue or pituitary glands or in rare 
cases, eyes, where a request for such tissue for the 
purpose of transplant or therapy is made by an authorized 
recipient; where the removal would not interfere with the 
course of an autopsy; where the removal would not alter the 
deceased's facial appearance; and where no objection by 
either the deceased or the next-of-kin is known to the 
coroner. The final criterion is often referred to as an 
opt-out provision, whereby there exists a rebuttable
95 See further, Jaffe, (1990, pp.535-536).
96 For example, a coroner is normally empowered to 
carry out an autopsy in order to establish the cause of 
death of an individual who has died in suspicious 
circumstances, in an accident or as the result of criminal 
activity.
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presumption, based on the deceased's pre-mortem silence on 
the matter, that the organs are available for 
transplantation.
This presumption may be rebutted by the next-of-kin 
making known their objection to the use of the deceased's 
organs in such a manner. The coroner is under no duty to 
enquire into the exact wishes of the next-of-kin or the 
deceased. It is for the next-of-kin to come forward with 
any objection to the transplant. Moreover, the coroner is 
afforded immunity from suit in the event of the next-of-kin 
suing the coroner after the removal of the organs in
question on the grounds that the consent of the next-of-kin
was not obtained.97
This has not prevented a number of litigants 
challenging presumed consent statutes on constitutional 
grounds.98 In State v Powell.99 the parents of the victim 
of a road traffic accident challenged the action of the 
coroner who had removed the deceased's corneal tissue
without their consent.
At first instance, the Florida presumed consent
statute was found to be unconstitutional in that it 
violated procedural and substantive due process, deprived 
the surviving family members of equal protection and was
97 See, Jaffe, (1990, pp.536-538).
98 State v Powell 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert, 
denied. 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Georgia Lions Eye Bank v
Lavant 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985); Tillman v Detroit 
Receiving Hospital 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
99 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert, deniedf 481 U.S. 
1059 (1987).
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tantamount to a taking of private property for a non-public 
purpose. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the state of 
Florida reversed this decision. The Florida Supreme Court 
analyzed the objectives of the presumed consent law and 
concluded that it was a reasonable means of achieving a 
permissible legislative objective of providing sight to 
many of Florida's blind citizens.100
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the 
physical invasion of cornea removal was infinitesimally 
small in comparison to the autopsy itself.101 On the 
question of the intervention constituting a taking of 
private property for a non-public purpose it was held that 
there were no property rights in a dead body, and that as 
a result no unconstitutional taking had occurred in this 
case. In Georgia Lions Eye Bank v Lavant.102 the parents of 
an infant who had died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome took 
an action against the defendant eye bank which had been 
authorized by the coroner to remove corneal tissue during 
an autopsy.
At first instance, it was held that the piece of 
legislation governing presumed consent in the state of 
Georgia was in violation of due process in that it deprived 
individuals of a property right in the corpse of the next- 
of-kin, and that it failed to provide notice and an
100 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert denied at 1191.
101 Ibid.
102 255 Ga. 60, 355 S.E.2d 127 (1985).
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opportunity to object to the taking of the tissue.103 The 
decision was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of 
the state of Georgia. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the lower court holding that there is no 
constitutional property right in the body of a deceased 
person.
The Georgia Supreme Court did add that at common law 
there existed, what amounted to, a quasi-property right in 
a corpse, this common law right was of no significance 
constitutionally.104 In Tillman v Detroit Receiving 
Hospital105 the plaintiff claimed that the statute 
authorizing removal of corneal tissue without consent was 
a breach of the constitutional right to privacy. However, 
the plaintiff's argument was rejected on the grounds that 
the constitutional right to privacy is a personal right 
which ends with the death of the individual to whom it 
attaches.
These cases all tended to support the notion that as 
property rights do not inhere in the body then as a result 
the non-consensual taking of bodily matter is legally 
acceptable in this particular instance. It may have been 
entirely appropriate to formulate a judicial rule which 
prohibited a property right in the human body in the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century when the concepts of 
organ harvesting or 'gene rape' were unheard of. However,
103 355 S.E.2d 127 (1985), p.128.
104 Ibid.
105 360 N . W. 2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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can such a stance be justified today in a world which has 
changed beyond the recognition of those who framed this so- 
called 'no property7 rule? Those who extol the virtues of 
a judge-made system of laws speak of the ability of such a 
system to adapt to changing societal scenarios. However, in 
this instance, as in many others, the common law system has 
been found wanting.
In the context of presumed consent laws therefore,
this leads to a situation where the non-consensual taking
1)
of bodily materials is legally valid and not open to
constitutional challenge. While the intention behind such
laws is laudable, the wider availability of transplant
organs and tissue, the moral question of the justifiability
of using individuals as mere spare part banks remains. The
problem is articulated thus by James Childress:
for presumed donation to be ethically valid, it 
must satisfy very rigorous standards. Silence may 
only indicate a lack of understanding of the 
means of dissent or of the proposed course of 
action; hence vigorous public education would be 
required, along with easy ways to register 
dissent.106
The difficulties raised by the non-adherence to the
doctrine of informed consent in this area could, to a large
degree, be dissipated if one were to use the theory of
tacit consent as the basis for such intervention, argues
Childress. He frames this argument in the following terms:
tacit consent... is consent that is expressed 
silently or passively by omissions or by failures 
to indicate or signify dissent... The potential 
consenter must be aware of what is going on and 
know that consent or refusal is appropriate, must
106 Childress, (1989, p.97).
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have a reasonable period of time for objection, 
and must understand that expressions of dissent 
will not be allowed after this period ends. He or 
she must also understand the accepted means for 
expressing dissent, and these means must be 
reasonable and relatively easy to perform. 
Finally, the effects of dissent cannot be 
'extremely detrimental to the potential 
consenter7. Some of these conditions ensure the 
consenter7s understanding; others ensure the 
consenter7s voluntariness. When these conditions 
are met, the potential consenter7s silence may be 
construed as tacit consent. Such consent may be 
ethically valid in some circumstances.107
The philosophical foundations of the theory of tacit
consent are to be found in the writings of John Locke.108
Locke adverted to tacit consent in the context of the
relationship between the individual and the state, but such
107 Ibid., pp.96-97. See also the discussion of tacit 
consent by Simmons, (1976, pp.279-280), where he 
establishes similar criteria for the validity of a tacit 
consent:
(1) [t]he situation must be such that it is 
perfectly clear that consent is appropriate
and that the individual is aware of this.
This includes the requirement that the 
potential consenter be awake and aware of 
what is happening. (2) There must be a 
definite period of reasonable duration when 
objections or expressions of dissent are 
invited or clearly appropriate, and the 
acceptable means of expressing this dissent 
must be understood by or made known to the 
potential consenter. (3) The point at which 
expressions of consent are no longer 
allowable must be made clear in some way to 
the potential consenter... (4) The means
acceptable for indicating dissent must be 
reasonable and reasonably easily performed.
(5) The consequences of dissent cannot be 
extremely detrimental to the potential 
consenter. The violation of either (4) or
(5) will mean that silence cannot be taken 
as a sign of consent, even though the other 
conditions for consent and tacit consent be 
satisfied.
108 Locke, (1994, section 119, pp.347-348).
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a model can be applied in equal measure to relations 
between patients and doctors or between individuals 
generally. Locke framed the discussion in the following 
terms:
[t]he difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon 
as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. 
how far any one shall be looked on to have 
consented, and thereby submitted to any 
government, where he has made no expressions of 
it at all. And to this I say, that every man, 
that hath any possession, or enjoyment, of any 
part of the dominions of any government, doth 
thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far 
forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that 
government.109
In applying this model of tacit consent to the organ 
transplant situation, one may argue that presumed consent 
laws while having survived constitutional challenge, do not 
perhaps value the sovereignty of the individual. As Locke 
put it:
[f]or a man, not having > the power over his own 
life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, 
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under 
the absolute, arbitrary power of another.110
This is a definition of the concept of inalienable rights.
Thus, an individual may not give up such rights even where
he has consented to do so. An example of a so-called
inalienable right is the right to life. Thus, the criminal
law m  Ireland has adopted this notion in the rule that an
individual cannot consent to his own murder.
However, a necessary condition of an inalienable right
is that such a right inheres m  an individual. In the case
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., section 23, p.24.
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of presumed consent the law does not recognize a right to
property in the body, therefore the question of an
inalienable right in this instance does not arise. If,
however, one were to recognize a right to property m  the
body, could such a right be classed as an inalienable right
and therefore not amenable to transfer, making presumed
consent laws invalid?
The idea of presumed consent has not won total
approval in the United States. Veatch has argued that such
a model is antithetical to individual autonomy. He argues:
[i]f the body is essential to the individual's 
identity, in a society which values personal 
integrity and freedom, it must be the 
individual's first of all to control, not only 
over a lifetime, but within reasonable limits 
after that life is gone as well. If the body is 
to be made available to others for personal or 
societal research, it must be a gift.111
Thus, Veatch would favour a model similar to that of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968, based on the idea of
consensual giving or donation of the organ. Ramsey bases
his argument on a similar view:
[t]he positive consent called for by Gift Acts, 
answering the need for gifts by encouraging real 
givers, meets the measure of authentic community 
among men. The routine taking of organs would 
deprive individuals of the exercise of the virtue 
of generosity.112
However, Ramsey is not altogether in favour of the 
model represented by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968. 
He would alter this model and proposes in its stead the 
following formula:
111 Veatch, (1976, pp.268-269).
112 Ramsey, (1970, p. 210).
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the pre-mortem giving of cadaver organs ought 
also be if possible a familial or shared 
decision. So also families that shared in pre- 
mortem giving of organs could share in freely 
receiving if one of them needs transplant 
therapy. This would be - if workable -; a 
civilizing exchange of benefit that is not the 
same as commerce in organs.113
This model may not be entirely workable in practice. Indeed
as one commentator has put it:
[t]he family in its most intense moment of grief 
must sign or refuse to sign approval forms. Any 
policy that places the onus of approval on the 
family at the moment of death is not only 
insensitive but doomed to failure. When a young 
person... suddenly and unexpectedly dies, his 
family may be dumbfounded, may find it difficult 
if not impossible to believe that he has died, 
and yet at the same time be agonizingly aware of 
the fact that he has died. In addition to being 
stunned, a family member in grief often bears a 
sense of guilt. When the family is in such a 
frame of mind, it would be inclined to see the 
granting of permission for the removal of any 
organ from the deceased as hurting or violating 
or demeaning the loved one.
When we find ourselves in these 'boundary 
situations' - when our lives have become 
unravelled - we need ritual, routine, and 
automatic procedures. These procedures ought to 
be those that reflect our collective judgment 
expressed in more normal times.114
One way in which one could justify the presumed
consent model is on the utilitarian basis of effectiveness.
In comparison to the donation or voluntarist model, the
presumed consent model increases the supply of useable
organs. As Childress has noted:
[p]resumed consent laws] have been effective. For 
example, substantial increases occurred in cornea 
transplants in the few years after such 
legislation in Georgia (from 25 in 1978 to over 
1,000 in 1984) and Florida (from 500 in 1978 to
113 Ibid., pp.212-213.
114 Muyskens, (1978, p.96).
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over 3,000 in 1984)... It is possible that 
presumed consent laws endure without major vocal 
opposition because of different views about
different [human body parts] - corneas versus 
solid organs - and because the public is largely 
unaware of these laws, even in the dozen or so 
states where they exist.115
However, after noting the arguments for such laws,
Childress concludes that they are ultimately not ethically
valid. He bases this view on the fact that the public are
largely unaware of such laws. From this he infers the
following:
presumed donation laws are not ethically valid 
because of a lack of understanding on the part of 
the 'donors7 who are allegedly 'donating' by 
their silence. Under such circumstances the 
policy is actually one of expropriation 
masquerading as presumed consent.116
There are others, however, who favour the utilitarian
argument in favour of presumed consent. Harris argues this
case forcefully when he writes:
[i]s the squeamishness, sentimentality or 
ignorance of relatives of the dead a sufficiently 
important value to warrant protection at the cost 
of hundreds of lives annually?... If the state 
can order post-mortem examination of the dead on 
the slightest pretexts, where for example there 
is the vaguest suspicion as to the cause of 
death, how much more important and useful it 
would be to order post-mortem transplantation! If 
the ability to use cadaver organs for transplants 
were automatic there is no doubt that many 
hundreds, perhaps even many thousands of lives 
could be saved annually at the same 'social cost7 
that we already (willingly?) pay for judicial 
certainty as to the cause of death.117
This view is far removed from the traditional voluntarist
115 Childress, (1989, p.98).
116 Ibid.
117 Harris, (1983, pp.228-229).
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model and appears to condone such non-consensual taking on 
mere utilitarian grounds, without even seeking to add the 
perfunctory justificatory device of tacit consent. This 
model would appear to be at odds with the traditional model 
of the corpse as deserving of residual respect.
Others would reject this traditional model of residual 
respect for the corpse by differentiating between non- 
consensual acts aimed at the living and those aimed at the 
dead. Jonsen, for example, argues that the main purpose of 
the doctrine of consent is to protect the autonomy of the 
living and this purpose is no longer relevant to the corpse 
which has no autonomy and as a result cannot be harmed. 
Jonsen also recognizes that there are secondary purposes of 
consent which include respecting the pre-mortem wishes of 
the deceased and observing cultural practices in relation 
to burial. However, Jonsen argues that such secondary 
purposes:
would seem to yield before the significant value 
of therapy for those suffering from serious 
illness... The genuine possibility of significant 
benefit to others overrides any secondary 
purposes that consent and permission might 
have.118
The views of Harris and Jonsen, while being arguably
justifiable on utilitarian grounds, tend to avoid the more
complex moral question of why a corpse cannot be harmed and
the repercussions of this view for the consent model in
general. As Childress puts it:
[a]lthough Jonsen's approach merits careful 
consideration, it fails to see that people can be
118 Jonsen, (1988, p . 219).
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wronged even when they are not harmed (e.g., by 
having their will thwarted after their deaths), 
and that socio-cultural practices of disposal of 
the body remain very important for various 
communities, including the family and religious 
communities. Even if respect for autonomy, like 
all other principles is only prima facie binding, 
it cannot be justifiably overridden unless there 
is no acceptable alternative.119
Required Request Laws.
A different legislative response to the perceived 
failure of the donation or voluntarist model of organ 
procurement can be seen in the so-called required request 
laws adopted by certain states in the United States. These 
laws provide that hospital administrators are required to 
ask or designate a member or members of staff to ask next- 
of-kin about the possibility of organ donation when death 
has been pronounced.120
The revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1987 provides 
for this form of organ procurement policy. Section 4(a)(2) 
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1987 allows the coroner 
to authorize the removal of organs or other tissues only 
after reasonable efforts have been made to notify the neXt- 
of-kin and obtain their consent for donation. This policy 
differs from presumed consent in that all reasonable 
efforts must first be made on the part of the hospital to 
obtain the consent of the deceased's next-of-kin. However, 
in practice, the policy has met with a number of obstacles.
119 Childress, (1989, p.98).
120 See, Caplan, (1984, pp.981-983).
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Most importantly, there appears to be a reluctance on the
part of hospital administrators and physicians to implement
such policies, on the basis that such a request would be
perceived as pressurizing the family at an emotionally
stressful time. As Caplan has noted:
[t]here are many within the transplant community 
who are still committed to the notion that organ 
donation should be voluntary... There are others 
who still believe that donation is an act of 
heroism or supererogation and that families ought 
not to be forced or coerced into being
heroes.121
Routine Inquiry.
Routine inquiry is another model which has been 
adopted in the United States in an attempt to increase the 
supply of transplant organs. This was a federal initiative 
enacted by means of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
19 8 6.122 This model provides that in order to remain
eligible for Medicare or Medicaid funds, hospitals must 
create written protocols for the identification of 
potential organ donors so that the next-of-kin of potential 
organ donors will be aware of the possibility of consenting 
to the transplant of the deceased's organs.
It is thus the family and not the potential donor who 
make the decision in relation to the transplanting of
organs. This, it has been noted, abandons the principle of
121 Caplan, (1989, pp.305-306). See m  addition, 
Prottas, and Batten, (1988, pp.642-645).
122 42 United States Code section 1320b-8 (Supp. V
1987).
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individual autonomy in favour of the more utilitarian
objective of obtaining more transplant organs:
[r]outine inquiry is thus a scheme to obtain 
organs from individuals who, statistically, are 
known to be unwilling to donate... The current 
system of routine familial inquiry sacrifices 
individual autonomy... in an attempt to obtain 
more cadaveric organs.123
Moreover, there is no conclusive proof that such a
curtailment of the ideal of individual autonomy achieves
its utilitarian objective.124
The English Model. 
English Common Law.
As with all other forms of surgical procedure, the 
common law doctrine of consent is of relevance in 
determining the legality or otherwise of organ transplants. 
Thus, to establish the prima facie validity of organ 
donation in a living donor, the patient must give voluntary 
consent to the procedure, be aware of what he is consenting 
to and be competent to give that consent.125
123 Anonymous, (1990, p.1621).
124 Ibid., where it is noted that in the aftermath of 
the introduction of this policy, 16,363 patients were 
awaiting a kidney, 1,324 were awaiting a heart, 830 were 
awaiting a liver, 240 a heart-lung combination, 322 a 
pancreas, and 94 a lung.
125 See further, Dworkin, (1970, pp. 353-355). See in 
addition, Skegg, (1984, p.36), who observes that:
sometimes a procedure is performed on a 
person in the knowledge that it will 
certainly be to that person's bodily 
detriment. This is the case when a kidney is 
removed from a healthy person, for
1 0 8
However, in the case of the cadaver donor the consent 
model is not as easily applicable. As will be seen in the 
later discussion on the common law 'no property' rule m  
relation to the corpse, the law is in a far from healthy 
state on this issue.
Suffice it to say that the English common law does not 
recognize a specific right of property in the body of a 
deceased person or a living person for that matter.126 
However, the common law authority on the alienability or 
otherwise of the corpse was developed in a time when 
anaesthetics were barely conceived of, and when the nearest 
one was likely to get to the notion of organ 
transplantation was by reading the fiction of Mary Shelley. 
Given the rapid development of organ transplant technology 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, it was 
imperative that this area of medical intervention be 
adequately regulated by statute.
transplantation into someone who is in need 
of it. The operation is a major one and is j 
not without risks. But it is not 
unreasonably dangerous, and the probable 
benefit to the recipient far outweighs the 
probable detriment to the donor. Hence, if 
called upon to deal with a case in which a 
kidney had been removed from a consenting 
adult, for transplantation into someone in 
need of it, the courts may confidently be 
expected to take the view that the operation 
did not amount to the offence of battery.
126 See the detailed discussion of the topic of the body 
as property in section 2.7 of this chapter, pp.140-161.
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English Legislative Models.
Corneal Grafting Act 1952. This Act contained a variation
on the theme of presumed consent.
It provided that the person m  lawful possession of
the cadaver could authorize the transplant of corneal
tissue in the absence of any reason to believe that either
the deceased or the next-of-kin had expressed a dissent on
the matter. This Act was subsequently repealed by the Human
Tissue Act 1961. The introduction of the Human Tissue Act
1961 witnessed a change in policy from the quasi-presumed
consent model to the reasonable enquiry model. The Human
Tissue Act 1961 in section 1(1) provides that the removal
of an organ shall be valid if the deceased:
either in writing at any time or orally in the 
presence of two or more witnesses during his last 
illness, has expressed a request that his body or 
any specified part of his body be used after his 
death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of 
medical education or research, the person 
lawfully in possession of his body after his 
death may, unless he has reason to believe that 
the request was subsequently withdrawn, authorise 
the removal from the body of any part or, as the 
case may be, the specified part, for use in 
accordance with the request.
However, if the deceased had not expressed a wish on the
issue then the Act provided in section 1(2) that the person
lawfully in possession of the body of the deceased127 could
The first legislative development in this area was the
127 While the common law has refused to recognize a 
right of property in the corpse, it has allowed for a 
possessory interest in the corpse. See for example, Williams 
v Williams (1882) 20 Ch.D 659; R. v Fox (1841) 2 Q.B. 246 
and R.v Feist (1858) Dears and Bell 590. Meyers, (1990, 
p.190), notes that:
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authorise the removal of any part from the body for
transplantation purposes or for the purposes of medical 
education or research if, having made such reasonable 
enquiry as may be practicable, he had no reason to believe 
either:
(a) that the deceased had expressed an objection 
to his body being so dealt with after his death, 
and had not withdrawn it; or
(b) that the surviving spouse or any surviving 
relative of the deceased objects to the body 
being so dealt with.
The Act while purportedly allowing the individual to
control the manner m  which his body shall be used after
his death does not necessarily lead to such a situation in
practice. As Mason and McCall-Smith observe, in the event
of the next-of-kin of the deceased objecting to the
donation request of the deceased:
they could overrule any specific request made by 
the deceased. Even allowing for the fact that the 
relatives have no locus standi to object to the 
removal of organs under section 1(1), the doctor 
is in a difficult position in the event of their 
objections being voiced. On the one hand, he has 
legal justification to proceed and he may, 
rightly, be thinking of the potential recipients.
On the other, it would be extremely hard to 
justify in ethical terms a decision to add 
further suffering to the bereaved.128
[a] careful distinction needs to be drawn 
here between the person with right to 
possession of the corpse - almost certainly 
the surviving spouse or next-of-kin under 
common law - and the person in possession of 
the deceased's corpse - almost certainly the 
institution where he expires. The Act is 
concerned with the latter, tangible 
possession, which the hospital clearly has, 
though it may well be otherwise bound to 
transfer the possession to the relatives.
128 Mason and McCall-Smith, (1991, p . 308).
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a situation where it seems to raise more problems than it
actually solves. In section 1(2) the term "reasonable
enquiry as may be practicable" is not defined m  the Act,
nor has it been the subject of an authoritative judicial
definition.129 This oversight coupled with certain other
infelicities of drafting style130 has led the British
Transplantation Society to put forward proposals for the
amendment of the Act. Specifically, the Society has called
for the repeal of section 1(2) of the Act and its
replacement by the following wording:
[w]ithout prejudice to the foregoing subsection, 
the person lawfully in possession of the body of 
a deceased person may authorise the removal of 
any part from the body for use for the said 
purpose if, having made such inquiry as is both 
reasonable and practicable in the time available, 
he has no reason to believe that the deceased had 
expressed an objection (which he was not known to 
have withdrawn) to his body being so dealt with 
after his death.
Provided that authorization shall not be 
given under this subsection if the person 
lawfully in possession of the body has reason to 
believe that the surviving spouse or any 
surviving relative of the deceased objects to the 
body being so dealt with.1312
The Society also proposed the addition of a new 
subsection to section 1 which would clarify the position in 
relation to who had possession of the corpse for the 
purposes of the Act:
The ambiguous nature of the wording of the Act has led to
129 See further, Dworkin, (1970, pp.353-357).
130 The failure in section 1 to define the person in 
lawful possession of the body of the deceased; the failure 
to define 'relative' for the purposes of the Act.
131 British Transplantation Society, (1975), cited in 
Kennedy and Grubb, (1994, p.1171).
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[f]or the avoidance of doubt in the 
interpretation of this section, it is hereby 
declared :
(a) that the hospital authority is the person in 
possession of the body of a deceased person lying 
in the hospital, and that this possession is 
lawful until such time as the hospital authority 
fails to comply with a request for possession of 
the body, made by the person who has the right to 
immediate possession of it.
(b) That a printed but personally signed 'donor 
card', or other document, is ' m  writing7 for the 
purpose of subsection 1 of this section.
(c) The 'time available7, for the purpose of an 
inquiry under subsection 2 of this section 
extends only until the moment at which steps must 
be taken to remove the part of the body, if it is 
to be suitable for the therapeutic or other 
purpose m  question.132
However, the proposals of the Transplantation Society were
not adopted by the legislature.
As in the United States, legislation has not solved
the problem of a shortfall in the number of donor organs
available for transplantation. In 1987, the then Department
of Health and Social Security requested the Conference of
Medical Royal Colleges and their Faculties in the United
Kingdom to set up a working party to investigate the
reasons behind the shortage of donor organs for transplant.
The Report of the working party chaired by Sir Raymond
Hoffenberg did not lead to any change in legislative policy
in this area.133 Indeed, the Report displayed a certain
antipathy to the introduction of either required request or
presumed consent laws.
In recent years, the situation in relation to the
132 Ibid.
133 Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their 
Faculties in the United Kingdom, (Hoffenberg Report) (1987, 
pp.1-3).
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under-supply of organs for transplantation in the United 
Kingdom has not improved. Recent figures reveal that a 
total of 5,700 people are awaiting an organ transplant.134 
However, the only policy response on the part of the 
government has been to set up a national computer register 
of organ donors, m  an effort to increase the number of 
people choosing to donate their organs on death. The 
government has therefore decided to retain the voluntarist 
model, rather than adopt presumed consent or required 
request laws.
2.6 Beyond Consent: Suggested Solutions to the Problem of 
Procurement and Allocation of Scarce Organs.
Due to the apparent failure of extant methods of organ 
procurement, attention has been focused- on more 
controversial means of obtaining human tissue. These organ 
procurement models shall now be examined in order to 
determine their legal and ethical validity.
134 See, Hunt, (1994, p.6). The article cites the 
following as the primary reasons for the shortage of organ 
donors:
organs are usually taken only from patients who 
have died in intensive care units. In addition, 
about thirty per cent of all families asked by 
doctors to agree to donation of a relative's 
organs refuse to give their consent. The success 
of the seat-belt campaign has also reduced the 
number of organ donors; donors from fatal road 
accidents fell from twenty-nine per cent in 1989 
to nineteen per cent in 1993. In addition, 
medical advances mean that more people are being 
kept alive to benefit from a transplant, 
intensifying demand further.
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Compulsory Transfer of Body Parts.
John Harris has advocated a policy of compulsory 
transfer of body parts m  order to save the lives of those 
who are suffering from diseased organs. However, his model 
involves the killing of a third party to obtain these 
organs :
[w]henever doctors have two or more dying 
patients who could be saved by transplants, and 
no suitable organs have come to hand through 
'natural' deaths, they can ask a central computer 
to supply a suitable donor. The computer will 
then pick the number of a suitable donor at 
random and he will be killed so that the lives of 
two or more others may be saved.135
This so-called 'survival lottery' would have as its aim the
saving of a greater number of lives than it takes. The
implications of such a scheme for individual liberty are
quite far-reaching. Moreover, the scheme may not even save
as many lives as was envisaged. Harris adverts to this
difficulty when he writes:
[o]ne feature of the survival lottery... makes 
its implementation less than attractive. This 
feature is the tendency of the lottery to lead to 
a gradual deterioration of the health of any 
society which operates it. This happens in two 
ways. The first is caused by the fact since 
diseased organs are no use for transplantation, 
the computer would select only healthy donors, 
thus discriminating unfairly against the 
healthy... and also... gradually leading to a 
society in which those with healthy organs... 
were weeded out. This would be re-enforced by the 
second way in which the lottery would undermine 
the health of a society, namely by removing the 
disincentives to imprudent action. For why should 
I curtail my smoking and drinking because they 
are unhealthy practices when my diseased organs 
can and will always be replaced... the survival
135 Harris, (1980, p . 69).
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lottery will gradually lead to a society 
depopulated of the prudent and populated by the 
imprudent. And thus to a society in which 
eventually it would be difficult to find suitable 
donors and thus both to a situation in which the 
lottery would cease to save many lives and also 
to one in which the healthy would live under 
virtual sentence of death.136
This leads Harris to amend his proposal. His refined 
model would confine the 'survival lottery' to the dying. 
This scheme would be voluntary and would take the following 
form:
[w]henever two or more patients could be saved by 
the sacrifice of one then either straws could be 
drawn, or more fairly, a nation-wide scheme would 
be introduced to maximise the advantage. This 
could be a voluntary scheme and ought to prove 
attractive to the dying.137
Harris is also in favour of a scheme which would allow for
the non-consensual removal of organs from cadavers and
permanently unconscious patients.
Harris's model has been criticized by Rakowski138 who
argues that there is no need for a lottery in such a
situation. He believes that:
[t]he order of natural death could generally be 
used to determine who became a donor and who a 
recipient if cadaver organs were in insufficient 
supply... If for some reason... only live donors 
would serve, they could be taken in the order in 
which their vital signs waned irreversibly. Why 
not let the Fates spin the wheel? The problem 
cannot be that if one let nature choose the 
victims, the number of lives saved would not be 
maximized because those on their deathbeds 
sometimes have fewer reusable organs than more
136 Ibid., p.80.
137 Ibid., p.81.
138 Rakowski, (1993, pp.341-342).
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virile patients.139
Rakowski m  this instance would favour a voluntary scheme
if this were m  fact feasible. He states that:
forcing all to face the same odds of becoming an 
unwilling donor would be patently unfair to those 
who prudently kept their chances of organ failure 
low and who would not have agreed to become a 
member of a maximizing scheme on the same terms 
as less careful participants...
Even those who bear the same risks... might 
have different attitudes towards participation.
Some people dying of heart disease might gladly 
gamble with the time remaining to them in 
exchange for some chance of receiving a 
transplant, while others might prefer to finish 
out their days and then sleep, rather than risk 
immediate death to win an indefinitely long but 
dreary reprieve. Some might also decline to join 
for religious or moral reasons... Mandatory 
participation by ailing patients or the 
population at large in an organ transplant scheme 
that minimized deaths would therefore be a 
violation of right, not its embodiment.140
Rakowski has nonetheless argued for a policy of non­
voluntary post-mortem organ transplants and mandatory 
transfer of organs from living donors, which does not
involve the taking of the 'donor's' life. Rakowski's view
is based on a model of distributive justice which holds 
that nobody should have less valuable resources and
opportunities available to him than anyone else, merely 
because of some chance happening the risk of which he did 
not choose to occur. For his purposes he considers human 
body parts to be resources because such materials are:
something that a person needs to accomplish his 
ends, no different in this respect from the 
nutrients necessary to sustain life or the 
intelligence essential to prudent or productive
139 Ibid. , p. 342.
140 Ibid. , p. 344 .
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action.141
transfer of cadaver organs should be preferred over the
compulsory removal of organs from the living. The fact that
organ transplants carry a degree of risk for both donor and
recipient and are quite expensive leads him to this
conclusion.142 He believes that:
[r]ational persons could be expected to support 
a policy of compulsory cadaver donation, given 
the disparity between the cost to the unwilling 
donor and the g a m s  to potential recipients. Or, 
at the very least, it seems highly unlikely that 
they would oppose such a policy with anything 
approaching unanimity, and the burden of 
justifying, by reference to collective consent, 
a modification of the rule that equality of 
fortune yields is on those who would change the 
rule. It is certainly not asking overmuch of 
someone (or his relatives) to relinquish his 
organs when he can no longer use them and to live 
with the knowledge that through his death he may 
become a greater benefactor than his will
indicates.143
Rakowski, however, does not rule out a scheme of 
mandatory transfer of non-essential organs from the living 
to individuals in need through no fault of their own. This 
would only be applicable if a scheme for compulsory
transfer of cadaver organs could not meet demand. Thus,
under this model it would be appropriate to remove a kidney 
from someone with two functioning kidneys to save the life 
of an individual with kidney failure not brought about as 
the result of some risky activity in which he had
Rakowski is of the opinion that, ideally, compulsory
141 Ibid., p. 168.
142 Ibid., pp. 169-170.
143 Ibid. , p.170.
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participated. He justifies this on the basis that:
the loss of an organ would rarely force someone 
to alter his lifestyle radically and because 
someone denied a donation would certainly
die.144
This conception of the compulsory transfer of body
parts based on a model of distributive justice is not
supported by other commentators. Thus, theorists such as
Ronald Dworkin would argue that a model of distributive
justice should make a distinction between the persons in
that model and the resources which should be allocated to
them on the basis of equality. Body parts in this
conception of distributive justice would not be considered
to be resources and would not be counted among the goods
which may be allocated to persons within the model. Dworkin
tends to the belief that the change brought about in the
individual's lifestyle by the forced removal of a body part
may not be as insignificant as may at first appear:
[w]ould it be outrageous to require blood 
donations according to some fair lottery? Kidney 
donations? Eye donations? We might well wish to 
resist this chain of questions by adopting a 
prophylactic line that comes close to making the 
body inviolate, that is, making body parts not 
part of social resources at all. We might justify 
this by appealing to the importance of protecting 
the person, and the danger m  adopting any line 
less bright. That kind of impulse contributes, I 
think, to our repugnance in contemplating even 
minor maiming as a punishment, even when a 
convicted criminal would prefer losing, say, a 
finger to a long jail sentence.145
Rakowski takes exception to these criticisms of a 
compulsory organ transfer scheme. Firstly he believes that
144 Ibid., p. 348.
145 Dworkin, (1983, p. 39).
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the cost of not going beyond Dworkin's 'prophylactic' line
is the lives of individuals with kidney failure and the
sight of those without functioning corneas.146 Secondly, he
argues that such transfers would not entail a profound
personality change in the donor:
[t]hose who lose their vision in one eye or the 
services of one of their kidneys are not normally 
viewed as different persons on that account, nor 
are those who donate an eye or a kidney 
voluntarily. But if the worst case is not greatly 
to be feared, because it is practically 
impossible to go too far, then empowering 
officials to decide when body parts should be 
transferred should not pose much danger of 
murder, assuming that a radical transformation of 
someone's personality should indeed be so 
regarded. Hence, there appears no need for a 
bright line making the body inviolate.147
This counter-argument appears to assume that nothing short
of murder is serious enough to prevent unwanted
interference with the body of an individual.
This notion seems to be contrary to all ideas of
individual freedom and autonomy. Even allowing for the fact
that the means, direct non-consensual battery, is being
employed for a greater end, the restoration of sight or the
saving of a life, this principle cannot be supported. It
weakens the principle of the inviolability of the person
without necessarily adding to the overall societal good.
This model is not necessarily going to result in a more
just or equal society, merely a society with many damaged
and violated individuals who have been forced to give up
part of their anatomy for the greater good of equal
146 Rakowski, (1993, p. 185).
147 Ibid.
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justice. Words such as trauma or frustration do not seem to
enter Rakowski's vocabulary.
On Dworkin's critique based on our repugnance to the
idea of maiming or disfiguring prisoners, Rakowski claims
that part of our horror of maiming is perhaps its very
pointlessness. In the case of the involuntary donor, at
least, his maiming would have a point:
[b]ut if it were necessary to torture a terrorist 
to save the lives of many innocent people, many 
of us would probably suppress what revulsion we 
still felt... and do what was necessary to rescue 
the blameless from harm. Perhaps forcing someone 
to relinquish some part of his body so that 
another person may live should, and in time 
would, be seen in a similar light. But if justice 
requires that such transfers be made, his 
resistance might be seen as more like that of an 
evasive taxpayer than of the intended victim of 
senseless violence.148
However, unlike the evasive taxpayer or indeed the
murderer, the donor has committed no crime. Rather, he has
been unfortunate enough to have been selected by lottery as
an unwilling victim of societal justice.
It begs the question of why those who have been
fortunate to have been born without a malady or disability
should be treated as mere sources of scarce resources by
virtue of their status. No ideal of distributive justice
can justify the maiming of a non-consenting actor.
In practical terms is such a scheme going to work? Is
it possible to achieve such societal parity? What if the
donor later loses the sight in his remaining eye or suffers
kidney failure when he only has one remaining kidney? Will
148 Ibid., p. 187.
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he then not become the disadvantaged member of society who 
must receive a cornea or a kidney from another unwilling 
donor?
The Foetus as Transplant Donor.
The question of using the foetus as a transplant 
donor is one rife with controversy for the Irish doctor. 
Given the present non-provision of abortion in Ireland, the 
question appears to be moot. However, given the ethical 
stance of the Irish Medical Council it is unlikely that 
foetal material would be used in transplant surgery under 
any circumstances.149 The ethical dilemma for Irish doctors 
is that foetal transplantation is dependant on a supply of 
tissue which comes m  the main from induced abortions. This 
is so because tissue from spontaneous abortions is not 
considered suitable due to the high incidence of viral 
infections and chromosomal abnormalities.150 Opponents of 
abortion link the use of foetal tissue in transplantation 
to the substantive issue of abortion, arguing that the two 
issues are not ethically separable.151 Such commentators 
contend that abortion would enjoy a greater degree of 
acceptance if the general public associated it with the 
improvement in the lives of others such as the recipients 
of foetal tissue transplants. Secondly, opponents of the
149 See, Medical Council, The, (1994, p.36).
150 See, Annas and Elias, (1989, pp. 1079-1082) .
151 See, Burtchaell, (1986, pp.7-11).
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procedure would argue that if the mother who was unsure
whether to terminate her pregnancy, saw the potential good 
to be derived from the use of foetal tissue in 
transplantation, she may be persuaded to terminate her 
pregnancy.
Yet, it may be possible, in a practical sense, to 
regulate this area of medical practice to prevent abuse and 
also to separate it from the issue of abortion. In the 
United States, the National Institutes of Health Human 
Foetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel, endeavoured 
to keep separate the issues of abortion and foetal 
transplantation by recommending the following guidelines:
(a) [t]he decision to terminate a pregnancy and 
the procedures of abortion should be kept 
independent from the retrieval and use of foetal 
tissue.
(b) Payments and other forms of remuneration and 
compensation associated with the procurement of 
foetal tissue should be prohibited, except 
payment for reasonable expenses occasioned by the 
actual retrieval, storage, preparation, and 
transportation of the tissues.
(c) The decision and consent to abort must 
precede discussion of the possible use of the 
foetal tissue and any request for such consent as 
might be required for that use.
(d) The pregnant woman should be prohibited from 
designating the transplant-recipient of the 
foetal tissue.
(e) Anonymity between donor and recipient should 
be maintained, so that the donor does not know 
who will receive the tissue, and the identity of 
the donor is concealed from the recipient and 
transplant team.
(f) The timing and method of abortion should not 
be influenced by the potential uses of foetal 
tissue for transplantation or medical 
research.152
However, certain commentators go further and state
152 Human Foetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel, 
(1988, p.50).
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consent to the use of the abortus in transplantation. Thus,
Bopp and Burtachell, two dissenting members of the National
Institutes of Health Human Foetal Tissue Transplantation
Research Panel stated:
the very agents of someone's death are surely 
disqualified on the behalf or in the stead of the 
victim - disqualified as a man who has killed his 
wife is morally disqualified from acting as her 
executor.153
This argument is based on the view that the foetus has the 
moral status of a person and the aborting of a foetus is 
tantamount to the killing of a person. However, one could 
plausibly argue that a person is sentient, has desires and 
as Feinberg154 has argued has moral interests and as a 
consequence has rights. The foetal brain is not 
sufficiently developed to allow perception of pain, until 
some time between twenty and twenty-four weeks 
gestation.155 In relation to foetal transplants to 
sufferers from Parkinson's disease, tissue from the 
substantia nigra of the foetal midbrain is, ideally, 
obtained at a gestational age of approximately eight to 
eleven weeks, before the foetus is capable of 
perception.156
that the mother of an aborted foetus has no right to
153 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
154 Feinberg, (1974, pp.159-184).
155 See further, Annand and Hickey, (1987, pp. 1321- 
1329).
156 Sumner, (1984, pp. 71-93).
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The Scientific Basis for the Use of the Foetus as a 
Transplant Source.
oOne also has to have regard to the alleged benefits of 
foetal tissue transplantation to those who receive such 
donations. It has been argued that foetal brain tissue 
transplants are appropriate in the treatment of sufferers 
from Parkinson's disease.157 However, the majority of 
patients treated do not show dramatic signs of 
improvement,158 and one must, as a result, be cautious m  
regarding this procedure as an effective and valid 
treatment for Parkinsonism until it is supported by a 
substantial body of empirical evidence.159
Experimental evidence gathered from laboratory studies 
on rats reveals that the optimal age of the foetal tissue 
for transplantation purposes is nine weeks.160 Normally, 
the method used for terminating a first trimester pregnancy 
is suction. However, the difficulty with this method is 
that the foetal brain will not remain intact and will have 
to be pieced together after the procedure in order to 
locate the substantia niara. As one commentator has noted:
[t]he retrieval of one specific portion of the
brain from the tissues recovered m  the course of
suction termination is likely to raise
substantial logistic questions about clinical
157 See, Lmdvall, Brundm and Widner, (1990, pp. 574- 
577) and Madrazo, Leon and Torres, (1988, p.51).
158 See, Merz, (1989, p.2929).
159 See further, Joynt and Gash, (1987, pp.445-446) and 
Sladek and Shoulson, (1988, pp.1386-1388).
160 McCullagh, (1993, p.209).
125
application. Identification of substantia nigra 
from foetal remains has been achieved as a 
research procedure. However, the extent to which 
it could reproducibly be accomplished as a 
clinical routine remains questionable.161
An alternative solution to this problem is to alter the
method of termination. This has been achieved by using
limited suction under the guidance of ultrasound and by
means of forceps delivery.162
The only large body of empirical evidence in relation
to the effectiveness of foetal tissue transplants which is
available relates to foetal tissue transplants in animals
and not in humans. Despite the ethical propriety of animal
experimentation, it does in this instance give an
indication of the possible outcomes of such treatment in
humans.163 The animals used in such experiments are
administered chemicals which induce states akin to
Parkinson's disease. This has been achieved by, for
example, injecting rats with a substance known as 6-
hydroxydopamine (6-O.H.D.A.). This substance when injected
into the brain causes brain lesions and acts to counter the
action of the neurotransmitter dopamine. In recent years
however, it has been observed that another substance
M.P.T.P. may produce an even more true reproduction of
Parkinson's disease in laboratory animals. The effect of
M.P.T.P. in this context was discovered:
161 Ibid., p.210.
162 Ibid., pp.210-211.
163 See further, Dunnett, Bjorklund, Gage and Stenevi, 
(1985, pp.451-469).
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following the inadvertent self-administration by 
drug addicts of this substance, present as a 
contaminant in pethidine. A substantial number of 
affected individuals were observed to develop the 
typical features of Parkinson's disease during 
the following weeks. The use of M.P.T.P. in 
primates produces what is currently believed to 
be the best model of the human disease.164
Once the abnormality in the behaviour of the animal
has been induced in this manner, the next step in the
experiment is to use foetal brain cells in an attempt to
improve the condition of the animal. The results produced
have not been encouraging. While rats who have been
subjected to this treatment have shown improvement in
relation to their ability to perform certain simple
functions, they have not shown a marked improvement in
relation to more complex tasks:
[t]he reliability of dopamine-rich grafts to 
ameliorate some functional deficits induced by 
dopamine-depleting lesions on the one hand, and 
to have no effect oh other, m  some senses more 
complex, measures has implications for the 
clinical potential of neural transplantation.165
Moreover, the task of applying this animal model to the
human model is not without its difficulties. As McCullagh
observes:
[e]ven the most superficial comparison between 
the tests used in assessment of rats with 
'experimental Parkinsonism' and the tests used in 
human patients with this disease indicates that 
the latter are much more complex and rely upon 
measurements for which no simple animal 
equivalent exists.166
164 McCullagh, (1993, p.196).
165 Ibid., p.197, and see, Dunnett, Whishaw, Rogers and 
Jones, (1987, pp.63-78).
166 McCullagh, (1993, p.198).
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animal model to humans. The inability of the animal to
communicate its reactions to the treatment is problematic:
[w]hen translated to experimental animals, in 
which the capacity to interrogate the subject 
about possible remission of symptoms is lacking, 
the means of assessing the severity of 
'experimental Parkinsonism' are notably lacking 
in precision and reproducibility. An additional, 
major complication when comparing animal models 
for treatment, for instance, of diabetes and 
Parkinsonism, is that the manner in which the 
disease process affects normal function is well 
understood in diabetes but remains the subject of 
speculation in the case of Parkinsonism... This 
likely dissimilarity between experimental and 
clinical situations serves to introduce doubt 
into any inferences about human treatment of 
Parkinsonism drawn from animal models of 
treatment.167
Another disparity between the animal and human models
of treatment is that the possibility of rejection is much
less likely in animal models than in humans. This is due to
the fact that in the laboratory the subjects are closely
related whereas in the human model this will not
necessarily be the case.168 The survival of such tissue in
laboratory rats cannot, as a result, be taken as indicative
of success in the human model.169 Indeed, as one commentator
has concluded:
it seems more likely that the long-term use of 
powerful immunosuppressive drugs, such as 
cyclosporin A with its attendant side-effects, 
would be required to obtain extended acceptance
T h e r e  a r e  f u r t h e r  o b s t a c l e s  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a p p l y  t h e
167 Ibid. , p . 198 .
168 Ibid. , pp. 202-203 .
169 See, Geyer, Gill, Kunz and Moody, (1985, pp.244- 
247)? Lodin, Hasek, Chutna, Sladecek and Holan, (1977, 
pp.275-280) and Raju and Grogan, (1977, pp.1187-1191).
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The studies which have been undertaken on human 
subjects have proved far from conclusive to date. Reports 
from England,171 Sweden,172 and Mexico,173 on foetal 
transplants in humans have not as yet demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt the effectiveness of the procedure.
The Anencephalic Neonate as Transplant Donor.
The use of the anencephalic neonate as a source of 
transplant organs has yet to be considered by the Irish 
legislature or judiciary. The medical practitioner in this 
area of medical practice is thus bereft of clear legal 
guidelines. In the absence of statutory or judicial 
guidelines, the medical practitoner would normally look to 
professional codes for guidance on such a matter. However, 
to date the medical profession in Ireland has not 
instituted specific guidelines on this issue.
As a result, the surgeon must look to the detailed 
recommendations set down by the Conference of Medical Royal 
Colleges and their Faculties in the United Kingdom on the
o f  a  g r a f t . 170
170 McCullagh, (1993, p.203).
171 See, Phillips, (1988, p.15).
172 See, Lindvall, Backlund, Farde, Sedvall, Freedman, 
Hoffer, Nobbin, Seiger and Olsen, (1987, pp.457-468).
173 See, Madrazo, Drucker-Colin, Diaz, Martinez-Mata, 
Torres and Becerril, (1987, pp.831-834).
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issue.174 The Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their 
Faculties m  the United Kingdom is of the view that organs 
for transplantation can be removed from anencephalic 
infants when two doctors who are not members of the 
transplant team agree that spontaneous respiration has 
ceased.175 This, one could assume is an attempt to isolate 
the issue of declaring an anencephalic infant dead from the 
issue of organ transplantation.
It has been noted that the definition of brain death 
in neonates has, unlike that in adults, been connected with 
the issue of organ transplantation.176 Others however 
disagree with this contention.177 There are a number of 
factors which differentiate the definition of death m  the 
neonate from that in the adult patient.178
Firstly, the occurrence of hypotension or abnormally 
low blood pressure is common in the neonate who has 
suffered from perinatal asphyxia (deprivation of oxygen 
during the birth process). This may lead to a depressed 
brain function.179
A second factor is the absence of an accurate history 
of the preceding events in utero. In the adult patient a
174 See, Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their 
Faculties m  the United Kingdom, (1988, pp.1-2).
175 Ibid.
176 See, Freeman and Ferry, (1988, pp. 301-303).
177 See, Bailey and Nehlsen-Cannarella, (1987, pp.878- 
879) and Shewmon, (1987, p.878).
178 See, Volpe, (1987, pp.293-297).
179 Ibid.
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that it allows for a confident diagnosis of a specific
condition causing brain damage which m  turn facilitates
the diagnosis of brain death.180
A third factor is the need for much longer observation
periods m  order to diagnose brain death in the neonate,
because of the frequency with which errors could be
introduced by isolated observations.181 This could prove to
be an obstacle in the case of organ transplantation where
available time is limited as, for example, where the organs
have to be transported over a long distance. In addition it
has been observed that:
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  n e o n a t a l  
electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) is difficult. The 
E.E.G. of the normal infant younger than thirty 
weeks can exhibit periods of discontinuous low- 
amplitude activity. Following brain injury, the 
E.E.G. trace can be isoelectric (flat) for a 
prolonged period. However, this can be followed 
by subsequent recovery of the subject, at least 
to a vegetative state. Such a clinical history 
emphasizes the differing requirements for 
decisions to discontinue life support and to 
designate an infant as a source of organs for 
transplantation.182
Indeed, the guidelines laid down by the Medical Royal
Colleges and their Faculties in the United Kingdom differ
from the standards laid down for non-anencephalic patients.
As McCullagh points out:
the placement of an anencephalic infant on a 
respirator does not necessarily imply that 
spontaneous respiration has ceased... To
knowledge of the preceding medical history is important in
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 McCullagh, (1993, p.110).
designate loss of spontaneous respiration as 
'death' as the Medical Royal Colleges 
recommended, represents a substantial shift from 
the existing U.K. recommendations for non- 
anencephalic subjects. These still require, not 
just suspension of spontaneous respiration, but 
positive recognition that irreversible cessation 
of bram-stem function has already occurred. The 
extent of the inconsistency created by selecting 
this standard for anencephalics will be evident 
if it is compared with the generally accepted 
attitude, that organs should not be removed from 
non-anencephalic neonates with beating hearts 
within seven days of birth even if they satisfy 
the brain-stem death criteria for older children 
and adults.183
While one cannot state conclusively that anencephalic
neonates are being treated differently to other individuals
merely because of their suitability for the purposes of
organ transplantation, it is nonetheless important that any
guidelines governing the use of anencephalic organs in
transplantation should not err on the side of treating the
anencephalic first and foremost as a potential source of
spare parts. The dilemma has been well put by Ian Kennedy,
writing in a different context. Nonetheless, the views
expressed are equally applicable to the case of the
anencephalic neonate:
if this surgery is to become acceptable, and the 
voluntary supply of organs from cadavers is to be 
increased, every effort is needed to persuade the 
general public that such operations are being 
conducted in a responsible and humane way, that 
the law, m  other words, is not being re-written 
in favour of the potential recipient and against 
the interests of the moribund donor.184
Due to the growing demand for donor organs, the
anencephalic neonate has been seen as a potential source
183 Ibid., p. 154.
184 Kennedy, (1971, p. 947).
132
for such organs. It is thus necessary to divorce the need 
for organs on one hand from the definition of death m  the 
neonate on the other.
This is not m  practice an easy task. The anencephalic 
neonate suffers from a condition in which the neural tube 
(the tube of tissue which forms the spinal cord and from 
which the brain develops) fails to close. As a result, the
icerebellum and the cerebrum fail to develop, while the
brain-stem continues to develop. In addition the vault of
the skull does not develop and the brain appears as a mass
of exposed tissue.
As a result of these defects the anencephalic may be
stillborn or in the alternative live only for a period
ranging from a day to a month.185 The anencephalic when
born alive is capable of spontaneous respiration. However
as has been noted:
[b]ecause of the lack of higher brain function, 
the baby's respiratory system intermittently 
lapses. These incidents repeat with increasing 
frequency until respiration ceases entirely, by * 
which time the baby's oxygen-starved organs are 
so severely damaged that they are no longer 
suitable for transplantation.186
Thus, the question of obtaining salvageable organs remains
present throughout the short life of the anencephalic. The
question is then whether one should wait until all
respiratory activity has ceased with the attendant risk of
obtaining unusable organs or whether to retrieve the organs
at a point where all respiratory activity has not ceased.
185 See, Friedman, (1990, pp.921-922).
186 Ibid., p.924.
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As anencephalics are capable of spontaneous respiration at
birth they are not therefore legally dead for the purposes
of the whole brain definition of death. As a result, as one
commentator has noted:
the procurement of vital organs from an 
independently breathing anencephalic newborn 
would be considered the proximate cause of the 
baby's death, and the physician who procured such 
organs would be open to homicide charges.187
While the above commentator was writing in the context of
American criminal law, there is no reason to believe that
the same conclusion would not apply in Ireland, as the
fault standard for the crime of homicide would have been
met in such a case. Thus in such cases, it could be stated
that there was an intentional termination of the life of an
individual.188 Therefore, one cannot lawfully retrieve
organs from an anencephalic until he has reached the point
of whole brain death, at which point his organs may not be
useable.
In an attempt to overcome this dilemma, a number of 
solutions have been suggested. Firstly, statutory 
amendments have been proposed. Secondly, alterations in 
medical management of anencephalic neonates have been 
proposed. In the United States, attempts have been made m  
California, New Jersey and Ohio to alter the law in this 
regard. In 1986, three California state senators introduced 
a Bill to amend sections 7180-7183 of the California Health 
and Safety Code which sections incorporated California's
187 Ibid., p.930.
188 See further, Tomkin and Hanafin, (1995, pp.98-116).
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version of the Uniform Determination of Death Act 1980. The
Bill would amend Californian law on the issue m  the
following manner:
7180. (a) An individual who has sustained either 
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain-stem is dead. Additionally, 
an individual born with the condition of 
anencephaly is dead. A determination of death 
must be made in accordance with accepted medical 
standards.
7180.5 'Anencephaly' as used m  this chapter, 
means markedly defective development of the 
brain, together with absence of the bones of the 
cranial vault and the cerebral and cerebellar 
hemispheres, and with only a rudimentary brain­
stem and some traces of basal ganglia 
present.189
The Bill also proposed that the diagnosis of anencephaly be
determined independently by another physician who was not
a member of the transplant team. The Bill was the object of
sustained criticism and was ultimately unsuccessful. As one
critic of this move put it:
[a]dding anencephalics to the category of dead 
persons would be a radical change, both in the 
social and medical understanding of what it means 
to be dead and in the social practices
surrounding death. Anencephalic infants may be 
dying, but they are still alive and breathing. 
Calling them 'dead' will not change physiological 
reality or otherwise cause them to resemble those 
(cold and non-respirating) bodies that are 
considered appropriate for post-mortem 
examinations and burial.190
In New Jersey, a Bill was introduced in the state 
assembly m  1986 which attempted to amend the state's 
version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968 to the
189 State of California Senate Bill, Number 2018 1986.
190 Capron, (1987, p. 6).
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extent that organ transplantation in the case of the
anencephalic would not require the death of the
anencephalic:
[a] parent of an anencephalic infant, either 
prior to or upon the birth of that infant, may 
submit to the attending physician or surgeon a 
written request for the donation of the body of 
that infant, or a part thereof, to any of the 
donees for any of the purposes stated in section 
3 of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 1968... to 
which the attending physician or surgeon shall 
consent in writing if the requested donation is 
medically suitable of purpose... and if one of 
the parents does not object to the donation, 
regardless of whether the infant has sustained an 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
bra in-stem.191
This Bill was also unsuccessful. In Ohio, a Bill was 
introduced in 1988 which provided that an anencephalic 
infant could be put on a respirator and tested for the 
absence of spontaneous respiration every six hours. If the 
neonate failed to resume spontaneous respiration on three 
successive occasions then he could be declared dead. This 
Bill also failed to win legislative approval.192
The second method of reform in this area came in the 
form of professional guidelines. Foremost amongst such 
initiatives were the Loma Linda protocols. In 1987, the 
Loma Linda Medical Centre in California produced a set of 
protocols in relation to the management of anencephalic 
neonates, which were thought to be compatible with the law 
in relation to the determination qf death.193 Under these
191 State of New Jersey Assembly Bill number 3367 1986.
192 See, McCullagh, (1993, pp. 168-169).
193 See, Barinaga, (1987, p.592).
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guidelines all anencephalic newborns would be placed on a
respirator for a maximum of seven days. During that period,
physicians would remove the baby from the respirator every
twelve hours in order to determine if brain death had
occurred. If spontaneous respiration failed to resume on
three successive occasions, then the neonate would be
pronounced dead and organ removal could proceed. The
determination of death was to be made by two physicians
independent of the transplant team.
Those babies who were not brain dead at the end of the
seven day period would be disconnected from the respirator
and allowed to die. This model failed to work for a number
of reasons. Firstly, the protocol provided for the
administration of a painkiller, Demerol, if the neonates
displayed any signs of distress. The use of this drug
complicated matters in that one of its side effects is that
it acts as a sedative and depresses respiration. This in
turn would make it more difficult to obtain a reliable
diagnosis of death. To remedy this problem, the protocol
provided for the use of Narcan, which works to counter the
effect of Demerol. This use of drugs also raised the
question of whether anencephalics could feel pain. As they
are apparently missing the parts of the brain which are
responsible for feeling pain why should the use of
painkillers be thought appropriate? One commentator has
framed the dilemma thus:
[i]f they do feel pain, artificially prolonging 
the lives of these infants by hooking them up to 
respirators would inflict additional pain upon 
unconsenting subjects solely for the benefit of
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others. Since organ removal for transplantation 
can be accomplished painlessly under anaesthesia, 
the effort to comply with statutory brain death 
requirements via the Loma Linda protocol 
performed an indefensible cruelty upon its 
subjects that otherwise could have been 
avoided.194
In practical terms the protocols were not a success.
None of the first six anencephalic infants who were treated
in accordance with the protocols were used as sources of
organs, as they did not display a loss of respiratory
capacity within the seven day period.195 It has been
pointed out196 that this approach to the treatment of the
anencephalic neonate may well be in contravention of
Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights
of Disabled Persons 1975. Article 10 states that:
disabled persons shall be protected against all 
exploitation, all regulations and all treatment 
of a discriminatory, or abusive or degrading 
nature.
McCullagh197 argues that:
[r]emoval of organs from any incompetent 
individual could be argued to be exploitative. 
Application to anencephalics of treatment which 
would not be applied to any other class of 
individual is undoubtedly discriminatory. 
Infliction of life support on a patient for whom 
it can predictably have no benefit is certainly 
abusive. Presumably, the response to these 
charges would be that the anencephalic was not a 
person and was therefore outside the scope of the
194 Friedman, (1990, pp.932-933).
195 See, Goldsmith, (1988, pp.1671-1672).
196 McCullagh, (1993, p. 158).
197 Ibid.
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Declaration.198
If one were to argue that an anencephalic neonate were 
not a person as was the case m  the legislative proposals 
in California and New Jersey, then one could resolve the 
legal difficulties presented by obtaining salvageable 
organs from such entities. Thus, Glanville Williams has 
written:
[t]here is, indeed, some kind of legal argument 
that a 'monster' is not protected even under the 
existing law... Yet the question still remains 
whether it is permissible morally and legally so 
to define a human being as to exclude the grosser 
sports of nature... It seems probable... that a 
creature that is clearly a monster in the old- 
fashioned sense could lawfully be put to a 
merciful death. This appears to be a reasonable 
deduction from the rule stated by... Bracton and
198 Ibid. See also, Friedman, (1990, pp.958-959), where 
he puts the issue thus:
the position that all products of human 
conception are persons is equally 
unprovable. Thus, the controversy 
surrounding anencephaly represents a classic 
case of ethical pluralism, similar to the 
debate which raged about abortion prior to 
Roe v Wade. In that area, decision-making by 
majontarian democratic processes was 
considered an appropriate means of resolving 
the problem. Pro-choice and pro-life 
advocates attempted to persuade each other 
of the soundness of their respective 
positions, though at the bottom of the 
debate lay the reality that the 'difficult 
question of when life begins' is one upon 
which 'those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at a 
consensus'... The resulting "abortion map" 
was a patchwork quilt of states that 
proscribed or permitted abortion m  varying 
degrees. A similar approach should be valid 
in deciding about anencephaly. The various 
state legislatures should not be prevented 
from choosing, by majority fiat. a theory of 
personhood that seems most correct to its 
members.
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other institutional writers that a monster is not 
a man... The only possible objection, apart from 
the extreme view that even a monster is the abode 
of an immortal spirit, is the difficulty of 
drawing the line? but all moral and legal rules 
require a line to be drawn somewhere.199
Friedman has attempted to apply this idea to the
contemporary debate over anencephalic organ donors. He
tries to draw the line relying on ideas of consent and
personhood:
[t]he proposals to harvest vital organs from 
anencephalics are premised on an analysis 
identical to that used to justify abortion. The 
moral stricture against harvesting organs applies 
only to persons. These infants can no more 
satisfy even minimal criteria of personhood than 
can foetuses... [anencephalics] will never 
qualify as persons in the sense put forth by 
proponents of personhood theory. In view of the 
enormous benefits to be derived from proposed 
transplantation protocols, there is every reason 
to take advantage of such crucial sources of 
organs. Of course, as is the case with normal 
neonates, the treatment accorded these infants 
generates intense parental emotion. Therefore, it 
certainly would be immoral to remove organs from 
anencephalics without parental consent. But once 
consent is forthcoming, we must realize that no 
person's rights are violated by the 
procurement.200
2.7 The Body as Property?
In analyzing the question of transfer of body parts, 
the question of ownership of such parts must be addressed. 
Is there for example a property right in bodily parts which 
may have implications for the transplantation of organs and
199 Williams, (1958, p.31).
, 200 Ibid., p.955.
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o t h e r  b o d i l y  p a r t s ?
The Corpse.
The traditional rule in relation to the human corpse
and the laws of property was the 'no property' rule. As the
term suggests the human body was deemed not to be the
subject of property. As Skegg has noted, this rule:
provides the legal context for the various 
provisions of English law relating to the use of 
bodies for medical education and research, and 
for therapeutic purposes.201
The origins of the 'no property' rule are shrouded in
mystery. However, various rationale for the rule have been
advanced. It has been asserted that the rule can be traced
to medieval times and the role played by the ecclesiastical
courts in burial.202 The rule was not articulated in
judicial form until the case of Exelby v Handyside203 in
1749, more commonly referred to as Dr. Handyside's case.
The case was not reported contemporaneously, but was
reported some fifty-four years later by East in his Pleas
of the Crown wherein it is stated:
[i]n the case of Dr. Handyside, where trover was
201 Skegg, (1992, p.311).
202 See, Palmer, (1991, p.9, footnote 35) and Skegg, 
(1992, p.311).
203 (1749), 2 East P.C. (1803) 652; 1 Hawk P.C. (8th ed. 
1824) 148. Matthews, (1983, p.208), has observed that this 
case:
is a case remarkable for its influence being 
quite disproportionate to the information 
available about it.
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brought against him for two children that grew 
together; Lord C.J. Willes held that the action 
would not lie, as no person had any property in 
corpses.204
However, this case has not been viewed as definitive 
authority for the 'no property' rule and now appears to be 
of mere historical interest.205
In the case of Williams v Williams206 the 'no 
property' rule was explicitly referred to in support of the 
decision of the court.207 In this case a testator had given 
instructions in his will that upon his death his body be 
given to a friend thereafter to be cremated and his ashes 
placed m  a particular vase as set out in a letter sent to 
the friend. The will directed that the friend be paid for 
the performance of this task. However, on the death of the 
testator, the body was not given into the charge of the 
friend but was instead buried in a London graveyard by the
204 (1749), 2 East P.C. (1803) 652.
205 See, Matthews, (1983, pp.208-210) and Skegg, (1992, 
p.311).
206 (1882) 20 Ch.D 659.
207 Although, as Skegg, (1992, p.311) notes, the rule 
appears to have been accepted obiter in a number of cases 
prior to Williams v Williams:
But during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century there were several cases m  which 
common law judges accepted the rule. In all 
but one of these cases, the judge's comments 
were undoubtedly obiter. They were obiter in 
R. v Sharpe (1857) Dears and Bell 160, where 
Erie J. said at 163, 'Our law recognizes no 
property in a corpse'; in Foster v Dodd 
(1867) L.R. 3 Q.B. 67, where Byles J. said 
at 77, 'A dead body by law belongs to no 
one'; and in R. v Price (1884) 12 Q.B.D.
247, where Stephen J. said at 252, 'a dead 
body is not the subject of property'.
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executors. The friend subsequently obtained the relevant 
permission to have the body disinterred, whereupon she 
brought it to Italy and had it cremated. She then claimed 
against the estate, the expenses incurred in carrying out 
the testator's instructions. The plaintiff failed in her 
action. Kay J. cited a number of grounds for his refusal to 
uphold the plaintiff's claim. Firstly he claimed that "[i]t 
is quite clearly the law of this country that there can be 
no property in the dead body of a human being".208
He cited in favour of this proposition the obiter 
statement in the case of R . v Sharpe209 to similar effect. 
However, as Matthews has noted, the case of R. v Sharpe 
concerned an interred rather than a disinterred corpse.210 
In R . v Sharpe f the defendant was permitted to open his 
mother's grave in order to bury his father there. His 
mother had been buried m  the unconsecrated burial ground 
of a group of dissenters. However, he removed his mother's 
remains and took the bodies of both his parents to be 
buried in consecrated ground. The defendant was charged and 
convicted of the offence of unlawfully, wilfully and 
indecently opening a grave and removing a body. In the 
course of his judgment, Erie J. referred obiter to the 'no 
property' rule, stating:
[o]ur law recognizes no property in a corpse, and
the protection of the grave at common law, as
contradistinguished from ecclesiastical
208 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch.D. 659, pp.662-663.
209 (1857) Dears and Bell 160.
210 Matthews, (1983, pp.211-212).
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protection to consecrated ground, depends upon 
this form of indictment.211
Matthews accuses Kay J. m  his decision m  Williams v
Williams212 of confusing the separate issues of the 'no
property' rule and the exclusive right of the executor to
possession of the corpse:
[a]part from the fact that the 'no property' 
statement in R. v Sharpe was obiter. Kay J. 
entirely fails to notice the material distinction 
between that case and the instant one, i.e. 
between a buried and an unburied corpse. This is 
doubly surprising in view of Kay J.'s expressly 
drawing attention to the executor's entitlement 
to possession of the corpse m  the latter case, 
albeit for the purposes of burial. No-one has any 
right to possession of a buried corpse, and so 
the statement in R. v Sharpe is not difficult to 
understand. What is difficult to understand is 
why it must inevitably also apply to an unburied 
corpse, in which there are rights to possession, 
even if of a limited nature.213
For the latter proposition, Matthews cites the decision of
the Supreme Court of the state of Minnesota in the case of
Larson v Chase214 wherein it was stated that:
the mere fact that a person has exclusive rights 
over a body for the purposes of burial leads 
necessarily to the conclusion that it is his 
property m  the broadest and most general sense 
of that term, viz., something over which the law 
accords him exclusive control.215
On this apparently mistaken basis Kay J. went on to
conclude that in this case the plaintiff's claim should
fail. The remaining reasons for his decision which were
211 R. v Sharpe (1857) Dears and Bell 160, p.163.
212 (1882) 20 Ch.D. 659.
213 Matthews, (1983, p. 211).
214 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
215 Ibid., p. 239.
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premised on his interpretation of the 'no property7 rule 
were that a person cannot by law dispose of his dead body 
and that, as a result, the direction in the codicil to the 
executors to deliver over the corpse to the plaintiff, who 
was not one of the executors, was void.216
In analyzing these conclusions of Kay J.'s, Matthews 
argues that:
[w]e must assume that m  referring to 'property'
Kay J. did not include the right to possession 
for burial, for if he did the first limb of the 
first proposition [to the effect that the 
executors have exclusive right to possession of 
the body for the purposes of burial] would be 
impossible. On the hypothesis, then, that 
'property' does not include, the right to 
possession, it by no means follows that, if no- 
one has 'property', the right to possession 
cannot be transmitted to or created in another.
On the contrary, that is exactly what Kay J. 
expressly averred to be the case m  the first 
proposition. What Kay J. objected to was the 
transmission or creation of the right to 
possession by the will. But this is entirely the 
substance of the first proposition, and has 
nothing to do with the second.217
Matthews therefore concludes that the judge's reference to
the 'no property' rule in this case cannot form part of the
ratio decidendi of the case and must be regarded as a
merely obiter statement. Skegg views the nineteenth century
cases which referred to the 'no property' rule as having
three points in common, none of which provided a definitive
solution to the problem of proprietorial rights m  the
body:
in these cases judges did not rely on Coke's 
statement that the 'burial of the [c]adaver... is
216 williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch.D. 659, p.665.
217 Matthews, (1983, p.212).
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nullius m  b o m s ' or on Dr. Handyside's case. The 
judges apparently regarded the 'no property' rule 
as well established, and not a matter of 
controversy or uncertainty, or requiring the 
citation of authority. A second characteristic of 
these cases was that there was no hint that the 
'no property' rule was restricted to buried 
corpses, or that any distinction was to be drawn 
between corpses awaiting burial (or cremation) 
and those which had been buried (or cremated). 
Thirdly, m  none of the cases was there any 
suggestion that the rule that human corpses are 
not the subject of property was linked to, or in 
any way dependent upon, any rule about whether 
living human beings could be regarded as 
property, or whether they own themselves or can 
be owned by others.218
Thus, even though there appears to have been a general
judicial acceptance of the 'no property' rule it seems to
have been the result of deference to tradition rather than
as the result of rigorous legal analysis. Thus, what scant
authority does exist appears not to be sufficient.
To find a more rigorous discussion of the topic one is
forced to turn to the decisions of Commonwealth courts. In
the Canadian case of Miner v Canadian Pacific Railway219
the mother of a deceased youth recovered expenses from the
defendant as a result of their negligent delay in
delivering his body. The court recognized that m  certain
instances property may exist m  a corpse and indeed
criticised the English authorities on the subject:
the law recognizes property in a corpse, a 
property, of course, which is subject, on the one 
hand, to the obligations... of proper care and 
prima facie of decent burial appropriate to its 
condition and the condition of the individual in 
his lifetime... and to the restraints upon the 
voluntary or involuntary disposal by law (... the
218 Skegg, (1992, p.312).
219 (1910) 15 W.L.R. 161 (Alberta Sup. Ct.).
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existence authorising its use for anatomical 
purposes) or arising out of the fact that the 
thing m  question is a corpse ( . . . no lien can 
attach: R. v Fox (1841) 2 Q.B. 246; a public
exhibition contrary to public decency is not 
permissible... ); and, on the other hand, the 
nature and extent of the right or obligation of 
next of kin, medical institute... I cannot see 
any ground m  reason why there should not be 
appropriate remedies against interference with 
the right of property therein, subject to the 
obligations and restrictions which I have 
indicated.220
In the Australian case of Doodeward v Spence221 the
plaintiff worked with a travelling show and exhibited the
preserved corpse of a stillborn child with two heads. The
plaintiff was prosecuted for indecent exhibition of the
corpse and the corpse was taken into the custody of the
defendant police officer. The plaintiff sought the return
of the corpse and on being refused he brought an action in
detinue against the defendant. The defendant claimed that
no action lay to recover the corpse because no rights of
property m  human tissue were recognized at common law.
However, the plaintiff succeeded on appeal to the High
Court of Australia. The Chief Justice, Griffith C.J. was of
the opinion that:
[l]f ... there can, under some circumstances, be 
a continued rightful possession of a human body 
unburied, I think, that the law will protect that 
rightful possession by appropriate remedies. I do 
not know of any definition of property which is 
not wide enough to include such a right of 
permanent possession. By whatever name the right 
is called, I think it exists, and that, so far as 
it constitutes property, a human body, or a 
portion of a human body, is capable by law of 
becoming the subject of property. It is not
220 Ibid., pp. 168-169.
221 (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406.
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necessary to give an exhaustive enumeration of 
the circumstances under which such a right may be 
acquired, but I entertain no doubt that, when a 
person has by the lawful exercise of work or 
skill so dealt with a human body or part of a 
human body m  his lawful possession that it has 
acquired some attributes differentiating it from 
a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a 
right to retain possession of it, at least as 
against any person not entitled to have it 
delivered to him for the purpose of burial.222
However, it has been noted that such a general statement
should be read in the light of:
the superior right of the person entitled to have 
the body delivered to him for burial, and to the 
existence of any positive law (such as burial or 
public health Acts) proscribing the exhibition of 
the corpse in the particular circumstances of the 
case.223
In addition to the specific question of property 
rights in the dead body, there has also been some judicial 
comment on rights to possession of such corpses. A coroner 
has a prior right to the possession of a body when it is 
required for the purpose of a coroner's inquiry. 224 For the 
purposes of medical education a right to possession may be 
obtained in a cadaver.225
Moreover, in the United Kingdom the Human Tissue Act 
1961 provides for the authorization of the removal and use 
of body parts for therapeutic purposes and for the purposes
222 Ibid., p.415.
223 Palmer, (1991, p.11).
224 See, R. v Bristol Coroner. Ex Parte Kerr [1974] Q.B. 
652. The same should be true of Ireland where coroners are 
vested with similar powers to call inquiries into deaths. 
See, the Coroners Act 1962 sections 17 and 18.
225 See generally, the English Anatomy Act 1984.
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of medical education and research.226 A corollary of this 
right to possession is to be found m  relation to the ashes 
of the deceased after cremation. In the United Kingdom, the 
Cremation Regulations 1930 provide that the person who has 
applied for the body of the deceased to be cremated shall 
be permitted to take possession of the ashes after the 
cremation.227
The Living Body.
The living body cannot be the subject of property 
rights. If this were the case then the concept of slave 
ownership would be quite valid and humans could be bought 
and sold on the open market. However this does not imply 
that bodily parts or bodily products cannot be the subject 
of ownership.
In the English case of R. v Welsh228 the defendant
226 Section 1. Skegg, (1992, p. 313), surmises that in 
this context:
if the person lawfully in possession of a 
body authorizes the removal of a part so 
that it can be kept as a permanent exhibit 
in the museum of a medical school, and the 
part is subsequently removed for that 
purpose, a permanent right to possession 
would seem to have been acquired.
227 Cremation Regulations 1930, SR and 0. No. 1016, 
regulation 176 of which provides that:
[a]fter the cremation of the remains of a 
deceased person the ashes shall be given 
into the charge of the person who applied 
for the cremation if he so desires.
228 [1974] R.T.R. 478.
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provided a urine sample for the police under section 9 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1972 and then proceeded to pour it 
down the sink. He was charged and convicted with the theft 
of urine from the police. That theft applies to 'property' 
wpuld lead one to infer that this particular bodily product 
was capable of being construed as property.229 In the 
subsequent case of R . v Rothery230 the defendant had 
provided the police with a blood sample. He subsequently 
removed the blood from the station. As a result he was 
charged and convicted of the theft of the capsule 
containing the blood rather than the blood itself. In 
addition he was charged and convicted of the statutory 
offence of failing to supply a specimen under section 9(3) 
of the Road Traffic Act 1972.
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of 
Appeal. The question for resolution was whether he should 
have been convicted of theft or the statutory offence or 
both. If the theft conviction was valid then it would be 
tantamount to stating that blood could be the subject of 
property. In the Court of Appeal the conviction for the 
statutory offence under section 9(3) of the Road Traffic 
Act 1972 was quashed but the theft conviction was not. 
Scarman L.J. giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
stated:
229 In this case the definition of theft was set out in 
the Theft Act 1968, section 1(1) where a person is regarded 
as having committed theft when he appropriates the property 
of another. It is for the courts to decide what constitutes 
'property' in any particular case.
230 [1976] R.T.R. 550.
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[t]he appellant says: 'I did provide the
[specimen] though I admit that later I stole it 
back; I am guilty of theft, but not guilty of the 
statutory offence'. The Crown says that by 
stealing it back the appellant ensured that no 
specimen was available for laboratory test; 
therefore, he is guilty both of the statutory 
offence and of theft.
Common sense is with the appellant, even 
though the merits are not. He did, when required, 
provide a specimen for laboratory test; when 
asked, he did not refuse, but agreed. And he must 
have provided the police officer with the 
specimen in the sense of putting him in 
possession or control of it, otherwise he could 
not have stolen it from him under section 5(1) of 
the Theft Act 1968.231
Effectively one can conclude from this analysis that blood
can be the subject of property in certain circumstances.
In the Californian case of Moore v Regents of the
University of California232 the Supreme Court of the state
of California was faced with another aspect of the
ownership of bodily parts, 'gene rape'. The plaintiff had
undergone treatment at the defendant hospital for
leukaemia. This involved the removal of his enlarged
spleen. However without the patient's knowledge or consent,
his treating physician had taken samples of the white blood
cells from his cancerous spleen and cultured them into a
cell-line which was capable of producing blood proteins
effective in treating immunosuppressive diseases.
The defendants subsequently applied for and were
granted a government patent for this so-called invention.
The cell-line was later sold to a biotechnology company for
231 Ibid., pp.552-553.
232 2 4 9 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1988); 793 P. 2d 479 
(1990).
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over one and a half million dollars. The market value of 
this cell-line has been estimated at three billion dollars.
The plaintiff brought an action in conversion against 
the defendants for the misappropriation of his cells. He 
claimed that both his cell tissue and the cell-line were 
his tangible personal property.
The Californian Supreme Court could locate no relevant 
authority imposing liability in conversion for the use of 
human cells in medical research and were not prepared to do 
so in this case. It was held that to establish a 
conversion, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate an 
actual interference with his ownership or right of 
possession. The Supreme Court was satisfied that Moore did 
not retain an ownership interest in the excised cells.
On the point as to whether the excised cells and the 
resultant cell-line could be the property of Moore, it was 
held that as the cell-line was distinct both factually and 
legally, from the cells taken from Moore's body, the cell- 
line could not be viewed as his property. Support for this 
view was derived from the existing law in relation to 
patents.
In the case of Diamond v Chakrabarty.233 it was held 
that patent law permits the patenting of organisms that 
represent the product of human ingenuity, but does not 
permit the patenting of naturally occurring organisms. On 
this analysis the California Supreme Court in Moore v 
Regents of the University of California went on to hold
233 447 u  303 ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
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that:
[h]uman cell-lines are patentable because '[l]ong 
term adaptation and growth of human tissues and 
cells m  culture is difficult - often considered 
an art'... and the probability of success is 
low... It is this inventive effort that patent 
law rewards, not the discovery of naturally 
occurring raw materials. Thus, Moore's
allegations that he owns the cell-line and the 
products derived from it are inconsistent with 
the patent, which constitutes an authoritative 
determination that the cell-line is the product 
of invention. Since such allegations are nothing 
more than arguments or conclusions of law, they 
of course do not bind us.234
The Supreme Court of California considered the 
possibility of extending the doctrine of conversion in this 
case, but decided not to, for policy reasons. It was 
believed that such an expansion would hinder research in 
the area of genetics by restricting access to the requisite 
raw materials. It was also stated that it was for the 
legislature to resolve the pro'blem and that the court was 
not the proper forum for the resolution of this dilemma. 
Thirdly, it was held that there was no need to extend the 
doctrine of conversion to this area as there existed 
adequate causes of action on which those who found 
themselves in a position similar to the present plaintiff 
could rely. The cause of action which the Supreme Court 
cited was the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts 
material to the patient's consent, or in the alternative 
the performance of medical procedures without first having 
obtained the patient's informed consent.
However, the dissenting opinion of Mosk J. took issue
234 7 9 3 P.2d 479 (1990), p.500.
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is factually and legally different from the cells excised
from Moore's body, Mosk J. was of the opinion that there
was no distinction. He explained this position in the
following terms:
The complaint alleges that Moore's cells 
naturally produced certain valuable proteins in 
larger than normal quantities; indeed that was 
why defendants were eager to culture them in the 
first place. Defendants do not claim that the 
cells of the Mo cell-line in fact have an 
abnormal number of chromosomes, at the present 
stage of this case we do not know if that fact 
has any bearing whatever on their capacity to
produce proteins; yet it is in the commercial
exploitation of that capacity -not simply in 
their number of chromosomes - that Moore seeks to 
assert an interest. For all that appears, 
therefore, the emphasized fact is a distinction 
without a difference.235
Mosk J. also disagreed with the majority's view of the
patenting of the cell-line. He argued that what Moore in
effect did, albeit unknowingly, was to collaborate with the
researchers by donating his body tissue. While conceding
that the patent in general is not granted for the cell in
its natural state but for the modified biogenetic product,
Mosk J. stated that:
the uniqueness of the product that gives rise to 
its patentability stems from the uniqueness of 
the original cell. A patient's claim to share in 
the profits flowing from a patent would be 
analogous to that of an inventor whose 
collaboration was essential to the success of a 
resulting product. The patient was not a coequal, 
but was a necessary contributor to the cell- 
line.236
Mosk J. was of the opinion that following this line of
with the majority's stance. On the point that the cell-line
235 Ibid., p.516.
236 Ibid., p. 528.
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to Moore obtaining a property interest in both his excised
cells and the subsequent biogenetic product.
The dissenting opinion also questioned the majority's
use of policy arguments to prevent the extension of the
doctrine of conversion. Mosk J. believed that the extension
of the doctrine into this area would not restrict any
further access to raw materials. He claimed that the very
concept of patentability restricted access to such
materials. Indeed the growth of the biotechnology industry
further narrowed such access according to Mosk J. Thus:
the biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies 
demanded and received exclusive rights in the 
scientists' discoveries, and frequently placed 
those discoveries under trade secret protection.
Trade secret protection is popular among 
biotechnology companies because, among other 
reasons, the invention need not meet the strict 
standards of patentability and the protection is 
both quickly acquired and unlimited in 
duration.237
He went further in his criticism of this aspect of the 
majority decision claiming that despite the policy 
justification for not extending the doctrine of conversion, 
there exist two stronger countervailing reasons for so 
doing.
Firstly, the general societal value of respecting the 
bodily integrity of the individual could be put forward as 
an argument for allowing certain proprietorial rights in 
one's own body. This individual right to bodily integrity 
was threatened in the past by practices such as slavery and
argument the law of patents would not constitute a barrier
237 Ibid., p.530.
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J., this threat still exists in the form of scientists who
are willing to exploit a patient's tissue soley to obtain
commercial benefit.
Mosk J.'s second countervailing argument is that of
the notion of fairness in dealings between members of
society, based on equity's abhorrence of those who benefit
from unjust enrichment. Thus, the patient from whom the raw
material was harvested has no right in law to share in the
benefits derived from the product of his body. This
according to the dissenting judge is:
both inequitable and immoral. As Dr Thomas H. 
Murray, a respected professor of ethics and 
public policy, testified before Congress, 'the 
person [who furnishes the tissue] should be 
justly compensated... If biotechnologists fail to 
make provision for a just sharing of profits with 
the person whose gift made it possible, the 
public's sense of justice will be offended and no 
one will be the winner.238
The dissenting opinion also contains criticism of the 
majority's second policy reason for non-extension of the 
conversion doctrine, that it was for the legislature to 
resolve the issue. Mosk J. held that such abdication of 
responsibility on the part of the courts would be m  effect 
an abdication of the courts' stewardship of an area of law 
which more than most was a creature of the common law, that 
is to say, the law of torts. He then proceeded to disabuse 
the majority of the notion that current statutory provision 
did not allow the sale of bodily material:
[a]s to organs the majority rely on the Uniform
indentured servitude. In the present day, according to Mosk
238 Ibid., p.533, quoting Murray, (1986, pp.5-6).
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Anatomical Gift Act [1968]... for the proposition 
that a competent adult may make a post-mortem 
gift of any part of his body but may not receive 
'valuable consideration7 for the transfer. But 
the prohibition of the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act [1968] against the sale of a body part is 
much more limited than the majority recognized: 
by its terms... the prohibition only applies to 
sales for 'transplantation7 or 'therapy7. Yet a 
different section of the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act [1968] authorizes the transfer and receipt of 
body parts for such additional purposes as 
'medical or dental education research, or 
advancement of medical or dental science7... No 
section of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act [1968] 
prohibits anyone from selling body parts for any 
of those additional purposes; by clear 
implication, therefore, such sales are legal. 
Indeed, the fact that the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act [1968] prohibits no sales of organs other 
than sales for 'transplantation7 or 'therapy7 
raises a further implication that it is also 
legal for anyone to sell human tissue to a 
biotechnology company for research and 
development purposes.239
Likewise, Mosk J. argued that the statutes in relation to
blood donation did not prohibit the sale of blood. This led
him to conclude that:
because such statutes treat both organs and blood 
as property that can legally be sold in a variety 
of circumstances, they impliedly support Moore's 
contention that his blood cells are likewise 
property for which he can and should receive 
compensation, and hence are protected by the law 
of conversion.240
Mosk J. also took issue with the final policy reason 
of the majority, that of there being an adequate cause of 
action for individuals who found themselves in a situation 
similar to that of the plaintiff.
The cause of action articulated by the majority was 
that of breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose to the
239 Ibid., p.535.
240 Ibid., p. 537.
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economic or research purposes. Mosk J. outlined three
objections to this view. Firstly, he believes that such a
remedy is not practically available citing for his
contention the following reasons:
[t]here are two barriers to recovery. First, 'the 
patient must show that if he or she had been 
informed of all pertinent information, he or she 
would have declined to consent to the procedure 
m  question'... As we explained in the seminal 
case of Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 229 (1972) at 245, 
'There must be a causal relationship between the 
physician's failure to inform and the injury to 
the plaintiff. Such a causal connection arises 
only if it is established that had the revelation 
been made consent to treatment would not have 
been given'.
The second barrier to recovery is still
higher, and is erected on the first: it is not 
even enough for the plaintiff to prove that he 
personally would have refused consent to the 
proposed treatment if he had been fully informed; 
he must also prove that in the same circumstances 
no reasonably prudent person would have given 
such consent...
Even in an ordinary Cobbs type action it may 
be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that no 
reasonably prudent person would have consented to 
the proposed treatment if the doctor had 
disclosed the particular risk of physical harm 
that ultimately caused the injury... because in 
many cases the potential benefits of the 
treatment to the plaintiff clearly outweigh the 
undisclosed risk of harm. But that imbalance will 
be even greater in the kind of nondisclosure 
action that the majority now contemplate: here we 
deal not with a risk of physical injuries such as 
a stroke, but with the possibility that the 
doctor might later use some of the patient's cast 
off tissue for scientific research or the 
development of commercial products.241
In addition, Mosk J. disapproves of the non-disclosure
action because it fails to give the patient the right to
grant consent to the use of his tissue for commercial
patient the fact that his cells are about to be used for
241 Ibid., p.538.
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such an enterprise. In summary this failure:
accentuates the negative and eliminates the 
positive: the patient can say no, but he cannot 
say yes and expect to share in the proceeds of 
his contribution... it is therefore not an 
adequate substitute for the conversion 
remedy.242
Finally, according to Mosk J. the non-disclosure
action does not allow a potential plaintiff to gain access
to all potential defendants.
Thus, for example, research assistants who
participated with the attending physician in the
development of the cell-line would not come within the
bounds of the doctor-patient relationship for the purposes
of such a form of action. Applying this model to the
present case then the only defendant who Moore would be
able to sue in a non-disclosure suit would be the physician
who treated him. The co-defendants in the instant case were
not physicians. Mosk J. concludes thus:
[a]s to these defendants, the majority can offer 
Moore only a slim hope of recovery: if they are 
to be liable on a non-disclosure cause of action, 
say the majority, 'it can only be on account of 
[the physician's] acts and on the basis of a 
recognized theory of secondary liability, such as 
respondeat superior...
To the extent that a plaintiff such as Moore 
is unable to plead or prove a satisfactory theory 
of secondary liability, the non-disclosure cause 
of action will thus be inadequate to reach a 
number of parties to the commercial exploitation 
of his tissue. Such parties include, for example, 
any physician-researcher who is not personally 
treating the patient, any other researcher who is 
not a physician, any employer of the foregoing... 
and any person or corporation thereafter 
participating in the commercial exploitation of
purposes on the condition that he share m  the proceeds of
242 Ibid., p.540.
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As can be seen from the dissenting judgment m  this 
case, there are cogent reasons for establishing a property 
rule in relation to bodily material such as cell tissue. 
This is so both for reasons of individual human rights such 
as the right of the individual to bodily integrity and 
autonomy as well as for reasons of legal certainty.
At present, in this jurisdiction as in the United 
States we can only rely on a number of precedents in 
relation to bodily materials as property which are far from 
authoritative on the point. 244 To arrive at a position of 
greater equity what is required is a clear acceptance 
either judicially or in statute of a property right in all 
bodily materials. This would allow for the protection of 
those who have like John Moore been 'gene-raped' and have 
in effect no recourse to justice. However, it may also lead 
to a situation where the body is a mere object to be bought 
and sold in the biotechnological marketplace. The symbolic 
acceptance of the body as property may as a result be 
distasteful for many. Nonetheless the current position 
where the body is represented as not being a commodity does 
not lead to an adequate protection against the inevitable 
exploitation which will be carried out. Neither does it 
prevent economically marginalized individuals from 
clandestinely selling their organs to willing buyers. Thus,
the tissue.243
243 Ibid., p.541.
244 See for example, R. v Welsh [1974] R.T.R. 478 and 
R. v Rothery [1976] R.T.R. 550.
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the potential benefits of adopting a property model of 
human body parts and materials outweigh the perceived 
disadvantages of such a development.245
2.8 Conclusions.
The way in which death is defined is of crucial 
importance to medical practice. One can see that even in 
this seemingly uncontroversial area of clinical practice 
ideological debate has taken place. In developing a body of 
Irish jurisprudence on death in general, one must not 
neglect the importance of framing a statute which clearly 
delineates the basis on which death is to be determined. 
The model adopted will determine the way in which the wider 
area of death and dying will be viewed in policy terms.
245 Skegg, (1992, p. 314), in speaking of the 
abandonment of the 'no property' rule in the context of 
cadavers raises the question of whether such an abandonment 
would lead to the commercial exploitation of corpses or 
parts of corpses. He frames his reply in the following 
terms:
[i]n fact, the 'no property' rule has not 
prevented all such sales. Human skeletons 
continue to be purchased by medical 
students, and museums and others have 
purchased human heads and other human 
remains... If the sale of corpses or parts 
of corpses is to be prevented or regulated, 
this is best done by appropriate legislation 
(cf. Human Organ Transplants Act 1989) 
rather than by placing reliance on a 
possible effect of the 'no property' rule.
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CHAPTER THREE: PREGNANCY TERMINATION - THE END OF THE
BEGINNING.
A thing would grow into a person, a tiny lump of 
stuff would become a human body, a human mind.
The astounding process of creation was going on 
within her; but Marjorie was conscious only of 
sickness and lassitude; the mystery for her meant 
nothing but fatigue and ugliness and a chronic 
anxiety about the future, pain of the mind as 
well as discomfort of the body.1
3.0 Introduction.
This chapter reviews the legal and moral background to 
a topic which falls into the category of the taking of 
life, pregnancy termination. The aim of this analysis is to 
provide a practical example of how the existence of 
different ethical viewpoints on the right to life can have 
practical ramifications for the way in which this issue is 
dealt with by policy and legal actors. Moreover, this 
analysis allows one to identify the manner in which the law 
and policy-makers have approached this matter and to 
discover if any lessons may be learned from this experience 
in relation to how legal and policy actors should approach 
the related issue of euthanasia.
3.1 The Sanctity of Foetal Life Model and Pregnancy 
Termination.
This variant of the sanctity of life doctrine views 
the foetus as being of similar status to the members of the 
species homo sapiens who have actually been born. In other
1 Huxley, (1994, p.2).
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However, the weakness of this argument is that it
presupposes that a human comes into being at a particular
point which may be empirically identified. Thus, Noonan2
concludes that the human being comes into existence from
the moment that the ovum is fertilized. Noonan claims that
it is at conception that human beings receive their genetic
code and holds that the:
positive argument for conception as the decisive 
moment of humanization is that at conception the 
new being receives the genetic code. It is this 
genetic information which determines his 
characteristics, which is the biological carrier 
of human wisdom, which makes him a self-evolving 
being. A being with a human genetic code is man.3
However, as Williams notes, the:
idea of a moment of conception when a new human 
being is miraculously created is over-dramatised, 
and results from ignorance of modern biology. The 
'moment' when the two gametes (the sperm and the 
ovum) fuse resolves itself under the microscope 
into a succession of clearly discernible stages, 
which may take twenty-four hours or more to 
complete. No one of these stages identifies 
itself as obviously the 'moment of conception'. 
However you date man's beginning, it is, like his 
ending, a process.4
Others who argue that the foetus is a human being do not
adhere to the view that this humanness attaches to the
foetus at conception.
Thus, Brody5 argues that the point at which the foetus
becomes human coincides with the commencement of brain
words, on this view, the foetus is a human being.
2 Noonan, (1970, p.57).
3 Ibid.
4 Williams, (1994, p.76).
5 See, Brody, (1975, pp.1-4).
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function. Nonetheless, irrespective of what boundary one 
draws in relation to the dawn of humanity in the fertilised 
ovum, one is then obliged to argue why such a being is to 
be accorded the same status as a living human being? The 
argument tends to focus on the inherent rights of the 
members of the species homo sapiens as opposed to members 
of any other species. One can frame the argument thus:-
(1) a human foetus is a human being from the 
moment of conception.
(2) It is wrong to kill a human being.
(3) Pregnancy termination entails the killing of 
a foetus.
(4) Therefore pregnancy termination is wrong.
However, as Glover points out, the problem with such an
argument is that:
even if we allow that the foetus is a human
being, it is hard to see how, without appealing 
to its potential rather than its actual
properties, we can use this to justify its 
protected status.6
Nonetheless one of the most vehement opponents of 
abortion, the Roman Catholic Church opposes the practice of 
abortion on the grounds that the foetus is a human being
and as such has a right not to be killed. The current view
of the Roman Catholic Church on the topic is that the 
foetus is a person from the moment of conception and has a 
right to life from that point onwards.7 As Dworkin points
6 Glover, (1990, p.121).
7 See, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, (1987, pp.1-2).
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out8 this view differs from the traditional Thomist
argument against abortion. Dworkin observes that the
current official Vatican line on abortion has only existed
for a century whereas for:
substantial periods, if there was any reigning 
opinion within the church hierarchy it was to the 
contrary: that a foetus becomes a person not at 
conception but only at a later stage of 
pregnancy, later than the stage at which almost 
all abortions now take place.9
Rather than base its opposition to abortion on the 
basis of the inherent humanity of the foetus, the early 
church based this argument on a more general appeal to the 
sanctity of life. Thus, Thomas Aquinas held that abortion 
in the early weeks of pregnancy is not murder because at 
that stage the soul is not present. This was based on the 
idea that the foetus does not possess a rational soul at 
the time of conception but only comes to possess one at a 
later stage, forty days in the case of a male foetus and 
later in the case of a female foetus.10 This view did not
8 Dworkin, (1993, pp.35-50).
9 Ibid., p.39.
10 Ibid, p.40, where Dworkin explains that this model 
of ensoulment was based on the idea of hylomorphism 
advocated by Aquinas. This idea:
holds that the human soul is not some 
independent free-floating substance that can 
be combined'with anything, but is logically 
related to the human body in the same way as 
the shape or form of any object is logically 
related to the raw material out of which it 
is made. No statue can have a given form 
unless it - the whole stone, or wood, or 
wax, or plaster - has that form. Even God 
could not bring it about that a huge 
unformed block of stone actually had the 
shape of Michelangelo's David. By the same
165
the foetus was ensouled. On the contrary, the practice of
abortion was just as strenuously condemned in this pre-
ensoulment period as it was on ensoulment, but for
different reasons. Rather abortions at this stage were
viewed as 'anticipated homicide7 and as such not
permitted.11 This placed the act of pre-ensoulment abortion
in the same category as contraception and masturbation
which while not homicide interfered with the natural
process of procreation. As Dworkin points out:
[i]n the Middle Ages, the term 'homicide7 was 
sometimes used to name any offense, including 
contraception, against the natural order of 
procreation, and thus against the sanctity of 
life conceived as God7s divine gift. Decrees of 
Pope Gregory IX provided that anyone who treated 
a man or a woman 'so that he cannot generate, or 
she conceive, or offspring be born, let it be 
held as homicide7. This expanded conception of 
homicide, to include not just the killing of an 
actual human being but any interference with 
God7s creative force, united the church7s various 
concerns with procreation. Masturbation, 
contraception, and abortion were together seen as 
offences against the dignity and sanctity of
imply that the church viewed abortion as permissible until
token, nothing can embody a human soul, on 
this view, unless it already is a human 
body, which 'meant, for Aquinas and later 
Catholic doctrine, a body with the shape and 
organs of a human being. Aquinas therefore 
denied that a human soul is already instinct 
in the embryo that a woman and a man 
together create through sex. That initial 
embryo, he thought, is only the raw material 
of a human being, whose growth is directed 
through a series of souls, each appropriate 
to the stage it has reached, and each 
corrupted and replaced by the next, until it 
has finally achieved the necessary 
development for a distinctly human soul.
11 Ibid. , p. 43 .
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Pius IX declared that early abortions were also to be
punished by excommunication.13
This interpretation of foetal status saw the foetus as
being ensouled from the moment of conception. This is the
official view which now pertains. This view is more
absolutist, declaring that abortion in any circumstances
even in the case of rape or incest is a grave s m  and
therefore impermissible. The traditional Thomist view is
not as hardline in nature and would allow for certain
exceptions. Dworkin goes on to point out the disparity
between the official view of the church and that of the lay
members of the church on the issue of the sanctity of life
as it relates to abortion. He cites the example of Ireland
in the aftermath of the case of Attornev-General v X and
Others14 where there appeared to be a divergence between
the official church line and public opinion on the issue:
the law that resulted from the referendum plainly 
presupposes that a foetus is not a person from 
conception; if it were, a state would certainly 
be justified m  ordering its citizens not to kill 
a foetus in a foreign country - indeed, it would 
be morally obliged to do so...
So the Irish people's latest vote is further 
confirmation that even people who believe, on 
religious grounds, that the state should prohibit 
almost all abortions do not actually think that 
a foetus is a person from the moment of 
conception. They believe something different but 
more firmly grounded in Catholic tradition: that
human life itself.12
The traditional view was to change in 1869 when Pope
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. , p. 44 .
14 [1992] 1 I . R . 1.
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abortion is a fierce and rarely justified waste 
of the divine gift of human life. People who 
oppose abortion for that reason might well find 
it acceptable that citizens be permitted to have 
an abortion abroad. Almost no one is such a moral 
relativist as to believe that infanticide is 
morally proper if done where the laws permit it, 
but many people do think that each nation should 
be permitted to decide for itself what may be 
done on its soil, out of respect for fundamental 
intrinsic values, when no one's rights are 
violated.15
Thus, Dworkin believes that religious opposition to
abortion can be better understood:
as based on the detached assumption that human 
life has intrinsic value rather than on the 
derivative idea that a foetus is a person with 
its own interests and rights.16
3.2 The Sanctity of Life Model and Pregnancy Termination.
This model does not focus exclusively on the status of 
the foetus, but rather on a more general idea of the value 
of all human life. When one hears the term sanctity of life 
one immediately reaches the superficial conclusion that it 
is an exclusively conservative doctrine. Indeed this is, 
only in part, true.
The traditional Thomist natural law viewpoint, as we 
have seen, adopts this stance. However, what is less 
clearly recognisable is that in many ways the liberal pro- 
choice model believes in a fundamental sanctity of life. 
This view of a sanctity of life model as being common to 
both pro-life and pro-choice advocates has been put forward
15 Dworkin, (1993, p.48).
16 Ibid. , p. 50 .
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[t]he great majority of people who have strong 
views about abortion - liberal as well as 
conservative - believe, at least intuitively, 
that the life of a human organism has intrinsic 
value in any form it takes, even m  the extremely 
undeveloped form of a very early, just-implanted 
embryo. I say 'at least intuitively' because many 
people have not related their views about 
abortion or euthanasia to the idea that human 
life has intrinsic value.18
To this extent, public opinion is in agreement on the basic
assumption that life is sacred. It is the degree to which
individuals respect this idea of the sanctity of life which
differentiates them in practice. Dworkin uses what he terms
the frustration thesis to determine the common belief of
both conservatives and liberals in a sanctity of life
model. He outlines this thesis in the following manner:
[w]e believe... that a successful human life has 
a certain natural course. It starts m  mere 
biological development - conception, foetal 
development, and infancy - but it then extends 
into childhood, adolescence, and adult life in 
ways that are determined not just by biological 
formation but by social and individual training 
and choice, and that culminate m  satisfying 
relationships and achievements of different 
kinds. It ends, after a normal life span, m  a 
natural death. It is a waste of the natural and 
human creative investments that make up the story 
of a normal life when this normal progression is 
frustrated by premature death or in other ways.
But how bad this is - how great the frustration - 
depends on the stage of life m  which it occurs, 
because the frustration is greater if it takes 
place after rather than before the person has 
made a significant personal investment in his own 
life, and less if it occurs after any investment 
has been substantially fulfilled, or as 
substantially fulfilled as is anyway likely...
So the idea that we deplore the frustration 
of life, not its mere absence, seems adequately
by Ronald Dworkin.17 He is of the view that:
17 Ibid., pp. 68-101.
18 Ibid. , p. 69 .
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to fit our general convictions about life, death 
and tragedy. It also explains much of what we 
think about the particular tragedy of abortion.
Both conservatives and liberals assume that m  
some circumstances abortion is more serious and 
more likely to be unjustifiable than in others. 
Notably, both agree that a late-term abortion is 
graver than an early-term one...
The frustration thesis gives us a natural 
and compelling justification of it. Foetal 
development is a continuing creative process, a 
process that has barely begun at the instant of 
conception. Indeed, since genetic individuation 
is not yet complete at that point, we might say 
that the development of a unique human being has 
not started until approximately fourteen days 
later, at implantation. But after implantation, 
as foetal growth continues, the natural 
investment that would be wasted in an abortion 
grows steadily larger and more significant.19
Thus, there are points of convergence on the issue of
the sanctity of life between conservative and liberal
opinion. However, there is also quite a deal of disparity.
Dworkm illustrates this by means of a spectrum of
frustration. At either end of this spectrum is to be found
radical conservative and liberal views on the issue of the
taking of life. Using the frustration thesis, Dworkin
creates a model of the amalgam of views which exist on the
issue of abortion. These views are formed on the basis of
how various groupings see abortion as frustrating the
natural cycle of life.
As explained in his espousal of the frustration
thesis, a normal human life is made up of two modes of
creative investment in that life, the natural and the
human. The relative stress which one places on the
importance of each mode to the successful, normal life
19 Ibid., pp.88-89.
determines, to a large degree, the position of the 
individual on the spectrum of opinion. Thus:
[i]f you believe that the natural investment in 
a human life is transcendently important, that 
the gift of life itself is infinitely more 
significant than anything the person whose life 
it is may do for himself, important though that 
may be, you will also believe that a deliberate, 
premature death is the greatest frustration of 
life possible, no matter how limited or cramped 
or unsuccessful the continued life would be. On 
the other hand, if you assign much greater 
relative importance to the human contribution to 
life's creative value, then you will consider the 
frustration of that contribution to be a more 
serious evil, and will accordingly see more point 
in deciding that life should end before further 
significant human investment is doomed to 
frustration.20
It is on this model that Dworkin proposes a reshaping of 
the discourse on abortion and in some way to understand the 
real reasons why various groupings adopt conflicting 
stances on the issue. One can see that there is a basic 
commonality of opinion on the issue of the sanctity of 
life. It is the degree to which individuals support this 
abstract premise which causes division on the topic. This 
model of interpreting the differing ways in which 
individuals understand the ideal of the sanctity of life 
offers as Dworkin says a schema "for understanding the 
arguments and decisions that we and other people make in 
real life".21
This model is useful in understanding the Irish 
discourse on the issue of abortion. In addition it is also 
of use m  determining how another contentious life and
20 Ibid. , p.91.
21 Ibid. , p. 100.
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death issue will be dealt with in the forum of public 
discourse in Ireland in the years ahead. It in fact 
provides the conceptual bridge which unites the issues of 
abortion and euthanasia. By applying this model to the 
question of euthanasia one will be provided with a rather 
accurate picture of the upcoming Irish debate on the issue 
of death and dying.
3.3 The Privacy Model and Pregnancy Termination.
In the United States in the case of Roe v Wade22 the
problem of restricting access to abortion services was
dealt with by appealing to the right of privacy. Thus, as
Blackmun J. stated in his judgment in that case, the right
to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy".23
The right to privacy however is a largely undefined
and perhaps indefinable right. There has been voluminous
debate as to what exactly it means and whether it is a
valid constitutionally protected right.24 As Rubenfeld has
written, the Supreme Court has never:
hazarded a definitive statement of what it was 
supposed to protect. At the heart of the right to 
privacy, there has always been a conceptual 
vacuum.25
22 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
23 Ibid. , p. 153 .
24 See further, Rubenfeld, (1989, pp.737-807).
25 Ibid. , p.739.
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theoretical principle from which the right of privacy
emanates is manifest m  the cases m  which such a right has
been articulated. The basis for a privacy right lies in the
Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution which
states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people". The Ninth Amendment has
enabled the Supreme Court to articulate an unenumerated
right to privacy which is not mentioned in the text of the
Constitution. This right was described in Griswold v
Connecticut26 as being discernible m  the penumbras of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments. In the
subsequent case of Eisenstadt v Baird27 Blackmun J.
elaborated on this right in the following terms:
[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual, married or 
unmarried, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
to bear or beget a child.28
The right was further extended by the Supreme Court in 
Roe v Wade29 to include within its scope the right of a 
woman to obtain an abortion within the first two trimesters 
of her pregnancy. This privacy right derived from the 
protection of liberty to be found m  the Due Process Clause
This inability on the part of the judiciary to elucidate a
26 3 81 U.S. 479 (1965) .
27 405 U.S. 438 (1972) .
28 Ibid. , p. 453 .
29 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
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referred to by Dworkin as creating a 'constitution of
principle'.30 By interpreting the Constitution in this
manner, Dworkin argues, we create a model which:
lays down general, comprehensive moral standards 
that government must respect but that leaves it 
to statesmen and judges to decide what these 
standards mean in concrete circumstances. What 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
actually mean, on this view of the Constitution, 
depends on the best, most accurate understanding 
of liberty and equal citizenship.31
However, there is a competing model of constitutional 
interpretation which Dworkin refers to as creating a 
'constitution of detail'.32 This has very different 
implications for the way in which constitutional decision­
making is viewed. Thus, under this model, Dworkin observes, 
what is created is "a collection of independent historical 
views and opinions unlikely to have great unity or even 
complete consistency".33 As a result one would be confined 
to a narrow, literalist view of the Constitution, which is 
far from dynamic. As Dworkin puts it, such a model would 
express :
only the very specific, concrete expectations of 
the particular statesmen who wrote and voted for 
them. The Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses would then have only the force that the 
particular people who voted for them would have
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This manner of interpreting the Constitution has been
30 Dworkin, (1993, p. 119).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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expected them to have.34 
This model has gained considerable ground in the years 
since Roe v Wade was decided. It can be seen clearly in 
White J.'s majority decision m  Bowers v Hardwick35 where 
it was held that the right to privacy did not extend to 
consensual adult male homosexual activity.
The majority noted the previous areas which had been 
protected under the privacy right; family, marriage and 
procreation and saw no connection between these areas and 
consensual homosexual activity. Thus, it concluded that, as 
in this case, a state statute criminalizing consensual male 
homosexual acts was not unconstitutional. White J. in his 
opinion for the majority clearly articulated the 
'constitution of detail7 as identified by Dworkin. White J. 
claimed:
[t]he court is most vulnerable and comes nearest 
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution... There should be, therefore, great 
resistance to expand the substantive reach of 
[due process], particularly if it requires 
redefining the category of rights deemed to be 
fundamental. Otherwise, the judiciary necessarily 
takes to itself further authority to govern the 
country without express constitutional 
authority.36
White J. believed that there was a danger in the continued 
development of unenumerated rights such as the right of 
privacy. He believed that it could lead to the "imposition
34 Ibid.
35 478 U.S. 286 (1986) .
36 Ibid. , pp. 194-195.
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of the Justices' own choice of values on the states".37
However, the majority judgment itself was an
expression of a value judgment. In this case the message
which was hidden behind the judicial rhetoric was that
consensual male adult homosexual acts were not to be
accorded the same status as heterosexual sexual activity.
The majority based this conclusion on views of
homosexuality which were traditional and very conservative.
The first argument was based on tradition. Traditionally
the approach of legislators in the United States to
homosexual acts was that such acts should be criminalized.
The majority claimed that the historical background of such
legislation pointed to a general societal rejection of
homosexual acts. Thus, the majority concluded:
[a]gainst this background, to claim that a right 
to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted m  
this nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, 
facetious.38
This appeal to tradition however is not without its own
problems. As Stacy has noted:
[d]epending on one's definition of 'deeply rooted 
tradition', one can view Hardwick as involving at 
least two different sets of conflicting 
traditions. The first involves the tradition of 
formal proscription of sodomy and the perhaps 
more recent tradition of refusal to enforce this 
proscription. The second set consists of the 
tradition of governmental non-involvement (sic) 
in consensual sexual intimacy generally and the 
competing tradition of intolerance of 
homosexuality. The majority did not attempt to 
provide the means for deciding whether any of 
these practices qualify as 'deeply rooted
37 Ibid. , p. 191.
38 Ibid. , p. 194 .
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traditions', or for resolving a conflict between 
them assuming they do qualify. Nor did the 
majority explain whether and how the Court's past 
privacy decisions can plausibly be viewed as 
emerging from deeply rooted traditions.39
Secondly, the majority was of the view that homosexual
acts could not be distinguished for the purposes of
constitutional adjudication from other forms of sexual
activity to which the Supreme Court had not given
constitutional recognition:
it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit 
the claimed right to homosexual conduct while 
leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, 
and other sexual crimes... We are unwilling to 
start down that road.40
The majority thus claimed that they could only adhere to
the previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court on privacy
and as these referred only to marriage, family and
procreation, they could not extend privacy protection to
the area of homosexual acts. However, it is clear that in
doing so the majority were displaying their distaste for
the development of this right. As Rubenfeld has put it:
[t]he device of compartmentalizing precedent is 
an old jurisprudential strategy for limiting 
unruly doctrines. The effect here is that, after 
Hardwick. we know that the right to privacy 
protects some aspects of marriage, procreation 
and child-rearing, but we do not know why. By 
identifying three disparate applications 
ungrounded by any unifying principle, the 
majority effectively severed the roots of the 
privacy doctrine, leaving only the branches, 
which will presumably m  short order dry up and 
wither away.41
39 Stacy, (1992, pp.549-550).
40 Bowers v Hardwick 478 U.S. 286 (1986), pp.195-196.
41 Rubenfeld, (1989, p.749).
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more conservative judiciary to overturn it, remains a means
of protecting individual rights against third party
interference. Yet the problems of the theoretical basis of
the right of privacy remain. As Henkin has noted in
referring to the development of - the privacy right by
Douglas J. in Griswold v Connecticut42;
[a]lthough it is not wholly clear, Douglas J.'s 
argument seems to go something like this: since 
the Constitution, in various 'specifics' of the 
Bill of Rights and in their penumbra, protects 
rights which partake of privacy, it protects 
other aspects of privacy as well, indeed it
recognizes a general, complete right of 
privacy...
A logician, I suppose, might have trouble 
with that argument. A legal draftsman, indeed, 
might suggest the opposite: when the Constitution 
sought to protect private rights it specified 
them; that it explicitly protects some elements 
of privacy, but not others, suggests that it did 
not mean to protect those mentioned.43
The underlying weaknesses in the privacy model as a means
of protecting reproductive freedom and indeed individual
sexual liberty and physician-assisted suicide have prompted
certain commentators to look for an alternative model.44
This shall be the focus of the following section.
The privacy model however, despite the attempts of a
3.4 The Equality Model and Pregnancy Termination.
The abortion debate as well as incorporating views
42 3 81 U.S. 479 (1965) .
43 Henkin, (1974, pp. 1421-1422 ) .
44 See further, Dworkin, (1993, pp.50-60).
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uphold female sanctity. No matter who articulates the
message of foetal rights, male or female, the voice of this
lobby is patriarchal. It is also interesting to note that
the prominent voice in legal discourse in this country has
been male. The prominent voice in legislative discourse has
also been male. Maleness is society's public persona.
Femininity has been hidden, obscured.
One puzzling factor m  this account is the
representation of Ireland as female. This may stem from a
time when Ireland was indeed pre-patnarchal, to a time
when, as in Celtic mythology the influence of women on
society was significant. Or are these symbolic
representations of Ireland as female merely creations of a
male-dominated society inscribing woman's role as producer
of offspring on the collective imagination?
Today, the issue of abortion continues to be regulated
by male-dominated institutions who still speak the language
of patriarchy. The idea of legal discourse being dominated
by the male is well put by Finley when she observes:
the primary linguists of law have almost
exclusively been men - white, educated,
economically privileged men. Men have shaped it, 
they have defined it, they have interpreted it 
and given it meaning consistent with their 
understandings of the world and of people 'other' 
than them.45
This male language is also the lingua franca of 
reproductive medicine, another male-dominated institution. 
As Greschner has put it:
supportive of foetal sanctity also includes views which
45 Finley, (1989, p.892).
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[t]he metaphor of production is the dominant 
medical metaphor to describe the process of 
menstruation, pregnancy and birth: women are the 
machines that must produce a perfect product, a 
healthy baby. Just as machines are separate from 
their products, so too are women separate from 
their 'products', children. Doctors, not women, 
'deliver' the product and improve its quality...
The medical model of production overlaps and 
supports the notion that birth is a 'natural' 
event. Women menstruate, become pregnant and give 
birth because that is what their bodies are 
designed for; women themselves are simply living 
through a biological process into which they have 
no input.46
This perceived imbalance in public discourse has resulted 
in a move amongst certain feminist thinkers to the equal 
treatment model of pregnancy termination.47 This model has 
rather different implications for the abortion debate than 
the privacy model described in the previous section. Indeed 
for many the privacy model as applied to the question of 
abortion has many shortcomings.
The limitations of basing reproductive autonomy on a 
right to privacy have been demonstrated m  a number of 
cases which were heard after the decision in Roe v Wade.48 
Noteworthy among such cases are Harris v McRae49 and Maher 
v Roe.50
In Harris v McRae.51 the Supreme Court held that a 
federally funded programme to subsidize medically necessary
46 Greschner, (1990, pp.647-648).
47 See further, Dworkin, (1993, pp.50-60).
48 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
49 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
50 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
51 448 U.S. 297 (1980) .
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services which denied funds to indigent women in order to
enable them to have medically necessary abortions except in
the case of rape, incest or where the life of the mother
was threatened, did not unduly interfere with a woman's
constitutionally protected freedom to decide whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy. The Supreme Court gave the
following rationale for this decision:
[t]he financial constraints that restrict an 
indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range 
of constitutionally protected freedom of choice 
are the product not of governmental restrictions 
on access to abortions but rather of her 
indigency.52
Similarly m  Maher v Roe53 the Supreme Court held that the 
withdrawal of funding for abortions coupled with full 
funding for childbirth did not affect the privacy rights of 
women. The Supreme Court was of the view that unequal 
subsidization of abortion in order to encourage childbirth 
did not prevent women from gaining access to pregnancy 
termination services. These practical failings of privacy 
protection m  this area have led to the development of a 
new conceptual model on which to base the question of 
access to abortion. This model focuses on the idea of 
equality or equal treatment.54
52 Ibid. , p. 316.
53 432 U.S. 464 (1977) .
54 McKinnon, (1983, pp.32-34), argues that:
[p]rivacy conceived as a right from public 
intervention and disclosure is the 
conceptual opposite of the relief McRae 
sought for welfare women. State intervention 
would have provided a choice these women did 
not have in private... The way the law of
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The equality model unlike the privacy model does not 
focus on the personhood of the foetus. Indeed many who 
support the equality model accept that the foetus does 
possess a vestige of humanity. Thus, as McKinnon has 
observed:
in the experience of many pregnant women, the 
foetus is a human form of life. It is alive...
More than a body part but less than a person, 
where it is, is largely what it is. From the 
standpoint of the pregnant woman, it is both me 
and not me. It 'is' the pregnant woman in the 
sense that it is m  her and of her and is hers 
more than anyone's. It 'is not' her in the sense 
that she is not all that is there.S5
This model does not therefore rely on a conflictual
relationship between the foetus and the mother, but rather
sees the issue as part of a wider question of the status of
the female m  society. Sunstein has summed up this model in
the following manner:
[o]n this view, abortion should be seen not as
privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy 
also bars change in control over that 
intimacy. The existing distribution of power 
and resources within the private sphere will 
be precisely what the law of privacy exists 
to protect.. . I think it is not a 
coincidence that the very place (the body), 
the very relations (heterosexual), the very 
activities (intercourse and reproduction), 
and the very feelings (intimate) that 
feminism has found central to the subjection 
form the core of privacy law's coverage. In 
this perspective, the legal concept of 
privacy can and has shielded the place of 
battery, marital rape, and women's exploited 
labour, preserved the central institutions 
whereby women are deprived of identity, 
autonomy, control, and self-definition, and 
protected the primary activities through 
which male supremacy is expressed and 
enforced.
55 McKinnon, (1991, p.1316).
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murder of the foetus but instead as a refusal to 
continue to permit one's body to be used to 
provide assistance to it. The failure to see it 
in this way is simply a product of the perceived 
naturalness of the role of women as childbearers 
- whether they want to assume that role or not.
And even if a general legal obligation of bodily 
assistance to the vulnerable might be 
constitutionally acceptable, such an obligation 
cannot be permitted if it is imposed solely on 
women. This is so especially because of the close 
real-world connection between selectivity of this 
sort and constitutionally illegitimate 
stereotypes about the appropriate role of 
women... the argument from equality is supported 
by four different points: (1) prohibiting
abortion is a form of prima facie or de jure sex 
discrimination; (2) it is impermissibly 
selective; (3) it results from constitutionally 
unacceptable stereotypes; and (4) it fails 
sufficiently to protect foetal lives. Standing 
alone, any one of these points is probably 
insufficient. They derive force by their 
cumulative effect.56
The equality model requires a reconceptualization of
the current model of society, where the hitherto repressed
female voice is allowed to surface in public discourse. The
first component of the argument sees public policy
restrictions on abortion as a form of sex discrimination.
As Sunstein points out:
[a] statute that is explicitly addressed to women 
is of course a form of sex discrimination. A 
statute that involves a defining characteristic 
or a biological correlate of being female should 
be treated in precisely the same way. If a law 
said that 'no woman' may obtain an abortion, it 
should readily be seen as a sex-based 
classification. A law saying that 'no person' may 
obtain an abortion has the same meaning.57
The current model of limiting abortion is reflective
of a traditional male-oriented view of the role of the
56 Sunstein, (1992, p. 32).
57 Ibid. , pp. 32-33 .
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female. The female has motherhood thrust upon her rather
than choosing it for herself. McKinnon's idea of the foetus
as of the woman is not compatible with the dominant
societal model of motherhood. Rather the woman is seen as
separable from the foetus in her womb. She remains the
'other' even m  this most unique of relationships. At one
extreme the woman is a mere foetal container, the dominated
party in this relationship. Thus, as Greschner observes:
[t]he role of the mother is obliterated... 
Patriarchy, through both religion and medicine, 
took pregnancy and subverted the process into a 
model of separate persons within one person 
imposing its way of thinking about human life on 
women. Unsurprisingly, the foetus is visualized 
as a miniature man, more precisely of late as a 
male astronaut inside a uterine spaceship.58
This dominant model has constricted female choice m
the matter of motherhood. Indeed, choice is often
completely absent in this as m  many aspects of the lives
of women. As Adrienne Rich has pointed out:
[f]or most women actual childbirth has involved 
no choice whatever, and very little 
consciousness. Since prehistoric times, the
anticipation of labour has been associated with
fear, physical anguish or death, a stream of 
superstitions, misinformation, theological and 
medical theories - in short, all we have been 
taught we should feel, from willing victimization 
to ecstatic fulfilment.59
Thus, the idea that laws restricting abortion should be
viewed as a form of unequal treatment stems from the
notion of motherhood as a societally imposed construct. The
absence of choice in the past does not imply that given the
58 Greschner, (1990, p.649).
59 Rich, (1976, p.149) .
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choice a woman would not choose to become a parent. Rather
the introduction of choice would allow her to do so on her
own terms and in a manner in which she is viewed as more
than a mere carrier of the male seed. In this view woman
becomes the creator rather than just an accessory. The
difference between a pregnancy that is chosen and one that
is imposed has been well put by Finley:
[i]f a pregnancy is wanted, many women may feel 
an ecstatic connected wholeness with the wonder 
of their growing body. The developing foetus is 
not just part of her; it is her and part of a 
seamless web. Whatever is done to or for it, is 
done to her, not just through her. If the 
pregnancy is unwanted, conflict with an opposed 
autonomous rights holder still does not 
encapsulate what many women feel. The feelings 
may be of terrifying annihilation, of invasion by 
and surrender of self to the pregnancy - not of 
a fight against a separate being. After 
terminating an unwanted pregnancy, a woman does 
not feel as though she has vanquished an enemy, 
but as if she has been given herself back. 
Overwhelming relief, a sense of autonomy restored 
- but sometimes a sense of part of herself 
lost.60
The second component of the equality argument as 
visualized by Sunstein is that the limitation on access to 
abortion services is unnecessarily selective. As Sunstein 
points out:
[t]he basic problem is that an act of abortion is 
not an ordinary killing, but instead a refusal to 
allow one's body to be devoted to the protection 
of another. Government never imposes an 
obligation of this sort on its citizens - even 
when human life is uncontroversially at stake. 
Parents are not compelled to devote their bodies 
to the protection of children, even if, for 
example, a risk-free kidney transplant is 
necessary to prevent the death of their child...
It seems clear that a proposal to impose duties 
of bodily imposition on parents or others would
60 Finley, (1989, pp.900-901).
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be treated as a frightening and unacceptable 
intrusion on personal autonomy - even when life 
is at stake, even when death would result from 
refusal to carry out the relevant duty, and even 
when the people to be protected owe their 
existence and vulnerability to the people on whom 
the imposition would be placed... The fact that 
similar impositions are not made m  cases in 
which men are involved... suggests that the 
prohibition of abortion is a form of 
impermissible selectivity. It indicates that a 
discriminatory purpose is ultimately at work.61
This again stems from an unwillingness to accept the
individuality of the female in society.
To this argument that policy-makers are being
needlessly selective in the limiting of access to abortion,
one may find a counter-argument, Sunstein notes, m  another
area of public policy. She gives the example of the
military draft of which men have traditionally been the
subject.
Thus, it could be argued that in this instance the
state imposes a peculiar burden on the body of the male.
Sunstein sees this example not as confounding her argument
but as confirming it. She sees the example of the draft as
part of a wider notion of the relative roles of males and
females m  society. Thus, she claims that the:
central point is that legal provisions ensuring 
that only men are drafted are part of a system of 
sex role stereotyping characterized by a sharp, 
legally produced split between the domestic and 
public spheres - with women occupying the first 
and men occupying the second... legal 
restrictions on abortion are an element in the 
legal creation of a domestic sphere in which 
women occupy their traditional role... Male-only 
drafts are part of the legal creation of a public 
sphere in which men occupy their traditional
61 Sunstein, (1992, p. 34).
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The third part of the equality argument is based on 
the idea that the traditional model of the role of women in 
society is a constitutionally unacceptable stereotype. This 
stereotypical view of women's role is according to Sunstein 
responsible for the situation which currently prevails. She 
claims that:
the restrictions that do or could exist in this 
world would in all probability have failed to 
pass without the involvement and support of 
people holding and relying on unacceptable 
stereotypes.63
The final part of the equality argument states that
legal prohibitions on abortion do not in fact achieve what
they purport to achieve, that is, to protect foetal life.
Rather what they do m  fact achieve is force women to have
dangerous abortions, thus endangering the lives of women.64
In the context of current constitutional reality, the
equality model would appear to be untenable in that the
current construct of equality merely requires that women be
treated m  a similar manner to men insofar as they are the
same as men. Thus, as men cannot currently become pregnant,
laws restricting access to abortions are not looked upon as
being discriminatory m  this sense. However, as Sunstein
argues, the current constitutional model of equality:
turns out also to be a conception of neutrality. 
According to that conception, the government's 
duty of impartiality is violated when, and only
62 Ibid., p. 36.
63 Ibid. , p.37.
64 Ibid., pp. 37-39.
role.62
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when, it distinguishes between those who are the 
same, by, for example, treating blacks 
differently from whites, or women differently 
from men. But this conception of neutrality rules 
out of bounds a perfectly plausible claim of 
inequality. It does so precisely because it 
embodies a controversial substantive baseline.
Here the baseline is not existing distributions 
of wealth and opportunities; it is not as if the 
social status quo. m  that sense, is taken as 
prepolitical and just. Something quite similar 
is, however, at work. Women's biological 
differences 'from the norm' are treated as a 
social given, and legal rules directed at those 
differences are said not to implicate equality.65
Thus, the equality argument while valid in theory does
not seem workable in the current constitutional context.
This stems from a particular societal perception of women
which is patriarchal in nature. However, this current view
is not entirely immutable. What is required is a shift in
social perceptions in relation to gender differentiation.
Thus, as Sunstein concludes:
there is no obvious reason to ask the equality 
question m  this way. Indeed, if we do so, we 
will fail to see inequality m  cases where it 
plausibly exists... Surely a law that turns a 
biological capacity into a social and legal 
disability for a part of the population, and for 
only that part, should be seen as raising 
questions of discrimination. If a biological 
capacity limited to one gender is made a basis 
for social disadvantage through law, one might 
think that the relevant law creates a problem of 
inequality.66
3.5 Pregnancy Termination and the Irish Constitution: The 
Sanctity of Autonomy?
The carrying out of an abortion in Ireland, until the
65 Ibid. , p. 43 .
66 Ibid. , pp. 43-44 .
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Supreme Court decision in the case of Attorney-General v X 
and Others.67 was thought to be illegal in all 
circumstances. This prohibition was to be found in both 
statutory and constitutional provisions. Sections 58 and 59 
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 rendered the 
provision of abortion a criminal act.68 Section 58 of the 
Civil Liability Act 196169 and section 10 of the Health
67 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
68 Section 58 provides:
[e]very woman, being with child, who, with 
intent to procure her own miscarriage shall 
unlawfully administer to herself any poison 
or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully 
use any instrument or other means whatsoever 
with the like intent, and whosoever, with 
intent to procure the miscarriage of any 
woman, whether she be or not with child, 
shall unlawfully administer to her or cause 
to be taken by her any poison or other 
noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any 
instrument or other means whatsoever with 
the like intent, shall be guilty of felony, 
and on being convicted thereof shall be 
liable to be kept in penal servitude for 
life.
Section 59 provides:
[w]hosoever shall unlawfully supply or 
procure any poison or other noxious thing, 
or any instrument or thing whatsoever, 
knowing that the same is intended to be 
unlawfully used or employed with intent to 
procure the miscarriage of any woman, 
whether she be or be not with child, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being 
convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept 
in penal servitude for any period less than 
three years and not exceeding five years.
69 This provides:
[f]or the avoidance of doubt it is hereby 
declared that the law relating to wrongs 
shall apply to an unborn child for his 
protection in like manner as if the child
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(Family Planning) Act 197970 contained further provisions
in relation to the protection of the foetus. Article
40.3.3. of Bunreacht na hEireann 1937, inserted as the
result of a referendum, appeared to guarantee the right to
life of the foetus. This article provides that:
the State (sic) acknowledges the right to life of 
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal 
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its 
laws to respect, and as far as practicable, to 
vindicate that right.
This idea of the foetus as a person with equal rights 
is deeply indebted to Roman Catholic moral teaching on the 
issue. However, it is not out of place m  a constitution 
which is influenced by Roman Catholic thought.71
The Thomist formulation of natural law was in official 
favour at the time of the preparation of Bunreacht na 
hEireann 19 3 7 . 72 Aquinas contended that the civil society
were born, provided the child is 
subsequently born alive.
70 Section 10 states:
[n]othing in this shall be construed as 
authorising:
(a) the procuring of abortion,
(b) the doing of any other thing the doing 
of which is prohibited by section 58 or 
section 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (which sections prohibit the 
administering of drugs or the use of 
instruments to procure abortion or the 
supplying of drugs or instruments to procure 
abortion), or;
(c) the sale, importation into the State,
(sic) manufacture, advertising or display of 
abortifacients.
71 See further, Clarke, (1993, pp.177-180).
72 For a discussion of Thomist thought see section 1.2 
of this thesis, pp.7-28.
190
only discover. In the words of Walsh J. in the case of
McGee v Attorney-General,.73 natural law is "the law of God
promulgated by reason and is the ultimate governor of all
the laws of men".74
It was the First Vatican Council m  1869 which
instituted a revival in Thomist thought. This was followed
m  1879 by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, Aeterni Patris which
called for the education of the clergy to be founded on the
works of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, Canon Law was amended to
this effect, with Canon 1366 stating that "Catholic
theology and philosophy be taught according to the method,
principles, and doctrine of the Angelic Doctor [viz Thomas
Aquinas]".75 The Thomist natural law approach was still m
vogue at the time of the framing of Bunreacht na hEireann
i 1937. Pope Pius XII in his encyclical of 1930, Casti
Connubi. stated that all Christians must be:
guided and led in all things that touch upon 
faith or morals by the Holy Church of God through 
its Supreme Pastor the Roman Pontiff, who is 
himself guided by Jesus Christ our Lord.76
Thus, in Thomist thought, civil law is subordinate to the
divine law.
The individual is thus bound by a set of principles 
which is derived from a particular theological viewpoint,
follows the rules of natural law which human beings may
73 [1974] I.R. 284.
74 Ibid., pp.317-318.
75 Cited in Coughlan, (1990, p.23).
76 Quoted in Clarke, (1984, p.61).
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whether one subscribes to that viewpoint or not. The fact 
that Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 is based on Roman Catholic 
philosophy is quite evident. The preamble to the 
Constitution puts one in no doubt as to document's 
intellectual provenance. The Roman Catholic conception of 
God, the supreme being, is to be the source of all legal 
and political power and it is to God that "all actions both 
of men and States (sic) must be referred".
God makes another appearance in Article 6.1 as the 
supreme arbiter of all law. While acknowledging that 
Ireland is to be a representative democracy with all 
governmental powers coming from the people, it is the 
divine power which holds ultimate sway.
Current Roman Catholic teaching on abortion, as has 
been explained above in section 3.1 is a relatively new 
innovation and is by no means the immutable traditional 
viewpoint on the issue.
The constitutional provision in relation to abortion 
was inserted as a result of the lobbying of certain pro­
life groups who were closely allied with Roman 
Catholicism.77 These groups, wary of the liberal trend in 
the Irish Supreme Court in the nineteen sixties and early 
nineteen seventies, were of the opinion that the Supreme 
Court might focus on the question of abortion and use the 
fundamental rights provisions of Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 
to allow for abortion in certain circumstances in a manner
77 See further, Girvm, (1986, pp. 61-81); O'Carroll, 
(1991, pp.53-71) and O'Leary and Hesketh, (1988, pp.43-62).
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similar to the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Roe v Wade.78
It is thus necessary to investigate the decisions of 
the Supreme Court in a line of cases beginning with Rvan v 
Attorney-General79 in 1965, which showed how judicial 
innovation could transform even the most reactionary of 
documents into a source of protection for human rights. In 
Ryan v Attorney-General the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
existence of certain fundamental rights which were not 
enumerated m  the Constitution but were nonetheless 
guaranteed to every citizen. The source of such 
unenumerated rights according to the Supreme Court was 
Article 40.3 of the Constitution which then provided that:
1. [t]he State (sic) guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws 
to defend and vindicate the personal rights of 
the citizen.
2. The State (sic) shall, in particular, by its 
laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the 
life, person, good name, and property rights of 
every citizen.
The decision m  Rvan v Attorney-General provided the basis 
for further development of a jurisprudence of fundamental 
rights. The Supreme Court in McGee v Attorney-General80 
stated that the right to privacy m  the context of marriage 
was one of the unenumerated rights under Article 40.3 of 
the Constitution. Henchy J. stated that:
78 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
79 [1965] I.R. 294.
80 [1974] I.R. 284.
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[i]t is for the courts to decide m  a particular 
case whether the right relied on comes within the 
constitutional guarantee. To do so, it must be 
shown that it is a right that inheres m  the 
citizen in question by virtue of his human 
personality. The lack of precision in this test 
is reduced when subsection 1 of section 3 of 
Article 40 is read (as it must be) in the light 
of the Constitution as a whole and, in 
particular, in the light of what the 
Constitution, expressly or by necessary ' 
implication, deems to be fundamental to the 
personal standing of the individual in question 
in the context of the social order envisaged by 
the Constitution.81
However, the idea of what may be accepted as
fundamental to the personal standing of the individual may
differ from individual to individual and m  particular may
be influenced by the ethos of the Constitution.
Irish society in the nineteen seventies lacked the
apparent consensus on moral issues that it possessed in the
nineteen thirties when the Constitution was accepted by a
majority of the population. Modern Irish society was more
pluralist than heretofore and the rights of those who did
not subscribe to the philosophy inherent m  the
Constitution had to be taken into account.
Walsh J. adverted to this state of affairs m  his
decision in McGee v Attorney-General82 when he stated:
[ajccording to the preamble, the people gave 
themselves the Constitution to promote the common 
good with due observance of prudence, justice and 
charity so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual might be assured. The judges must, 
therefore, as best they can from their training 
and their experience interpret these rights m  
accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice 
and charity. It is but natural that from time to
81 Ibid. , p. 325.
82 [1974] I.R. 284.
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time the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be 
conditioned by the passage of time; no 
interpretation of the Constitution is intended to 
be final for all time. It is given in the light 
of prevailing ideas and concepts.83
Thus, in this case the Supreme Court was prepared to 
deviate from Roman Catholic teaching on a particular issue 
but justified such a decision as being in line with the 
Constitution. Therefore in spite of the Thomist nature of 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has developed a means 
of articulating individual rights which may not be m  
accord with Roman Catholic teaching. The inclusion of 
Article 40.3.3 in the Constitution was intended by the pro­
life lobby to prevent the Supreme Court developing the 
right to privacy guaranteed under Article 40.3 further to 
include a right to abortion.
However, the amendment was revealed to be of merely 
cosmetic affect. Irish women continue to travel to the
I
United Kingdom to terminate their pregnancies. The moral 
exhortation implicit in this provision has not had any 
impact on the numbers travelling outside the state to 
obtain an abortion. Indeed in 1992 the number of women with 
Irish addresses having abortions in the United Kingdom was 
4,247.84 This compares with a pre-amendment figure of 3,650 
in 1982.85 Indeed the Supreme Court was ultimately to hold 
that Article 40.3.3 did not provide an absolute prohibition 
on abortion.
83 Ibid., p. 319.
84 See, Tomkin and Hanafm, (1995, p.183).
85 See, Charleton, (1992, p.188).
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The case which demonstrated that the constitutional 
prohibition on abortion was not absolute, was that of 
Attorney-General v X and Others.86
The case concerned a fourteen year old girl who had 
been the victim of a rape and who was pregnant as a result. 
The girl travelled to England, accompanied by her parents, 
in order to obtain an abortion. However before the abortion 
could take place, the defendants received notice of the 
, fact that the Attorney-General had obtained an interim 
injunction restraining the girl and her parents from 
procuring or obtaining an abortion within or outside 
Ireland. A permanent injunction was granted by Costello J. 
in the High Court. The defendants appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held by a majority of 
four to one that Article 40.3.3 of Bunreacht na hEireann 
1937 permitted abortion, when it was established as a 
matter of probability that there was a real and substantial 
risk to the life of the mother, if the abortion were not 
carried out. Thus, the medical evidence that the girl in 
question intended to commit suicide if she were prevented 
from terminating the pregnancy was sufficient to bring the 
case within the scope of this exception. In the words of 
Finlay C.J.:
if a physical condition emanating from a 
pregnancy occurs in a mother, it may be that the 
decision to terminate the pregnancy in order to 
save her life can be postponed for a significant 
period in order to monitor the progress of the 
physical condition, and that there are diagnostic 
warning signs which can be readily relied upon
86 [1992] l i.R. l.
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during such postponement.87 
However, Finlay C.J. went on to distinguish a case such as 
the present one, where the threat to the life of the mother 
was one which was not susceptible to such a monitoring 
process:
a threat of self-destruction such as is outlined 
in the evidence m  this case, which the 
psychologist clearly believes to be a very real 
threat, cannot be monitored in that sense and 
that it is almost impossible to prevent self- 
destruction in a young girl in the situation in 
which she is if she were to decide to carry out 
her threat of suicide.88
One part of the decision which would appear to support 
the contention that the insertion of Article 40.3.3 was of 
merely symbolic importance, is the judgment of 0 7Flaherty 
J. who was of the opinion that "[t]he enactment of Article 
[40.3.3.] m  1983 did not I believe bring about any 
fundamental change in our law11.89 O'Flaherty J. went on to 
outline the existing legislative provisions in the form of 
section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and 
section 58 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 which protected 
the foetus. In addition, he gave an example of a judicial 
pronouncement on the topic in the form of Walsh J.'s 
articulation of a right to life for the unborn in the case 
of G v An Bord Uchtala90 a case decided before the
87 Ibid. , p. 55.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p.88.
90 [1980] I.R. 32, p.69, where Walsh J. stated:
[[a] child] has the right to life itself and 
the right to be guarded against all threats
197
On this basis, one could claim that Ireland is m  a 
substantially similar position to that of the United 
Kingdom when the law in that jurisdiction in relation to 
the topic of abortion was also governed by the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861.
It is therefore of relevance to examine the English 
jurisprudence during the period when the law in relation to 
abortion was governed by the aforementioned statute. This 
involves examining the use of the criminal law as a means 
of enforcing a perceived notion of a common morality.
3.6 The Criminal Law and Pregnancy Termination: Limiting 
Autonomy.
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 continues to 
regulate the provision of abortion services in Ireland. The 
Act which must now be read in the light of constitutional 
adjudication on the issue in the case of Attorney-General 
v X and Others91 continues to apply to all those who 
provide pregnancy termination services in cases where the 
health or life of the mother are not m  jeopardy.
Thus, a doctor who provided pregnancy termination
directed to its existence whether before or 
after birth...
The right to life necessarily implies 
the right to be born, the right to preserve 
and defend (and to have preserved and 
defended) that life.
insertion of Article 40.3.3.
91 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
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services would be liable in criminal law for such an act.
It is instructive to examine the situation which 
obtained in England in the period between the decision in 
R. v Bourne92 a case with similar facts and conclusions to 
that of the case of Attorney-General v X and Others93 and 
the eventual introduction of legislation which codified the 
common law on the issue m  1967.94
The situation is substantially similar in that the 
judiciary interpreted the extant legislation in a manner 
which apparently subverted it. As a result, the law on the 
books and the law in reality diverged on whether and to 
what extent abortion was permissible. The significant 
difference in the two scenarios is the existence in Ireland 
of a written constitution which included an express 
provision protecting the rights of the foetus.
In the case of R. v Bourne95 a girl of fourteen was 
pregnant as the result of a rape. The defendant, a 
qualified surgeon, carried out an operation, terminating 
the pregnancy. He was subsequently charged under section 58 
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 with unlawfully 
procuring an abortion. The case was of importance to the 
medical profession as it was the first m  which a skilled 
surgeon was charged under that particular section. In the 
words of Macnaghten J. the case was one of:
92 [1938] 3 All E.R. 615.
93 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
94 Abortion Act 1967.
95 [1938] 3 All E.R. 615.
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first instance, first impression. So far as I 
know, the matter has never arisen before a jury 
for them to determine m  circumstances such as 
these, and there was, it seems, even amongst 
counsel some doubt as to what was the proper 
expression of the law in such a case as this.96
The question which Macnaghten J. put to the jury for
determination was whether the prosecution had satisfied
them beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
terminate the pregnancy in good faith for the purpose of
preserving the life of the girl. If the prosecution had
succeeded in doing so, then the defendant should be found
guilty. If the prosecution had not succeeded in proving
this, then the defendant should be acquitted. In the event
the defendant was acquitted. The significance for the
medical profession of the judgment was to be found m  the
following statement of Macnaghten J. which outlined the
circumstances in which a doctor could lawfully carry out an
abortion:
[t]here are... cases... where it is reasonably 
certain that a woman will not be able to deliver 
the child with which she is pregnant. In such a 
case, where the doctor expects, basing his 
opinion upon the experience and knowledge of the 
profession, that the child cannot be delivered 
without the death of the mother, in those 
circumstances the doctor is entitled and, indeed, 
it is his duty - to perform this operation with 
a view to saving the life of the mother, and in 
such a case it is obvious that the sooner the 
operation is performed the better. The law is not 
that the doctor has got to wait until the 
unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death 
and then at the last moment snatch her from the 
jaws of death. He is not only entitled, but it is 
his duty, to perform the operation with a view to 
saving her life.97
96 Ibid. , p.616.
97 Ibid. , p. 618 .
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aborting the foetus for the purpose of saving the life of
the mother had always existed under section 58 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and that this was
implied by the inclusion in the section of the word
'unlawful7. He believed that:
it has always been the law that the Crown have 
got to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, 
and it has always been the law that on a charge 
of procuring abortion, the Crown have got to 
prove that the act was not done in good faith for 
the purpose of preserving the life of the 
mother.98
Thus, there appeared to be a conflict between the 
legislative model of abortion and the common law model. 
However, as Keown has pointed out, section 58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 may not, in fact, have 
been as absolutist as may have been assumed. He bases this 
assertion on "certain judicial and extra-judicial 
pronouncements"99 which taken together demonstrate that the 
declaration in R. v Bourne had in fact been accepted 
practice within the medical profession in the period before 
1938. Thus, in the case of R. v Collins100 a case involving 
a medical practitioner charged with the murder of a woman 
upon whom he had allegedly been performing a procedure 
calculated to procure a miscarriage, the judge m  his 
summing-up stated that such an act constituted a felony. 
However, he did add that:
98 Ibid. , p.617.
99 Keown, (1988, p. 52).
100 [1898] 2 Brit. Med. J. 59, 122.
Indeed Macnaghten J. contended that the defence of
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[i]t could well be understood that there were 
cases where it was necessary, in order to save 
the life of a woman, that there should be 
forcible miscarriage, and a properly qualified 
doctor had to say when that time had arrived.
That was not unlawful.101
Although, it was stated obiter, Keown stresses the
significance of this passage:
[t]his dictum is noteworthy not only for its 
explicit recognition of the lawfulness of
therapeutic abortion, but also for its limitation 
of the defence to qualified doctors and the 
apparent absence of any requirement that the 
doctor's opinion be based on reasonable grounds 
or be confirmed by that of a second doctor.102
An earlier case, that of R. v Wilhelm.103 provided
evidence of the practice adopted by the medical profession
m  relation to abortion. This case involved a medical
practitioner who had allegedly attempted to procure a
miscarriage using an instrument. The chief medical witness
for the prosecution testified to the effect that m  some
cases of pelvic contraction it was accepted medical
practice to procure abortion. However, he stated that in
this particular case the instrument which the accused had
used to procure the abortion was not one normally used for
this purpose nor could he find any evidence of contraction
in this case.
Keown notes that the trial judge m  his direction to 
the jury stated that if a person attempted to procure an 
abortion without lawful cause, he would be guilty of an
101 Ibid., p.129, cited in Keown, (1988, p.52).
102 Ibid.
103 (1858) 17 Medical Times Gazette 658.
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unlawful act.104 The presence of the qualification, 
'without lawful cause' would lead one to suppose that 
abortion was not absolutely prohibited by law. However he 
did not elaborate on what might constitute a lawful cause 
in this context.
Keown also cites the 1929 case of R. v Belllos as 
evidence of a less rigid judicial interpretation of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. In that case, Keown 
notes, the trial judge in his summing up stated that not 
all operations to terminate pregnancy were unlawful. Such 
cases would include operations to save the life of the 
mother and, if possible, the child. In addition, the judge 
stated that such a procedure may be lawful in a case where 
the foetal sac had burst and there was a likelihood of 
blood poisoning if the foetus were not removed.106
Moreover, Keown furnishes evidence of extra-judicial 
pronouncements which support the thesis that abortion was 
not absolutely prohibited under the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861. Thus, in 1895, the Royal College of 
Physicians sought the opinion of counsel on the question 
inter alia of whether the law prohibited the procurement of 
an abortion for therapeutic purposes, which in effect means 
to save the life of the mother. The opinion of counsel was 
that:
the law does not forbid the procurement of
104 Keown, (1988, pp. 52-53).
105 [1929] 1 Brit. Med. J. 1061.
106 Keown, (1988, p.53).
203
abortion during pregnancy, or the destruction of 
the child during labour, where such procurement 
or destruction is necessary to save the mother's 
life.107
Indeed, Keown concludes that this opinion does not go far
enough in its view of the lawfulness of abortion under the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861:
[fjirstly, the destruction of the child during 
delivery was not an offence known to law and 
hence did not require a defence. Secondly, in 
relation to the destruction of the child before 
delivery, it is arguable that the criterion of 
saving the woman's life was too restrictive.108
Keown bases these assertions on further extra-judicial
evidence of best clinical practice in this area of medical
treatment. At a speech to a joint meeting of the Medico-
Legal Society and the obstetrics section of the Royal
Society of Medicine in 1927, Humphreys J. outlined the
circumstances under which an abortion might be lawful. A
contemporaneous report of the meeting provides the
following explanation of the judge's view:
the steps taken by a qualified medical man to get 
rid of a condition in his patient which he 
considered, using the best of his skill and 
ability, and of course honestly, on medical 
grounds and on medical grounds alone, to be 
dangerous to the safety of the patient. He used 
the word 'safety' advisedly, because the purely 
medical question was not one with which the law 
was concerned. No doctor who had used the best of 
his skill and judgment in the sole interest of 
his patient need imagine for a moment that the 
law would call him to account.109
107 Quoted in Smith, (1905, p.154), cited by Keown, 
(1988, p.54).
108 Keown, (1988, p. 54).
109 Anonymous, (1927, pp.230-231), cited by Keown, 
(1988, p.54).
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professional knowledge of the medical 'man' the judge's
views were not prompted by some overwhelming desire to
identify and uphold any conception of maternal rights. He
seems to have based his view of the legality of abortion m
certain circumstances on the professional autonomy of the
doctor rather than on any innate desire to improve the lot
of women in society. Thus, as Keown adds:
[t]he sole concern of the doctor was, he
stressed, the medical rather than the social or
economic welfare of his patient. The golden rule 
was that he was not entitled to consider the 
prospect of social disgrace or a diseased child, 
but only 'the health and future of his patient on 
medical grounds'. He added: '[w]hen a doctor in 
the exercise of his discretion had decided to 
induce abortion there was no question of law or
ethics'. It would he continued, be an
impertinence for one with no medical knowledge to 
express any views upon which conditions justified 
the induction of abortion by a doctor.110
Another extra-judicial opinion was given at this
particular meeting. This is to be found in the summing up
of the meeting by Salter L.J.. He was of the opinion that
the inclusion of the word 'unlawfully' in the wording of
section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861
implied that there were circumstances in which an abortion
could be deemed lawful. Moreover, he believed that the
circumstances in which an abortion could be lawfully
performed were wider than those outlined by Humphreys J..
Thus, he was of the opinion that in the case of an
inherited disease an abortion may be lawful.111 It is
As well as betraying a certain deference to the
110 Keown, (1988, p. 55).
111 Ibid.
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interesting to note that such opinions were pronounced in 
the period before the introduction of the Infant Life 
(Preservation 1 Act 1929,112 when English law on the issue 
was governed solely by the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861. This fact makes the above stated opinions even more 
directly relevant to the current Irish situation.
It can thus be concluded that the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 allows for abortion in limited 
circumstances. Article 40.3.3. of Bunreacht na hEireann 
1937 has, as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the case of Attorney-General v X and Others113 altered 
the scope of such exceptions. According to the majority 
judgment in Attorney-General v X and Others a pregnancy 
termination may be regarded as lawful only when the life of 
the mother is in jeopardy. This is narrower than the 
previous English common law exceptions which would include, 
in addition, damage to the mother's health either physical 
or mental.
In Australia, where legislation similar to that to be 
found in section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 
1861 governs this aspect of medical intervention, the 
courts have adopted a broader set of exceptions than the 
Irish judiciary. In R. v Davidson.114 a case decided on
112 This Act in section 1(1) prohibited the destruction 
of a child capable of being born alive but allowed the 
destruction of such a child if it was necessary to preserve 
the life of the mother.
113 [1992] 1 I . R . 1.
114 [1969] V.R. 667.
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legislation similar to section 58 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, that being, section 69 of the Crimes
Act 1958115 the implications of the word 'unlawful' were
further considered. In his judgment, Mehennitt J.
enumerated the criteria which must be present in order to
construe an act as being unlawful. These were:
(i) that the accused did not honestly believe on 
reasonable grounds that the operation was not 
necessary to preserve the woman from a serious 
danger to her life or her physical or mental 
health which the continuance of the pregnancy 
would entail; or
(n) that the accused did not honestly believe on 
reasonable grounds that the act done by him was 
m  the circumstances proportionate to the need to 
preserve the woman from serious danger to her 
life or her physical or mental health.116
The decision extended the definition of danger to life m
this context beyond merely the dangers normally associated
with childbirth to include:
danger to physical or mental health provided it 
is a serious danger not being merely the normal 
dangers of pregnancy and childbirth.117
The legal position m  Ireland is more restrictive than
in the similar situations outlined above. The current Irish
test would appear to limit the termination of pregnancy to
115 Which provides:
[w]hosoever. . . with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman whether she is or 
is not with child administers to her or 
causes to be taken by her any poison or 
other noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any 
instrument or other means with like intent 
shall be guilty of felony and shall be 
liable.
116 [1969] V.R. 667, pp.671-672.
117 Ibid., p. 671.
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situations where it is carried out for the bona fide 
purpose of preserving the life of the mother. Such an act 
may not be lawful where it was carried out to preserve the 
physical or mental health as opposed to the life of the 
mother.
The need for legislation in this area is beyond doubt.
The law as it presently exists is uncertain and clear
legislative guidelines are required. In the absence of such
legislation, the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney-
General v X and Others118 case regulates the actions of the
medical profession in this area. However, the Irish Medical
Council has issued its own guidelines on the issue. These
guidelines provide that:
situations arise in medical practice where the 
life and/or health of the mother or of the 
unborn, or both, are endangered. In these
situations it is imperative ethically that
doctors shall endeavour to preserve life and 
health. This is in accordance with the
International Code of Ethics where the English
text states: 'A doctor must always bear in mind 
the obligation of preserving human life7 and the 
Declaration of Geneva which in 1983 stated: 'I
will maintain the utmost respect for human life 
from its beginning even under threat and I will 
not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws 
of humanity7.119
These guidelines put the doctor m  such a situation in an
invidious position. If the doctor carries out a termination
of pregnancy within the limits of the ruling in Attorney-
General v X and Others then even though he acted within the
law he may be subject to disciplinary sanctions from the
118 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
119 Medical Council, The, (1994, p.36).
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Medical Council. If, on the other hand, he acts within the 
guidelines of the Medical Council and refrains from 
carrying out the abortion he may be subject to legal
sanctions if the life of the mother is endangered as a
result of his failure to intervene.120
In Northern Ireland the issue of abortion is governed 
by sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 and section 25 of the Criminal Justice (Northern 
Ireland) Act 1945 which is identical in its wording to the 
English Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. The provisions 
of the English Abortion Act 1967 do not apply in Northern 
Ireland. The potential for a case similar to R. v Bourne121 
or Attorney-General v X and Others122 transpiring in the 
Northern Ireland context was not therefore beyond the
bounds of probability.
In the case of Re K (A Minor) (Northern Health and 
Social Services Board) v F and G123 the High Court of 
Northern Ireland was faced with such a scenario.
K was fourteen years old and lived in a children's 
home pursuant to a Fit Person Order. She was made a ward of 
court when she was found to be m  the thirteenth week of a 
pregnancy which she wished to terminate. K had stated that 
she would commit suicide if she were forced to continue 
with the pregnancy.
120 See, Bowers, (1993, pp. 1-2).
121 [1938] 3 All E.R. 615.
122 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
123 [1994] Med.L.Rev. 371.
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was a substantial risk of suicide. He was of the view that
the psychological sequelae of the pregnancy going to full
term were more dangerous than the sequelae following
termination.124 In addition a consultant obstetrician and
gynaecologist considered that termination of the pregnancy
was the preferable option but stated that he was unable to
do so due to uncertainty as to the state of the law on the
matter in Northern Ireland.
One commentator has noted in referring to this
reluctance to carry out the procedure that:
[i]t has been suggested that the doctors were 
fearful of a civil action from the mother of K if 
they performed the termination. Given the 
assurances from the judge it seems unlikely that 
any such civil action could have been sustained.
More possible, however, would be the possibility 
of civil action by K herself, based on the fact 
that she had to be taken to Liverpool whilst 
recovering from major surgery m  order that a 
termination be performed which would have been 
lawful in Northern Ireland.125
Shiel J. granted an order permitting the termination 
of the pregnancy and in so doing stated that a termination 
carried out in the circumstances of the case was lawful m  
Northern Ireland.
Relying on the case of R . v Bourne126 Shiel J. held 
that it was only a crime to act with intent to procure a 
miscarriage if it was unlawfully done. He was of the 
opinion that the word 'unlawfully' should be interpreted in
f
124 Ibid. , p.372.
125 McGleenan, (1994, p.392, footnote 15).
126 [1939] 3 All E.R. 615.
The High Court was told by a psychiatrist that there
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a manner which was consistent with section 25 of the 
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 1945 so that an 
abortion could only be performed with the object of saving 
the life of the mother. Sheil J. also considered that it 
was in K's 'best interests' that the pregnancy should be 
terminated.
In the subsequent case of Re A (Northern Health and 
Social Services Board) v AMNH. IC McC and the Official 
Solicitor127 the High Court granted an order authorising a 
termination in the case of A, a twenty-three year old 
severely mentally handicapped woman. She became pregnant as 
the result of non-consensual sexual intercourse. The 
consultant gynaecologist to whom she was referred stated in 
evidence to the High Court that this case was one which 
fell within the category of a lawful abortion. Moreover, 
two psychiatrists who had examined A were of the view that 
the continuation of the pregnancy would be likely to be 
detrimental to her mental state.
The position in Northern Ireland remains far from 
clear. It would appear that abortion is available on a 
limited basis in the province, where the termination is for 
the purpose of preserving the life of the mother. Yet, it 
has been pointed out on the basis of anecdotal evidence 
that abortions are carried out in Northern Ireland on a 
regular basis, the majority where there is a severe foetal 
handicap. However, this is an instance where the mother's 
life is not normally in danger. Thus, as McGleenan points
127 H i g h  C o u r t ,  U n r e p o r t e d ,  2 1  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 4 .
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out:
[i]f this is the case then it seems that there is 
one legal issue yet to be tested. That is the 
question of whether or not it is lawful to 
procure a miscarriage where the objective is not 
to preserve the life of the mother (or her 
physical or mental health), but rather is to 
terminate the life of a foetus which medical 
opinion has determined to be m  some way 
handicapped.128
In Canada, the provision of pregnancy termination 
services was permitted in certain specific circumstances by 
the addition of section 251 to the Canadian Criminal Code 
1892 in 1969. Section 251 delineated in a legislative sense 
the circumstances in which an abortion could lawfully be 
carried out. This altered the previous legislative position 
m  relation to the issue whereby abortion had been 
classified as a form of homicide, the only defence to which 
was necessity in certain limited circumstances.129
Section 251 altered the position to the extent that, 
if carried out m  certain prescribed circumstances abortion 
was to be regarded as lawful.
Section 251(4) of the Criminal Code 1892 sets out the
circumstances in which an abortion will not be regarded as
being contrary to the law as follows:
(a) a qualified medical practitioner, other than 
a member of a therapeutic abortion committee for 
any hospital, who m  good faith uses m  an 
accredited or approved hospital any means for the 
purpose of carrying out his intention to procure
128 McGleenan, (1994, p.394).
129 These provisions were similar to the English 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. See, An Act Respecting 
Offences Against the Person 1869. These provisions were 
subsequently incorporated into the Canadian Criminal Code 
1892.
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(b) a female person who, being pregnant, permits 
a qualified medical practitioner to use in an 
accredited or approved hospital any means 
described in paragraph (a) for the purpose of 
carrying out his intention to procure her own 
miscarriage, if, before the use of those means, 
the therapeutic abortion committee for that 
accredited or approved hospital, by a majority of 
the members of the committee and at a meeting of 
the committee at which the case of such female 
person has been reviewed,
(c) has by certificate in writing stated that in 
its opinion the continuation of the pregnancy of 
such female person would or would be likely to 
endanger her life or health, and
(d) has caused a copy of such certificate to be 
given to the qualified medical practitioner.130
However, if an abortion were to be carried out which
did not adhere to the provisions of section 251(4) of the
t h e  m i s c a r r i a g e  o f  a  f e m a l e  p e r s o n ,  o r
130 For the purposes of subsection (4), subsection (6) 
further defines the following terms:
"accredited hospital" means a hospital 
accredited by the Canadian Council on 
Hospital Accreditation in which diagnostic 
services and medical, surgical and 
obstetrical treatment are provided;
"approved hospital" means a hospital in a 
province approved for the purposes of this 
section by the Minister of Health of that 
province;
"qualified medical practitioner" means a 
person entitled to engage in the practice of 
medicine under the laws of the province in 
which the hospital referred to in subsection 
(4) is situated;
"therapeutic abortion committee" for any 
hospital means a committee, comprised of not 
less than three members each of whom is a 
qualified medical practitioner, appointed by 
the board of that hospital for the purpose 
of considering and determining questions 
relating to terminations of pregnancy within 
the hospital.
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Criminal Code 1892, the person who carried out such a
procedure would be liable to imprisonment for life131 and
the woman who either intended to procure her own
miscarriage or permitted a third party to so do, would be
liable to two years' imprisonment.132
Thus, in effect one could say that abortion was still
a criminal offence unless it could be ascertained that it
was abortion was carried out in the approved manner as set
out in section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892.
For many, the criminalization of this aspect of
reproductive autonomy was unacceptable. This led to a
Supreme Court challenge to the legislation in 1975 in the
case of Moraentaler v The Queen133 by pro-choice groups,
which proved to be unsuccessful. The Supreme Court in that
case refused to interfere with the decision of Parliament
as set out in the section stating that:
[t]he values we must accept for the purposes of 
this appeal are those expressed by Parliament 
which holds the view that the desire of a woman 
to be relieved of her pregnancy is not, of 
itself, justification for performing an 
abortion.134
However, the issue was to come before the Supreme Court 
again eleven years later, this time with rather different 
results, m  the case of Moraentaler. Smollina and Scott v
131 Section 251(1) of the Criminal Code 1892.
132 Ibid., section 251(2).
133 (1975) 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161.
134 Ibid., p. 203.
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constitutional equation, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms 1982. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms 1982 provides that:
[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.
In Morgentaler. Smolling and Scott v The Queen,136 section
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 was
employed by counsel for the appellants in arguing that
section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892 was unconstitutional.
In that case the appellants were qualified medical
practitioners who had set up a private clinic in Toronto
with the object of providing pregnancy termination
services. However, the women for whom they provided this
service had not obtained a certificate from a therapeutic
abortion committee of an accredited or approved hospital as
set out m  section 251(4) of the Criminal Code 1892.
The doctors in question were opposed to the existing
legislation on policy grounds and had made public
statements to that effect. Both their statements and
actions were a direct criticism of the constriction placed
upon reproductive autonomy by section 251 of the Criminal
Code 1892. The appellants had been charged with conspiracy
to procure a miscarriage contrary to section 251(4) and
The Queen.135
By 1988, an additional factor had entered the
135 (1988) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
136 Ibid.
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section 423(1) (d) of the Criminal Code 1892 and were 
acquitted at first instance. However, the Crown appealed 
the acquittal to the Court of Appeal and a new trial was 
ordered. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused argued 
that section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892 was 
unconstitutional on the grounds inter alia that it was 
incompatible with section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 1982. The appellants' contention was 
that the right to 'life, liberty and security of the 
person' encompassed a right to control one's own life 
including one's reproductive functions.
The majority in the Supreme Court decision in this 
case was of the view that section 251 of the Criminal Code 
1892 infringed the rights set out in section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. For the most 
part the majority opinions did not rely on arguments of a 
substantive nature based on reproductive autonomy but on 
procedural arguments. However one member of the majority, 
Wilson J., while concurring with the other members of the 
majority, also adverted, in her decision, to the broader 
substantial right to liberty included in section 7, which 
more clearly outlines the nature of reproductive autonomy. 
The majority decisions demonstrate a certain unwillingness 
to deal with the substantive issue of reproductive 
autonomy. In his judgment Dickson C.J.C. made it clear that 
he was not going to explore the broader implications of the 
appellants' contention that the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person guaranteed by section 7 of the
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 was:
a wide-ranging right to control one's own life 
and to promote one's individual autonomy. The 
right would therefore include a right to privacy 
and a right to make unfettered decisions about 
one's own life.137
Dickson C.J.C. based his judgment on the more narrow
right to security of the person to be found in section 7 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and on the
procedural aspect of the principles of fundamental justice
alluded to in that section. Thus, for Dickson C.J.C. the
manner in which the impugned section of the Criminal Code
1892 operated constituted an infringement of the security
of the person as protected by section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982:
state interference with bodily integrity and 
serious state-imposed psychological stress, at 
least in the criminal law context, constitute a 
breach of security of the person. It is not 
necessary in this case to determine whether the 
right extends further, to protect either 
interests central to personal autonomy, such as 
the right to privacy, or interests unrelated to 
criminal justice.138 ^
In arriving at the conclusion that section 251
operated against the security of the person Dickson C.J.C.
examined the procedural effect of the section and was of
the opinion that:
[t]he evidence indicates that section 251 causes 
a certain amount of delay for women who are
successful in meeting its criteria. In the
context of abortion, any unnecessary delay can 
have profound consequences on the woman's
137 Morgentaler. Smolling and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, p.397.
138 Ibid. , p.401.
217
physical and emotional well-being.139 
The evidence pointed to a marked inequality of access to 
pregnancy termination services under the legislative 
scheme.
One important piece of empirical evidence which was 
presented in argument was- a 1977 Report on the operation of 
Canada's abortion law.140 This Report came to the 
conclusion that there were significant delays in obtaining 
permission from the therapeutic abortion committees.
These delays had the potential to lead to both 
physical and emotional suffering. Thus, as Dickson C.J.C. 
stated:
the implications of any delay, according to the 
evidence, are potentially devastating. The first 
factor to consider is that different medical 
techniques are employed to perform abortions at 
different stages of pregnancy. The testimony of 
expert doctors at trial indicated that in the 
first twelve weeks of pregnancy, the relatively 
safe and simple suction dilation and curettage 
method of abortion is typically used m  North 
America. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth 
week, the more dangerous dilation and evacuation 
procedure is performed, although much less often 
in Canada than in the United States. From the 
sixteenth week of pregnancy, the instillation 
method is commonly employed in Canada. This 
method requires the intra-amniotic introduction 
of prostaglandin, urea or a saline solution, 
which causes a woman to go into labour, giving 
birth to a foetus which is usually dead, but not 
invariably so. The uncontroverted evidence showed 
that each method of abortion progressively 
increases risks to the woman.141
139 Ibid., p.402.
140 See, Canada, Committee on the Operation of the 
Abortion Law, (Badgley Report) (1977).
141 Moraentaler. Smollmg and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, p.403.
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periods appropriate to each particular method of abortion,
the evidence demonstrated that the earlier the termination
was performed, the fewer the complications and the lower
the risk of mortality.142 He was thus able to conclude on
this point that:
[i]t is no doubt true that the over-all 
complication and mortality rates for women who 
undergo abortions are very low, but the 
increasing risks caused by delay are so clearly 
established that I have no difficulty in 
concluding that the delay in obtaining 
therapeutic abortions caused by the mandatory 
procedures of section 251 is an infringement of 
the purely physical aspect of the individual's 
right to security of the person.143
However, it is not sufficient for the purposes of 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1982 that the impugned piece of legislation infringed the 
individual's right to security of the person, it is also 
necessary to establish whether that infringement is 
accomplished in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. If it was then section 251 of the 
Criminal Code 1892 could be saved under the second part of 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1982. In assessing whether section 251 of the Criminal Code 
1892 operated in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice, Dickson C.J.C. again confined his 
analysis to the procedural aspects. In coming to a decision 
on this point he again had recourse to empirical research
Dickson C.J.C. went on to point out that even within the
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p.404.
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on the operation of section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892. 
He found in the Badgley Report144 information which 
demonstrated :
that many of the most serious problems with the 
functioning of section 251 are created by 
procedural and administrative requirements 
established in the law.145
As a result of the provisions of section 251(4) of the
Criminal Code 1892 hospitals were required to provide three
qualified physicians in order to establish a therapeutic
abortion committee. There should be in addition a qualified
medical practitioner available to perform the abortion who
was not a member of the therapeutic abortion committee.
However, as the Badgley Report observed:
[o]f the 1,348 civilian hospitals in operation in 
1976, at least 331 hospitals had less than four 
physicians on their medical staff. In terms of 
the distribution of physicians, 24.6 per cent of 
hospitals in Canada did not have a medical staff 
which was large enough to establish a therapeutic 
abortion committee and to perform the abortion 
procedure.146
Moreover, the additional procedural requirements of
section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892 reduced the number of
hospitals in which pregnancy termination services could be
provided even further. Thus, as Dickson C.J.C. noted:
[f]or the purposes of section 251, therapeutic 
abortions can only be performed in 'accredited' 
or 'approved' hospitals. As noted above, an 
'approved' hospital is one which a provincial
144 See, Canada, Committee on the Operation of the 
Abortion Law, (Badgley Report) (1977).
145 Morqentaler. Smolline? and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, p.409.
146 Canada, Committee on the Operation of the Abortion 
Law, (Badgley Report) (1977, p.102).
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minister of health has designated as such for the 
purpose of performing therapeutic abortions. The 
minister is under no obligation to grant any such 
approval. Furthermore, an 'accredited' hospital 
must not only be accredited by the Canadian 
Council on Hospital Accreditation, it must also 
provide specified services. Many Canadian 
hospitals do not provide all of the required 
services, thereby being automatically 
disqualified from undertaking therapeutic 
abortions.147
Another difficulty with the procedural scheme under 
section 251(4) was the failure to provide an adequate 
standard for the determination of when a therapeutic 
abortion could be lawfully granted.
The only guidance which section 251(4) gave the 
therapeutic abortion committee on this matter was that it 
could grant a certificate when it is of the opinion that 
the pregnancy would endanger the life or health of the 
woman.
However, a critical failing in the statutory scheme is
the absence of a definition of the term 'health7. This led
the Badgley Report to conclude:
[t]here has been no sustained or firm effort in 
Canada to develop an explicit and operational 
definition of health, or to apply such a concept 
directly to the operation of induced abortion. In 
the absence of such a definition, each physician 
and each hospital reaches an individual decision 
on this matter. How the concept of health is 
variably defined leads to considerable inequity 
m  the distribution and the accessibility of the 
abortion procedure.148
In practice therapeutic abortion committees defined health
147 Morgentaler. Smolling and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, p.409.
148 Canada, Committee on the Operation of the Abortion 
Law, (Badgley Report) (1977, p.20).
m  differing ways. As Dickson C.J.C. noted:
[f]or some committees, psychological health is a 
justification for therapeutic abortion; for 
others it is not. Some committees routinely 
refuse abortions to married women unless they are 
in physical danger, while for other committees it 
is possible for a married woman to show that she 
would suffer psychological harm if she continued 
with a pregnancy, thereby justifying an abortion.
It is not typically possible for women to know in 
advance what standard of health will be applied 
by any given committee...
When the decision of the therapeutic 
abortion committee is so directly laden with 
legal consequences, the absence of any clear 
legal standard to be applied by the committee m  
reaching its decision is a serious procedural 
flaw.149
In conclusion, Dickson C.J.C. was satisfied that the
provisions of section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892 did not
<
comport with the principles of fundamental justice
observing that:
[i]n the present case, the structure - the system 
regulating access to therapeutic abortions - is 
manifestly unfair. It contains so many potential 
barriers to its own operation that the defence it 
creates will in many circumstances be practically 
unavailable to women who would prima facie 
qualify for the defence, or at least would force 
such women to travel great distances at 
substantial expense and inconvenience in order to 
benefit from a defence that is held out to be 
generally available.150
It was thus on the basis of procedural argument that the
majority struck down section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892.
As one commentator has noted:
Dickson C.J.C. transformed Moraentaler. Smolinq 
and Scott from a case about substantive abortion 
rights into one about the procedural rights of 
criminal defendants. The advantage of this
149 Moraentaler. Smolling and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, pp.411-412.
150 Ibid. , p. 414 .
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strategy for judges is that it simplifies 
decision-making and avoids certain questions of 
judicial legitimacy by enabling them to engage in 
policy-making behind the veneer of exercising 
traditional judicial functions.151
However, there was a member of the majority who was 
prepared to explore the substantive issue of reproductive 
autonomy.
Wilson J. in her judgment referred, in addition to the
wider right to liberty m  section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms 1982. She was of the view that:
[a] consideration as to whether or not the 
procedural requirements for obtaining or 
performing an abortion comport with fundamental 
justice is purely academic if such requirements 
cannot as a constitutional matter be imposed at 
all. If a pregnant woman cannot, as a 
constitutional matter, be compelled by law to 
carry the foetus to term against her will, a 
review of the procedural requirements by which 
she may be compelled to do so seems pointless. 
Moreover, it would, in my opinion, be an exercise 
in futility for the legislature to expend its 
time and energy in attempting to remedy the 
defects in the procedural requirements unless it 
has some assurance that this process will, at the 
end of the day, result in the creation of a valid 
criminal offence.152
The extant legislation on pregnancy termination according
to Wilson J. as well as interfering with the individual's
right to security of the person under section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, also
interfered with the wider right of women to liberty. Wilson
J. viewed the liberty right as essentially a right to
decide for oneself, to control one's destiny. She believed
151 Manfredi, (1993, p.118).
152 Moraentaler, Smollino and Scott v The Queen (1988) 
44 D.L.R. (4th) 385, p.483.
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that section 251 of the Criminal Code 1892 deprived women
of this ability by preventing them from deciding whether or
not to terminate a pregnancy:
[t]he purpose of the section is to take the 
decision away from the woman and give it to a 
committee. Furthermore, as the Chief Justice 
correctly points out, the committee bases its 
decision on 'criteria entirely unrelated to the 
[pregnant woman's] priorities and aspirations'.
The fact that the decision whether the woman will 
be allowed to terminate her pregnancy is in the 
hands of a committee is just as great a violation 
of the woman's right to personal autonomy in 
decisions of an intimate and private nature as it 
would be if a committee were established to 
decide whether a woman should be allowed to 
continue her pregnancy. Both these arrangements 
violate the woman's right to liberty by deciding 
for her something that she has the right to 
decide for herself.153
It is also interesting to note that Wilson J. adverted
to the substantive aspects of the principles of fundamental
justice. She was of the view that a deprivation of a
section 7 right which has the effect of infringing a right
guaranteed elsewhere in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms 1982 cannot be in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.154 She alluded m  particular to the
rights embodied in section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms 1982. Section 2(a) provides that:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion.
Wilson J. gave the following rationale for stating that the 
deprivation of a right protected under section 7 of the
153 Ibid. , p.491.
154 Ibid., p.494.
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 infringed
freedom of conscience and religion:
I believe that the decision whether or not to 
terminate a pregnancy is essentially a moral 
decision, a matter of conscience. I do not think 
there is or can be any dispute about that. The 
question is: whose conscience? Is the conscience 
of the woman to be paramount or the conscience of 
the state? I believe, for the reasons I gave in 
discussing the right to liberty, that in a free 
and democratic society it must be the conscience 
of the individual .1551
Indeed Wilson J. was of the opinion that freedom of
conscience and religion included the right not to believe
m  a particular set of religious beliefs or any at all. She
stated this view mindful of the preamble to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 which states that
"Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the
supremacy of God". However, this should not lead to a
situation where individual human values were ignored:
[ljt seems to me, therefore, that in a free and 
democratic society 'freedom of conscience and 
religion7 should be broadly construed to extend 
to conscientiously-held beliefs, whether grounded 
in religion or m  a secular morality. Indeed, as 
a matter of statutory interpretation, 
'conscience7 and 'religion7 should not be treated 
as tautologous if capable of independent, 
although related, meaning. Accordingly, for the 
state to take sides on the issue of abortion, as 
it does in the impugned legislation by making it 
a criminal offence for the pregnant woman to 
exercise one of her options, is not only to 
endorse but also to enforce, on pain of a further 
loss of liberty through actual imprisonment, one 
conscientiously-held view at the expense of 
another1. It is to deny freedom of conscience to 
some to treat them as a means to an end...
Legislation which violates freedom of 
conscience m  this manner cannot, m  my view, be 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental
155 Ibid. , p.494.
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This argument may be of some relevance for the Irish 
debate on abortion. Surely it could be argued in the Irish 
context that the right to freedom of conscience and the 
free profession of religion as guaranteed in Article 44.2.1 
of Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 also includes a right not to 
hold any religious views? On that basis, one could apply 
the above argument of Wilson J. mutatis mutandis to the 
Irish situation. One must also bear in mind that Wilson J. 
was able to come to the above conclusion within the 
parameters of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1982 which endorses a view that all positive law is 
subordinate to God. It should also be the case with 
Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 which has a similar theoretical 
perspective.
The Canadian Supreme Court in Morgenta1er. Smo11lng 
and Scott v The Queen157 established that section 251 of 
the Criminal Code 1892 infringed section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and struck it down. It 
did not however provide an alternative regulatory scheme 
for the provision of abortion services in Canada, thus 
leaving a lacuna for Parliament to fill.
This lacuna had not been filled when m  1989 the case 
of Tremblay v Daigle158 came before the Supreme Court for 
adjudication. In that case the parties, Jean-Guy Tremblay
156 Ibid., p.497.
157 (1988) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
158 (1989) 62 D.L.R. (4th) 634.
justice within the meaning of section 7.156
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and Chantal Daigle had been living together for some time.
When their relationship ended, Daigle, who was, at that
point, pregnant decided to have an abortion. Tremblay did
not agree to this and obtained an interlocutory injunction
from the Superior Court of Quebec to prevent the abortion
from going ahead. Daigle appealed to the Quebec Court of
Appeal but her appeal was dismissed, whereupon she appealed
this decision to the Canadian Supreme Court.
Tremblay argued that under Quebec law a right to life
inheres in the foetus. He grounded this view on section 1
of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 1977
which states that "[e]very human being has a right to life,
and to personal security, inviolability and freedom". The
argument of the respondent was that:
a foetus is an 'etre humain', in English, 'human 
being7, and therefore has a right to life and a 
right to assistance when its life is in 
peril.159
The Supreme Court was not convinced of the validity of the
respondent's argument noting that:
[a] linguistic analysis cannot settle the 
difficult and controversial question of whether 
a foetus was intended by the National Assembly of 
Quebec to be a person under section 1. What is 
required are substantive legal reasons which 
support a conclusion that the term 'human being7 
has such and such a meaning. If the answer were 
as simple as the respondent contends, the 
question would not be before the court nor would 
it be the subject of such intense debate in our 
society generally... A purely linguistic argument 
suffers from the same flaw as a purely scientific 
argument: it attempts to settle a legal debate by 
non-legal means; in this case by resorting to the 
purported 'dictionary7 meaning of the term 'human
159 Ibid., p.650.
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Human Rights and Freedoms 1977 did not display a clear
intention on the part of the framers to even consider the
question of the status of the foetus. It was noted that:
this lack of an intention to deal with a foetus' 
status is, in itself, a strong reason for not 
finding foetal rights under the Charter... One 
can ask why the Quebec legislature, if it had 
intended to accord a foetus the right to life, 
would have left the protection of this right in 
such an uncertain state... If the legislature had 
wished to grant foetuses the right to life, then 
it seems unlikely that it would have left the 
protection of this right to such 
happenstance.161
Thus, the Supreme Court supported Daigle's decision to 
have an abortion. The Supreme Court did not deem it 
necessary to examine the implications of section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 for this 
question as the instant case was a civil action between two 
private parties. For the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982 to be invoked, according to the Supreme 
Court, there must be some sort of state action which is 
being impugned.
In the wake of the case the legislative lacuna still 
remained to be filled. The Bill which was proposed to fill 
the lacuna was a compromise solution. The Bill provided for 
the addition of two new sections to the Canadian Criminal 
Code 1892 as follows:
287. (1) [e]very person who induces an abortion
being' .160
The Supreme Court concluded that the Quebec Charter of
160 Ibid., pp. 650-651.
161 Ibid., p. 152.
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on a female person is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years, unless the abortion is 
induced by or under the direction of a medical 
practitioner who is of the opinion that, if an 
abortion were not induced, the health or life of 
the female person would be likely to be 
threatened.
(2) For the purposes of this section, 'health7 
includes, for greater certainty, physical, mental 
and psychological health;
'medical practitioner', in respect of an abortion 
induced in a province, means a person who is 
entitled to practise medicine under the laws of 
that province;
'opinion7 means an opinion formed using generally 
accepted standards of the medical profession.
(3) For the purposes of this section and section 
288, inducing an abortion does not include using 
a drug, device or other means on a female person 
that is likely to prevent implantation of a 
fertilized ovum.
288. Every one who unlawfully supplies or 
procures a drug or other noxious thing or an 
instrument or thing, knowing that it is intended 
to be used or employed to induce an abortion on 
a female person, is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years.162
The Bill was not to prove ultimately successful, as it was
defeated in the Senate in 1991, with both pro-choice and
pro-life senators voting against it.
3.7 Practical Implications I: Freedom of Information and 
Freedom to Counsel.
The objective of genetic counselling is to inform the 
patient of the risk of genetic disease occurring in her 
potential offspring and to inform her of the options 
available to her in the light of such risk.
In Ireland, approximately 1,000 babies are born 
annually with a significant genetic disorder and one person
162 Bill C-43, An Act Respecting Abortion 2d Sess., 34th 
Pari., 1989.
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A new genetic counselling service was introduced m  
July 1994, which consists of one consultant medical 
geneticist who provides eight sessions a week m  Crumlin 
Hospital in Dublin and three sessions in Dublin's Temple 
Street children's hospital.
A neurogenetic facility has been established at the 
Adelaide Hospital in Dublin where predictive testing is 
carried out on patients of eighteen years and over, to 
assess the potential risk of inheriting neurological 
conditions.164
This form of non-directive counselling is based on the 
client-centred therapy of Carl Rogers developed in the 
nineteen forties.165
The essence of non-directive counselling is that the 
therapist does not directly advise the client but rather 
tries to draw out the client's true feelings on a 
particular issue. Thus, the doctor should not allow his 
personal views on a particular option colour the 
therapeutic relationship. This is especially true m  
relation to one of the options which is open to the patient, 
on discovering that her child has a genetic disease. In 
Ireland abortion is only permissible to preserve the life
in fifty suffers from a genetic illness.163
163 See, Holmquist, (1994, p.3).
164 Ibid. See m  addition, Tomkin and Hanafin, (1995, 
p. 203) .
165 See, Rogers, (1942, pp.1-30) and Rogers, (1961,
pp.1-8).
The ruling body of the medical profession in Ireland, 
the Medical Council, has issued guidelines on the issue of 
pregnancy termination which reflect the Council's 
opposition to abortion.167 In a number of cases decided 
before the case of Attorney-General v X and Others168 the 
Irish courts held that non-directive pregnancy counselling 
which included the option of pregnancy termination was 
contrary to Irish law as it then stood.
In the case of Attorney-General (at the relation of 
the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) 
Ltd.) v Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman 
Centre Ltd.169 an injunction was sought by the plaintiffs 
against the defendant pregnancy counselling service which 
would prevent the defendants from providing pregnant women 
with information on the pregnancy termination option. The 
Supreme Court held in favour of the plaintiffs stating 
that:
[t]he performing of an abortion on a pregnant 
woman terminates the unborn life which she is 
carrying. Within the terms of Article 40 section 
3 subsection 3 it is a direct destruction of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to life of the 
unborn child.
It must follow from this that there could 
not be an implied and unenumerated constitutional 
right to information about the availability of a 
service of abortion outside the state which, if
166 See the discussion in section 3.5 of this chapter, 
pp.202-211.
167 Medical Council, The, (1994, p.36).
168 [1992] 1 I . R . l.
169 [1988] I.R. 593.
or health of the mother.166
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availed of, would have the direct consequence of 
destroying the expressly guaranteed 
constitutional life of the unborn... no right 
could constitutionally arise to obtain 
information the purpose of the obtaining of which 
was to defeat the constitutional right to life of 
the unborn child.170
In the subsequent case of The Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v Stephen 
Groaan and Others171 the plaintiffs brought proceedings 
against the defendants, officers of students' associations, 
preventing them from providing information on pregnancy 
termination services located outside the state. The High 
Court in this case decided to refer certain questions to 
the European Court of Justice before ruling on the issue 
and refused the defendant's application for an 
interlocutory injunction. The plaintiffs appealed this 
decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted an 
interlocutory injunction preventing the defendants from 
distributing information on pregnancy termination.
However, the Supreme Court did not overturn the High 
Court's decision to refer the questions to the European 
Court of Justice.
On the question of the provision of information on 
pregnancy termination services, the European Court of 
Justice172 held that it was not contrary to European 
Community law for a member state in which abortion was 
outlawed to prohibit the defendants from distributing
170 Ibid. , p.625.
171 [1989] I.R. 753.
172 [1992] I.L.R.M. 461.
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information about the provision of pregnancy termination 
services in clinics in other member states where the 
provision of such services is lawful, provided that such 
clinics have no involvement in the distribution of such 
information.
The question of freedom of expression was also 
relevant to this issue. Indeed, the defendants in Attorney- 
General (at the relation of the Society for the Protection 
of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd.) v Open Door Counselling 
Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.173 appealed the
decision of the Supreme Court to the European Court of 
Human Rights on the grounds that the prohibition on
provision of information on pregnancy termination violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. Article 10
states that:
1. [e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent states from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, m  
the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights or others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
173 [1988] I.R. 593.
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The European Court of Human Rights in the case of Open Door 
Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland174 held that 
the prohibition imposed by the Supreme Court was a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.
The European Court of Human Rights was struck by the 
absolute nature of the Supreme Court's injunction on the 
provision of information, regardless of the woman's state 
of health, or her reasons for seeking counselling on 
pregnancy termination.
It was felt that such prohibition was too broad and 
disproportionate. This conclusion was supported by other 
facts of the case.
Firstly, the counselling, being non-directive, meant 
that the counsellors neither advocated nor encouraged 
pregnancy termination, but confined themselves to an 
explanation of the available options.
Secondly, information about pregnancy termination 
services m  other countries could be obtained from other 
sources such as telephone directories and magazines. 
However, this information was not supervised by qualified 
counsellors and was therefore less protective of women's 
health. The European Court of Human Rights was of the 
opinion that the injunction had created a risk to the 
health of women who, due to the lack of proper counselling, 
were seeking abortions at a later stage in their
of the judiciary.
174 (1992) 15 E.H.R.R. 244.
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The subsequent Supreme Court decision m  the case of 
Attorney-General v X and Others175 revealed that Article 
40.3.3. of Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 did not impose a 
blanket ban on the provision of pregnancy termination 
services. Instead abortion was permissible if it was 
established as a matter of probability that there was a 
real and substantial risk to the life of the mother if the 
abortion were not carried out.
Thus, if abortion were legal in Ireland, albeit in 
very limited circumstances, how could counselling which 
included the abortion option or the distribution of 
information on abortion services be considered to be 
repugnant to the law? What was clearly required was 
legislation which would give statutory force to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Attorney-General v X and Others.
This was not forthcoming. Instead the government of 
the day, as a compromise solution, held a referendum on the 
substantive issue of abortion and on the related rights to 
travel and information.176 The wording of the proposed 
amendment to Article 40.3 in relation to the right to 
disseminate information on pregnancy termination was as 
follows:
[sjubsection 3 of this section shall not limit 
freedom to obtain or make available, in the 
state, subject of such conditions as may be laid 
down by law, information relating to services 
lawfully available m  another state.
pregnancies.
175 [1992] 1 I.R. l.
176 For a full account see, Girvin, (1994, pp.203-221).
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referendum which was held m  November 1992. This wording
thus became the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Confusion still reigned as to the exact status of the
amendment in Irish law. In the light of the case of
Attorney-General v X and Others177 and the constitutional
referendums on the issue, the bodies who had been the
subject of the Supreme Court injunction in Attorney-General
(at the relation of the Society for the Protection of
Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd.1 v Open Door Counselling
Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.178 applied to the
Supreme Court to overturn the decision to prevent them from
assisting pregnant women to travel abroad for abortions or
from giving information on foreign abortion clinics.179
The Supreme Court refused the application, holding
that the application should have been brought before the
High Court in the first instance. Denham J. gave the only
dissenting judgment in the case wherein she stated that:
[w]hat is at issue here is whether an extant 
order of the Supreme Court which is contrary to 
the Constitution should stand. I am satisfied 
that it should not.180
Following this case the Attorney-General, m  a letter 
to the Council for the Status of Women, stated that the 
order of the Supreme Court m  the original case of
The populace voted in favour of this amendment in the
177 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
178 [1988] I.R. 593.
179 See, MacDubhghaill, (1994, p.l).
180 Ibid.
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Attorney-General (at the relation of the Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd.) v Open Door 
Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.181 was 
correct when it was made, that is, before the decision in 
Attorney-General v X and Others182 "but that it is now 
inconsistent with the Constitution because of the 
amendments".183
Since 12 May 1995, the position has to some degree
jbeen regularized, as is explained later m  the following 
section of this thesis. In the context of genetic 
counselling it now appears that a medical geneticist is 
enabled to give details of the abortion option to patients, 
provided that such information meets the criteria laid down 
by the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the 
State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995.
The New Abortion Information Act: An Overview.
As a result of the referendum on the issue of the 
provision of information on pregnancy termination services, 
the Oireachtas recently approved a Bill on this topic. 
However, this was referred to the Supreme Court by the 
President so that its constitutionality might be tested.
On 12 May, 1995 the Supreme Court, in a decision
181 [1988] I.R. 593.
182 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
183 MacDubhghaill, (1994, p.l).
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briefly discussed in the conclusion of this thesis, held 
that the Bill was not repugnant to the Constitution.184 The 
Bill was enacted later the same day. The Regulation of 
Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies') Act 1995 centres on information likely to be 
required by a woman contemplating termination procedures 
outside the jurisdiction, and those who provide these 
services. Such information is referred to in the Act as 
"Act information".
The Act limits the lawful public dissemination of 
foreign pregnancy termination information.
Such information may be given, if the procedures 
described are lawful in the country where they are carried 
out. The information must be truthful, objective and must 
not advocate or promote pregnancy termination.
If the information does not conform to these criteria, 
it is unlawful to disseminate anything (such as a book, 
magazine or pamphlet) containing such information, or to 
play in public, films or recordings of the information.
Counsellors (and the term in this context will have 
particular reference to doctors and genetic counsellors) 
who are asked to give information to a woman who may be, or 
is, pregnant, are restricted in the information that they 
can give.
First, the doctor must give truthful and objective 
information and must not advocate or promote pregnancy
184 Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) 
Bill 1995, Supreme Court, Unreported, 12 May 1995.
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termination. Secondly, the doctor must give general advice 
and information in relation to all the courses of action 
open to the patient/client.
The doctor is precluded from making any arrangements 
for termination of pregnancy for the patient/client.
The doctor may, however, give the patient/client 
originals or copies of any medical notes or records kept. 
Presumably the patient/client can then give them to the 
doctor or clinic performing the termination.
No person with an interest (including a financial 
interest) in any pregnancy termination company or 
partnership outside the state can give pregnancy 
termination information in the state.
No provider of pregnancy termination services can give 
any financial inducement to counsellors in Ireland. If 
either of the preceding financial elements are present, 
then such counsellor may not provide information on foreign 
pregnancy termination services in this state.
Counsellors with conscientious objections are accorded 
special rights: no person is obliged to give advice about 
pregnancy termination.
The penalty for breach of the provisions of this Act, 
is a fine not exceeding IR£1,500. Prosecutions may only be 
brought by or with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Offending material may be forfeit, and 
destroyed. The Gardai are given powers of search and 
seizure but medical, surgical, clinical or social notes are 
specifically excluded.
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3 . 8  P r a c t i c a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s  I I :  T h e  R i g h t  t o  T r a v e l .
The question of whether an individual who sought to
have an abortion could freely travel outside the
jurisdiction to obtain one was also raised in argument in
the case of Attorney-General v X and Others.185
In the earlier case of The State CM) v Attorney-
General186 Finlay P., as he then was, held that the right
to travel abroad derived from the Christian and democratic
nature of the state. The right to travel was thus an
unenumerated constitutional right. Notwithstanding this
fact certain members of the Supreme Court in the decision
in Attorney-General v X and Others187 were prepared to
allow that right to be overridden in a case where it
conflicted with the right to life of the foetus. Thus,
Finlay C.J. was of the view that the right to travel was
not an absolute right:
[notwithstanding the very fundamental nature of 
the right to travel and its particular importance 
in relation to the characteristics of a free 
society, I would be forced to conclude that if 
there were a stark conflict between the right of 
the mother of an unborn child to travel and the 
right to life of the unborn child, that the right 
to life would necessarily have to take precedence 
over the right to travel.188
Hederman J. concurred in this view, stating:
[a] restraint upon leaving the territory of the
185 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
186 [1979] I.R. 73.
187 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
188 Ibid. , p. 57.
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jurisdiction of the courts would m  the ordinary 
way be a restraint upon the exercise of the 
constitutional right to travel but the competing 
right is the preservation of life and of the two 
the preservation of life must be deemed to be 
paramount and to be sufficient to suspend for at 
least the period of gestation of the unborn life 
the right to travel.189
Egan J. echoed these views in his judgment:
[t]he right to travel can only effectively arise 
in reference to an intention to procure an 
unlawful abortion and must surely rank lower than 
the right to life of the unborn. It may well be 
that proof of an intention to commit an unlawful 
act cannot amount to an offence but I am dealing 
with the question of an unborn within the
jurisdiction being removed from the jurisdiction 
with the stated intention of depriving it of its 
right to life.190
Surely this is not the only instance m  which a
conflict between a right to life and the right to travel
may arise? Would it not also occur in the case of an
incurably ill patient, an A.I.D.S. sufferer, for example,
who wanted to leave the country to go to a state such as
the Netherlands to benefit from more liberal laws m
relation to active voluntary euthanasia? Might not this
group of persons also be deprived of their right to travel
under such a view?
McCarthy J. summed up how ridiculous such a
restriction would be in practice when he observed:
[i]f, for instance, a citizen of another state 
who did not at the time of her arrival in Ireland 
know she was pregnant, learned of her condition 
whilst here and wished immediately to go home in 
order to terminate the pregnancy, she is unlikely 
to inform any official authority or any 
interested bystander. If, however, she did so,
189 Ibid. , p.73.
190 Ibid., p.92.
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would the courts make an order detaining her in
Ireland for nine months? I think not.191
Following the decision in Attorney-General v X and 
Others a referendum was held on the issues which arose in 
the case, namely, the right to life of the unborn, the 
right to travel and the right to information. On the issue 
of the right to travel it was proposed that the following 
words be inserted as a qualifier to Article 40.3.3. of 
Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 11 [s]ubsection 3 of this section 
shall not limit freedom to travel between the state and 
another state11. This amendment was accepted by the 
electorate with 62.4 per cent voting m  favour.
3.9 Practical Implications III: In Vitro Fertilisation.
)
Ireland lacks specific legislative regulation in the 
area of in vitro fertilisation. It is thus the case that in 
the absence of such specific regulation the general common 
law principles m  relation to consensual medical treatment 
apply. In addition, the constitutional provisions in 
relation to the individual's right to privacy are of 
relevance here.
The dearth of legislation m  this area does not imply 
that there exist no guidelines for the practitioner.
The Medical Council has accepted the guidelines laid 
down by the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
191 Ibid. , p.84.
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of the Royal College of Physicians of Ireland.192 These 
guidelines provide that the in vitro fertilisation 
treatment may be offered to married couples who have 
received appropriate counselling, understand the procedure, 
and have given valid consent. The guidelines stress that 
only sperm and e<jgs from the consenting couple will be used 
in the procedure.
All fertilised ova produced as a result of this 
procedure are to be replaced in the potential mother's 
uterus. The freezing or storage of spare embryos for 
experimental purposes is expressly prohibited.
However the Medical Council has recently relaxed the 
restriction on the freezing of embryos in the context of 
fertility treatment only.193 The development of ad hoc 
rules m  this area is bound to give rise to legal and 
ethical problems in the absence of adequate legislative 
provisions. Thus, for example, if the embryos frozen in a 
particular case of treatment turn out not to be required, 
what is the practitioner to do with the excess embryos? He 
cannot store them for the purposes of research as this 
would infringe the Medical Council's guidelines, nor can he 
use them on another patient as the Medical Council does not 
allow the donation of eggs and sperm. If, on the other 
hand, the doctor wanted to dispose of the embryos he may 
suffer the wrath of the pro-life lobby who could argue that
192 Medical Council, The, (1994, pp. 36-37 and 
Appendix G, pp.62-63).
193 See, Hegarty, (1994, p.2).
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The validity of such an argument is questionable, but 
given the uncertain position in relation to the rights of 
the unborn in Irish law at present, the doctor in such a 
position is operating in an extremely grey area. The pro­
life argument would revolve around the idea that a doctor 
who disposes of embryos in such circumstances would be 
acting illegally. The current uncertain position can only 
be resolved by detailed legislation which would clearly 
state when an abortion may be legally permissible.
In the interim, doctors have recourse to the 
guidelines194 introduced by the Medical Council in the wake 
of the decision in the case of Attorney-General v X and 
Others.195 It must be stated that these guidelines would 
tend to favour a view of the foetus as deserving of special 
protection. Thus, a doctor who carries out a termination of 
a pregnancy in the exceptional cases permissible under the 
common law as stated in Attorney-General v X and Others. 
may, nonetheless, be open to a charge of professional 
misconduct under the Medical Council's guidelines.196 The 
question which must be asked m  the context of in vitro 
fertilisation is whether the disposal of excess embryos is 
tantamount to the illegal taking of life? If one is to 
adhere to the logic of the pro-life argument then the
he is terminating the life of an unborn entity.
194 Medical Council, The, (1994, p.36).
196 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
196 Medical Council, The, (1994, p. 36).
244
answer is m  the affirmative.197 It would appear to be 
irrelevant that the embryo is not actually in the womb. As 
far as the anti-abortion argument is concerned life has 
commenced and any intervention which would intentionally 
lead to the termination of this life is tantamount to an 
illegal taking of life.198
Under existing law the doctor in such a position may 
not come within the scope of the exception outlined m  the 
case of Attorney-General v X and Others199 as there would 
be no possibility of raising the argument that the non- 
disposal of the embryo would lead to the mother's life 
being put at risk. The doctor is therefore in an unenviable 
position, for, whatever option he chooses he is open to 
disciplinary action.
The solution to such an absurd problem is the 
introduction of legislation akin to the English Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 which would clearly 
delimit the rights and duties of both patient and doctor m  
the context of in vitro fertilisation. In addition, clear 
legislative regulation is also necessary in order to allow 
the practitioner to operate in an atmosphere which is free 
from doubt and uncertainty.
It is clear from the guidelines that the Institute of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and the Medical Council
197 See for example, Connery, (1977, pp.1-31).
198 See further, section 3.1 of this chapter, pp. 175-
181.
199 [1992] 1 I.R . 1.
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favour the technique of in vitro fertilisation solely for 
the purposes of treating certain instances of infertility. 
The use of the technique for experimental purposes is 
anathema to the ideals of both bodies.
3.10 The Implications for a Right to Die.
As has been seen, the topic of abortion has been a 
divisive one in Irish society. The central issue, as Ronald 
Dworkin200 would have it, is the extent to which people are 
prepared to admit of exceptions to the principle of the 
sanctity of life. The traditional deontological model of 
the Irish Constitution on the issue of the value of life 
has been modified somewhat by the initiation of this 
debate, resulting in the Supreme Court's decision in the 
case of Attorney-General v X and Others.201
However, we have to ask ourselves, how far have we 
actually come in embracing a different model? The 
provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, in 
relation to pregnancy termination are still extant, the 
constitutional protection of the foetus survives, albeit m  
a modified form. Moreover, women are still unable to obtain 
access to pregnancy termination services in Ireland, nor 
are doctors free to provide such services. It is still 
arguable as to whether the public's willingness to embrace 
the doctrine of the sanctity of life will admit of many, if
200 See, Dworkin, (1993, pp.84-101).
201 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
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This has implications for the debate on euthanasia, 
which is, after all, another issue which comes within the 
ambit of right to life discourse. As has been noted, those 
who support the deontological model of the sanctity of life 
tend to view any practice which interferes with it as being 
beyond the pale. Thus, issues pertaining to ending life 
once it has begun may provoke similar, if not more virulent 
reaction from these groupings. As we shall see in the 
chapters which follow, the debate over the sanctity of life 
in Ireland is not over, and indeed will remain unfinished, 
until a public and legal discourse is initiated on the 
topic of the right to die, which has more in common with 
the discourse on abortion than one may care to admit.
a n y ,  e x c e p t i o n s  i n  a r e a s  o f  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e .
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CHAPTER FOUR: PASSIVE EUTHANASIA.
Of turning back to help them. Don't.
What they were once was what they would 
not be;
Not liking what they are not is what 
now they are.
No one can help them; walk on, keep on 
walking,
And do not let your goodness self- 
deceive you:
It is good that they are but not that 
they are thus.1
4.0 Introduction.
Passive euthanasia consists of refraining from taking 
all steps necessary to keep a terminally ill patient or a 
patient in a persistent vegetative state alive. This would 
include, inter alia. the situation where a doctor 
discontinues the provision of life-sustaining medical 
treatment.
Since this thesis was submitted on 2 May 1995, two 
major developments have occurred which are of considerable 
importance in assessing the position of the law in Ireland 
in this area.
On 5 May, the High Court considered the problem of 
treatment withdrawal. In the case of Re C (Ward of Court)2 
the High Court was faced with an application by the family 
of a severely brain-damaged woman, for an order allowing 
her to die naturally.
Lynch J. was of the opinion that the test to be 
applied in such a case was the 'best interests' test. Thus,
1 Auden, (1969, p.311).
2 High Court, Unreported, 5 May 1995, Lynch J..
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it would be necessary to decide whether it would be in the 
'best interests' of the woman that her life be prolonged by 
artificial means or whether she be allowed to die. Lynch J. 
concluded that in the instant case it would be in the 
patient's 'best interests' that artificial feeding should 
be terminated, allowing her to die. He so ordered.
Lynch J. took into account not only the views of the 
family of the ward, but also those of the institution in 
which she was being cared for, by further ordering that the 
family of the ward should be permitted to move the ward to 
another institution, whose moral views on treatment 
withdrawal in circumstances such as those in the instant 
case, would permit the carrying into effect of such a 
procedure.
This case is currently under appeal. It will be heard 
by the Supreme Court on 12 June 1995.
The Oireachtas has not yet deemed it necessary to 
introduce legislation on the issue.
The eventual Supreme Court decision in the case of Re 
C (Ward of Court1 will make such legislation all the more 
important, for the eventual clear delineation of the rights 
of the patient.
The second important development which will 
indubitably influence both legislative and judicial 
consideration of this topic, was the decision referred to 
in the closing pages of Chapter Three: the decision in Re 
Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services
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Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies') Bill 19953
given by the Supreme Court on 12 May.
This case suggests that the Supreme Court will now 
extend considerable freedom to the Oireachtas to balance 
competing rights and interests in its legislative 
determinations; and that, in the instant case, it was not
unconstitutional for the Oireachtas to accommodate the
rights of the mother and of the unborn child m  the way
proposed by the Regulation of Information (Services Outside 
the State for Termination of Pregnancies') Bill 1995. The 
Supreme Court signalled that claims made in reliance on 
natural law or superior to positive law would (perhaps) be 
met with less enthusiasm than conflicting claims made on 
the basis of specific constitutionally accorded rights.
Such an inference may well prove of great importance 
in the consideration of the alternative options which 
surround the patient who is no longer competent.
It is in the context of these two significant 
developments in Irish law, that the whole topic of patient 
autonomy and treatment refusal is addressed.
This topic has become the subject of widespread debate 
in recent years. In the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom, the courts have been forced to make 
pronouncements on the issue.
What can be seen from the various judicial and 
legislative developments in the last twenty years is a 
general acceptance of a right not to have one's life
3 Supreme Court, Unreported, 12 May 1995.
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maintained artificially. This chapter attempts to delineate 
the boundaries of any future legislative intervention on 
this issue and to outline the options available to the 
judiciary in coming to a decision in this area.
4.1 The Common Law and Treatment Withdrawal.
Many would view the area of criminal omissions as the
starting point of any discussion on the legal liability of
the health care professional who discontinues life-
sustaining treatment. The criminal law makes a distinction
between positive acts and omissions. In relation to causing
death by omitting to act, an individual is not deemed to be
liable unless he was under a legal duty to care for the
victim. The standard Irish text on criminal law states that
there can be no:
liability for manslaughter by omission unless the 
accused was under a duty to the victim to perform 
the act, the neglect of which caused death.4
Certain English decisions have outlined the criteria for
establishing a legal duty in such circumstances. Thus, the
duty has been established in relation to ties of blood,
such as the parent-child relationship5 and that of a person
or persons caring for an elderly relative.6
4 Charleton, (1992, p.96).
s See for example, R. v Sheppard [1980] 3 All E.R. 899.
6 See, R. v Instan [1893] 1 Q.B. 450 and R. v Stone 
[1977] 2 All E.R. 341.
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In R.v Instan7 the accused lived with her elderly 
aunt. In the days leading up to her death, the aunt 
developed gangrene in one of her legs and was unable to 
move or care for herself. The accused was the only person 
who was aware of the aunt's plight and consequently the 
only one who could seek medical assistance. This she did 
not do. In addition she refrained from feeding her aunt in 
the days before her death. Lord Coleridge C.J. affirmed the 
accused's conviction for manslaughter, stating that there 
was a common law duty on the defendant in this relationship 
to care for her aunt.
In the later case of R. v Stone.8 the first defendant, 
Stone, was the elder brother of the deceased woman. It was 
discovered that Stone was of low intelligence, and was 
partially deaf and blind. Stone co-habited with the second 
defendant, Dobinson, who was described as being 
'ineffectual and inadequate'. The victim came to live with 
the defendants in 1972. She suffered from anorexia nervosa 
and spent most of the time in her room. The victim's mental 
condition gradually deteriorated to a point where she was 
in urgent need of medical help.
The defendants did not however seek medical assistance 
until some three years after the victim's arrival. The 
first attempt at summoning the deceased's doctor failed as 
the deceased refused to tell the defendants his name. Some 
months later, Dobinson attempted to improve the deceased's
7 [1893] 1 Q.B. 450.
8 [1977] 2 All E.R. 341.
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deceased was by this time bedridden and lying in her own
excrement. She died in August 1975.
Medical reports concluded that she had been in need of
urgent medical attention for days, if not for weeks. Both
defendants were convicted of manslaughter, despite their
mental shortcomings. In his judgment in the Court of
Appeal, Geoffrey Lane L.J. explained the reasoning behind
the decision thus:
whether Fanny [the deceased] was a lodger or not, 
she was a blood relation of the appellant Stone; 
she was occupying a room in his house; the 
appellant Dobinson had undertaken the duty of 
trying to wash her, of taking such food to her as 
she required... the jury were entitled to find 
that the duty [to care] had been assumed. They 
were entitled to conclude that once Fanny became 
helplessly infirm... the appellants were, in the 
circumstances, obliged either to summon help or 
else to care for Fanny themselves.9
Thus, if a person is under a duty of care recognised 
by the criminal law, an omission to act, which causes 
death, is deemed to be manslaughter provided that a high 
degree of negligence can be proved on the part of the 
carer.
That the law has recognized this duty of care as 
existing in the context of the doctor-patient relationship 
can be seen in certain of the judgments in the case of 
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland.10 Lord Goff of Chieveley was 
of the opinion that a:
doctor's conduct in discontinuing life support
condition, by washing her with the help of a neighbour. The
9 Ibid., pp.345-346.
10 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
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can properly be categorised as an omission. It is 
true that it may be difficult to describe what 
the doctor actually does as an omission, for 
example, where he takes some positive step to 
bring the life support to an end. But 
discontinuation of life support is, for present 
purposes, no different from not initiating life 
support in the first place. In each case, the 
doctor is simply allowing his patient to die in 
the sense that he is desisting from taking a step 
which might, in certain circumstances, prevent 
his patient from dying as a result of his pre­
existing condition; and as a matter of general 
principle an omission such as this will not be 
unlawful unless it constitutes a breach of duty 
to the patient. I also agree that the doctor's 
conduct is to be differentiated from that of, for 
example, an interloper, who maliciously switches 
off a life support machine because, although the 
interloper may perform exactly the same act as 
the doctor who discontinues life support, his 
doing so constitutes interference with the life- 
prolonging treatment then being administered by 
the doctor. Accordingly, whereas a doctor, in 
discontinuing life support, is simply allowing 
his patient to die of his pre-existing condition, 
the interloper is actively intervening to stop 
the doctor from prolonging the patient's life, 
and such conduct cannot possibly be categorised 
as an omission.
The distinction appears, therefore, to be 
useful in the present context in that it can be 
invoked to explain how discontinuance of life 
support can be differentiated from ending a 
patient's life by a lethal injection. But in the 
end the reason for that difference is that, 
whereas the law considers that discontinuance of 
life support may be consistent with the doctor's 
duty to care for his patient, it does not, for 
reasons of policy, consider that it forms any 
part of his duty to give his patient a lethal 
injection to put him out of his agony.11
Thus, the House of Lords m  the decision in Airedale N.H.S.
Trust v Bland was prepared to depart from the traditional
approach to criminal omissions in the case of the medical
practitioner who had participated in the discontinuance of
medical treatment. The reasons for so doing were of a
11 Ibid., p.369.
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson makes clear:
if there comes a stage where the responsible 
doctor comes to the reasonable conclusion (which 
accords with the views of a responsible body of 
medical opinion) that further continuance of an 
intrusive life support system is not in the 'best 
interests' of the patient, he can no longer 
lawfully continue that life support system: to do 
so would constitute the crime of battery and the 
tort of trespass to the person. Therefore he 
cannot be in breach of any duty to maintain the 
patient's life. Therefore he is not guilty of 
murder by omission.12
Likewise in the United States, courts have tended to
make an exception to the general rule in relation to a duty
to act in the case of the medical practitioner and the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, based on the act-
omission distinction. In the case of In Re Conroy.13 the
New Jersey Supreme Court was unconvinced of the usefulness
of this distinction in the case of treatment withdrawal,
believing that such a distinction was nebulous and elusive.
It was noted that in a case such as the one before it:
would a physician who discontinued naso-gastric 
feeding be actively causing [the patient's] death 
by removing her primary source of nutrients; or 
would he merely be omitting to continue the 
artificial form of treatment; thus passively 
allowing her medical condition, which includes 
her inability to swallow, to take its natural 
course?... The ambiguity inherent in this 
distinction is further heightened when one 
performs an act within an over-all plan of non­
intervention, such as when a doctor writes an 
order not to resuscitate a patient.14
In effect, the act-omission distinction appears to be more
policy nature as the following passage from the judgment of
12 Ibid., p.385.
13 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) .
14 Ibid. , p. 1234 .
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of a hindrance than an aid to resolving the legal problems 
in this area. It is more in the way of a theoretical red 
herring than a positive contribution towards the resolution 
of the problem. As the Report of the President's Commission 
put it:
merely determining whether what was done involved 
a fatal act or omission does not establish 
whether it was morally acceptable. Some actions 
that lead to death can be acceptable: very
dangerous but potentially beneficial surgery or 
the use of hazardous doses of morphine for severe 
pain are examples. Some omissions that lead to 
death are very serious wrongs: deliberately
failing to treat an ordinary patient's bacterial 
pneumonia or ignoring a bleeding patient's pleas 
for help would be totally unacceptable conduct 
for that patient's physician...
Making the distinction also presupposes an 
unsound conception of responsibility, namely (1) 
that human action is an intervention in the 
existing course of nature, (2) that not acting is 
not intervening, and (3) that people are 
responsible for their interventions (or, at 
least, are much more responsible for deliberate 
interventions than for deliberate omissions). The 
weaknesses of this position include the ambiguous 
meaning of 'intervention' when someone takes an 
action as part of a plan of non-intervention 
(such as writing orders not to resuscitate), the 
inability to define clearly the 'course of 
nature', and the indefensibility of not holding 
someone responsible for states of affairs that 
the person could have prevented.15
However, the Commission was not in favour of amending 
policy in this area and concluded that while treatment- 
withdrawal was acceptable "the current interpretation of 
the legal prohibition of active killing should be 
sustained".16
15 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, (1983, p.67).
16 Ibid.
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the act-omission distinction is but a mere policy tool. The
use of the term "current interpretation" could lead one to
conclude that the whole conceptual basis is subject to
changing policy driven interpretations. This view was well
put in an anonymous note in the Harvard Law Review.17 The
author in arguing against distinctions between acts and
omissions in the case of physician-assisted suicide and
treatment refusal states:
[bjecause there are no inherent distinctions 
between letting a patient die and assisting a 
patient's suicide, the patient's interest in 
dying cannot, without implicating policy 
arguments, be divided into an interest in 
'refusing' and an interest in 'receiving' 
treatment. The patient has a single, undivided 
interest in controlling what happens to her body.
The right of self-determination, although subject 
to some overriding state interests, does not 
cease to exist at some indeterminate, imaginary 
line between having life-saving treatment 
withdrawn and receiving suicide assistance...
Legal causation is a question of policy, not 
mechanical connection. Consider a case in which 
a physician disconnects a respirator that is 
keeping a patient alive. If the patient had 
expressly requested continued treatment, surely 
a court would find that the physician's act 
caused the patient's death. However, the same act 
would be legal if the patient had demanded 
cessation of treatment. In either case, the 
physician's act - turning off the respirator - is 
a cause-in-fact of the death: but for turning off 
the machine, the patient would be alive today. To 
say that the physician did not cause the death of 
the patient who demanded withdrawal of treatment, 
then, means that this act was not the legal, or 
'proximate' cause of the death. Whether the 
physician's act is a proximate cause 'depend[s] 
essentially on whether the policy of the law will 
extend the responsibility for the conduct to the 
consequences which have in fact occurred'...
Thus, the seemingly objective statement that 
would be made in the second instance, that the
This statement could be interpreted as implying that
17 See, Anonymous, (1992, pp.2021-2040).
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patient's illness, not the patient or the 
physician, caused the death, is no more than a 
policy-based conclusion that the patient's and 
physician's actions are not prohibited.18
Thus, the act-omission distinction is a shaky
foundation on which to build a right to die jurisprudence.
It could be argued that it is an outmoded legal tool
unsuited to the exigencies of high technology medicine.19
As a result, it is submitted that other models be looked to
in attempting to seek a resolution to this dilemma.
4.2 The Competent Patient and Refusal of Medical Treatment.
That treatment withdrawal may be valid in the case of 
the conscious rational adult may be inferred from a number 
of judicial pronouncements in this area. Thus, medical 
treatment can be refused by a competent adult even if it 
leads to his death. In the case of the minor patient the 
position is not as straightforward due to the law's 
conception of the child.
18 Ibid., pp.2029-2031.
19 Meisel, (1989, p.78), notes:
[t]he difficulties with the act-omission 
analysis - in characterizing conduct as an 
act or an omission, and in specifying the 
moral difference that such a 
characterization should entail - have led to 
its rejection by the courts m  right to die 
cases.
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The Competent Adult.
In R. v Blaue20 an assault victim refused a blood 
transfusion on the grounds that the religious sect of 
which she was a member (the Jehovah's Witnesses) forbade 
such a medical intervention. As a result of refusing the 
blood transfusion, she died of her injuries. The 
perpetrator of the assault, the defendant in the instant 
case, argued that the victim's decision to refuse medical 
treatment was a form of novus actus interveniens which 
broke the causal link between his act and the death of the 
victim, and that as a result, he was no longer guilty of 
her manslaughter. The Court of Appeal rejected the 
defendant's argument and upheld his conviction for 
manslaughter.
In the case of Re T (Adult; Refusal of Medical 
Treatment).21 the patient was a twenty year old female who 
had been injured in a traffic accident when she was thirty- 
four weeks pregnant.
T was diagnosed as having pneumonia and was prescribed 
large doses of pethidine, oxygen and antibiotics. She 
subsequently went into labour. Before the delivery, T was 
visited by her mother, a Jehovah's Witness. T herself was 
not a member of the sect. After conversations with her 
mother, T told the midwife that she did not want blood 
transfusions. The obstetrician told T that a caesarian
20 [1975] 3 All E.R. 446.
21 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
259
section did not normally require a blood transfusion. After 
the obstetrician had left, the midwife furnished T with a 
form which provided for^ the refusal to consent to blood 
transfusions. This form was required to be countersigned by 
the attending doctor, but in this case, the medical 
practitioner did not sign the document.
There followed an emergency caesarian section 
operation, T's condition deteriorated and the medical team 
was of the opinion that blood and plasma transfusions were 
necessary. She was placed on a ventilator and was 
administered sedatives. However her situation was critical 
and transfusions of blood and plasma were required for her 
survival.
T's father joined with the father of the child in 
applying to the court for a declaration that it would not 
be unlawful for the medical team to give T such 
transfusions without her consent. At the hearing it was 
adduced that T's parents were separated since T was three 
years old. Custody was eventually granted to her mother. 
The custody order prohibited the mother from rearing T as 
a Jehovah's Witness. However, T's mother had forced her 
daughter to live by the tenets of the sect. It was argued 
on T's behalf that her decision to forego blood 
transfusions had been made under undue influence from her 
mother, who had encouraged her to refuse blood 
transfusions.
At first instance, Ward J. held, that because of her 
medical condition, and due to the effect of the medication
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which had been administered to her, she was not in a 
rational state when she signed the consent refusal form. An 
interlocutory order was granted allowing the transfusions 
to be given.
However, the Official Solicitor appealed this decision 
to the Court of Appeal. The case was important in that it 
would provide guidance for hospital authorities faced with 
such a dilemma. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of 
the Official Solicitor. The Court of Appeal affirmed the 
right of the patient to decide whether or not to undergo a 
particular form of treatment. However, in order for this 
right to be upheld, it must be validly exercised. In this 
case, it was found, that the form signed by T was invalid 
as it had not been signed by a medical practitioner and 
because the significance of this form had not been 
properly explained to her.
In Canada the issue arose for decision in a slightly 
different form in the case of Malette v Shulman.22 In this 
case the plaintiff was unconscious as the result of 
injuries sustained in a road traffic accident. She was 
rushed to the emergency ward of the Kirkland and District 
Hospital where she was treated by the defendant medical 
practitioner. Dr. Shulman was of the opinion that the 
plaintiff was suffering from shock caused by blood loss. He 
then ordered that she be given intravenous glucose and 
Ringer's Lactate in order to increase her blood pressure. 
However, at this point, one of the nurses in attendance
22 (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
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discovered that Mrs. Malette was carrying a card which 
stated that she was a Jehovah's Witness and as such no 
blood or blood products were to be administered to her in 
any circumstances.
Dr. Shulman was thus faced with a dilemma. He was of 
the opinion that without blood transfusions Mrs. Malette's 
condition would deteriorate leading to irreversible shock 
and death. He was also aware that the plaintiff had not and 
would not consent to a blood transfusion even to save her 
life. Nonetheless, the defendant decided to proceed with a 
blood transfusion. As a result the plaintiff recovered from 
her injuries and survived to take a battery action against 
Dr. Shulman. The action was successful at first instance. 
However, the defendant appealed this decision to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision stating that Dr. Shulman was not legally entitled 
to act as he did even though his actions had saved the life 
of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion 
that:
[a] doctor is not free to disregard a patient's 
advance instructions any more than he would be 
free to disregard instructions given at the time 
of the emergency. The law does not prohibit a 
patient from withholding consent to emergency 
medical treatment, nor does the law prohibit a 
doctor from following his patient's instructions.
While the law may disregard the absence of 
consent in limited emergency circumstances, it 
otherwise supports the right of competent adults 
to make decisions concerning their own health 
care by imposing civil liability on those who 
perform medical treatment without consent.23
Thus, in this particular case the Court of Appeal was
23 Ibid., p.330.
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satisfied that the card which Mrs. Malette was carrying:
set forth unqualified instructions applicable to 
the circumstances presented by this emergency. In 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
those instructions should be taken as validly 
representing the patient's wish not to be 
transfused. If, of course, there were evidence to 
the contrary - evidence which cast doubt on 
whether the card was a true expression of the 
patient's wishes - the doctor, in my opinion, 
would be entitled to proceed as he would in the 
usual emergency case. In this case, however, 
there was no such contradictory evidence.24
In the United States the approach of the judiciary has
been less favourable to the patient in such cases. In the
case of In Re Estate of Dorone25 the patient was a twenty-
two year old Jehovah's Witness. He was unconscious as he
was suffering from an acute subdural haematoma. To relieve
this condition an operation was required, during the course
of which a blood transfusion was necessary. The patient's
parents, however, refused to consent to the blood
transfusion even though without the operation and the
transfusion the patient would die. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania overruled the decision of the parents stating
that:
medical intervention, which necessarily included 
blood transfusions, could preserve Mr. Dorone's 
life. When evidence of this nature is measured 
against third party speculation as to what an 
unconscious patient would want there can be no 
doubt that medical intervention is required. 
Indeed, in a situation like the present, where 
there is an emergency calling for an immediate 
decision, nothing less than a fully conscious 
contemporaneous decision by the patient will be 
sufficient to override evidence of medical
24 Ibid.
25 517 Pa. 3 (1987) .
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having given birth to twins, was found to be bleeding from
the uterus. The medical practitioner in attendance believed
that a dilation of the cervix and curettage of the uterine
lining was required. However, the patient was a Jehovah's
Witness and had previously signed a 'Refusal to Permit
Blood Transfusion' form. During the procedure it transpired
that a blood transfusion was necessary to preserve the
patient's life. The doctor in charge of the procedure
decided that nevertheless the transfusion should be given.
As a result the plaintiff and her husband sued in battery.
The Michigan Court of Appeals did not uphold the
plaintiffs' claim following the approach taken in In Re
Estate of Dorone stating that:
it is the patient's fully informed,
contemporaneous decision which alone is 
sufficient to override evidence of medical 
necessity... [The plaintiff's] prior refusals had 
not been made when her life was hanging in the 
balance or when it appeared that death might be 
a possibility if a transfusion were not given. • 
Clearly, her refusals were, therefore, not 
contemporaneous or informed...
Without contemporaneous refusal of treatment 
by a fully informed, competent adult patient, no 
action lies for battery and summary disposition 
was proper.28
necessity.26
In the later case of Werth v Taylor27 the patient
The English case of In Re C (Adult: Refusal of
26 Ibid., p.9.
27 475 N.W.2d 426 (1991) .
28 Ibid., cited by Kennedy and Grubb, (1994, p.1330).
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Treatment)29 provides one with yet another variation on the 
general theme of treatment refusal and the consequences for 
the medical practitioner. In this case, the patient, though 
a sentient adult, was suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia. C had been sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment in 1962 for stabbing a former lover. It was 
discovered, during the currency of his sentence, that C was 
mentally ill. He was, as a result, transferred to 
Broadmoor. It was there that he was diagnosed as being a 
chronic paranoid schizophrenic, and remained 
institutionalized ever since. In September 1993, the 
surgeon at Broadmoor diagnosed C as suffering from gangrene 
of the foot, whereupon C was transferred to Heatherwood 
Hospital.
At the hospital, the consultant vascular surgeon found 
C's leg to be severely infected with a necrotic ulcer 
covering the dorsum. He was of the opinion that C would die 
quite shortly if the leg was not amputated below the knee. 
C refused to consent to the amputation, claiming that he 
would rather die with two feet than live with one. The 
surgeon then, in the light of the gravity of C's condition, 
tried to obtain his consent to less radical surgery. On 22 
September, he succeeded in obtaining C's consent to 
debridement of the dead tissue under general anaesthetic.
There followed an improvement in C's condition and the 
risk of imminent death had been averted. Nonetheless, the 
patient applied for an injunction to prevent any future
29 [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290.
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attempt to amputate his leg without his consent. In
applying the principles laid down in both Airedale N.H.S.
Trust v Bland30 and Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical
Treatment).31 Thorpe J. allowed the application. The
question of C's capacity to consent was discussed and it
was found that C was capable of managing his own affairs
and was thus not precluded from giving valid consent.
Thorpe J. concluded that the correct question to be
addressed in determining C's capacity was:
whether it has been established that C's capacity 
is so reduced by his chronic mental illness that 
he does not sufficiently understand the nature, 
purpose and effects of the proffered 
amputation.32
Thorpe J. was satisfied that, on the evidence, C though
suffering from schizophrenia:
understood and retained the relevant treatment 
information [and] that in his own way he believes 
it, and that in the same fashion he has arrived 
at a clear choice.33
This decision, and the earlier decision in Re T (Adult:
Refusal of Medical Treatment) confirm the autonomy of the
patient in deciding whether or not to undergo life-saving
medical treatment.
30 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
31 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
32 In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1
W.L.R. 290, p.295.
33 Ibid.
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The Minor Patient.
In the United Kingdom, the question of the minor 
patient and the refusal of treatment leading to the 
possible death of the patient has been broached in the case 
of Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment).34 In that case, a 
sixteen year old girl who suffered from anorexia nervosa 
was the subject of an application by her local authority 
under section 100 (3) and (4) of the Children Act 1989 for 
a court order that it be free to place W in a hospital 
specialising in eating disorders and that she be given 
medical treatment without her consent if necessary.
At first instance, it was held that although W had 
sufficient understanding to make an informed decision, the 
court had inherent jurisdiction to make the order sought. 
W appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court 
of Appeal dismissed W's appeal, holding that it had an 
unlimited inherent jurisdiction over minors and as such 
could, in the child's 'best interests', override the 
child's wishes even where the child was capable of 
understanding the nature and consequences of her refusal to 
accept treatment where such refusal would lead to the death 
of the child or to severe permanent injury. However, it was 
noted that:
nevertheless such a refusal is a very important 
consideration in making clinical judgments and 
for parents and the court in deciding whether 
themselves to give consent. Its importance
34 [1992] 4 All E.R. 627.
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increases with the age and maturity of the minor.35 
This decision considerably narrows the freedom of action of 
the minor as laid down in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority.36 Given the approach to the 
autonomy of the child in Irish law, it is likely that an 
Irish court faced with a question such as that raised in Re 
W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment1) would follow the more 
restrictive line adopted in that case rather than the 
Gillick model of child autonomy in the context of medical 
treatment.
The more general area of the capacity of the minor to 
consent to medical procedures is of relevance here. The 
common law does not impose a particular age limit below 
which an individual cannot give valid consent to medical 
treatment. The important factor in this area is whether the 
child has sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
appreciate what is entailed in the particular treatment. 
The issue of consent and the minor patient was broached in 
the case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority.37 The case arose as a result of the issuing by 
the then Department of Health and Social Security of a 
circular which stated that a doctor consulted at a family 
planning clinic by a girl under the age of sixteen would 
not be acting unlawfully if he prescribed contraceptives 
for the girl, as long as he was acting in good faith to
35 Ibid., pp.639-640.
36 [1985] 3 All E.R. 402.
37 Ibid.
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protect her against the harmful effects of sexual 
intercourse. The plaintiff, a mother of five daughters 
under the age of sixteen, sought an assurance from her area 
health authority that her daughters would not receive 
contraceptive advice without her consent.
The health authority refused such an assurance, 
whereupon the plaintiff brought an action against the 
health authority and the Department of Health and Social 
Security seeking a declaration that the advice contained in 
the circular was unlawful as it amounted to advice to 
doctors to commit the offence of causing or encouraging 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under sixteen, 
contrary to section 28(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, 
or the offence of being an accessory to unlawful sexual 
intercourse with a girl under sixteen, contrary to section 
6(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.
The plaintiff also sought a declaration against the 
health authority that a doctor or other professional person 
employed by it in its family planning service could not 
give advice and treatment on contraception to any child of 
the plaintiff below the age of sixteen without the consent 
of the plaintiff.
In its decision in the case, the House of Lords 
recognised the right of the minor to autonomy in this area. 
Thus, the fact that a girl was under the age of sixteen did 
not imply that she was incapable of consenting to such 
treatment and advice. The relevant factor was not the age 
of the individual but rather her ability to understand
2 6 9
based on the particular capacity of the individual in
question. As a result, a doctor could engage in such
treatment, once he was satisfied that the minor was of
sufficient understanding and intelligence to appreciate the
particular treatment, without incurring the sanction of the
criminal law, or infringing the rights of the parents.
Thus, in the words of Lord Scarman:
as a matter of law, the parental right to 
determine whether or not their minor child below 
the age of sixteen will have medical treatment 
terminates if and when the child achieves a 
sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
enable him or her to understand fully what is 
proposed. It will be a question of fact whether 
a child seeking advice has sufficient 
understanding of what is involved to give a 
consent valid in law. Until the child achieves 
the capacity to consent, the parental right to 
make the decision continues save only m  
exceptional circumstances.38
In Ireland the issue has not, as of yet, come before 
the courts for decision. However, the presence in Bunreacht 
na hEireann 1937 of Articles 41 and 42 may constitute a 
barrier to a decision similar to that m  the case of 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
being arrived at in Ireland. Article 41 sets out to give 
explicit constitutional protection to the family and the 
institution of marriage. The family is seen under Article 
41.1.2 as "the necessary basis of social order". Article 
42.1 holds that the family is "the primary and natural 
educator of the child". Indeed Gavan Duffy J. in his
fully what was proposed. This would be a question of fact
38 Ibid., pp.423-424.
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to the provenance of these articles:
Articles 41 and 42, redolent as they are of the 
great Papal encyclical in pari materia, formulate 
first principles with conspicuous power and 
clarity... which exalt the family by proclaiming 
and adopting in... the Constitution... the 
Christian conception of the place of the family 
in society and in the [s]tate.4°
Thus, even if a minor fully appreciates the nature and 
consequences of contraceptive treatment and advice, the 
constitutional supremacy of the family will invalidate this 
consent. The interests of the minor are thus of mere 
secondary importance. Supporters of this conception of the 
rights of the family,41 argue that children have a right to 
be protected from precocious sexual activity and that the 
courts will protect the family against any infringement of 
their constitutional rights. Children are, in effect, to be 
protected from themselves in this area of medical 
treatment. In being protected from themselves, they are, 
effectively, allowed to remain unprotected from sexually 
transmitted diseases or unplanned pregnancies.
judgment in the case of Re Tilson39 left one in no doubt as
39 [1951] I.R. 1.
40 Ibid., p. 14.
41 McMahon and Binchy, (1990, p.420).
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4.3 Establishing a Right to Refuse Treatment.
The Constitutional A r g u m e n t - .
In the New Jersey Supreme Court case of In Re
Quinlan42 the right to die in the sense of refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment was held to be encompassed by
the constitutional right to privacy. In this case, the
patient was in a chronic persistent vegetative state. On
the evidence it was believed that the patient would never
return to a sentient state. In its judgment in the case the
New Jersey Supreme Court came to the conclusion that in
certain circumstances the right to privacy could be
interpreted as including a right to refuse medical
treatment, leading to the death of the patient:
[p]resumably this right is broad enough to 
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical 
treatment under certain circumstances, in much 
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass 
a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under 
certain conditions.43
Having concluded that there existed a right to privacy 
that may allow the termination of treatment in certain 
circumstances, the Supreme Court of New Jersey then 
addressed the question of the possible criminal liability 
of those involved in withdrawing such treatment. It was 
held that:
there would be no criminal homicide in the 
circumstances of this case. We believe, first,
42 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976).
43 Ibid. , p. 663 .
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that the ensuing death would not be homicide but 
rather expiration from existing natural causes. 
Secondly, even if it were to be regarded as
homicide, it would not be unlawful.
These conclusions rest upon definitional and 
constitutional bases. The termination of
treatment pursuant to the right to privacy is, 
within the limitations of this case, ipso facto 
lawful. Thus, a death resulting from such an act 
would not come within the scope of homicide
statutes proscribing only the unlawful killing of 
another. There is a real and in this case
determinative distinction between the unlawful 
taking of the life of another and the ending of 
artificial life-support systems as a matter of 
self-determination.44
The case established a right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment on the part of the competent patient with a
terminal45 or incurable46 illness, a position which has
been adopted in a plethora of subsequent cases throughout
the United States.
In the wake of In Re Quinlan, courts, in addition to
grounding the patient's right to refuse treatment in the
constitutional right to privacy, have premised this right
on the common law right to self-determination as expressed
in the doctrine of informed consent.47
44 Ibid., p.664.
45 See, inter alia. Satz v Perlmutter 379 So.2d 359 
(1980) and Tune v Walter Reed Armv Medical Hospital 602 
F.Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
46 See for example, Bouvia v Superior Court fGlenchur) 
179 Cal. App.3d 1127 (1986), (here the patient was suffering 
from cerebral palsy, which is not classified as a terminal 
illness. The court nonetheless held that the patient should 
be allowed to forego artificial feeding and hydration) and 
Thor v Superior Court 855 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1993), (where a 
quadriplegic patient was allowed to refuse further medical 
treatment).
47 Meisel, (1989, p.53).
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cites the example of the New Jersey Supreme Court decision
in the case of In Re Conroy49 where it was concluded that
the right to decline life-saving treatment was part of the
common law right of self-determination. In the earlier case
of In Re Eichnerfso it was held at first instance that the
state's interest in preserving human life was not
sufficient to prevent the disconnection of a respirator
attached to an eighty-three year old heart attack victim,
citing as support for this conclusion the common law right
to self-determination and not the right to privacy.51 The
court of first instance contended that by using the right
to privacy as a justificatory basis for this decision, it
would lead to unrestrained applications of the privacy
right.52 On appeal the decision of the court of first
instance was upheld but it was stated that the
constitutional right to privacy could be viewed as a valid
means of upholding the right to treatment refusal. It was
held that the right to privacy:
encompasses the freedom of the terminally ill but 
competent individual to choose for himself 
whether or not to decline medical treatment...
[and it] is virtually inconceivable that the 
right of privacy would not apply.53
48 Ibid.
49 486 A. 2d 1209 (1985) .
50 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979).
61 Ibid., pp. 593-594.
52 Ibid. , p. 591.
53 426 N. Y . S . 2d 517 (1980), p.539.
Meisel,48 in his standard text on the right to die
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On a further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the lower court but did not broach 
the question of the validity of extending the privacy right 
to cover such a situation. This was a consolidated appeal 
of both the case of In Re Eichner and the case of In Re 
Storar54 which concerned John Storar, a fifty-two year old 
mentally retarded man who had never been competent. The 
decision in In Re Eichner was affirmed with the appeal 
court relying on the common law right to self- 
determination.55 However in the decision in In Re Storar. 
it was held that treatment could not be discontinued
because the patient was not capable of making known his 
preferences in relation to treatment withdrawal. On the 
self-determination basis the right to refuse treatment
could not be accorded as the patient was incapable of 
either refusing or accepting treatment. This, it may be
argued betrays the conceptual inadequacy of the common law
right to self-determination in this instance. One 
commentator has expressed this inadequacy in the following 
terms:
[u]nder common law, the patient loses the right 
of self-determination if incompetent; it is a 
personal right that a surrogate cannot exercise 
on behalf of the patient without clear evidence 
of the patient's intent. Thus, only a competent 
patient may exercise the common law right of 
self-determination, because the common law 
demands clear evidence of the patient's treatment 
preferences.56
54 434 N. Y.S. 2d 46 (1980).
55 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), pp.272-273.
66 Shaver, (1989, p. 226).
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The Legislative Model.
also had a further consequence, the widespread adoption by
individual states of living will statutes which allow for
competent persons to create a living will stating their
wishes in relation to the discontinuance of life-sustaining
treatment. In addition many states have adopted durable
power of attorney legislation which allows competent
persons to appoint a particular person to make a decision
on their behalf in relation to treatment withdrawal in the
event of their entering a state of permanent
unconsciousness.57 The generic term 'advance directive' is
often used to encompass the varying forms of prospective
decision-making which are of relevance to this area. As one
commentator has explained:
[t]he term 'advance directive' is used to denote 
several different things. First, it is sometimes 
used to designate the concept of anticipatory 
health care decision-making. At other times it is 
used to refer to the content of an oral or 
written statement made by an individual 
(declarant) to become effective under stated 
conditions. The term can also be used to refer to 
a vehicle for embodying such a statement, such as 
a living will, durable power of attorney, or 
other natural death act directive. (Natural death 
acts frequently use the terms 'directive' and 
'directive to physician' as synonymous with the 
term 'advance directive').58
The development of the advance directive and the 
enduring power of attorney in the context of treatment
The development of a right to die jurisprudence has
57 For an overview of this area see, Roach, (1991, 
pp.161-168).
58 Meisel, (1989, p.318).
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withdrawal demonstrates an attempt on the part of the 
legislators to enshrine patient autonomy m  public policy. 
However, these forms of legal instrument by their very 
nature can apply only to the competent adult patient. The 
mentally incompetent and the minor are not permitted to 
avail of this instrument. In addition not all once 
competent persons will have created an advance directive 
before entering a state of permanent unconsciousness. This 
has led to the courts adopting different decision-making 
standards in the case of the once competent patient who has 
made a directive, the once competent patient who has not 
made a directive, and the never competent patient, a 
situation which has resulted in a certain lack of 
uniformity.
The patient who has provided clear and convincing 
proof of his wish to have treatment withdrawn in the event 
of his entering a state of incompetence will obviously 
provide little difficulty. Thus it would seem that on the 
face of it a valid living will poses no problems.59
The American Modelis).
All fifty American states and the District of Columbia 
now have on their statute books some form of advance 
directive legislation.60 In addition many states have
59 See, Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of 
Health 110 S.Ct 2841 (1990).
60 See, Dworkin, (1993, p.180) and Salatka, (1992, 
pp.155-161).
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enacted health care durable power of attorney statutes.61 
Living wills are classified broadly as instruction 
directives. They allow the declarant (the party making the 
living will) to make known his wishes in relation to 
medical treatment in the event of a terminal or incurable 
illness. A health care durable power of attorney falls into 
the category of a proxy directive. These instruments, 
unlike a classic living will, do not set down specific 
instructions in relation to medical treatment, but rather 
allow the principal or grantor (as the creator of the 
durable power of attorney is known) to appoint a proxy or 
proxies to make health care decisions on his behalf in the 
event of his becoming incompetent.
The living will is less flexible than the health care 
durable power of attorney in that at the time of framing a 
living will one can not possibly contemplate all the 
treatment options that may be available if and when the 
directive becomes operative. With a durable power of 
attorney, the appointed surrogate will be able to judge the 
requirements of the particular situation 
contemporaneously.62
One method of overcoming this problem is to create a 
combination directive which combines the advantageous 
aspects of both living wills and proxy directives. As a 
leading American commentator has noted:
[a] combination directive permits the spirit of
61 See, Salatka, (1992, pp.159-161).
62 See further, Meisel, (1989, pp.318-335).
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the declarant's instructions to govern, with the 
interstices filled m  by the proxy.63
A major problem of the advance directive legislation
in the United States is its sheer diversity and lack of
uniformity. This has created a situation where the rights
of the terminally ill vary from one state to the next. As
one writer has stated:
Americans are now shopping for cities or states 
with more sympathetic laws on many different 
social and medical issues, which creates a trend 
that will burden a handful of states with the 
most pressing and expensive problems.64
The case of In Re Busalacchi65 demonstrates the
problems which beset this area. In this case the patient
lay in a persistent vegetative state in a rehabilitation
institution in the state of Missouri as the result of a
road traffic accident. Her father sought to transfer her to
Minnesota, a state which had less stringent laws in
relation to treatment withdrawal. The patient had left no
clear and convincing evidence of her wishes in relation to
treatment withdrawal, but even if she had it is doubtful it
would have proved sufficient, as she was a minor at the
time of the accident and therefore lacking the competence
to decide on future medical treatment. Even though her
next-of-kin wished to make a treatment decision on her
behalf, this was stymied by the court m  its exercise of
the guardianship laws. In this case it was held that the
63 Ibid. , p. 322 .
64 Roach, (1991, p.166).
65 5 March 1991, No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315.
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make without demonstrating that she was not receiving
adequate care in Missouri:
[s]pecifically, we will not permit [a] guardian 
to forum shop m  an effort to control whether 
[the patient] lives or dies.66
It could be argued that this refusal might in some way
interfere with the individual's right to travel. However,
as Bnlmayer has written:
[t]he home state may be able to defeat the right 
to travel argument by arguing that it is not 
preventing the woman from exercising the right to 
travel, but simply holding that her guardian is 
not entitled to make the decision for her. Here, 
however, we need to take a closer look at the 
state's guardianship law. What decisions, 
exactly, is the guardian ordinarily entitled to 
make? Assume that the state would normally allow 
the guardian to move the patient from one 
hospital to another in order to obtain different 
treatment. In such circumstances the state should 
not be able to prohibit the guardian from moving 
the patient to another state on the grounds that 
the purpose of the move is illegal. For the 
purpose itself is not illegal: termination of
life support would be permitted if the patient 
were already in that state...
The only argument the state can use to 
prevent the death would be the contention that 
the guardian could not decide to move the patient 
regardless of the illegality of the motive. One 
can certainly imagine states holding such a 
limited view of guardianship; in such states, the 
guardian would be prohibited from taking the 
patient out of the hospital for virtually any 
reason.67
However, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, it was 
held that the father of the patient was entitled to remove 
the feeding tube.68
decision to move the patient was not one the parent could
66 Ibid, p.17.
67 Bnlmayer, (1993, p.905).
68 Ibid. , p. 874.
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Nonetheless it is imperative that certainty should 
prevail in this area. Various attempts have been made in 
the past without particular success to introduce uniform 
laws in this area.
The Uniform Rights of the Terminally 111 Act 198569 is 
a model statute drafted by the National Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. It was adopted in 1985 and forms the 
basis for living will legislation in a number of states. 
However, it has not led to a situation of uniformity even 
in those states which have used it as a basis for their 
legislation in this area.
The Uniform Right to Refuse Treatment Act 1982 was 
drafted by the group Concern m  Dying m  1982. This model 
statute provides a means by which a competent person can 
state how they wish to be treated in the event of their 
becoming incompetent and also allows them to appoint a 
proxy decision-maker. This act has not been adopted by any 
state.70 The Medical Treatment Decision Act 1981 was 
drafted by the Society for the Right to Die in 1981. It has 
not been adopted by any state but has influenced certain 
provisions of the living will statutes of some states.71 
These model statutes have not created a situation of 
greater certainty and uniformity in this area of medical 
treatment.
69 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 609 (1987).
70 Meisel, (1989, p.336).
71 Ibid.
281
The Australian Model.
In certain states in Australia, an attempt has been 
made to frame legislation which would go some way towards 
providing a practical resolution to the dilemma posed by 
passive euthanasia. The Natural Death Act 1983 of South 
Australia is the piece of legislation which has acted as a 
model for subsequent legislative intervention by certain 
other Australian states.72 The Natural Death Act 1983 
enables the terminally ill patient in specific 
circumstances to forego life-sustaining treatment. In 
addition it provides immunity from civil and criminal 
liability for doctors, who, acting without negligence, 
follow the directions of such patients. The Natural Death 
Act 1983 only applies to terminally ill patients who are 
defined in section 3 as those people who are suffering 
from:
any illness, injury or degeneration of mental or 
physical faculties-
(a) such that death would, if extraordinary 
measures were not undertaken, be imminent; and
(b) from which there is no reasonable prospect of 
temporary recovery, even if extraordinary 
measures were undertaken.
The term 'extraordinary measures' is taken to 
mean:
medical or surgical measures that prolong life, 
or are intended to prolong life, by supplanting 
or maintaining the operation of bodily functions 
that are temporarily or permanently incapable of
72 See for example, the Northern Territory Natural 
Death Act 1988.
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artificial feeding and artificial hydration.
The capacity of the patient is important in exercising
this right to forego treatment under the Natural Death Act
1983. Thus, the Act will only apply to the patient who:
is conscious and capable of exercising a rational 
judgment of all the various forms of treatment 
that may be available in his particular case so 
that the patient may make an informed judgment as 
to whether a particular form of treatment should, 
or should not, be undertaken.74
As a result, the category of patients who may avail of this
right to forego life-sustaining treatment is quite narrow.
In effect it is confined to the competent adult and does
not make provision for the minor or the incompetent adult.
In effect the Natural Death Act 1983 allows the
defined category of patients to make an advance directive
detailing how the medical practitioner should proceed m
the event of the patient suffering a terminal illness
necessitating his being kept alive by artificial means. The
Act itself does not specify when the will should be made
but it would appear that it should be made before the
patient succumbs to the terminal illness. This would avoid
the problem of pressure being exerted on the patient by
avaricious relatives when the patient is m  a vulnerable
state as a result of the illness. However the Act does not
lay down requirements in relation to those persons who may
independent operation.73
This would include such measures as artificial ventilation,
73 Natural Death Act 1983, section 3.
74 Ibid., section 4(4).
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validly witness the advance directive. This may raise the 
problem of the witnesses being related to the patient which r 
would cast doubt on whether the patient freely signed the 
document or was badgered by relatives into doing so.
Once made, the living will becomes effective 
indefinitely, unless of course it is revoked. The Natural 
Death Act 1983 provides that such an advance directive will 
become effective in the event of the patient suffering from 
a terminal illness which would necessitate the use of life- 
sustaining medical intervention.75
The medical practitioner who acts in compliance with 
the wishes of the patient as expressed in the advance 
directive will not be deemed liable for causing the death 
of the patient.76 In addition the medical practitioner who 
is faced with the decision as to whether:
(a) a patient is, or is not, suffering from 
terminal illness;
(b) a patient revoked, or intended to revoke, the 
direction not to have the extraordinary measures 
applied or undertaken;
(c) a patient was, or was not, at the time of 
giving direction, capable of understanding the 
nature and consequences of the direction77
makes such decision in good faith and without negligence,
will be deemed to be immune from criminal liability. The
Act does not grant immunity in civil law for the
practitioner. The Act only applies to the withdrawal of
life-sustaining measures and does not provide immunity m
75 Ibid., section 4(1).
76 Ibid., section 6.
77 Ibid., section 5(3).
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causes or accelerates death, as distinct from an 
act that permits the dying process to take its 
natural course.78
In the Australian state of Victoria, the Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 as amended by the Medical Treatment 
(Enduring Power of Attorney') Act 1990 and by the Medical 
Treatment (Agents~) Act 1992 allows a competent adult to 
refuse consent to treatment for a condition from which he 
is currently suffering.
The major impetus for the Medical Treatment Act 1988 
was the decision of the coroner m  the inquest into the 
death of a former water-skiing champion, John McEwan, who 
suffered from quadriplegia as a result of a diving 
accident.79 In a document drawn up by his solicitor, he had 
expressed a wish to die, and not to be revived if he became 
unconscious. Having refused to take all food and 
medication, he was certified under the Victorian Mental 
Health Act 1958 on the grounds that he was not capable of 
making a rational decision due to his suffering from severe 
depression. He eventually agreed to take food and 
medication and the certification was revoked. He was 
discharged from hospital, whereupon he discontinued taking 
anti-depressant medication. His respirator was disconnected 
in April 1986. At the inquest, the coroner found that death 
was not due to the disconnection of the respirator but was
cases where the doctor perforins an act which:
78 See, Parliament of South Australia, (1983). See 
also, Natural Death Act 1983, section 6(1).
79 See Lanham and Woodford, (1992, pp.659-675).
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caused by heart failure resulting from the diving accident. 
This decision provoked public debate on the issue and it 
was thought that the current legislation did not adequately 
uphold the patient's right to die. The Victorian Parliament 
commissioned two reports into the issue80 before enacting 
the Medical Treatment Act 1988.
The Medical Treatment Act 1988 provided for procedures 
for the drawing up of refusal of treatment certificates on 
the part of patients and also created a statutory offence 
of medical trespass for those who do not comply with the 
wishes of the patient as expressed in the refusal of 
treatment certificate.
The patient in question must be an adult of sound mind 
who has understood the information on the nature of his 
condition and has voluntarily expressed a wish to forego 
life-sustaining treatment for a current condition.81 The 
refusal of treatment certificate must be signed by two 
witnesses, one of whom must be a medical practitioner. The 
Act does not provide a definition of 'sound mind' for the 
purposes of refusing medical treatment. For guidance on who 
may be deemed to be competent for the purposes of creating 
a valid refusal of treatment certificate, one may look to 
the Victorian Parliament's final Report wherein an 
incompetent patient is defined as:
80 See, Social Development Committee upon the Inquiry 
into Options for Dying with Dignity, (1986, pp.1-5) and 
Social Development Committee Upon the Inquiry into Options 
for Dying with Dignity, (1987, pp.2-4).
81 Medical Treatment Act 1988, section 5(1).
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a patient who is not capable of understanding the 
nature, consequences and risks of the proposed 
medical treatment and the consequences of non­
treatment, and who is thus incapable of 
consenting to, or refusing, medical treatment.82
In opposition to the Natural Death Act 1983 in South 
Australia, the Medical Treatment Act 1988 includes within 
its scope any patient of sound mind who suffers from an 
illness requiring treatment, regardless of whether the 
illness is terminal. Those who fail to adhere to the 
refusal of treatment certificate under the Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 will be guilty of the criminal offence 
of medical trespass. This is a summary offence which 
attracts a maximum fine of A$500. In addition, the patient 
whose wishes have not been complied with, may sue the 
doctor m  the tort of trespass or may lodge a complaint 
with the Medical Board of Victoria.
The approach of the various state legislatures m  
Australia to the issue of the autonomy of the dying patient 
whilst not free from imperfection, certainly shows a 
willingness on the part of government to provide practical 
solutions to complex medical dilemmas. These developments 
also give societal recognition to the right of the patient 
to die with dignity. The advantage of a legislative 
solution to such issues is that it allows the interests of 
all parties involved to be represented. In addition, it 
should allow those involved to be provided with clear 
guidelines as to their respective rights and duties m  such
82 Social Development Committee upon the Inquiry into 
Options for Dying with Dignity, (1987, p.174).
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a situation.
Certain commentators have questioned the concept of 
treating the now incompetent patient as competent based on 
his wishes expressed in an advance directive.83 In other 
words, can the expression of the wishes of the patient as 
set down while in a competent state actually reflect his 
current view on the question? Has his opinion changed in 
the interim? Those who argue that advance directives can 
never be conclusive proof of the now incompetent patient's 
choice argue that the self of today is not necessarily the 
self of yore, that in effect identity and opinion change 
over time.
This view is derived from a view of the self which 
sees the person in a persistent vegetative state as lacking 
a psychological continuity with the person when competent, 
thus making this person different for moral purposes from 
the previous self. Even though this person is physically 
continuous with the competent self he is not necessarily 
psychologically continuous with his competent self. 
Foremost amongst those who advocate the concept of personal 
identity as being based on psychological continuity is 
Derek Parfit. Parfit gives the following example to 
demonstrate his thesis:
4.4 Autonomy. Personal Identity and the Living Will.
83 See further, Buchanan, (1988, pp.277-302); Morgan, 
(1994, pp.411-442) and Rhoden, (1988, pp.410-419).
288
[o]n this way of thinking, the word 'I' can be 
used to imply the greatest degree of 
psychological connectedness. When the connections 
are reduced, when there has been any marked 
change of character or style of life, or any 
marked loss of memory, our imagined beings would 
say, 'It was not I who did that, but an earlier 
self'...
If I say, 'It will not be me but one of my 
future selves'; I do not imply that I will be 
that future self. He is one of my later selves, 
and I am one of his earlier selves. There is no 
underlying person who we both are.84
Applying this type of argument to the issue of advance
directives, Dresser has contended that if:
little or no psychological connectedness and 
continuity exist between the individual at the
two points in time, then there is no particular
reason why the past person, as opposed to any 
other person, should determine the present 
person's fate.85
Arguing against this conception of the self, Dworkin86
claims that the failure to respect the right of the
individual when competent to determine how he shall be
treated when no longer competent, amounts to an
infringement of the individual's right to, what he terms,
precedent autonomy.87 Thus, Dworkin would hold that:
[a] competent person's right to autonomy requires 
that his past decisions, about how he is to be 
treated if he becomes demented be respected even 
if they contradict at that later point.88
A further argument against the psychological continuity
basis of personal identity m  this context has been
84 Parfit, (1971, p.25).
85 Dresser, (1986, pp.380-381).
86 Dworkin, (1993, pp.218-241).
87 Ibid., pp.226-229.
88 Ibid. , p. 228.
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living wills are the expressions of values which 
we should assume are the relevant values of the 
patient, viewed as someone with a past. This view 
is appropriate because the values expressed m  
living wills are paradigmatically future-oriented 
(avoiding future treatment one considers 
dehumanizing) or other-directed (reducing 
relatives' suffering, or preserving their 
inheritance). Moral analyses are, after all, 
about human relationships, and most persons do 
not believe that these relationships lose all 
meaning when a person is no longer conscious or 
aware of a betrayal.89
In legal reality, the advance directive would appear 
to be quite valid. Thus, the legal validity of such 
instruments may be grounded in legislation. In the wake of 
In Re Quinlan90 states began to adopt legislative solutions 
to the dilemma of treatment withdrawal.
These solutions came in the form of natural death or 
living will statutes. The first state to introduce such a 
measure was California. The effect of the California 
Natural Death Act 197691 was to give a legal basis to the 
concept of an advance directive. Other states gradually 
followed California's lead, leading to the situation today 
where all fifty states and the District of Columbia now 
have some form of legislation giving legal effect to the 
advance directive in one or other of its many forms.92
proffered by Rhoden. Rhoden argues that:
89 Rhoden, (1988, pp.415-416).
f
90 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976).
91 California Health and Safety Code sections 7185-7195 (1976).
92 For a review of the varying types of statutes m  
existence see, King, (1992, pp.1-20).
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4.5 The Incompetent Patient: Judicial Criteria.
For varying reasons many competent persons will not 
make advance directives. This has forced courts to adopt a 
decision-making strategy in relation to the now incompetent 
but previously competent patient. Moreover, in many cases 
the permanently unconscious patient may, even when 
conscious have been legally incompetent, as, for example, 
m  the case of the minor or the mentally incapacitated 
individual. This has led the courts to engage in a process 
of surrogate decision-making and the development of a 
number of different tests applicable to separate groups of 
individuals. Courts have developed two principal tests in 
relation to treatment refusal and the unconscious patient; 
the 'substituted judgement'93 (sic) test and the 'best 
interests' test.
'Substituted Judgement'.
The 'substituted judgement' test allows the surrogate 
to choose the course which most closely approximates to the 
patient's own wishes based on such factors as the probable 
effects qf continued treatment, the likelihood of a cure, 
the patient's views, if any, on life-sustaining treatment
93 For the sake qf clarity these tests are here 
reproduced with the spelling derived from the U.S. cases.
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judicially m  the following terms:
[t]he doctrine of 'substituted judgement'... was 
utilized to authorize a gift from the estate of 
an incompetent person to an individual when the 
incompetent owed no duty of support. The English 
court accomplished this purpose by substituting 
itself as nearly as possible for the incompetent, 
and acting on the same motives and considerations 
as would have moved him... In essence, the 
doctrine m  its original inception called on the 
court to 'don the mantle of the incompetent'.95
The test as onginallly articulated was applicable only to
the distribution of funds from the estates of lunatics by
the court of chancery exercising its parens patriae
jurisdiction. However, it was adapted for use m  a most
inappropriate manner by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
case of In Re Quinlan.96
It is arguable whether the 'substituted judgement'
doctrine is entirely appropriate in the case of a patient
in a permanently unconscious state who has never expressed
a preference in relation to treatment withdrawal, as the
surrogate cannot really base his decision on the presumed
preferences of such a patient. As one commentator has noted
in highlighting the inadequacy of this standard m  cases of
treatment withdrawal:
[t]he English common law would not have had a 
name for Karen Quinlan. Certainly she was not an
expressed while competent.94 This test has been defined
94 The origins of the doctrine of 'substituted 
judgement' lie m  the decision of Lord Eldon in the case of 
Ex Parte Whitbread (1816) 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 Ch..
95 In Re Eichner 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), p.548. For a 
further detailed critique of the doctrine see, Buchanan and 
Brock, (1989, pp.112-122).
96 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976).
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idiot. While her condition was now static, she 
had not come into the world with a deficient 
mental apparatus; there was a past period of 
competency to hark back to. But neither was she 
a lunatic. Although she had once been competent, 
there was no waxing and waning of her intellect. 
Indeed there was no longer any intellect at all.
Karen Quinlan's deficit was more profound than 
the lunatic's. His was a failure of reason alone; 
hers was a failure of consciousness. The closest 
legal category that the common law had to 
describe her status was 'decedent', but the 
persistence of her lower brain function and the 
presence of her warm body made her not dead - not 
dead, not alive, not an idiot, not a lunatic.
There was a lacuna in the language of the law, so 
she was thrown into the general class of 
incompetents. There was no fine-tuning as to who 
was in that class - just individuals who were 
presently [sic] incompetent, regardless of how 
they came to be that way.97
However, despite such criticisms, the 'substituted
judgement' doctrine has become the norm m  judicial
decision-making on behalf of the incompetent patient in the
United States.98
However inadequate the 'substituted judgement'
standard may be m  determining whether a once competent
patient should continue to receive life-sustaining medical
treatment, it would seem beyond question that it is
completely inappropriate m  the case of the never competent
unconscious patient. Nonetheless the 'substituted
judgement' standard has been applied by certain courts m
cases involving never competent patients.
Thus, in the case of Superintendent of Belchertown
97 Harmon, (1990, pp. 37-38).
98 See for example, Brophy v New England Sinai 
Hospital, Inc. 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In Re Spring 405 N.E. 
2d 115 (1980) and Superintendent of Belchertown State School 
v Saikewicz 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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State School v Saikewicz" the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
applied the 'substituted judgement' standard to the case of 
an elderly, profoundly mentally handicapped male inmate of 
a state psychiatric institution. In this case, the patient 
was suffering from leukaemia and required chemotherapy. The 
patient's guardian ad litem was of the opinion that 
allowing Mr. Saikewicz to undergo a course of chemotherapy 
would not be in his 'best interests'.
The New Jersey Probate Court agreed that such a course 
of treatment would not be in the patient's 'best interests' 
listing the following factors in favour of such a decision; 
the side effects; the patient's age; the low chance of 
producing remission; the suffering which would be brought 
about as a result of the treatment; the inability of the 
patient to cooperate with the treatment and the quality of 
life possible for him even if the treatment brought about 
remission.100 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court came 
to a similar conclusion and justified it on the following 
grounds:
[i]n short, the decision in cases such as this 
should be that which would be made by the 
incompetent person, if that person were 
competent, but taking into account the present 
and future incompetency of the individual as one 
of the factors which would necessarily enter into 
the decision-making process of the competent 
person.101
By any standards this seems to be a most peculiar decision
99 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) .
100 Ibid., p. 422.
101 Ibid. , p.431.
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and shows up the utter inadequacy of this standard in the 
case of the never competent patient. The contradictory 
nature of allocating presumed preferences to a person who 
was never competent to hold such preferences is all too 
obvious. As Harmon has put it: "[fjinally Lord Eldon's
legal fiction had hit the jackpot: here was a generic,
reasonable idiot prone to giving his life away".102
The issue was to surface again in the New York Court 
of Appeals decision in the case of In Re Eichner.103 
However, in this case a rather different approach was 
taken. The appeal dealt with the applications for the 
withdrawal of a respirator from a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state104 and for the discontinuance of blood 
transfusions from a patient suffering from cancer of the 
bladder.105
In the case of In Re Eichner106 an eighty-three year 
old Roman Catholic cleric, Brother Fox, was on a respirator 
in a persistent vegetative state following a cardiac arrest 
during surgery for a hernia. A friend, Father Eichner, was 
appointed Brother Fox's guardian. While competent, Brother 
Fox had expressed the view that if he were to enter a 
vegetative state his life should not be artificially
102 Harmon, (1990, p. 41).
103 4 3 8 N . Y . S . 2d 266 (1981).
104 In Re Eichner 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1979).
105 In Re Storar 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980).
106 423 N . Y . S . 2d 580 (1979).
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maintained.107 At first instance, the application to 
withdraw life support was granted. On appeal to the New 
York Court of Appeals this order was upheld. It was held 
that clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes 
in relation to termination of life-sustaining treatment 
would have to be provided in such cases. In this case, such 
an evidentiary standard was met in that the patient had 
expressed on several occasions his desire not to be kept 
alive m  such circumstances.
In In Re Storar.108 the patient was a profoundly 
mentally handicapped adult suffering from cancer of the 
bladder leading to a continuous loss of blood. As a result 
he required frequent blood transfusions. The cancer later 
spread to his lungs giving him a life expectancy of 
approximately six months. His mother as guardian applied 
for the termination of the blood transfusions. At first 
instance her application was granted. On appeal, the New 
York Court of Appeals could find no clear and convincing 
evidence of the patient's intent. In this instance the 
approach of the New York Court of Appeals differed sharply 
from the approach of the Massachusetts court in 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz109 
and refused to extend the 'substituted judgement' test to 
the patient who was never competent. The New York court 
summed up its position thus:
107 Ibid. , p. 586.
108 434 N . Y . S . 2d 46 (1980).
109 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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[Storar] was always totally incapable of 
understanding or making a reasoned decision about 
medical treatment. Thus it is unrealistic to 
attempt to determine whether he would want to 
continue potentially life prolonging treatment if 
he were competent. As one of the experts 
testified at the hearing, that would be similar 
to asking whether 'if it snowed all summer would 
it then be winter?'110
As a result the treatment was ordered to be continued. This
application of the 'substituted judgement' test has also
been criticised, on the grounds that the evidentiary burden
is too great as opposed to being too lax.
It has been argued that the approach of the New York
Court of Appeals to the problem presented by Mr. Storar and
in the subsequent case of In Re Westchester County Medical
Center (O'Connor I111 may lead to a situation where many
incompetent patients may be forced to: "endure intrusive,
unbeneficial treatment that a similarly situated competent
patient would not choose".112
The application of the 'substituted judgement' test m
the case of the never competent is comparatively rare, but
when it is applied in such cases it raises questions about
the validity of using legal tools for purposes for which
110 438 N . Y . S . 2d 266 (1981), pp.274-275. See also, In 
Re Westchester County Medical Center (O'Connor) 531 N.E.2d 
607 (1988). But see contra. Shaver, (1989, p.229), who 
believes that the Storar decision:
denied the rights of any incompetent patient 
who did not have the forethought, or was 
unable, to make an explicit statement of his 
or her treatment preferences.
111 531 N.E. 2d 607 (1988).
112 Anonymous, (1990, p. 1647).
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they were not intended.113 In this instance the 
'substituted judgement' test is arguably not the standard 
which should be applied. In such cases it may be more 
logical to apply the 'best interests' standard.114
'Best Interests'.
It could be suggested that at first sight the 'best
interests' standard may be more objective in nature, in
that it does not focus on how the patient would have
chosen, if capable of so doing, but rather on the decision
which is most in keeping with the welfare of the patient.
The 'best interests' test as applied to treatment
withdrawal has been defined as follows:
[i]n assessing whether a procedure or course of 
treatment would be in a patient's 'best 
interests', the surrogate must take into account 
such factors as the relief of suffering, the 
preservation or restoration of functioning, and 
the quality as well as the extent of life
113 Meisel, (1989, pp.275-277), notes that the use of 
the 'substituted judgement' test in such circumstances 
appears to be confined to the Massachusetts courts.
A further example of the penchant of the Massachusetts 
courts for the 'substituted judgement' standard in 
inappropriate cases is the case of In Re Spring 405 N.E.2d 
115 (1980). In this case the patient was an elderly man who 
suffered from senile dementia and was in addition the victim 
of total kidney failure. It was established that if he 
continued with kidney dialysis treatment he would live for 
a further five years. His wife and son applied to the 
Massachusetts Probate Court for an order to terminate 
dialysis. The issue finally reached the Appeals Court which 
held, applying the 'substituted judgement' standard, that 
the patient if competent would not desire continued 
treatment, basing this decision on very vague and indeed lax 
evidentiary standards to the effect that his quality of life 
had considerably diminished.
114 See further, Anonymous, (1990, pp. 1649-1651).
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sustained.115
The 'best interests' standard has its origins m  the
equitable jurisdiction to oversee the estates of
incompetents.116 The application of this standard to the
field of medical decision-making is well established. Thus,
it is used to justify decisions to treat individuals who
may not be capable to consent to such treatment, such as
children117 and the mentally handicapped.118 However, m
the United States the 'best interests' standard has not
been applied very frequently in the area of treatment
withdrawal. As one commentator has noted:
[i]n right to die cases, however, the courts have 
generally concluded that medical treatment does 
not always advance a person's interests. This is 
evidenced by the fact that competent patients 
sometimes refuse treatment, even life-sustaining 
treatment and, when there are no countervailing 
state interests of a compelling nature, that 
refusal is to be accorded the same respect that 
a patient's consent to treatment is accorded.119
Certain courts have, however, applied the 'best 
interests' test in such cases. Thus, in the California 
Court of Appeal decision m  In Re Conservatorship of
115 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
(1983, p.135).
116 Meisel, (1989, p.264).
117 See further, Gaylin and Macklin, (1982, pp.20-39) 
and Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, (1973, pp.12-22).
118 See further, Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1989] 2 All E.R. 545.
119 Meisel, (1989, p.266).
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Drabnick120 it was held that a statutorily-appointed
conservator should decide the issue of treatment withdrawal
in the case of an incompetent patient who had not made a
formal advance directive, on the basis of the 'best
interests' standard. In the Minnesota case of In Re
Torres121 the 'best interests' test was also applied. It
was noted in that case that one factor that should be taken
into account was the welfare of the surviving family.
However, it has been argued that this standard strays too
far away from the ideal of patient autonomy and that indeed
one may be confusing other interests with the 'best
interests' of the patient:
[t]o the extent that most patients have an
interest in the well-being of their family, 
advancing the interests of their family benefits 
them as well. Importing such considerations into 
the 'best interests' analysis, however, invites 
the conflicts of interest that plague the 
'substituted judgement' standard and risks
shifting the focus of inquiry to the 'best 
interests' of the family.122
The 'best interests' test has fared rather more 
successfully in other jurisdictions in relation to 
treatment withdrawal. In the United Kingdom the judiciary 
was faced with the problem of how to decide for the 
incompetent patient in the case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v
Bland.123 The case concerned one Tony Bland, who at the age
of seventeen, was seriously injured in the Hillsborough
120 109 S.Ct. 399 (1988).
121 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
122 Anonymous, (1990, p.1653).
123 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
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football disaster in 1989. He suffered brain damage which
left him in a persistent vegetative state. The condition
was described thus by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in his
judgment m  the Court of Appeal decision on the case:
the brain-stem remains alive and functioning 
while the cortex of the brain loses its function 
and activity. Thus the P.V.S. (sic) patient 
continues to breathe unaided and his digestion 
continues to function. But although his eyes are 
open, he cannot see. He cannot hear. Although 
capable of reflex movement, particularly in 
response to painful stimuli, the patient is 
incapable of voluntary movement and can feel no 
pain. He cannot taste or smell. He cannot speak 
or communicate in any way. He has no cognitive 
function and can thus feel no emotion, whether 
pleasure or distress. The absence of cerebral 
function is not a matter of surmise; it can be 
scientifically demonstrated. The space which the 
brain should occupy is full of watery fluid.124
The manner m  which the House of Lords addressed the
problem at issue is reflective of the 'best interests'
approach. Indeed, the 'substituted judgement' approach as
developed by the American courts in the case of the
incompetent and non-sentient patient was explicitly
rejected by Lord Mustill in his judgment m  Airedale N.H.S.
Trust v Bland in the following trenchant terms:
[t]his process may perhaps , have some
justification where the patient is sentient but 
unable to communicate a choice, but it breaks 
down totally m  a case such as the present. To 
postulate a patient who is m  such a condition 
that he cannot know that there is a choice to be 
made, or indeed know anything at all, and then 
ask whether he would have chosen to terminate his 
life because that condition made it no longer 
worth living is surely meaningless, as is very 
clearly shown by the lengths to which the court 
was driven in Superintendent of Belchertown State 
School v Saikewicz 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The
124 Ibid. , p. 333.
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idea is simply a fiction, which I would not be 
willing to adopt even if there were m  the case 
of Anthony Bland any materials upon which a 
surrogate could act, which as far as I can see 
there are not.125
In referring to the 'best interests' test as previously
applied by the House of Lords in the case of Re F (Mental
Patient: Sterilisation I126 and applying it to the instant
case Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the 'best
interests' of the patient dictated termination of life-
sustaining medical treatment.127 In the words of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson the correct manner in which the dilemma in such
cases should be posed is as follows:
[t]he critical decision to be made is whether it 
is in the 'best interests' of Anthony Bland to 
continue the invasive medical care involved in 
artificial feeding. That question is not the same 
as, 'Is it m  Anthony Bland's 'best interests' 
that he should die?' The latter question assumes 
that it is lawful to perpetuate the patient's 
life: but such perpetuation of life can only be 
achieved if it is lawful to continue to invade
125 Ibid., p.396. See also the speech of Lord Goff, 
pp.374-375, where he stated that the 'substituted judgement' 
test formed no part of English law on this topic:
I do not consider that any such test forms 
part of English law in relation to 
incompetent adults, on whose behalf nobody 
has power to give consent to , medical 
treatment. Certainly, in Re F (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 All E.R.
545 your Lordships' House adopted a 
straightforward test based on the 'best 
interests' of the patient; and I myself do 
not see why the same test should not be 
applied in the case of P.V.S. (sic) 
patients, where the question is whether 
life-prolonging treatment should be 
withheld.
1 2 7
p.371.
[1989] 2 All E.R. 545.
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316,
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the bodily integrity of the patient by invasive 
medical care. Unless the doctor has reached the 
affirmative conclusion that it is m  the 
patient's best interest to continue the invasive 
care, such care must cease.128
Lord Mustill also framed the question in such terms
when he stated that the focus of inquiry should be placed
on the "interests of the patient, not in the termination of
life but in the continuation of his treatment".129 Lord
Mustill went on to delineate the boundaries of the 'best
interests' test m  such a case as follows:
(i) [t]he cessation of nourishment and hydration 
is an omission not an act. (ii) Accordingly, the 
cessation will not be a criminal act unless the 
doctors are under a present duty to continue the 
regime, (iii) At the time when Anthony Bland came 
into the care of the doctors decisions had to be 
made about his care which he was unable to make 
for himself. In accordance with Re F (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation') [1989] 2 All E.R. 545
these decisions were to be made in his 'best 
interests'. Since the possibility that he might 
recover still existed his 'best interests' 
required that he should be supported in the hope 
that this would happen. These 'best interests' 
justified the application of the necessary regime 
without his consent, (iv) All hope of recovery 
has now been abandoned. Thus, although the 
termination of his life is not in the 'best 
interests' of Anthony Bland, his 'best interests' 
in being kept alive have also disappeared, taking 
with them the justification for the non- 
consensual regime and the co-relative duty to be 
kept m  being, (v) Since there is no longer a 
duty to provide nourishment and hydration a 
failure to do so cannot be a criminal 
offence.130
The 'best interests' test, conversely to the United 
States, is thus the favoured test in English treatment
128 Ibid., pp.385-386.
129 Ibid., p. 398.
130 Ibid.
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withdrawal cases. However, Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb131
do not necessarily share the opinion that the 'substituted
judgement' test is not applicable in such cases. They claim
that the 'substituted judgement' test is a better protector
of individual self-determination, whereas the 'best
interests' test does not place as high a value on the
concept of self-determination. In their opinion:
[i]t is not clear whether Lord Mustill intended 
to banish the 'substituted judgement' test from 
English law completely. He suggested that it 
could be applied where the patient is sentient 
but unable to communicate and hence is
incompetent to make a decision. If this is 
correct, he contradicts himself. For, if the test 
is applicable to that case, it is applicable even 
though it is a 'fiction'. In principle, the 
decision-maker cannot know any more than in a 
case where the patient is unconscious. In both 
cases the decision-maker is required to ask 
himself 'what would the patient want?'. The 
patient cannot help him any more than if he were 
unconscious. Thus, in both cases all will turn on 
the extent to which the patient has made his 
wishes known.
In our view, it is still open for English
law to adopt his more sophisticated approach of
seeking to apply 'substituted judgement' before 
having recourse to 'best interests' where it is 
appropriate. The form the law would take would be 
that the doctor's duty is first to consider what 
he believes would be the patient's decision and 
only secondly, in default of that, to fall back 
on the 'best interests' test.132
In the later case of Frenchav Healthcare N.H.S. Trust 
v S133 the Court of Appeal confirmed the 'best interests' 
approach as taken in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland.134 S
131 Kennedy and Grubb, (1993, pp. 359-370).
132 Ibid., pp. 362-363.
133 [1994] 2 All E.R. 403.
134 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
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drug overdose. Like Tony Bland, he was in a persistent
vegetative state. He was fed by means of a gastronomy tube
which was inserted through his stomach wall.
In January 1994, it was discovered that the gastronomy
tube had become detached from his body. The medical team
felt that it was not medically practicable to reinsert the
tube. The surgeon in charge of S's case was of the opinion
that it was in S's 'best interests7 that the medical team
should refrain from intervening in S's case and to allow
him to die naturally. The surgeon in question felt that the
option of reinserting the gastronomy tube would not be
beneficial to S, stating that:
[t]o reinsert the tube now that we have such 
certainty about the state of his brain, his 
function and prospects would, m  my opinion be a 
criminal act as it would be being done against 
the 'best interests' of S.135
In this case the Court of Appeal further elaborated on the
role of the courts in this area of medical decision-making.
Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. stated that:
[i]t is, I think, important that there should not 
be a belief that what the doctor says is the 
patient's best interest is the patient's best 
interest. For my part I would certainly reserve 
to the court the ultimate power and duty to 
review the doctor's decision in the light of all 
the facts.136
This statement demonstrates how the law presumes to 
interpose itself between the doctor and the patient in his 
care. The doctor can no longer decide independently on how
was suffering from severe brain damage as a result of a
135 [1994] 2 All E.R. 403, pp.406-407.
136 Ibid., p. 411.
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judiciary for the ultimate decision.
This however may not be as great an erosion of medical
autonomy as it might at first sight seem. This can be seen
from the judgment of Lord Goff of Chieveley in Airedale
N.H. S. Trust v Bland137 where he offered a thoughtful
contribution on the relationship between the law and the
medical profession in relation to clinical decision-making:
[t]he truth is that, in the course of their work, 
doctors frequently have to make decisions which 
may affect the continued survival of their 
patients, and are in reality far more experienced 
in matters of this kind than are the judges. It 
is nevertheless the function of the judges to 
state the legal principles upon which the 
lawfulness of the actions of doctors depend; but 
in the end the decisions to be made in individual 
cases must rest with the doctors themselves. In 
these circumstances, what is required is a 
sensitive understanding by both the judges and 
the doctors of each other's respective functions, 
and in particular a determination by the judges 
not merely to understand the problems facing the 
medical profession in cases of this kind, but 
also to regard their professional standards with 
respect. Mutual understanding between the doctors 
and the judges is the best way to ensure the 
evolution of a sensitive and sensible legal 
framework for the treatment and care of patients, 
with a sound ethical base, in the interest of the 
patients themselves.138
This is an important contribution to the debate on the
resolution of medico-legal dilemmas, as it takes cognisance
of the importance of professional autonomy, the need for a
sound framework for the resolution of such disputes and
perhaps most importantly of all, the interests of the
patient. How such good intentions can be transformed into
he should treat such a patient but must defer to the
137 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
138 Ibid., p. 374.
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a workable mechanism remains to be seen, but at least it 
gives rise to a certain degree of optimism that such 
intractable moral dilemmas are not only receiving judicial 
attention, but are being dealt with m  a humane and 
equitable manner.
As a result of the decisions in Airedale N.H.S. Trust 
v Bland and Frenchay Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S a Practice 
Note139 was issued by the Official Solicitor m  March 1994 
which laid down the correct procedures to be followed in 
relation to terminating the artificial feeding and 
hydration of patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
Briefly the Practice Note upholds the approach taken in 
both of the aforementioned cases, to the effect that such 
termination of care will require the prior sanction of a 
High Court judge. In diagnosing persistent vegetative 
state, doctors should pay heed to the guidelines laid down 
on the issue by the British Medical Association.140 Thus, 
such a diagnosis should not be considered confirmed until 
the patient has been insentient for at least twelve months. 
The proper forum for the hearing of such applications is 
the Family Division of the High Court. In addition the 
court should consider carefully the previously expressed 
views of the patient, if any, on the issue of continuing 
life-sustaining treatment in the event of his entering a 
persistent vegetative state.
139 [1994] 2 All E.R. 413.
140 See, British Medical Association Medical Ethics 
Committee, (1994, pp.1-5).
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However, this is not to say that the 'substituted 
judgement' test has never been used by English courts m  
matters of this nature. One area in which this test has 
been adopted is in relation to treatment withdrawal and the 
severely handicapped neonate. The approach of the English 
courts to the dilemma posed by the severely handicapped 
neonate has not been uniform. In general, it would be true 
to say that a 'best interests' standard has been applied.
However, there was a notable exception in the case of 
Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment).141 J was a 
premature baby. However at birth he suffered severe brain 
damage. He was as a result epileptic and the medical 
evidence proffered at trial predicted that he was likely to 
be blind and deaf and that he would develop spastic 
quadnplegia. Moreover, it was likely that he would never 
be able to speak or develop intellectually. He would, 
however, be likely to feel pain. He was expected to survive 
no longer than his adolescence at the very most. On a 
number of occasions, J ceased breathing and had to be 
placed on a ventilator in order to keep him alive. He was 
now in a stable condition and was breathing independently. 
The medical opinion was that if J were to cease breathing 
again it would be fatal unless of course, he were 
ventilated again. The question which arose for the courts 
was whether it was m  the 'best interests' of J that he 
should be ventilated on the occurrence of such an 
eventuality or whether he should be allowed to die.
141 [1990] 3 All E.R. 930.
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At first instance, Scott-Baker J. made an order which
was in accord with the opinion of Dr. W, one of the
consultants charged with the care and treatment of J, as
expressed in a report compiled by Dr. W on 4 October 1990.
Thus, the court ordered the hospital to proceed as follows:
it would not be in [J's] 'best interests' to re- 
ventilate him in the event of his stopping 
breathing, unless to do so seems appropriate to 
the doctors caring for him given the prevailing 
clinical situation.142
This decision was appealed by the Official Solicitor.
In the Court of Appeal the appeal was dismissed. In his
judgment, Lord Donaldson M.R. adopted the 'substituted
judgement' approach to this question when he stated:
[w]e know that the instinct and desire for 
survival is very strong. We all believe in and 
assert the sanctity of human life... this
formulation takes account of this and also
underlines the need to avoid looking at the 
problem from the point of view of the decider, 
but requires him to look at it from the assumed 
point of view of the patient. This gives effect, 
as it should, to the fact that even very severely 
handicapped people find a quality of life
rewarding which to the unhandicapped may seem 
manifestly intolerable.143
This approach is also adopted by Taylor L.J.:
I consider that the correct approach is for the 
court to judge the quality of life the child 
would have to endure if given the treatment and 
decide whether in all the circumstances such a 
life would be so afflicted as to be intolerable 
to that child. I say 'to that child' because the 
test should not be whether the life would be 
tolerable to the decider. The test must be 
whether the child in question, if capable of 
exercising sound judgment, would consider the
142 Ibid., p.933.
143 Ibid. , p.938.
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life tolerable.144 
However this approach is not necessarily the correct one to 
adopt when the patient involved was never competent as in 
this case.
The approach of the court was influenced by the
\
decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Re 
Superintendent of Family and Child Service, and Dawson.145 
In that case the patient, Stephen Dawson, was a severely 
retarded six year old. This was the result of brain damage 
suffered at birth. At the age of five months Stephen was 
fitted with a shunt or plastic tube to drain excess 
cerebrospinal fluid from the head to another part of the 
body from where it was expelled. Without such an implant 
Stephen would die.
The hearing arose as a result of the shunt becoming 
blocked. The question to be answered was whether if the 
shunt became blocked remedial surgery should be carried out 
or whether Stephen should be allowed to die. The court in 
this case was of the opinion that life-sustaining treatment 
should not be withheld from Stephen. McKenzie J. was' of the 
view that:
[i]f it is to be decided that 'it is in the 'best 
interests' of Stephen Dawson that his existence 
cease', then it must be decided that, for him, 
non-existence is the better alternative. This 
would mean regarding the life of a handicapped 
child as not only less valuable than the life of 
a normal child, but so much less valuable that it 
is not worth preserving. I tremble at 
contemplating the consequences if the lives of
144 Ibid., p.945.
145 (1983) 145 D.L.R. (3d) 610.
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disabled persons are dependent upon such 
judgments.146
The 'substituted judgement' approach is to be witnessed in
the following statement of McKenzie J.:
I do not think that it lies within the 
prerogative of any parent or of this court to 
look down upon a disadvantaged person and judge 
the quality of that person's life to be so low as 
not to be deserving of continuance.
The matter was well put in an American 
decision - (Re Weberlist 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1974) 
at 787), where Justice Asch said: 'There is a
strident cry in America to terminate the lives of 
other people - deemed physically or mentally 
defective... Assuredly, one test of a 
civilization is its concern with the lives of the 
'unfittest', a reversal of Darwin's 
formulation... In this case, the court must 
decide what its ward would choose, if he were in 
a position to make a sound judgment'. This last 
sentence puts it right. It is not appropriate for 
an external decision-maker to apply his standards 
of what constitutes a liveable life and exercise 
the right to impose death if that standard is not 
met in his estimation. The decision can only be 
made in the context of the disabled person 
viewing the worthwhileness or otherwise of his 
life m  its own context as a disabled person - 
and in that context he would not compare his life 
with that of a person enjoying normal advantages.
He would know nothing of a normal person's life 
having never experienced it.147
This passage was quoted with approval by Lord
Donaldson M.R. in Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical
Treatment1) ,148 in arriving at his decision m  that case. 
Yet, even though he employed the reasoning of the Canadian
court, the ultimate decision at which the Court of Appeal
arrived was at variance with that of the former.
It was, it could be submitted, less dogmatic, and
146 Ibid. , p. 623 .
147 Ibid., pp. 620-621.
148 [1990] 3 All E.R. 930, p.938.
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allowed more scope for professional discretion. However, in
adopting such an approach, the right of the neonate to
continue to live despite having a quality of life which
when compared to the healthy child was very low, may have
been infringed upon.
While recognising the concept of the sanctity of life
in the medical context, Lord Donaldson M.R., nonetheless
states that in certain circumstances:
there will be cases in which the answer must be 
that it is not in the interests of the child to 
subject it to treatment which will cause
increased suffering and produce no commensurate
benefit, giving the fullest possible weight to 
the child's, and mankind's desire to survive.149
This may be so, but why should a severely handicapped
infant be treated differently from a person whose quality
of life is viewed as being appreciably greater? Take, for
example, the case of a competent adult who undergoes a
kidney transplant. The surgical procedure and its aftermath
will, of necessity, cause increased suffering both physical
and psychological to the patient and there is no certainty
of a commensurate benefit being achieved, with the risk of
rejection of the new organ being high. Indeed, one could
take the analogy further, and state that there is no point
in continuing dialysis on the part of the patient suffering
from kidney failure as the discomfort suffered by the
patient in having to attend a renal dialysis unit three
times per week may not be commensurate with the result
produced. Is not such a person's quality of life greatly
149 Ibid.
reduced also when one compares him to the average healthy 
adult?
Thus, the judiciary must, in employing such terms as 
quality of life, pay heed to the fact that such a term is 
not universally applicable. Viewed from the vantage point 
of a middle-class professional the quality of life of a 
member of the travelling community may be intolerable. 
However, the individual traveller may baulk at having to 
live the restricted life of the average suburbanite. In 
trying to apply universality to humanity a court can never 
achieve a satisfactory answer. However, what it may do is 
impose however innocently or unintentionally a norm or 
yardstick by which all are judged. Anyone who deviates from 
this norm may be viewed as being of less value than those 
who attain the norm. This, to borrow from McKenzie J. in Re 
Superintendent of Family and Child Service, and Dawson150 
is enough to make one 'tremble7.
In the first reported English case in which the 
question of whether an handicapped neonate should continue 
to receive life-sustaining medical treatment was explicitly 
broached, a slightly different approach was taken. In the 
case of Re B fA Minor') (Wardship: Medical Treatment).151 B 
was a mentally handicapped child with an intestinal 
blockage. Unless she was operated on to relieve this 
blockage, B would die. The parents of this child decided
150 (1983) 145 D.L.R. (3d) 610.
151 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 and reported m  [1990] 3 All 
E.R. 927.
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that it would be m  her 'best interests' that she not be
operated on and be allowed to die. However, the doctors m  
charge of her treatment sought and obtained the permission 
of the local authority for B to be made a ward of court. 
The local authority then applied for a court order 
directing the operation to be carried out. This order was 
granted.
The operation was to be carried out in another
hospital. When the surgeon in that institution who was to
carry out the operation discovered that the parents had
initially refused to consent to the procedure, he refused
to carry out the operation. In the Court of Appeal, it was
held that the operation should go ahead. Templeman L.J.
provided the following rationale for the decision:
[i]n the present case the choice which lies 
before the court is this: whether to allow an 
operation to take place which may result in the 
child living for twenty to thirty years as a 
mongoloid or whether (and I think this must be 
brutally the result) to terminate the life of a 
mongoloid child because she also has an 
intestinal complaint. Faced with that choice I 
have no doubt that it is the duty of this court 
to decide that the child must live... if the 
operation takes place and is successful then the 
child may live the normal span of a mongoloid 
child with the handicaps and defects and life of 
a mongol child, and it is not for this court to 
say that life of that description ought to be 
extinguished.152
In the subsequent case of Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment)153 the issue was further explored. Here 
C was a sixteen week old hydrocephalic infant. She had
152 [1990] 3 All E.R. 927, p.929.
153 [1989] 2 All E.R. 782.
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previously been the subject of a court order directing that 
a shunt be inserted to relieve pressure on her brain. The 
next question to be decided was whether intensive medical 
treatment should be given to C to sustain her life.
The local authority applied to the High Court for
directions as to how to proceed. The Official Solicitor on 
behalf of the child requested a paediatric report on C's 
condition. The report recommended that the objective of 
those treating C should be to ease her suffering rather 
than to prolong her life by a short period, but did not
rule out the administration of antibiotics, naso-gastric
feeding or intravenous fusions, if these would achieve this 
objective. The High Court agreed with this recommendation 
and directed that the medical professionals involved treat 
the infant:
in such a way that she may end her life and die 
peacefully with the greatest dignity and the 
least of pain, suffering and distress.154
However, Ward J. in the High Court also directed that:
it shall not be necessary either, (a) to 
prescribe and administer antibiotics to treat any 
serious infection which the minor might contract; 
or (b) to set up intravenous fusions or nasal 
gastric feeding regimes for the minor.155
This order was not entirely consistent with the
recommendations in the paediatric report as these
interventions were not entirely ruled out therein. Rather
it was left to the medical staff to decide whether such a
course of action was correct in the circumstances. The
154 Ibid., p. 787.
155 Ibid., p. 788.
315
Official Solicitor appealed against the terms of the order 
of the High Court. The Court of Appeal upheld the Official 
Solicitor's appeal to the extent that the High Court 
judge's direction to the effect that antibiotics, nasal 
gastric feeding or intravenous fusions were not necessary, 
be deleted from the order. Thus, the medical personnel 
would be allowed to treat C in the way in which they felt 
was correct without the court stepping into their zone of 
clinical independence.
In the later case of Re J (A Minor 1 (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment)156 the Court of Appeal had to decide on a 
similar situation. Here, J was sixteen months old and was 
handicapped both mentally and physically as a result of an 
accident at the age of one month. One of the medical 
practitioners who was responsible for J's treatment was of 
the opinion that it would be cruel to subject him to 
intensive care to maintain his life artificially in the 
event of his ceasing to breathe of his own volition.
The local authority, in whose care J was, applied to 
the High Court in order to obtain an answer to the question 
of whether J should be artificially ventilated or subjected 
to other life-saving medical intervention in the event of 
a life-threatening event. The High Court made an order to 
the effect that the health authority use intensive 
therapeutic measures for so long as it would prolong J's 
life.
This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal by
156 [1992] 4 All E.R. 614.
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the health authority. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal 
and dismissed the order. Lord Donaldson M.R. stated that 
the crucial issue of the appeal was the clinical autonomy 
of the doctor in deciding the 'best interests' of the 
patient:
[t]he fundamental issue in this appeal is whether 
the court in the exercise of its inherent power 
to protect the interests of minors should ever 
require a medical practitioner or health 
authority acting by a medical practitioner to 
adopt a course of treatment which m  the bona 
fide clinical judgment of the practitioner 
concerned as not being in the 'best interests' of 
the patient.157
Lord Donaldson M.R. stressed that the decision did not
imply that the court was ordering the non-application of
life-sustaining measures for J but that the court was
endeavouring to provide a framework within which both
professional and patient autonomy could as far as
practicably possible be protected:
[t]his does not mean that we thought, and still 
less required, that m  no circumstances should J 
be subjected to mechanical ventilation... What we 
are saying is that so long as those with parental 
responsibilities consent to J being treated by 
the medical staff of the health authority, he 
must be treated in accordance with their clinical 
judgment.158
Nonetheless, the question of the equal rights of the 
severely handicapped individual seems to have been evaded 
again in this case. Indeed, the consequences of this are to 
be seen in the judgment of Balcombe L.J. where he speaks of 
the rationing of scarce health resources. Thus, those who
157 Ibid., p.622.
158 Ibid., p.624.
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back of the queue, which may for them imply death. This
brings up the very distasteful scenario of having to choose
between lives. However distasteful this may be it becomes
even more so when those between whom one chooses are not
regarded as being of equal value. Judicial recognition of
this inequality, no matter how unintentional, is not to be
desired. Yet Balcombe L.J. states:
I would also stress the absolute undesirability 
of the court making an order which may have the 
effect of compelling a doctor or health authority 
to make available resources (both human and 
material) to a particular child, without knowing 
whether or not there are other patients to whom 
those resources might more advantageously be 
devoted.159
This is an issue which should be resolved by firstly 
recognising the humanity of the severely handicapped 
individual. The use by the judiciary of universal value 
judgments is not a welcome innovation. The right of all 
persons to medical treatment should be recognised rather 
than trying to argue that all are in theory entitled to 
treatment but in practice only the able few may receive it.
In New Zealand the 'best interests' test has been the 
preferred option of the courts in decision-making in 
relation to the incompetent patient and treatment 
withdrawal. In the case of Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney-General160 the patient m  question was suffering 
from Guillain-Barre's Syndrome. As a result of this disease
are seen as not living up to the norm may be pushed to the
159 Ibid., p.625.
160 [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235.
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the patient, although not brain dead,161 was unable to 
interact m  any way with his surroundings. He was m  the 
medical sense 'locked in7 and 'locked out7 in that he was 
unable to receive any sensory input from his surroundings 
and could not respond to his surroundings. The disease had 
affected his nervous system to such a degree that his brain 
was in effect no longer connected to any part of his body. 
The patient relied entirely on artificial respiration to 
stay alive.
His doctors believed that his condition was 
irreversible and that there was no prospect of recovery. 
Moreover, they believed that artificial ventilation was of 
no further therapeutic benefit and therefore sought to 
terminate this treatment.
The health board sought a declaration from the High 
Court to the effect that the withdrawal of the artificial 
respiration was not contrary to sections 151 and 164 of the 
New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 and that such an act would not 
constitute culpable homicide. Section 151 of the Crimes Act 
1961 imposes a legal duty on carers to supply those under 
their care with the 'necessaries of life7. Section 164 of 
the Crimes Act 1961 imposes liability for causing death by 
inflicting bodily injury which hastens death. Culpable
161 The leading New Zealand case on the definition of 
death is Joe v Joe (1985) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 675. In that case the 
court proposed that a person will be considered dead for 
legal purposes when there is an irreversible cessation of 
brain-stem function so that the person is in a state of 
permanent and irreversible unconsciousness and when 
respiration and circulation can only be sustained 
artificially.
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homicide is defined m  section 160(2) of the Crimes Act 
1961 as killing any person by an unlawful act or omission 
without lawful excuse to perforin a legal duty.
In his decision, Thomas J. held that the withdrawal of 
artificial respiration from the patient would not 
constitute culpable homicide under the Crimes Act 1961 if 
the following criteria were fulfilled.
First, the doctors responsible for the care of the 
patient, taking into account a responsible body of medical 
opinion, concluded that there was no reasonable possibility 
of his recovery.
Second, there was no therapeutic or medical benefit to 
be gained by continuing to maintain the patient on 
artificial ventilatory support, and to withdraw that 
support accorded with good medical practice as recognized 
and approved within the medical profession.
Third, the patient's wife and the Ethics Committee of 
the Auckland Area Health Board concurred with the decision 
to withdraw the artificial ventilatory support.
In this case these criteria were fulfilled and the 
patient's life-support system was withdrawn shortly 
afterwards. In relation to the criminal liability of 
doctors in such situations Thomas J. held that artificial 
ventilation was not a 'necessary of life' within the 
meaning of section 151 of the Crimes Act 1961 because there 
was no possibility of an improvement in the patient's 
condition, and this form of treatment was therefore of no 
therapeutic value. Moreover, even if artificial ventilation
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could be construed as a 'necessary of life7, the doctors in 
this case would be legally justified in withdrawing 
treatment as they would be acting with lawful excuse. In 
such a situation where the life of the patient is being 
sustained without any therapeutic benefit, medical 
practitioners are under no duty to prolong life at all 
costs. Thus, if they believe as a matter of medical 
judgment that the correct medical practice would be to 
cease treatment and that such a course of action would be 
in the 'best interests' of the patient then they are 
justified in so doing, provided they take careful steps to 
avoid error. Such steps would include consulting with the 
medical professional regulatory body, consulting with other 
medical specialists and obtaining the informed consent of 
the patient's family or guardian.
In relation to the offence of inflicting bodily injury 
which causes death under section 164 of the Crimes Act 1961 
Thomas J. was of the opinion that at least one of two 
conditions must be met before withdrawal of life support 
can be said not to constitute a cause of death.
These are (1) the medical practitioners in question 
are not under a duty to provide artificial ventilation as 
a 'necessary of life'; and/or (2) the medical practitioners 
have a lawful excuse for not providing artificial 
ventilation. In this case the doctors concerned had met 
both of these requirements and as a result their 
termination of ventilatory support could not constitute an 
offence under section 164 of the Crimes Act 1961. The 'best
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interests' approach of the High Court in this case was 
cited with approval by both Lord Goff162 and Lord 
Mustill163 in the House of Lords' decision in the case of 
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland.
A Hybrid Standard.
In the United States an effort was made by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court to remedy the problems in the extant 
decision-making standards, in the case of In Re Conroy.16,1 
In this case the patient was an elderly incompetent patient 
who had once been competent. She was confined to her bed in 
a nursing home suffering from Alzheimer's Disease and 
diabetes and was not capable of interacting with others, of 
speaking or feeding herself. She was not in a persistent 
vegetative state but was hardly conscious.
In In Re Conroy the New Jersey Supreme Court developed 
a three-stage test which combined elements of the 
'substituted judgement' and 'best interests' tests. In this 
case the patient had not made an advance directive. It was 
stated that the 'subjective judgement' test should first be 
used by the surrogate decision-maker. This test equated 
broadly with what other courts had defined as the 
'substituted judgement' test. However, if there was not 
enough evidence of the patient's wishes in this regard, the
162 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316, p.375.
163 Ibid. , p. 397.
164 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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'best interests' test.
Under the test m  In Re Conroy the surrogate could
choose from either of two versions of the 'best interests'
or 'objective' test. Firstly, one could decide on the basis
of the 'limited-objective' test which could be used in a
situation where there is some evidence of the patient's
past wishes but not enough to satisfy the 'substituted
judgement' or 'subjective' test. Secondly, one could decide
on the basis of the 'pure-objective' test, where there is
no evidence whatsoever of the patient's desires in this
area. As Meisel has stated, the court in In Re Conroy:
[r]ather than viewing the 'subjective' and 'best 
interests' tests as polar opposites... envisions 
them as points on a continuum in which the 
'subjective' standard is but a particularized 
application of the 'best interests' standard, the 
meaning of which comes from the patient's own 
subjective preferences.165
However, the court in In Re Conroy limited the
decision in the case to patients who were m  a similar fact
situation to Ms. Conroy:
an elderly nursing home resident... who is 
suffering from serious mental and physical 
impairments, who will probably die within 
approximately one year even with the treatment, 
and who, though formerly competent, is now 
incompetent to make decisions about her life- 
sustaming treatment and is unlikely to regain 
such competence.166
In the subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court case of In
surrogate should then proceed to decide on the basis of the
165 Meisel, (1989, p.279).
166 486 A.2d 1209 (1985), p.1219.
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Re Peter167 the patient was also an elderly nursing home
patient but in this case she was in a persistent vegetative
state and was capable of surviving in this condition with
the aid of artificial feeding and hydration for many
decades. On this basis it was held that the standard in In
Re Conroy was not applicable to the facts of this case,
justifying the decision in the following terms:
[w]hile a benefits-burden analysis is difficult 
with marginally competent patients like Claire 
Conroy, it is essentially impossible with 
patients m  a persistent vegetative state. By 
definition such patients, like Ms. Peter, do not 
experience any of the benefits or burdens that 
the Conroy balancing tests are intended or able 
to appraise. Therefore, we hold that these tests 
should not be applied to patients m  the 
persistent vegetative state.168
The New Jersey Supreme Court in this instance instead chose
to apply the 'substituted judgement7 standard. In another
New Jersey case decided m  the wake of In Re Conroy the
court again demonstrated that the decision in In Re Conroy
was limited to its facts. In the case of In Re Jobes169 the
patient was an incompetent patient in a nursing home.
However m  this case the patient was thirty-one years of
age and was in a persistent vegetative state. Thus, the
test In Re Conroy was deemed by the court not to be
applicable in this particular case. However the court in In
Re Jobes did lay down judicial safeguards for non-elderly
institutionalized patients.
167 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
168 Ibid., p. 425.
169 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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Thus, there must be confirmation of the patient's 
being m  a persistent vegetative state by at least two 
independent medical practitioners knowledgeable m  
neurology and supplemented by the patient's attending 
doctor if there is one.170 Thus, the decision in In Re 
Conroy while attempting judicially to avoid the previously 
outlined problems with both the 'substituted judgement' and 
'best interests' tests has not been successfully applied to 
cases which did not adhere to the particular fact situation 
in that case.
The standard laid down in In Re Conroy has much to 
recommend it, as it tries to avoid the absurdities brought 
about in cases such as Superintendent of Belchertown State 
School v Saikewicz171 but the main problem lies in the 
balancing requirement in both versions of the 'objective' 
test. Thus, if the burdens of continued treatment outweigh 
the benefits for the patient of continued treatment then 
and only then can treatment be withdrawn.
In In Re Conroy itself it was held that the burdens of 
continuing the treatment did not outweigh the benefits of 
continued treatment and as a result the court refused to 
order discontinuance of treatment. The types of burdens 
which are typically taken into consideration in such cases 
would include pain, indignity and the nebulous term 
'quality of life'. In In Re Conroy the burden which was 
given greatest consideration was pain. Thus, under the
170 529 A.2d 424 (1987), p.448.
171 370 N . E . 2d 417 (1977).
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quite difficult to justify treatment withdrawal m  many
cases. As Meisel has pointed out:
[t]he Conroy objective standards place too much 
weight on pain as a criterion for decision­
making. The equation of burden with pain requires 
that treatment be administered even when it 
accomplishes little or nothing more than 
prolonging the process of dying, precisely what 
the Conroy court seemed otherwise to have been 
intent on preventing. Some patients experience no 
actual pain because they are not suffering from 
a painful terminal illness, are in a persistent 
vegetative state, or are receiving strong anal­
gesic medications. Even if a patient is able to 
experience pain, the judicious use of analgesic 
medications can usually control it to the extent 
to which a patient perceives pain may be 
difficult even if the patient is not comatose.
Thus, pain should not be the sole, or even the 
central, criterion in determining the burdens 
that treatment imposes.172
Thus, while being a welcome judicial innovation m  
this complex field, the test laid down in In Re Conroy is 
not free from difficulties and has been of limited 
application. The court m  adopting the test was influenced 
by the recommendations put forward by the Report of the 
President's Commission on the topic of treatment 
withdrawal. This recommended a two-tiered test in relation 
to decision-making which was broadly similar to the 
standard laid down m  In Re Conroy but without the two- 
1imbed 'best interests' test. The Commission proposed that 
when possible the 'substituted judgement7 standard should 
be used but when that was' not possible then the surrogate 
should have recourse to the 'best interests' test and in so 
doing:
'objective' tests as enunciated in that case it will be
172 Meisel, (1989, p p . 291-292).
326
choose a course that will promote the patient's 
well-being as it would probably be conceived by 
a reasonable person in the patient's 
circumstances.173
The English Law Commission seems to be taking a 
similar approach to decision-making in this area. The model 
which was recommended in a recent Report174 also strives to 
overcome the difficulties which beset both the 'substituted 
judgement' and 'best interests' tests by proposing a hybrid 
standard.
)
4.6 Proposals for Change in England and Wales.
A more general difference m  approach to the question 
of decision-making for the incurably or terminally ill 
incompetent patient between the United States model and the 
English model is the noticeable lack of specific 
legislation in this field in England.
Absent are the multifarious living will and health 
care durable power of attorney statutes which exist m  the 
United States. Instead it has fallen to the courts to 
decide in these matters.
While the case of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland175 and 
subsequent cases in this area have given rise to a greater 
amount of certainty as to how to proceed in the case of the
173 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
(1983, p.136).
174 See, Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraphs 5.1-
5.39).
175 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
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patient in a persistent vegetative state, it is obviously
only a temporary measure and cannot provide the
comprehensive response to the many questions which this
area of medical treatment raises. It is clear from the
speeches of Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Mustill in
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland that the only satisfactory
solution to dilemmas of this kind is the introduction of
legislation. Lord Browne-Wilkinson offered a convincing
argument for a legislative solution to this dilemma:
[w]here a case raises wholly new moral and social 
issues, in my judgment it is not for the judges 
to seek to develop new, all embracing principles, 
of law m  a way which reflects the individual 
judge's moral stance when society as a whole is 
substantially divided on the relevant moral 
issues. Moreover, it is not legitimate for a 
judge in reaching a view as to what is for the 
benefit of the one individual whose life is in 
issue to take into account the wider practical 
issues as to the allocation of limited financial 
resources or the impact on third parties of 
altering the time at which death occurs.
For these reasons, it seems to me imperative 
that the moral, social and legal issues raised by 
this case should be considered by Parliament. The 
judge's function in this area of the law should 
be to apply the principles which society, through 
the democratic process, adopts, not to impose 
their standards on society. If Parliament fails 
to act, then judge-made law will of necessity 
through a gradual and uncertain process provide 
a legal answer to each new question as it arises.
But in my judgment that is not the best way to 
proceed...
It is for Parliament to address the wider 
problems which the case raises and lay down 
principles of law generally applicable to the 
withdrawal of life support systems.176
These concerns were echoed by Lord Mustill in his
speech in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland. He was of the
opinion that:
176 Ib id ., p. 382.
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adversarial proceedings, even with the help of an 
amicus curiae, are not the right vehicle for the 
discussion of this broad and highly contentious 
moral issue, nor do I believe that the judges are 
best fitted to carry it out...
The whole matter cries out for exploration 
in depth by Parliament and then for the 
establishment by legislation not only of a new 
set of ethically and intellectually consistent 
rules, distinct from the general criminal law, 
but also of a sound procedural framework within 
which the rules can be applied to individual 
cases. The rapid advance of medical technology 
makes this an ever more urgent task, and I 
venture to hope that Parliament will soon take it 
in hand.177
In the wake of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland, a number 
of proposals for reform have been put forward in this area 
of medical treatment. These shall now be examined.
The House Of Lords' Select Committee Model for Treatment 
Withdrawal.
Following the decision m  Airedale N.H.S. Trust v
Bland. a House of Lords' Select Committee was established
to examine the legal and policy issues which arise in this
area of medical practice. The terms of reference of the
Select Committee were to examine:
the ethical, legal and clinical implications of 
a person's right to withhold consent to life- 
prolonging treatment, and the position of persons 
who are no longer able to give or withhold 
consent; and to consider whether and in what 
circumstances actions that have as their 
intention or a likely consequence the shortening 
of another person's life may be justified on the 
grounds that they accord with that person's 
wishes or with that person's 'best interests'; 
and in all the foregoing considerations to pay 
regard to the likely effects of changes in law or
177 Ib id ., p. 392.
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The response of the House of Lords' Select Committee was
far from satisfactory. In its Report which was published in
January 1994, the Select Committee did not recommend the
introduction of specific legislation on the question of
treatment withdrawal and the incompetent patient. In the
place of recommending much-needed legislative guidelines m
this area, the Select Committee concluded that the
development of the idea that some treatments may be
inappropriate and need not be given, should make it
unnecessary in future to consider the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, except where the administration of
such treatment is burdensome to the patient.179 This is
unsatisfactory. Indeed it is, in effect, a non-conclusion.
As the Select Committee admitted:
[t]his question has caused us great difficulty, 
with some members of the Committee taking one 
view and some another, and we have not been able 
to reach a conclusion. But where we agreed is m  
judging that the question need not, indeed should 
not, usually be asked. In the case of Tony Bland, 
it might well have been decided long before 
application was made to the court that treatment 
with antibiotics was inappropriate, given that 
recovery from the inevitable complications of 
infection could add nothing to his well­
being.180
This conclusion is of very little worth in that it 
presumes to speak of a hypothetical ideal situation, what 
the practice ought to be rather than what the practice is.
medical practice on society as a whole.178
178 Select Committee on Medical Ethics, The, (1994,
p.7).
179 Ibid., paragraph 257.
180 Ibid.
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Thus, in the wake of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland181 the 
courts have been faced with many similar applications m  
relation to treatment withdrawal.182 This call from the 
Select Committee for a medical treatment idyll frankly 
defies explanation and does not even attempt to resolve the 
problem.
The Select Committee, while welcoming the idea of the 
advance directive, thought it unnecessary that legislation 
should be introduced on the subject.183 This again is a 
flawed conclusion given the lack of guidance which obtains 
at present as to the validity or otherwise of such 
instruments. Instead, the Select Committee has thrown the 
issue back into the hands of the courts in the great 
tradition of policy hot potatoes. The risible justification 
supplied by the Select Committee for this stance went as 
follows :
[w]e suggest that it could well be impossible to 
give advance directives in general greater legal 
force without depriving patients of the benefit 
of the doctor's professional expertise and of new 
treatments and procedures which may have become 
available since the advance directive was 
signed.184
Without appropriate statutory guidance the situation 
will remain far from clear. However, it is arguable that at
181 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
182 See for example, Frenchay Healthcare N.H.S. Trust
v S [1994] 2 All E.R. 403 and Swindon and Marlborough
N.H.S. Trust v S (1994) The Guardianf 10 December, p.7.
183 Select Committee on Medical Ethics, The, (1994, 
paragraphs 263 and 264).
184 Ibid., paragraph 264.
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present an advance directive may be valid at common law.
This point was made by the Law Commission m  a recent
Consultation Paper when it stated that:
[f]ollowing the dicta of the House of Lords in 
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland it appears that it 
may be possible to make an advance directive 
-which is legally binding.185
Thus, Lord Goff was of the view m  his judgment in Airedale
N.H.S. Trust v Bland that:
it is established that the principle of self- 
determination requires that respect must be given 
to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult 
patient of sound mind refuses, however 
unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by 
which his life would or might be prolonged, the 
doctors responsible for his care might give 
effect to his wishes, even though they do not 
consider it to be in his 'best interests7 to do 
so... To this extent, the principle of the 
sanctity of human life must yield to the 
principle of self-determination... and for 
present purposes... the doctor's duty to act m  
the 'best interests' of his patient must likewise 
be qualified... Moreover, the same principle 
applies where the patient's refusal to give his 
consent has been expressed at an earlier date, 
before he became unconscious or otherwise 
incapable of communicating it, though in such 
circumstances especial care may be necessary to 
ensure that the prior refusal of consent is still 
properly to be regarded as applicable in the 
circumstances which have subsequently 
occurred.186
In the earlier case of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) .187 Lord Donaldson M.R. was of the view that 
anticipatory refusals of medical treatment will be binding 
provided that: (i) when the patient made such a declaration
185 Law Commission, The, (1993, paragraph 264).
186 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316, p. 367 and see the judgment of 
Lord Keith, pp.360-361.
187 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
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that the declaration is applicable in the circumstances
under review and (1 1 1 ) the declaration must not have come
about as a result of undue influence.188 The Law Commission
concluded that:
[i]n England and Wales, the dicta in Re T (Adult: 
Refusal of Medical Treatment). together with 
those in Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland in both 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
indicate that an anticipatory decision which is 
'clearly established' and 'applicable in the 
circumstances' may be as effective as the current 
decision of a capable adult.189
However, the Law Commission did not share the same faith m
the existing common law guidance as the House of Lords'
Select Committee, and suggested the introduction of
legislation which would clarify the issues involved.190
The Select Committee proposed the development of a
code of practice on advance directives.191 This was also
the Select Committee's response to the problems posed by
the patient in a persistent vegetative state. The Report
stated that a definition of persistent vegetative state and
a code of practice in relation to its management should be
developed.192
This is not necessarily going to make a great impact 
on the immediate problem of treatment withdrawal in the
188 Ibid. , p. 798.
189 Law Commission, The, (1993, paragraph 3.7).
190 Ibid., paragraphs 3.11-3.20.
191 Select Committee on Medical Ethics, The, (1994, 
paragraphs 265-267).
192 Ibid., paragraph 258.
he was competent to consent to or to refuse treatment; (1 1 )
333
case of the permanently unconscious patient. It merely 
leads to the setting up of yet another committee to debate 
the definition of persistent vegetative state without 
necessarily coming to a satisfactory or indeed any 
solution, and is again a means of avoiding tackling the 
core issues.
The Law Commission's Model for Treatment Withdrawal.
A more balanced and thoughtful response to the problem
came in the Law Commission's Consultation Paper193 which
was published in March 1993 and in the Report which
followed it in March 1995.194 The overall policy aims of the
Law Commission m  this area were set out in a previous
Consultation Paper,195 in the following terms:
(l) that people should be enabled and encouraged 
to take for themselves those decisions which they 
are able to take;
(ii) that where it is necessary in their own 
interests or for the protection of others that 
someone else should take decisions on their 
behalf, the intervention should be as limited as 
possible and concerned to achieve what the person 
himself would have wanted; and
(iii) that proper safeguards should be provided 
against exploitation, neglect, and physical, 
sexual or psychological abuse.196
193 See, Law Commission, The, (1993, paragraph 3.11).
194 See, Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraphs 5.1-
5.39).
195 See, Law Commission, The, (1991, paragraph 4.27).
196 Ibid.
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relation to point (1 1 ), stating that:
there is no place m  the scheme we recommend m  
this Report for the making of decisions which 
would protect other persons but would not be in 
the 'best interests' of the person without 
capacity.198
The Law Commission's proposals in relation to advance
directives are quite straightforward. They give a statutory
footing to the current common law principles in this area
as developed m  the cases of Re T (Adult: Refusal of
Medical Treatment) ,199 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland,200
and In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment).201
The Commission wished to codify the existing case-law
and set out clearly for all concerned the law's stance on
such anticipatory decisions. The Commission defined an
advance refusal of treatment m  the following terms for the
purposes of the Draft Bill on Mental Incapacity which
accompanied the Report:
an 'advance refusal of treatment' should be 
defined as a refusal made by a person aged 
eighteen or over with the necessary capacity of 
any medical, surgical or dental treatment or 
other procedure and intended to have effect at 
any subsequent time when he or she may be without 
capacity to give or refuse consent.202
In the Report197 the Commission modified the position m
197 Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraph 2.46).
198 Ibid.
199 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
200 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
201 [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290.
202 Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraph 5.16 and 
Clause 9(1) of the Draft Bill on Mental Incapacity).
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V-
refusal of treatment as defined m  the Draft Bill on Mental
Incapacity should not preclude the provision of basic care.
Basic care was defined by the Commission as:
care to maintain bodily cleanliness and to 
alleviate severe pain, as well as the provision 
of direct oral nutrition and hydration.203
Moreover, an advance refusal of treatment would not be
applicable m  the case of a pregnant woman where in such a
case it endangers the life of the foetus unless the woman
has previously indicated to the contrary.204
This sub-clause was included as a reaction to the case
of Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment )205 where it
was held that it was lawful for doctors to perform a
caesarean section without the consent of the woman m
question. This decision appears to go against the grain of
treatment refusal cases such as In Re C (Adult: Refusal of
Treatment) .2°6 Indeed one commentator has stated that the
decision in Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
seems to:
ignore what seemed to be a settled requirement 
for consent to medical treatment when the 
individual is conscious and mentally competent.
Not only does the decision appear to ignore this, 
it also appears to run counter to the view that 
the foetus in English law does not have a legal 
personality until it is born alive. A belief in
203 Ibid., paragraph 5.36 and Draft Bill on Mental
Incapacity clause 9(7)(a) and (8).
204 Ibid., paragraph 5.26 and Draft Bill on Mental
Incapacity, clause 9(3).
205 [1992] 4 All E.R. 671.
206 [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290.
The Commission did recommend however, that an advance
336
the foetus having an independent legal 
personality seems implicit m  Sir Stephen Brown 
P.'s view that S's refusal of consent could be 
ignored; how else may an individual's rights be 
negated other than through the assertion, or 
protection, of the rights of others?207
The Law Commission's response, while attempting to
strike a balance between the rights of the mother and those
of the foetus tends to give greater regard to those of the
foetus. The Commission provided the following rationale for
this position:
[w]e do not... accept that a woman's right to 
determine the sorts of treatment which she will 
tolerate somehow evaporates as soon as she 
becomes pregnant. There can, on the other hand, 
be no objection to acknowledging that many women 
do in fact alter their views as to the 
interventions they find acceptable as a direct 
result of the fact that they are carrying a 
child. By analogy with cases where life might be 
needlessly shortened or lost, it appears that a 
refusal which did not mention the possibility 
that the life of a foetus might be endangered 
would be likely to be found not to apply in 
circumstances where a treatment intended to save 
the life of the foetus was proposed. Women of 
child-bearing age should therefore be aware that 
they should address their minds to this 
possibility if they wish to make advance refusals 
of treatment.208
However, it could be argued that this could still lead to
a situation where a woman, who, for example, had neglected
to state specifically her wishes m  this regard, may be
subjected to treatment to which she would not, if
competent, consent.
Moreover, in Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical
207 Thomson, (1994, p. 130).
208 Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraph 5.25).
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Treatment)209 the foetus in question was viable, but in the
Draft Bill on Mental Incapacity the Law Commission does not
specify that a woman's refusal of life-saving treatment
shall be overridden only in a situation where the foetus is
viable. It merely mentions the 'life of the foetus',
without more. It is to be assumed that if the foetus were
not viable then efforts to save it would not be initiated.
However, as Derek Morgan argues:
while acknowledging that Re S concerned the 
decision of a woman with a viable foetus, no such 
limitation is imposed on the presumption to be 
introduced into the new statutory provision. Thus 
in line with this proposal, an unconscious 
pregnant woman who presents with a birth plan or 
advance directive which refuses active treatment 
in the event of, say, catastrophic brain insult, 
could be ventilated for the supposed benefit of 
an eighteen, seventeen, sixteen week or even more 
immature foetus.210
The Law Commission also recommended that medical 
practitioners who withhold treatment as the result of the 
patient's previously stated wishes shall not be held liable 
for the consequences. Thus, clause 9(4) of the Draft Bill 
on Mental Incapacity provides that:
[n]o person shall incur any liability -
(a) for the consequences of withholding any 
treatment or procedure if he has reasonable 
grounds for believing that an advance refusal of 
treatment by the person concerned applies to that 
treatment or procedure; or
(b) for carrying out any treatment or procedure 
to which an advance refusal of treatment by the 
person concerned applies unless he knows, or has 
reasonable grounds for believing, that an advance 
refusal of treatment by the person concerned 
applies to the treatment or procedure.
209 [1992] 4 All E.R. 671.
210 Morgan, (1995, p. 352).
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The Commission also took note of those patients who 
may not have created an advance directive and those 
patients who were incapable of ever creating an advance 
directive due to infancy or mental incompetence. At 
present, the legal test applied in such cases is that 
stated m  cases such as Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) ,211 According to this test a doctor will not 
be liable when he treats a patient without that patient's 
consent where he acted m  the 'best interests' of the 
patient and if his actions were in accordance with those 
adopted by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in 
that particular field of diagnosis and treatment. The 
Commission favoured a more patient-centred approach. While 
not exactly adopting a 'substituted judgement' test in such 
circumstances the Commission favoured taking the patient's 
personality into account as far as possible. Thus, m  the 
Consultation Paper the Commission put it in the following 
terms:
a person who has never had the capacity to make 
decisions, or even the ability to express views, 
is still an individual and his unique reactions 
to the world may be identifiable. We consider 
that in determining the 'best interests' of an 
incapacitated adult it is appropriate to attempt 
to consider the consequences of a decision from 
the patient's point of view as far as 
possible.212
The Commission's Report on Mental Incapacity concluded 
that in relation to the never competent patient or the 
patient who had not created an advance directive before his
211 [1989] 2 All E.R. 545.
212 Law Commission, The, (1993, paragraph 3.50).
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incapacity, a medical practitioner should be given a 
statutory authority to treat provided it is reasonable in 
all the circumstances to safeguard the 'best interests' of 
an incapacitated person.213
In deciding whether a particular course of medical 
treatment is in the 'best interests' of an incapacitated 
patient one should take into account the following 
criteria:
(1) the ascertainable past and present wishes and 
feelings of the person, and the factors he or she 
would consider,
(2) the need to permit and encourage the person 
to participate,
(3) the views of other appropriate people, and
(4) the availability of an effective less 
restrictive option.214
This new statutory 'best interests' test thus combines
elements of both the 'best interests' and 'substituted
judgement' tests as understood in United States law.
In addressing the question of the form which such
advance directives should take, the Law Commission did not
stipulate that they should be in writing. However, the
Commission did add that there were advantages in expressing
such anticipatory decisions in writing as such a step
would:
be likely to furnish some definite proof that the 
refusal was made by the patient and intended to
213 Draft Bill on Mental Incapacity, clauses 4(1) and
3(1).
214 Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraph 5.7).
340
However, the Commissioners did go on to state that:
a rebuttable presumption is the best way to 
balance the need for flexibility and the 
desirability of formal writing. It would not, of 
course, answer the questions the doctor must ask 
as to whether (1) the patient had capacity to 
make the refusal and whether (2) the refusal 
applies to the treatment now proposed and in the 
circumstances which now exist.216
In order to further clarify the issue, the Commission
recommended that a code of practice m  relation to advance
directives be prepared. This, the Commission argued, would
fill the procedural interstices which legislation could not
hope to do.
While it may be considered laudable that the 
Commission decided to respect the spirit of the patient's 
wishes without constricting these wishes in evidentiary 
requirements, the absence of legislative guidelines on the 
form of an advance statement may lead to the patient's 
wishes not being enforced.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Commission does 
not succeed in striking the balance between flexibility and 
the need for a formal written document. While claiming that 
a written refusal is not required, the Commission then 
states that a written refusal would be likely to provide 
'some definite proof'. This begs the question of what sort 
of proof an oral refusal would provide.
Moreover, the guidelines which the Commission gives in
have effect m  the future.215
215 Ibid., paragraph 5.29.
216 Ibid., paragraph 5.30.
341
Commission states that such statements should be signed and
witnessed but does not specify the number of witnesses nor
does it state whether relatives of the patient should be
excluded from being witnesses.
In addition to this legislative framework, the
Commission has recommended a new judicial forum within
which to adjudicate on such treatment decisions. The new
jurisdiction would have a statutory basis. The rationale
for this was stated m  the following terms in the earlier
Consultation Paper:
[t]his would overcome the limitations of the 
common law, by providing a range of flexible 
orders in addition to a jurisdiction to make 
declarations. We envisage that the statutory 
jurisdiction would have several conceptually 
distinct functions. First, orders might be made 
approving or disapproving a particular decision 
made on behalf of an incapacitated person, or 
appointing someone to make decisions on the 
person's behalf. Secondly, the judicial forum 
would exercise a declaratory jurisdiction. This 
would not be concerned with making decisions for 
the incapacitated person but with establishing 
and declaring the facts, for example whether a 
person was incapacitated, or whether an 
anticipatory decision was 'clearly established' 
and 'applicable to the circumstances'.217
The Law Commission also made provision for a new model
power of attorney called a continuing power of attorney.218
This model is an enhanced form of the traditional power of
attorney which would allow an individual (the donor) to
give legal authority to a person of his choosing (the
relation to written advance statements are quite vague. The
217 Law Commission, The, (1993, paragraph 4.4).
218 Law Commission, The, (1995, Draft Bill on Mental 
Incapacity clause 12(1) and (2)).
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donee) to make and implement decisions on behalf of the 
donor when he is no longer capable through mental 
incapacity of making such decisions for himself.
The continuing power of attorney would apply inter 
alia to health care decisions.219 At present in England and
nWales the power of attorney does not extend to matters
i
other than financial affairs and property.220
The British Medical Association's Code of Practice on 
Advance Statements.
The British Medical Association has recently produced 
a Code of Practice on the subject of advance statements. 
This initiative came about in response to the call by the 
House of Lords' Select Committee on Medical Ethics for a 
code of practice m  relation to advance directives for 
health professionals.
The British Medical Association while taking a non­
directive approach in relation to advance statements, 
nonetheless is of the view that:
carefully discussed advance statements have an' 
important place in the development of a genuinely 
more balanced partnership between patients and 
health professionals.221
The Code of Practice does not purport to be definitive 
or binding in this area of medical treatment. It is merely
219 Draft Bill on Mental Incapacity, clause 16(1).
220 See section 3(1) of the Enduring Powers of Attorney 
Act 1985.
221 British Medical Association, (1995, p.l.)
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an example of greater 'dialogue7 between parties to the 
therapeutic relationship. The Code of Practice. while 
welcome, also demonstrates the difficulty of allocating to 
professional bodies the task which should have been 
completed by the Law Commission, that is to say, the 
provision of a detailed and definitive guide to 'best 
practice7 in this area of medical treatment. The Code of 
Practice is the result of a consultation process between 
the different groups and individuals with an interest in 
this area. It is thus, of necessity, an exercise in 
compromise.
Indeed, rather than fill the gaps in the Law
Commission7s recommendations, it seems to cause new
difficulties. In relation to the question of drafting an
advance statement the Code of Practice states m  a similar
vein to the Law Commission that:
[a]lthough oral statements are equally valid if 
supported by appropriate evidence, there are 
advantages to recording one7s general views and 
firm decisions m  writing. Advance statements 
should be understood as an aid to, rather than a 
substitute for, open dialogue between patients 
and health professionals.222
However, like the Law Commission, the Code of Practice does
not propose a sufficiently detailed scheme for the
formalities to be followed in the drawing up of such a
document. It states simply that:
[w]ritten statements should use clear and 
unambiguous language. They should be signed by 
the individual and a witness. Model forms are 
available but clear statements in any format
222 Ibid., paragraph 6.1.
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Thus, while being welcome in according symbolic 
importance to a balanced dialogue between patient and 
treatment provider, and in recognising the concept of 
patient autonomy in this area, the Code of Practice 
contains certain practical shortcomings.
4.7 Treatment Withdrawal in Ireland - A Proposal.
In Ireland, although there exists no legislation on 
the issue of refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment, 
it is possible that such a right may be derived from the 
constitutional right to privacy. Article 40.3.1 of 
Bunreacht na hEireann 1937 provides that the state: 
"guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the 
personal rights of the citizen". From this general 
statement, the Supreme Court has derived a number of 
unennumerated rights which though not listed in Bunreacht 
na hEireann 1937, nonetheless exist and are protected by 
it. Thus, the Irish Supreme Court has held, in common with 
the United States' Supreme Court, that a right to privacy 
exists in certain specified circumstances.224 Also of 
relevance to this area of medical practice is the judicial 
recognition of a right to bodily integrity. In the case of
223 Ibid., paragraph 6.2.
224 See, McGee v Attorney-General [1974] I.R. 284 and 
the discussion on the topic of personal rights in Casey, 
(1992, pp.309-358).
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upholding this right, the state had:
the duty of protecting the citizens from dangers 
to health in a manner not incompatible or 
inconsistent with the rights of those citizens as 
human persons.226
Professor Casey, m  his analysis of this statement,
believes that:
neither the [s]tate nor anyone else may insist 
upon a person undergoing medical treatment that 
he/she wishes to decline - even if death may 
result. To do so would surely trench
impermissibly upon the right of privacy.227
This may be quite straightforward m  the case of a
conscious, competent adult patient, but the lines become
increasingly blurred if the patient m  question is an
incompetent incurably ill patient.
Presumably if the patient had made an advance
directive before he entered his present state of
incompetence, one may obviously be able to discover his
wishes in relation to treatment withdrawal.
However, in Ireland at present there is no legislation
on the issue of advance directives. As this is the case,
courts will have to look to other legal sources for the
resolution of such a dilemma.
One could look at the relevant common law in relation
to advance directives. However as there is none in this
jurisdiction, courts will be forced to look at the
Ryan v Attorney-General225 the Supreme Court stated that in
225 [1965] I. R . 294.
226 Ibid. , p. 348.
227 Casey, (1992, pp.334-335).
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decisions of the courts of other states. Irish courts will 
probably look to English precedent in this regard. In doing 
so they would discover that at common law an advance 
directive is prima facie valid.
In the case of Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical
Treatment) ,228 Lord Donaldson M.R. was of the view that 
anticipatory refusals of medical treatment will be binding 
provided that: (1 ) when the patient made such a declaration 
he was competent to consent to or to refuse treatment; (ii) 
that the declaration is applicable in the circumstances 
under review and (iii) the declaration must not have come 
about as a result of undue influence.229 Moreover the Irish 
courts may decide to look for guidance to Airedale N.H.S. 
Trust v Bland230 for a common law means of justifying 
treatment withdrawal. However, Irish courts are not limited 
to the common law in their decision-making on this topic. 
They may also have recourse to Bunreacht na hEireann 1937. 
Thus, the principal argument supporting treatment 
withdrawal in such cases would be based on the right to 
privacy as encapsulated by Article 40. This argument would 
be similar to that put forward by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in the case of In Re Quinlan.231
One commentator who has elaborated on this argument in 
the context of Irish law is Costello J. now President of
228 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
229 Ibid. , p. 798.
230 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
231 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976).
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of medical treatment. 232 Costello J. argued that:
the dignity and autonomy of the human person (as
constitutionally predicated) require the [s]tate 
to recognise that decisions relating to life and 
death are, generally speaking, ones which a 
competent adult should be free to make without 
outside restraint and that this freedom should be 
regarded as an aspect of the right to privacy 
which should be protected as a 'personal' right 
by Article 40 . 3 . 1 .233
However, Costello J. goes on to state that such a right is
not absolute. Thus, he states that if one is to define a
right to die as a:
'right7 to procure death by his or her [the 
patient's] hand or by means of someone else, then 
it cannot be said that there is a 
constitutionally protected 'right to die', for it 
is a reasonable conclusion from the nature of man 
as envisaged in the Constitution that he may not 
kill himself or ask others to assist him to do 
so.234
Nonetheless, he states that one can make a distinction
between the above conception of the right to die and the
concept of allowing the patient to die by discontinuing
life-sustaining treatment. Costello J. provides the
following rationale for this position:
[i]n the case of the competent patient 
discontinuance would be in response to a request 
which the patient was constitutionally entitled 
to make, and no 'unlawful' act would occur. In 
the case of the incompetent patient 
discontinuance in the proper discharge of a duty 
of care would likewise involve no legal fault and 
the patient's death could not be an 'unlawful'
the Irish High Court, in an article on the issue of refusal
232 See, Costello, (1986, pp. 35-46).
233 Ibid. , p. 42 .
234 Ibid.
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homicide.235
act-omission distinction which has less to do with an
adherence to logic than with a casuistical argument based
on a particular philosophical perspective.
There are those who contend that such a distinction is
chimeric and that there is indeed no moral distinction
between killing and letting die. James Rachels236 argues
against this distinction. He claims that:
[t]he bare difference between killing and letting 
die does not, in itself, make a moral difference.
If a doctor lets a patient die for humane 
reasons, he is in the same moral position as if 
he had given the patient a lethal injection for 
humane reasons. If his decision was wrong - if, 
for example, the patient's illness was in fact 
curable - the decision would be equally 
regrettable no matter which method was used to 
carry it out. And if the doctor's decision was 
the right one, the method used was not in itself 
important.237
In arguing in this fashion Rachels attempts to arrive at 
the conclusion that if one is to justify killing in one 
instance, such as in the case of treatment withdrawal, then 
one should logically justify killing in the case of active 
euthanasia. He goes on to cite the typical argument against 
such a stance, an argument substantially similar to that of 
Costello J.:
[t]he important difference between active and 
passive euthanasia is that, in passive 
euthanasia, the doctor does not do anything to 
bring about the patient's death. The doctor does
This argument is yet another example of that nebulous
235 Ibid., p.44.
236 See, Rachels, (1975, pp.78-80).
237 Ibid., p. 79.
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nothing, and the patient dies of whatever ills 
already afflict him. In active euthanasia, 
however, the doctor does something to bring about 
the patient's death: he kills him. The doctor who 
gives the patient with cancer a lethal injection 
has himself caused his patient's death; whereas 
if he merely ceases treatment, the cancer is the 
cause of death.238
Rachels argues that such a distinction carries no
/
moral weight. He argues that a decision to withdraw 
treatment:
is subject to moral appraisal in the same way 
that a decision to kill... would be subject to 
moral appraisal: it may be assessed as wise or 
unwise, compassionate or sadistic, right or 
wrong. If a doctor deliberately lets a patient
die who was suffering from a routinely curable
illness, the doctor would certainly be to blame 
for what he had done, just as he would be to 
blame if he had needlessly killed the 
patient.239
Thus, if it is possible to state that there is  ^no
I
difference between killing and letting die and that in 
effect what one is doing m  both cases is 'killing', why do 
commentators such as Costello J. argue so vehemently in 
favour of treatment withdrawal and so vehemently against 
active euthanasia? Is there a basis other than logic upon 
which they base their arguments? To discover the motivation 
of such arguments one must examine the foundations of the 
act-omission distinction.
Feinberg has placed such arguments into the category 
of the 'moral significance claim'.240 The 'moral
significance claim' simply put attempts to demonstrate that
238 Ibid. , p.80.
239 Ibid.
240 Feinberg, (1984b, pp.165-185).
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there is a difference between causing something to happen
and merely allowing that thing to happen and that this
difference is morally significant. Significant enough,
Feinberg adds:
to warrant imposing criminal liability for those 
who intentionally cause certain harms while 
withholding criminal liability from those who 
merely fail to prevent those harms when they 
can.241
This in effect is what Costello is claiming.
Can such a claim be justified? Rachels in his argument 
would answer in the negative. There is no significant moral 
difference between killing and letting die. Others have 
argued that there is no significant moral difference 
between such cases. Jonathan Bennett claims that the 
distinction between act and omission is without moral 
significance by citing a number of thought experiments to 
support that claim.242
His first example is that of the impoverished 
village.243 In this example, one is threatened with a ten 
per cent loss of income but can recover this sum by 
pressing one's claim against a trust fund. If one does not 
press one's claim, the fund will be used to save the lives 
of the inhabitants of a remote and impoverished village. 
One presses one's claim. Bennett views this as a positive 
act or a killing rather than an omission and thus refuses 
to accept a morally significant difference between acts and
241 Ibid., p. 166.
242 See, Bennett, (1981, pp.89-91).
243 Ibid., p.89.
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omissions.
He goes further by citing another example which he 
refers to as Impoverished Village 2. In this example, if 
one were to donate ten per cent of one's income one could 
save the same number of lives in the same village. One does 
not do this.244
Thus, Bennett contends, since m  the first example the 
actor acts positively or, as he terms it, in a 'positively 
instrumental' fashion to bring about the result, while in 
the second example the actor is what he terms 'negatively 
instrumental' in bringing about the outcome, then there 
should be a morally significant difference between the two 
examples. However, he concludes that there is no morally 
significant difference between these cases.
To consolidate his argument he cites the example of 
Impoverished Village 3 where, having given one's accountant 
full power of attorney, one learns that because of a 
misunderstanding he is preparing to sign away ten per cent 
of one's income to be sent to the village. One phones to 
instruct him not to do it. 245 Similarly he can detect no 
sign of a morally significant difference between 
Impoverished Village 2, an example of so-called 'negative 
instrumentality' and Impoverished Village 3, a further 
example of 'positive instrumentality', thus concluding that 
there is no morally significant difference between acts and 
omissions.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., p.91.
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the example of an individual, B, who has a heart attack and
reaches for a bottle of life-saving medicine. Grey then
asks whether there is a significant difference between a
case where another individual, A, pushes the bottle out of
B's reach or where the bottle is just out of B's reach and
A could easily give it to him but he does not.246 Grey
draws the following conclusion:
[a]re not the morally relevant features of the 
situation A's state of mind and the consequences?
Yet in both versions these are the same: A wants 
B dead, and he dies. The only difference is that 
in version (i) a slight movement would be 
required of A to avert B's death while in (ii) A 
can achieve his desires without moving a muscle.
Is this a morally relevant difference?247
Brock248 cites two principal reasons why those who
support the act-omission distinction may do so. Firstly he
states that, for many, killing within medicine is often
viewed as an unjustified causing of death. On the other
hand it is increasingly being accepted that a doctor is
ethically justified in withdrawing life support in certain
cases.249 What Brock believes is mistaken m  the act-
omission distinction is:
the assumption that all killings are unjustified 
causings of death. Instead, some killings are 
ethically justified, including many instances of 
stopping life support.250
246 Grey, (1983 , p.159) .
247 Ibid.
248 See, Brock, (1993, pp.210-212).
249 Ibid. , p. 210.
250 Ibid.
Arguing for a similar conclusion, Thomas Grey cites
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The second reason often cited for maintaining the act- 
omission distinction, according to Brock, is that many in 
medical circles would regard equating treatment withdrawal 
with killing as psychologically uncomfortable. He claims 
that:
[t]he characterization as allowing to die is 
meant to shift felt responsibility away from the 
agent - the physician - and to the lethal disease 
process. Other language common in death and dying 
contexts plays a similar role; 'letting nature 
take its course' or 'stopping prolonging the 
dying process' both seem to shift responsibility 
from the physician who stops life support to the 
fatal disease process. However psychologically 
helpful these conceptualizations may be in making 
the difficult responsibility of a physician's 
role in the patient's death bearable, they 
nevertheless are confusions. Both physicians and 
family members can instead be helped to 
understand that it is the patient's decision and 
consent to stopping treatment that limits their 
responsibility for the patient's death and that 
shifts the responsibility to the patient.251
To further illustrate the moral evasiveness which takes
place in such cases, Brock gives the example of a gravely
ill patient who begins to develop respiratory failure.
In Case 1 a seriously ill patient is brought to a
hospital emergency room and sent to the intensive care
unit. The patient begins to develop respiratory
difficulties and is likely to require intubation very soon.
At that point the patient's family and long-standing
physician arrive at the intensive care unit and inform the
staff that there had been intensive discussion with the
patient when he was competent. Given his terminal illness,
as well as his state of debilitation, the patient had
251 Ibid., p . 211.
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firmly rejected being placed on a respirator under any 
circumstances, and the family and the physician produce the 
patient's advance directive to that effect. The staff in 
the intensive care unit do not intubate the patient, who 
dies of respiratory failure.252
The second example is similar to the first except that 
the family and the physician are delayed in traffic on the 
way to the hospital and arrive shortly after the patient 
has been placed on the respirator. The staff in the
intensive care unit extubate the patient, who dies of
respiratory failure. Again the question to be asked is, is 
there a morally significant difference between the first 
case and the second? Brock comes to the following 
conclusion:
[i]n Case 1 the patient is allowed to die, in
Case 2 he is killed, but it is hard to see why
what is done m  Case 2 is significantly different 
morally than what is done in Case 1. It must be 
other factors that make most killings worse than 
most allowings to die, and, if so, euthanasia 
cannot be wrong simply because it is killing 
instead of allowing to die.253
These other factors would include the view that individuals
have a right to life or a right not to be killed and
religious views about the sanctity of life.254
In the Irish context the act-omission distinction in
itself may not be morally significant, rather what is of
significance for those like Costello J. who put forward
252 Ibid. , p. 212.
253 Ibid.
254 The different views on a right to life are explored 
m  greater detail m  Chapter One of this thesis, pp.7-42.
355
such an argument are exactly these other factors which 
Brock cites. Thus, for example, given the specific 
symbolic, cultural and legal significance given to the 
right to life in Ireland, it would not be fallacious to 
infer that in the context of treatment withdrawal the 
distinction is being used as a casuistical tool to prevent 
one from conflicting with the ideal of the sanctity of 
life. Thus, while on the face of it Costello J.'s argument 
may seem almost radical in the Irish context, it is nothing 
of the sort. Rather, it is a pseudo-liberalism which sits 
perfectly with the current constitutional paradigm. By 
stating that the withdrawal of treatment is less morally 
reprehensible than killing he manages to stay within the 
boundaries of the sanctity of life argument and the current 
constitutional framework. If Costello J. were to do 
otherwise he would leave the door wide open for the 
justification of active euthanasia, a far greater evil than
N.mere treatment withdrawal under his model. Rather, this 
concession to patient autonomy is a mere strategic ploy, a 
battle lost in order to win the war for the sanctity of 
life.
If one then accepts the view that there is no morally 
significant difference between killing and letting die, 
that they are, in fact, both species of killing then one 
has to ask the entirely separate question, in what 
circumstances is killing justifiable? This allows one to 
look at the individual cases free of the haze of moral 
certitude. It also entails radically altering perceived
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\This will require an adjustment to the traditional sanctity
of life model, by moving to a less absolutist position on
the right to life.
There are those who would argue against the stance
taken by those like Rachels who attempt to disentangle the
issue from the knots of casuistical sophistry. Daniel
Callahan255 believes that Rachels makes three errors in
coming to his conclusion. Firstly, Callahan claims, killing
and letting die are causally different. He restates here
the argument that in the case of treatment withdrawal it is
the disease and not the doctor which causes the patient's
death.256 In support of his argument, he cites the
following example:
'[l]etting die' is only physically possible if 
there is some underlying disease that will serve 
as the cause of death. Put me on a respirator 
now, when I am in good health, and nothing 
whatever will happen if it is turned off. I 
cannot be 'allowed' to die by having a respirator 
turned off if I have healthy lungs. It is wholly 
different, however, if a doctor gives me a 
muscle-relaxing injection that will paralyse my 
lungs... That is what it means to 'kill' someone 
as distinguished from 'letting' someone die.257
This is a little disingenuous of Callahan, to say the
least. It avoids the real issue. Callahan claims that in
the second case: "[n]othing but the action of the doctor
giving the lethal injection is necessary to bring about the
societal beliefs in relation to the concept of killing.
255 Callahan, (1993, pp.77-83).
256 Ibid., p. 77.
257 Ibid.
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Thus, m  all cases of treatment withdrawal, the doctor 
does not kill the patient, the disease does. What then of 
the case of a patient m  a persistent vegetative state? 
Does the withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration not 
lead to his death? There is no underlying fatal pathology 
in such cases. But for the withdrawal of the artificial 
feeding and hydration the patient would have lived for a 
further thirty years. Or is one then to state that in such 
a case it was not the withdrawal of the artificial support 
which caused the patient's death but starvation and 
dehydration: that, m  effect, he died from natural causes. 
Callahan would view the withdrawal of artificial hydration 
and feeding in similar terms to the withdrawal of a 
respirator. He rationalises this claim in the following 
manner:
[i]f an inability to take food and water by mouth 
is the ordinary concomitant of a terminal illness 
- as it has been since time immemorial - that 
should be understood as a symptom (not always 
certain, of course) of a terminal condition, one 
way the dying body shuts down its key systems.
That circumstance was never, until recently, 
described as a patient's 'starving' to death, 
which connotes a violent, painful death. The 
cause of death was understood to be the 
underlying disease, and the inability to take 
nourishment by mouth a symptomatic way the deadly 
disease manifested itself. Indeed, the inability 
to take food and water itself helped to induce 
the final, usually gentle, coma. It led to a 
peaceful, not a violent, death.259
Callahan blames the thinking which associates letting
death".258
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., p.81.
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'technological monism' which he defines as follows: "the
compulsion to use technology out of a fear that failure to
use it makes us responsible for the ensuing death".260 This
is hardly the case. The point is rather that objectively
one can label an act of withdrawing life support on the one
hand and an act of injecting a consenting patient with an
overdose of painkillers on the other hand as acts of
killing which are justifiable. The very fact that the act
is called a killing should not automatically lead to a
conclusion that the actor is morally and legally culpable.
As Brock has written in adverting to this point:
many physicians and others use the concept of 
killing as a normative concept to refer to 
unjustified actions causing death. In this view, 
killing may occur in medicine accidentally or 
negligently, but physicians do not knowingly and 
deliberately kill their patients. Yet, of course, 
physicians do stop life support... and believe, 
quite rightly, that they can be justified in 
doing so... It is a mistake to suppose that all 
killing must be unjustified, either morally or in 
the law. Killing in self-defense is an example 
outside of medicine, and stopping life-support 
appears to be one within medicine.261
Secondly, Callahan argues that Rachels makes the
mistake of assuming that the intention in letting die is
the same as in killing. He claims that:
[s]ince death is biologically inevitable sooner 
or later, not a consequence of our actions but 
outside of them, we can hardly be said to 
'intend' death when we admit we can no longer 
stop it. Since mortality is our fate, 
biologically given, at some point treatment must 
no longer work to keep us alive... That a doctor
nature take its course with culpability on what he terms
260 Ibid., p.83.
261 Brock, (1993, p. 164).
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may keep a patient going for another day or so, 
but thinks that it is pointless to prolong the 
process, does not amount to 'intending' death 
either. The only intention is to stop a pointless 
action, and, put positively, to affirm the 
ultimate power of nature, over which we have 
limited control. Doctors treat patients in the 
first place because they want to help them, to 
make them well again. They ordinarily stop 
treating them when nothing more of value can be 
done, not because they want or intend them to be 
dead.262
This argument appears to combine elements of the
doctrine of double effect and the ordinary and
extraordinary treatment distinction. Firstly, Callahan
claims that the only intention is to stop a pointless
action. However in stopping this pointless action does not
the doctor also set in train a chain of events which
ultimately lead to the patient's death? But for the
doctor's action, the patient would not have died in such a
manner and at such a point in time. Callahan also claims
that doctors cease to treat patients when nothing more of
value can be done. This argument could be equated with the
distinction often drawn between ordinary and extraordinary
treatment. This distinction has its origins in Roman
Catholic teaching where such a distinction was:
used to mark the difference between obligatory 
and non-obligatory care - ordinary care being 
obligatory for the patient to accept and others 
to provide, and extraordinary care being 
optional.263
However, as the President's Commission concluded:
262 Callahan, (1993, pp.78-79).
263 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
(1983, p.82).
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[d]espite its long history of frequent use, the 
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
treatments has now become so confused that its 
continued use in the formulation of public policy 
is no longer desirable. Although those who share 
a common understanding of its meaning may still 
find it helpful in counselling situations, the 
Commission believes that it is better for those 
involved in the difficult task of establishing 
policies and guidelines m  the area of treatment 
decisions to avoid employing these phrases.264
Thirdly, Callahan claims that Rachels is incorrect m
thinking that the method by which a doctor brings about a
patient's death is not in itself important. Again Callahan
argues along similar lines pointing out the killing and
letting die distinction and the particular normative
significance of such terms in the medical context. He
believes that such a shift in thinking:
erases the long-established moral rule against 
killing by doctors, and also introduces a new 
justification for killing, that of relieving 
suffering. Even if one agrees with such a change, 
can it really be characterized as 'not in itself 
important'? Nothing less than the meaning and 
goals of medicine is at stake.265
This appears to be a reiteration of his previous points. He
then goes on to further justify his argument by stating
that doctors who withdraw life-support from the terminally
ill do not literally kill the patient. Rather what has
happened m  such a case, according to Callahan, is that we
have placed a moral overlay over the natural process of
dying which has confused the natural process of death with
our moral conception of death. Thus, it is possible to
264 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
265 Callahan, (1993, p.79).
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by his negligent failure to put a suffocating 
patient on a respirator in a timely fashion. But 
this way of speaking reflects a moral convention 
superimposed upon nature, a function of the fact 
that a moral rule has been developed over time 
that would hold doctors responsible for certain 
omissions on their part, those that we judge to 
be wrongful omissions. As long as we understand 
that it is the created moral rule about a 
physician's obligations, not some judgment on the 
natural state of affairs, that leads us to speak 
as if it is the doctor's omission that 'kills' 
the patient, there is no problem. We go wrong, 
however, when we think that the physician 
literally caused the death. The death results 
from the underlying disease, which is the only 
reason, the doctor's omission would make any 
difference in the outcome. It is only our 
historically created, humanly devised moral rule 
about the moral responsibility of physicians that 
allows us to speak of a doctor's 'killing' a 
patient.266
Later in his book, 267 one discovers the reason for 
Callahan's need to emphasise that treatment withdrawal is 
not killing per se.
Like others who have tried to underline the difference 
between acts and omissions in the context of medical 
treatment, he goes on to argue against active euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide. He differentiates between 
the natural process of dying in the case of treatment 
withdrawal, that is, the patient dies from the underlying 
disease, and the physician induced death in cases of active 
euthanasia.
He then coins the phrase 'technological monism' to 
give strength to his argument. This phrase is used to
state that a doctor killed a patient:
266 Ibid. , p.82.
267 Ibid., pp. 91-112.
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convey an idea of technology taking over the role of 
nature. Thus, he argues, technology becomes the new 
regulator of life and death. That we have come to believe 
that the withdrawal of this technological support is the 
cause of death and not the underlying disease. He can then 
claim:
[t]he ultimate evil of death lies m  its 
manifestation of our human limits and finitude.
It is a mistake to think that such finitude is 
fought by an embrace of medical progress and the 
forestalling of death. The enlistment of that 
progress in an unlimited struggle against death 
from disease is a basic error. If it is of our 
nature as biological creatures to die, one 
manifestation of our finitude... then it is 
foolish to think death can be overcome by medical 
science. It is even more misguided to believe
that we do honour to life, or express our
distaste for the phenomenon of death, by always
seeing death as the enemy. It is an enemy, but
not the enemy. The enemy is our finitude, our 
ultimately unrequited longing for more than we 
have. We resist death because it stands as a 
consummate nasty symbol, and the great wrenching 
finale, of a life that is endlessly marked by 
limits, boundaries, fences, and 
contradictions.268
Callahan in arguing in this fashion tries to shift the 
locus of the debate from the concept of individual self- 
determination to the idea of a human fixation with mastery 
of nature. The question thus focuses not primarily on the 
rights of the patient but on the more general battle which 
humanity is waging against mortality. This allows him when 
addressing the issue of active euthanasia to argue that 
this is m  fact killing according to his model, and should 
not be condoned. Callahan believes that:
we should as a society reject, and decisively so,
268 Ibid., pp.84-85.
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euthanasia and assisted suicide. If a death 
marked by pain or suffering is a nasty death, a 
natural biological evil of a supreme kind, 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are wrong and 
harmful responses to that evil. To kill another 
person directly - in the name of mercy and that 
person's self-determination (as I will define 
'euthanasia' here) or to assist another to commit 
suicide (logically little different from 
euthanasia) would add still another to a society 
already burdened with man-made evils.269
This formulation is not too far removed from the more
traditional arguments in favour of the act-omission
distinction in the area of euthanasia. However this form of
argumentation does little to resolve the dilemma in
practical terms. It merely maintains the status quo.
By adopting the formulation advanced by commentators
such as Rachels, we actually confront the problem rather
than slide across it on a thin layer of casuistry. One can
then accept that both treatment withdrawal and more active
means of hastening death are not morally separable, that
they are both acts of killing. However we can then progress
to the next plane of argument and state that even though
these acts may be classified as killing they are not
necessarily without justification. We do not have to
proceed to place a moral overlay on such acts and condemn
them as absolutely evil and beyond the pale of human
behaviour.
Thus Costello J.'s argument is not as clear-cut as it 
would appear at first glance. His analysis of the right to 
die while moving towards a situation where the patient is 
treated as an autonomous agent is not, however, an ideal
269 Ibid. , p. 103.
364
solution. The individual patient may only exercise his 
right to die m  limited circumstances, that is, only when 
no active measures are used to hasten the patient's death. 
This is arguably not a right to die in the true sense of 
the word but a conditional right to die. One cannot choose 
the manner of one's death without restriction. This type of 
argumentation is loaded with contradiction. One has a right 
to die but only if there is no 'active' intervention by a 
third party or assistance from a third party which could 
constitute aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a 
suicide. If one is in constant pain and has the lack of 
good fortune not to be on an artificial respirator then one 
cannot choose to hasten one's end. Thus, self-determination 
in this instance is only to be afforded to those who cannot 
exercise it, whereas those who can, may not, due to their 
wishes interfering with the 'natural order' of things.
A Legislative Solution.
Rather than wait for the Supreme Court to be faced 
with resolving this question, while many patients are 
prevented from exercising their right to self-determination 
in the intervening period, the government could decide to 
take some responsibility m  this field and introduce a 
programme of legislation which would put the concept of 
treatment withdrawal on a statutory footing. As 
demonstrated above, this approach has been taken by many 
other common law jurisdictions without the fabric of
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The first step would be to introduce legislation which 
would allow for the making of advance directives. This 
would allow those who are now competent to create a 
testamentary document which would set out their wishes in 
relation to medical treatment should they ever enter a 
state of incapacity.
The principal problem with this method is that those 
who now lack legal capacity such as the mentally 
incompetent and minors will be unable to avail of this 
instrument. However, given legal conceptions of rationality 
and competence this problem is likely to remain.270 On the 
positive side, such an initiative would at last give legal 
recognition to individual autonomy in this area of medical 
treatment, thus bringing it into line with the consent 
model as is understood in the case of the conscious adult 
and medical treatment. This, it could be argued, is merely 
an extension of the general right to refuse medical 
treatment to the area of treatment at the end of life.
The patient's wishes could still be ascertained 
through the medium of the advance directive. An important
270 See, Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraph 5.18), 
where it is stated that:
[tjhere would be little point in our 
recommending that an anticipatory refusal of 
treatment can be made by persons under the 
age of eighteen since it is now settled if 
controversial law that the court in exercise 
of its statutory and/or inherent 
jurisdiction (and possibly also any person 
who has parental i responsibility) may 
overrule the refusal of a minor, competent 
or not, to accept medical treatment.
society being irreparably damaged.
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contribution to the debate on the introduction of 
legislation in this regard has been the Report of the 
English Law Commission271 discussed above.
The Law Commission proposed a number of key 
legislative initiatives in this Report in relation to the 
question of anticipatory decision-making. As part of a 
wider remit which addressed the treatment of the mentally 
incapacitated in all areas of law, the Law Commission 
recommended that the law in relation to advance directives 
be put on a statutory footing.
It is submitted that the Irish legislature should take 
a similar approach to the one outlined by the Law 
Commission in this area of medical practice.
As our legislative canon is quite heavily influenced 
by English legislative conventions, this would not be a 
radical departure in procedural terms. The recommendations 
are based on a similar common law tradition and such 
legislation would not prove difficult to weave into our 
current statutory framework. What could prove to be a 
difficulty would be the traditional Irish antipathy to 
pioneering social legislation which aims to afford greater 
protection to individual autonomy over cultural 
conventions. One need only look to the current stalemate 
over proposed legislation in another field of medical 
controversy - pregnancy termination to satisfy oneself that
271 See, Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraphs 5.1-
5.39).
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In addition it is submitted that the Irish Medical 
Council should take note of the recent initiative 
undertaken by the British Medical Association in producing 
a Code of Practice in relation to advance statements about 
health care, and perhaps establish a steering group on the 
lines of the British Medical Association to study the issue 
and to produce professional guidelines on advance 
directives. This on its own is of little value, however, if 
Parliament does not act by introducing legislation which 
would give legal validity to the concept of the advance 
directive.
A complementary form of legislation which could also 
be introduced is the idea of a health care enduring power 
of attorney. This could be an adaptation of the American or 
Australian models already discussed, or perhaps it could be 
based on the model suggested by the Law Commission.273
In Ireland the law in relation to powers of attorney 
has changed little since it was put on a statutory footing 
in the nineteenth century. It is to be found in Part XI of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881 and sections 8 and 9 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1882.
The principal obstacle to the legal recognition of a 
health care power of attorney in the case of a patient who, 
for example, enters a permanent state of unconsciousness is
this would indeed be the case.272
272 See the discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis, 
pp.212-242.
273 Law Commission, The, (1995, paragraphs 7.1-7.63).
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that the power of attorney as currently conceived in 
Ireland ends on the donor's becoming mentally 
incapacitated. Moreover, such a power extends to matters of 
property only and does not take within its ambit issues 
such as health care decisions. The Irish government has not 
yet seen fit to amend the existing legislation to take 
account of these shortcomings. In England and Wales, the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 and the Conveyancing Act 1882 have 
been replaced by the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 and the 
Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1985. The Enduring Powers 
of Attorney Act 1985 Act was innovatory m  that it amended 
the traditional concept of the power of attorney by 
creating a new form of power of attorney which as the title 
suggests endures after the donor becomes mentally 
incapacitated. The continuing power of attorney as proposed 
by the Law Commission274 would allow areas of an 
individual's life other than property and affairs to become 
the subject of a power of attorney. Thus, it is 
theoretically possible to introduce legislation in relation 
to anticipatory health care decisions by way of amendment 
to, or replacement of, existing legislation.
4.8 Postscript.
The recent High Court decision in the case of Re C 
(Ward of Court)275 has demonstrated that there indeed
274 Ibid.
275 High Court, Unreported, 5 May 1995, Lynch J. .
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exists a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment 
in Ireland. In this case C was a severely brain-damaged 
woman. She was in a condition which Lynch J. described as 
"nearly, but not quite, what in modern times has become 
known as persistent or permanent vegetative state".276 C is 
unable to communicate. She has minimal capacity to 
recognise nursing staff and to react to strangers by 
showing signs of distress. She is able to follow people 
with her eyes in a reflex manner. C's family was of the 
opinion that it was in her 'best interests' that she be 
allowed to die naturally. Accordingly, the family applied 
to the High Court for an order directing artificial 
nutrition and hydration to cease. The institution in which 
C resided objected to such an order, claiming that it was 
contrary to its ethical code.
Lynch J. was of the opinion that in the case of an 
incompetent, incurably ill patient, the health care 
provider in question, may, subject to the acquiesence of 
the next-of-kin, lawfully withdraw life-sustaining medical 
treatment or refrain from providing such treatment. In this 
case the health care providers objected to this withdrawal 
of treatment. Lynch J. held that in such a case the test to
~i
be applied is whether it is m  the 'best interests' of the
patient that her life should be prolonged by artificial
<
means. Lynch J. also took into account what would be the 
patient's own wishes if she could be granted a momentary 
lucid period, a rather unhelpful entry into the twilight
276 Ib id ., p. 2.
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zone of 'substituted judgement'. The judge concluded that 
the courts m  such cases should "approach the matter from 
the standpoint of a prudent, good and loving parent in 
deciding what course should be adopted".277 On this basis 
Lynch J. ordered the discontinuance of artificial nutrition 
and hydration in the instant case. The decision is 
currently under appeal to the Supreme Court.
277 Ibid. , p . 25.
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CHAPTER FIVE; ACTIVE INTERVENTION TO END LIFE I;
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA.
And when Man bursts his 
mortal bounds,
is not the Boundless
revealed that moment?1
5.0 Introduction.
The medical professional is generally perceived as 
playing the role of life preserver, in effect, the nemesis 
of death, the villain of the piece.
However, in one aspect of medical practice, the care 
of the dying or incurably ill patient, the roles tend to be 
reversed and the medical practitioner becomes the pariah, 
seemingly abandoning his Hippocratic responsibilities and 
siding with vengeful death.
Thus, the doctor who departs from the Hippocratic 
injunction: "[t]o please no one will I prescribe a deadly 
drug, nor give advice which may cause his death",2 would 
seem to be departing from a fundamental tenet of the 
medical profession.
However, as in most medical dilemmas, the situation is 
not as easily resolved as this. One must look to the 
reasons which prompt a doctor to take such a course of 
action and to the wishes of the patient involved if he is 
competent or in the case of the incompetent patient, the 
wishes of the next-of-kin or the previously expressed
1 Tagore, (1989, p.220).
2 See, Mason and McCall-Smith, (1991, Appendix A, p.439).
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Central to this issue is the way in which death and 
life are perceived in a given society, the perception of 
the role of the doctor in society and the value given to 
the autonomy of the individual.
These values tend to be reflected in the approach of 
both the legislature and the judiciary to the question of 
allowing or inducing the death of a patient. Thus, the way 
in which this dilemma is resolved or not will be looked at 
in the context of a number of different societies in order 
to demonstrate the influence of attitudes and values on 
legislative and judicial policy in this area.
5.1 Defining the Problem.
Active euthanasia occurs when a doctor carries out a 
positive act which results in the death of a patient. This 
may take the form of the doctor administering a lethal 
injection to the patient. This act may be carried out at 
the request of the patient, in which case it is termed 
voluntary active euthanasia. Alternatively, the patient may 
not be capable of consenting to his death, in which case 
such medical intervention is termed non-voluntary active 
euthanasia. Passive euthanasia comprises of omitting to 
perform a life-saving medical procedure or withdrawing 
medical treatment which is preserving the patient's life 
and forms the basis of Chapter Four.
wishes of the patient when he was in a competent state.
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5.2 The Current Legal M o d e l .
Active euthanasia is not lawful in Ireland. Thus, a
doctor who gives his patient a lethal dose of a drug with
the intention of accelerating the patient's end would
arguably be charged with murder. There have been no Irish
cases specifically on this issue nor does there exist
specific legislation on the point. However, Irish courts
may look for guidance to the English precedents in this
area. The intention of the doctor in this regard would
appear to be of vital importance. Thus, in the case of R.
v Adams.3 Devlin J. stated the law as follows:
[i]f the acts done intended to kill and did, in 
fact, kill, it did not matter if a life were cut 
short by weeks or months, it was just as much 
murder as if it were cut short by years."
In that case, the defendant doctor was alleged to have
treated an incurable patient with large doses of heroin and
morphia. On the death of the patient, Dr. Adams was charged
with her murder. Here the accused was acquitted as the
intention required was not present. In his summing up to
the jury, Devlin J. stated "[t]he doctor is entitled to
relieve pain and suffering even if the measures he takes
may incidentally shorten life".5
One may detect here an argument similar to that of the
principle of double effect. This concept holds that an
3 [1957] Criminal Law Review 365.
4 Ibid., p.375.
5 Ibid.
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is permissible even though the goal may only be achieved by
the occurrence of a coincident harmful act. Thus, in this
context, the intention of a doctor may be to ease pain and
not to kill. However, if death occurs it is merely
incidental to the main purpose of the act. Peter Charleton,
writing in the Irish context, also proffers this argument
when he states that a doctor "will have no criminal
liability if he acts without criminal negligence and
without intent to kill or cause serious injuries".6 He goes
on to argue that a doctor who prescribes:
a treatment to ease terminal suffering may 
realise that a risk of an earlier death is 
thereby created. His purpose is not to kill but 
to comfort his patient. That cannot be murder.7
The doctrine of double effect has its origins in Thomistic
natural law philosophy and has been closely associated with
Roman Catholic ethical theory.8
In the case of R. v Cox9 the defendant was unable to
avail of the double effect argument as it was his intention
to cause the death of the patient in question. In that
case, Dr. Cox had been treating the deceased, Mrs. Lillian
Boyes, for some three years. She suffered from rheumatoid
arthritis and was reported to have been in severe pain as
her condition deteriorated. The accused prescribed
6 See, Charleton, (1992, p.23).
7 Ibid.
8 See in addition, Grisez, (1970, pp.64-96) and Mangan, 
(1949, pp.41-61).
9 High Court, Unreported, 18 September 1992, Ognall J..
action which is performed with the intention of doing good
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increasing doses of morphine-based drugs until the patient 
expressed her wish to die. As a result, Dr. Cox injected 
the patient with a lethal dose of potassium chloride which 
brought about her death. Dr. Cox was charged with attempted 
murder rather than murder. This, the prosecution claimed, 
was due to an inability to prove conclusively that the 
cause of death was the injection of potassium chloride, as 
the body had been promptly cremated. However, the 
prosecution may have been trying to avoid a repetition of 
the verdict in R.v Adams.
Dr. Cox was found guilty and given a suspended prison 
sentence of one year. Had Dr. Cox administered an analgesic 
cocktail, which has the secondary effect of hastening 
death, he might have escaped liability by arguing that his 
primary intention was to relieve pain. By using potassium 
chloride, which is a poison with no therapeutic qualities, 
he could not avail of the double effect argument.
In the case of R. v Lodwig f 10 the accused was cleared 
of murdering a patient when the prosecution offered no 
evidence. The patient was suffering from terminal 
pancreatic cancer and was in continuous pain. His death was
imminent. The patient's family asked Dr. Lodwig to do
something to relieve the pain. Dr. Lodwig injected the
patient with a lethal dose of potassium chloride and 
lignocaine. Dr. Lodwig claimed that it was his intention to 
kill the pain and not the patient, stating that the
10 (1990) Medico-Legal Journal. Volume 58, Part 2 ,
p.116.
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combination of drugs which he used had been the subject of
experiments conducted at St. Bartholemew's Hospital,
London. The object of these experiments had been to mix
potassium chloride with painkillers to accelerate their
analgesic effect.
From the foregoing, it would appear that if such a
case came to be decided in Ireland a substantially similar
approach would be taken. The only guidelines which are
available to the doctor at present are extra-legal and
these come in the form of the statement on euthanasia by
the Medical Council which provides:
[w]here death is imminent, it is the doctor's 
responsibility to take care that a patient dies 
with dignity and with as little suffering as 
possible. Euthanasia, which involves deliberately 
causing the death of a patient, is professional 
misconduct and is illegal in Ireland.11
5.3 An Alternative Approach: The Dutch Model.
The law governing active voluntary euthanasia in the 
Netherlands has recently been amended to allow doctors in 
clearly defined circumstances to act to end the life of a 
terminally ill patient without suffering the full rigour of 
the criminal law.12 The new regulations provide that 
doctors who carry out active euthanasia after the patient 
has requested it or does so without the request of the 
patient, should report the fact to the local coroner, who
11 Medical Council, The, (1994, p.38).
12 See, Fenigsen, (1993, pp.167-173).
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in turn will inform the district attorney. The district 
attorney will not proceed further with the matter if it can 
be shown that the doctor acted within the guidelines laid 
down by the Justice Ministry protocols on the issue of 
euthanasia.13
The practice of active voluntary euthanasia is not 
thereby legalized but the legislation, in effect, gives 
explicit legislative recognition to such a practice. This 
change in policy came about as a result of a growing debate 
on the topic of euthanasia within both medical and legal 
circles in the previous two decades. The importance of this 
debate was recognized when in 1990, the Dutch government 
established a committee under the chairmanship of Professor 
Remmelink, Procurator-General of the Dutch Supreme Court, 
which was to report in 1991.14
Background to the Dutch Euthanasia Debate.
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code 1891 provides that 
it shall be an offence to kill another at that other's 
request. This offence is punishable upon successful 
prosecution by imprisonment for a maximum period of twelve
13 Regelen met Betrekking tot de Hulpverlening door een 
Geneeskudige die zich Beroept op Overmacht bij 
Levensbeeindigmg op Uitdrukkeli jk en Ernstig Verlangen van 
een Patient. [Rules Concerning Assistance Rendered by a 
Physician who pleads Higher Necessity when Terminating Life 
of a Patient upon his Explicit and Serious Request. ], Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 1987-1988, numbers 
1-2, 20 383, pp.1-3.
14 See, Maas, van der, Delden, van and Pijnenborg, 
(1991).
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years or by a fine. This particular criminal offence covers
the act of active voluntary euthanasia. In addition,
Article 294 of the Penal Code 1891 provides that any person
who assists in the suicide of another shall be guilty of an
offence and liable to up to three years' imprisonment or to
a fine. Thus, the concept of physician-assisted suicide is,
in theory, deemed to be a criminal offence.
However, in practice, a defence was afforded to those
who were charged with such offences. In the 1984 Supreme
Court decision in the case of Office of Public Prosecutions
v Leendert.15 a doctor, who had ended the life of a
terminally ill, elderly patient, successfully pleaded the
defence of necessity.16 The Supreme Court judgment noted
that the following considerations should be taken into
account when deciding the guilt or otherwise of the accused
in such cases:
whether and to what extent according to 
professional medical judgment an increasing 
disfigurement of the patient's personality and/or 
further deterioration of her already unbearable 
suffering were to be expected; whether it could
15 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1985) No. 106, 451.
16 The defence of necessity in Dutch law is to be found 
in Article 40 of the Penal Code 1891. This defence provides 
that a person who has committed an offence due to either 
necessity or irresistible compulsion shall not be liable for 
that offence. The defence takes either of two forms. The act 
may have been committed as a result of psychological 
compulsion or it may have been perpetrated as the result of 
an emergency where the accused breaks the law in the 
interests of what he considers to be a greater or higher 
good. In the case of Office of Public Prosecutions v 
Leendert. the latter form of the defence was accepted by the 
Supreme Court. In that case the doctor was of the opinion 
that a greater good would be served by terminating the 
patient's life, that is to say, ending her pain and 
suffering.
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be expected that soon she would no longer be able 
to die with dignity under circumstances worthy of 
a human being; whether there were still 
opportunities to alleviate her suffering.17
The Supreme Court referred the matter back to the
Court of Appeal, requiring that the latter determine, on
the facts of the instant case, whether the act of the
accused in terminating the patient's life could be
construed "from an objective medical perspective" as "an
action justified in a situation of necessity."18
The Court of Appeal answered in the affirmative, and
the accused was acquitted. The Court of Appeal did however
alter slightly the terms of the question posed by the
Supreme Court by replacing the word 'objective' with the
word 'reasonable'.
The criterion thus used to determine whether the act
fell within the scope of the necessity defence was whether
it could be justified when measured against the standards
of reasonable medical opinion.
The courts were enabled to give further guidance on
the issue of active voluntary euthanasia soon after the
decision in the case of Office of Public Prosecutions v
Leendert. Keown19 adverts to a case involving the
prosecution of a doctor, who terminated the life of an
elderly neighbour who suffered from chronic multiple
sclerosis, after receiving many requests from the latter to
17 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1985) No. 106, 451, 
p.453.
18 Ibid.
19 Keown, (1992, p.55).
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so do, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts had 
failed to consider a number of defences in convicting the 
accused. These defences were: first, that the doctor had 
acted as a result of the extreme distress of the patient, 
and, secondly, that as a result of witnessing this distress 
and suffering on the part of the patient, the doctor 
herself found that she was under duress and could not act 
in a manner which differed from the manner in which she had 
acted.
The Supreme Court referred to this state of affairs as 
acting out of psychological necessity. The case was 
referred back to the Court of Appeal for further 
determination of the issues. The Court of Appeal in this 
case convicted the doctor. Perhaps the reasons for this 
decision may be seen in the factual differences in this 
case. Firstly, the victim in this case was not actually a 
patient of the accused. This brought the relationship 
outside the realm of the normal doctor-patient 
relationship. Secondly, the accused acted independently, 
without seeking further medical opinion.20
In the recent case of Office of Public Prosecutions v 
Chabot.21 Dr. Chabot had assisted in the suicide of a 
healthy and competent woman who had expressed her wish to 
die since the tragic deaths of her two sons.
The offence under article 294 of the Penal Code 1891 
covered this act of physician-assisted suicide. However,
20 See further, Leenen, (1989, pp.517-526).
21 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1994) No. 656, 3142.
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the Supreme Court was satisfied, that the accused had, in 
so acting, followed the guidelines laid down by the Royal 
Dutch Medical Association.
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that Dr. Chabot 
had established that his patient was competent to decide, 
was suffering unbearably, and had a voluntary, considered 
and long-standing wish to die.
In addition, it was adduced that he had consulted 
fellow practitioners about the case and had also advised 
his patient of other options that were open to her.
However, the Supreme Court did not accept that Doctor 
Chabot had acted in an emergency and was thus not afforded 
a defence under article 40 of the Penal Code 1891, and the 
accused was as a result found guilty. This was due to the 
fact that the practitioners whom the accused consulted did 
not see and examine the patient. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the accused was found guilty, the Supreme Court 
declined to punish him, due to the personality of the 
accused, as well as the circumstances in which the act took 
place.
It is now clear, following the decision of the Supreme 
Court, that, in addition to physical suffering, 
psychological suffering may form the basis of a patient's 
request to terminate his life. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that those requesting euthanasia do 
not necessarily have to be suffering from a terminal 
illness and that doctors who give second opinions in such 
cases must first examine the patient in question.
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The Impact of Medical Opinion and Practice on the 
Euthanasia Debate.
This judicial recognition of the practice of 
euthanasia echoed the custom of the medical profession 
itself in relation to the issue of active euthanasia. The 
Royal Dutch Medical Association had in the decade prior to 
the judicial pronouncements on the issue articulated a 
stance on the issue, stating that while the offence 
enunciated in the Penal Code 1891 should remain operative, 
there should be some form of defence or immunity from 
prosecution for the doctor who ended the life of an 
incurable patient on the latter's request.22
As a result of the judicial developments in this 
field, the Royal Dutch Medical Association established firm 
guidelines on the issue.23 The Guidelines for Euthanasia 
set out the criteria required to be fulfilled so that a 
doctor may be afforded a defence having euthanized a 
patient.
Firstly, the request to have one's life terminated 
must come freely and voluntarily from the patient. 
Secondly, the request must come from a patient who has 
based such request solely on a fully informed knowledge of 
his condition and that such a request is based solely on 
the wish to end the suffering caused to the patient by that 
condition and not on peripheral issues such as being a
22 See, Keown, (1992, pp.57-61).
23 Royal Dutch Medical Association, The, (1988, pp.429-
431).
383
burden on one's family. Thirdly, the decision to die must 
not be based on a temporary whim or depression but must be 
a continuing wish on his part. Fourthly, the patient must 
experience his suffering as persistent, unbearable and 
hopeless. Fifthly, the doctor must consult with other 
medical practitioners before terminating a patient's life.
The procedures for reporting cases of active voluntary 
euthanasia were set out in a protocol issued by the Justice 
Ministry in 1990.24 Under the protocol, medical 
practitioners were obliged to inform the coroner of all 
cases of active voluntary euthanasia. In addition 
procedures for the conduct of investigations into such 
deaths were outlined. The protocol directed that 
prosecutors on receipt of the coroner's report should 
instigate a police investigation only if they were 
satisfied in the light of the facts of the case, that the 
required guidelines had not been followed.
Thus, the crime of killing another at that other's 
request remains on the statute books, but those doctors who 
adhere to the procedures to be followed in the case of 
medical euthanasia shall be afforded a defence against 
prosecution.
24 Regelen met Betrekking tot de Hulpverlening door een 
Geneeskudige die zieh Beroept op Overmacht bij 
Levensbeeindiging op Uitdrukkeli jk en Ernstig Verlangen van 
een Patient. [Rules Concerning Assistance Rendered by a 
Physician who pleads Higher Necessity when Terminating Life 
of a Patient upon his Explicit and Serious Request. ], Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 1987-1988, numbers 
1-2, 20 383, pp.1-3.
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5.4 Active Euthanasia and the Slippery Slope.
Opponents of the Dutch model have based their
opposition on arguments of the slippery slope variety.25 In
the context of active euthanasia, the advocates of this
form of argumentation would hold that by allowing active
euthanasia based on the patient's consent today, in the
future more invidious forms of the practice may be allowed.
Thus, for example, the practice of involuntary active
euthanasia may in the future gain societal acceptance as a
result of the practice of active euthanasia per se being
accepted in medical and legal codes. The following is a
typical application of the slippery slope argument to the
issue of active euthanasia:
[h]owever well any legislation is hedged about 
with guidelines and protections against abuse, 
the slippery slope predicts an inevitable 
extension of these practices to other, more 
vulnerable, groups, such as those who are 
demented, mentally ill, chronically disabled, 
frail, dependent and elderly - and perhaps even 
simply unhappy.26
The argument is also referred to as the wedge
argument. The English writer Francis Cornford articulated
the wedge principle in the following terms:
you should not act justly now for fear of raising 
expectations that you act still more justly in 
the future - expectations which you are afraid 
you will not have the courage to satisfy. A 
little reflection will make it evident that the 
wedge argument implies the admission that the 
persons who use it cannot prove that the action
25 See for example, Fenigsen, (1993, pp.167-173) and 
Ogilvie and Potts, (1994, pp.492-493).
26 Ogilvie and Potts, (1994, p.493).
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is not just. If they could, that would be the 
sole and sufficient reason for not doing it, and 
this argument would be superfluous.27
In the judicial context the principle has been articulated
in the form of the maxim obsta principis.28 An oft-cited
example is that of its use in the judgment of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Boyd v United States29
wherein Bradley J. stated, in the context of a search and
seizure case, that:
it may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its 
mildest and least repulsive form; but 
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely, by 
silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure... [The court's] motto 
should be obsta principis.30
The classic articulation of the slippery slope 
argument in the context of euthanasia is to be found in the 
writings of the American legal academic, Professor Yale 
Kamisar.31 Kamisar32 has argued against the introduction 
of laws permitting euthanasia.
He raises two main objections to the introduction of 
legalized euthanasia.
The first is based on the wedge argument. He is of the 
opinion that the legalization of voluntary euthanasia would
27 Cornford, (1966, p. 23).
28 See further, LaFave, (1986, pp.291-310).
29 116 U.S. 616 (1886) .
30 Ibid. , p. 635.
31 See, Kamisar, (1958, pp.969-998) and Kamisar, (1991,
pp.1203-1242) .
32 See, Kamisar, (1958, pp.969-998).
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lead ineluctably to the legalization of involuntary 
euthanasia. This is based on the premise that it is not 
possible to draw a rational distinction between those 
patients who wish to die because they are a burden to 
themselves and those who are euthanized because they are a 
burden to others.33
Kamisar's second objection to the legal recognition of 
euthanasia is the possibility of abuse or mistake. He 
believes that various pressures may be brought to bear on 
the patient by either family members or members of the 
medical team m  whose charge the patient is, which would 
raise a doubt as to the validity of the patient's consent 
to the procedure. The interests of the patient may, as a 
result, be overlooked.34
In addition to the potential for abuse, the potential 
is also there for mistake on the part of the medical 
practitioner. Thus, for example, a doctor may incorrectly 
diagnose a patient as being terminally ill. Kamisar, as a 
result, finds that the risk of such abuses and mistakes 
outweighs the competing claim of that group in society who 
wish to terminate their lives through euthanasia. He 
believes that because the class of persons who require 
euthanasia is so numerically insignificant that its desires 
should not overshadow the enormity of the potential hazards 
of this practice.
These arguments were countered by Glanville Williams
33 Ibid., p.987.
34 Ibid., p.997.
387
in a 1958 article.35 In reply to Kamisar's objection based
on the wedge argument, Williams states that it would be
possible for courts to establish guidelines that struck a
balance between, on the one hand, the autonomy of the
patient who wished to die, and, on the other, the need to
prevent abuse of the kind Kamisar feared. In an earlier
book, Williams outlined in detail his views on the issue of
euthanasia.36 It was this original argument which prompted
Kamisar's article on euthanasia. Williams, in his book,
believed that:
it is good that men should feel a horror of 
taking human life, but in rational judgment the 
quality of the life must be considered. The 
absolute interdiction of suicide and euthanasia 
involves the impossible assertion that every 
life, no matter what its quality or 
circumstances, is worth living and obligatory to 
be lived. This assertion of the value of mere 
existence, in the absence of all activities that 
give meaning to life, and in face of the 
disintegration of personality that so often 
follows from prolonged agony, will not stand 
scrutiny. On any rationally acceptable philosophy 
there is no ethical value in living any sort of 
life: the only life that is worth living is the 
good life.37
The focus is thus placed on the needs of the 
individual patient and his circumstances rather than on the 
more general approach of anti-euthanasia theorists who view 
life per se as a good in itself without regard- to the 
quality of that life. Indeed, Glanville Williams proceeded 
to propose his own solution to this dilemma in the form of
35 See, Williams, (1958b, pp.1-15).
36 Williams, (1958a, pp.277-312).
37 Ibid., pp.281-282.
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1. [f]or the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby 
declared that it shall be lawful for a physician 
whose patient is seriously ill -
(a) to administer to the patient drugs lawfully 
made and sold for the purpose of keeping patients 
insensitive to pain or of inducing sleep or 
unconsciousness, and to increase the doses of 
such drugs to the extent necessary to compensate 
for the establishment of the patient's tolerance 
thereof; and
(b) to refrain from taking steps to prolong the 
patient's life by medical means;
Provided that the defence given by this section 
shall not apply if it is not proved that the act 
was not done, or the omission was not made, in 
good faith for the purpose of saving the patient 
from severe pain in an illness believed to be of 
an incurable and fatal character.
2. It shall be lawful for a physician, after 
consultation with another physician, to 
accelerate by any merciful means the death of a 
patient who is seriously ill, unless it is proved 
that the act was not done in good faith with the 
consent of the patient and for the purpose of 
saving him from severe pain in an illness 
believed to be of an incurable and fatal 
character.
There should be included a section defining 
'physician' as any person licensed (or 
registered) for the practice of medicine in the 
state concerned.38
This model statute which Williams freely adapted from an
original draft proposed by the Humanitarian Society of
Connecticut, allows for the acceptance of patient autonomy
over the competing and more generalized interest in the
sanctity of life. This would allow a patient to exercise
his choice to die in such circumstances without the
interposition of the criminal law between him and his dying
wish.
However, a question which must be asked in the Irish 
context is even if it were to be accepted by the
the following points of principle:
38 Ibid., p. 308.
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legislature or the judiciary that a right to die either in 
statutory or constitutional law existed would it be 
exercisable, given the conservative ethos of the medical 
profession? Even if certain hospitals allowed such 
procedures to take place what of the patient who through no 
fault of his own finds himself in a hospital which is 
governed by the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic 
church? Is such a patient to be deprived of such a right 
merely through force of circumstances? That this is a 
sensitive issue in the Irish context is already obvious 
from the decision of Lynch J. in Re C (Ward of Court).39 In 
making an order to permit the ward to be transferred to 
another institution for the purpose of treatment 
withdrawal, is Lynch J. not drawing attention to the 
serious legislative lacuna which now exists in a state 
which guarantees medical treatment for all citizens, but is 
silent as to treatment withdrawal?
39 High Court, Unreported, 5 May 1995, Lynch J.
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CHAPTER SIX: ACTIVE INTERVENTION TO END LIFE II;
SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE.
'But the worst of all', Mr. Power said, 
'is the man who takes his own life'. 
Martin Cunningham drew out his watch 
briskly, coughed and put it back.
'The greatest disgrace to have in the 
family', Mr. Power added.
'Temporary insanity, of course', Martin 
Cunningham said decisively.
'We must take a charitable view of it'. 
'They say a man who does it is a 
coward', Mr. Daedalus said.
'It is not for us to judge', Martin 
Cunningham said.1
6.0 Introduction.
This passage from Joyce encapsulates the traditionally 
ambivalent attitude to suicide in Ireland. The suicide is 
seen as either a coward who has abdicated all 
responsibility, or as someone who is no longer responsible 
for his actions, through insanity, and is to be pitied 
rather than scorned.
The societal attitude to suicide in Ireland today 
continues to reflect, to a large degree this former state 
of affairs. The individual actor must be either mad or a 
coward. Rarely is it accepted that the suicide may have 
acted for reasons other than moral cowardice or insanity, 
but as the result of a rational choice, as an exercise in 
free-will.
These societal attitudes have been reflected in 
legislation and social policy in this area, and in many
1 Joyce, (1986, p.79).
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instances persist to the present day, despite the 
decriminalization of suicide per se.
Indeed, not only in Ireland can one witness this 
schizophrenic approach to the topic of suicide. The problem 
of suicide is a universal one. The issue of suicide has 
long provoked controversy, between on the one hand, those 
who uphold the concept of the sanctity of life and those 
who, on the other hand, see suicide as the ultimate 
expression of individual freedom. As will be demonstrated 
later in the chapter, the attitude in relation to the topic 
of suicide per se is reflected in a marked reluctance on 
the part of policy actors to adopt proposals on the issue 
of physician-assisted suicide.
6.1 Suicide in Ethical Theory.
The question of suicide has been the source of moral 
debate since earliest times. References to the practice of 
suicide can be traced to biblical times. However, the moral 
question attached to the act of suicide does not appear to 
have been broached by the biblical writers.2 In Greece the
2 Alvarez, (1971, pp.45-46), points out:
[t]here are four suicides recorded in the 
Old Testament - Samson, Saul, Abimelech and 
Achitophel - and none of them earns adverse 
comment. In fact they are scarcely commented 
on at all. In the New Testament, the suicide 
of even the greatest criminal, Judas 
Iscariot, is recorded as blankly; instead of 
being added to his crimes, it seems a 
measure of his repentance. Only much later 
did the theologians reverse the implicit 
judgment of Saint Matthew and suggest that
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towards the rejection of suicide. This conclusion was based
on the idea that life was in the hands of the gods and it
was for them to take it and not for mere mortals to usurp
their power. In the Phaedo.3 Plato spoke of man as being
the property of the gods. Just as man is angered at the
theft of his property, so are the gods angered at the theft
of the life of a mortal, their property.4
Aristotle used a modified version of this argument,
stating that suicide was an offence against the state, in
that it deprived it of an economically useful citizen and
left a moral taint in its wake.5
Plato, however, allowed for a number of exceptions to
the prohibition on suicide. These included the onset of a
painful illness.
In Athens, suicide was by no means ruled out in
practice. Indeed, the practice was legitimated in the
political structure of the time. As Alvarez reports, each
would-be suicide was first obliged to plead his case before
the senate. The principles were stated in the following
terms by Libanius:
[w]hoever no longer wishes to live shall state 
his reasons to the Senate, and after having 
received permission shall abandon life. If your 
existence is hateful to you, die; if you are
Judas was more damned by his suicide than by 
his betrayal of Christ.
3 See, Plato, (1975).
4 See further, Alvarez, (1971, p.52).
5 Ibid.
philosophical discussion of the act of suicide tended
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overwhelmed by fate, drink the hemlock. If you 
are bowed with grief, abandon life. Let the
unhappy man recount his misfortune, let the
magistrate supply him with the remedy, and his
wretchedness will come to an end.6
The issue of suicide in Ancient Greece appears to be one of
individual will rather than an overtly medicalized problem.
In Rome the issue was dealt with in a similar fashion.
As Alvarez puts it:
[t]he advanced Stoicism of the later Roman Empire 
was a further development of Plato; the argument 
was essentially the same but now the 
circumstances were internalized. When the inner 
compulsion became intolerable the question was no 
longer whether or not one should kill oneself, 
but how to do so with the greatest dignity, 
bravery and style.7
This practicality was mirrored in the attitude of Roman Law
to suicide. In certain instances, suicide was not viewed as
a crime. Thus, the suicide of a private citizen was not
deemed to be a crime if it came about as the result of
"impatience of pain or sickness, or by another cause... [or
by]... weariness of life... lunacy, or fear of dishonour".8
There were, however, exceptions to this general rule. Thus
if the suicide in question was a slave or soldier, then the
act was deemed to be contrary to law. This exception was
justified by the fact that such individuals were the
property of their masters and by the act of suicide were
depriving these masters of their property.9 In addition, if
6 Quoted by Alvarez, (1971, pp.53-54).
7 Ibid., p.54.
8 Silving, (1957, p.80).
9 Ibid.
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there was no apparent cause for the act of suicide then the 
act was deemed illegal because a person who would not value 
his own life without due cause would much less value the 
lives of others.10 Moreover, if suicide was committed to 
escape trial for a crime then punishment would ensue, but 
as Silving points out "in this instance the sanction was 
imposed upon that crime rather than upon the suicide".11
In the early medieval period the institutional Church 
introduced a prohibition on suicide, a stance which 
diverged from the neutral position of the earlier biblical 
writers. In 452 A.D. the Church introduced this diktat at 
the Council of Arles. The rationale for such prohibition 
was given in the following terms: "whoever kills himself, 
thereby killing an innocent person, commits homicide".12
At the Council of Toledo in 693 A.D. it was decreed 
that all life comes from God and only he can take it. Thus, 
all those who appropriated this title transgressed the 
Canon law and were to be punished by excommunication and by 
being denied a Christian burial.
Both Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were 
unequivocal on the topic of suicide. Augustine based his 
argument against suicide firstly on the sixth commandment: 
"[t]hou shalt not kill". This was an absolute divine law
10 Ibid. , p.81.
11 Ibid., p.80. For an analysis of this aspect of Roman 
law see, Griffin, (1986a, pp.64-77) and Griffin, (1986b, 
pp.192-202).
12 cited by Silvmg, (1957, p.80).
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Plato's argument to the effect that life was the property
of God and it was for him to decide when it ended. Thus,
suicide was seen as a mortal sin against God.14 In the
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, suicide was seen as a
transgression of the natural law and could not be
countenanced. It was a mortal sin against God, the ultimate
source of life, and also against the principles of justice
and charity.15 Aquinas posits three principal reasons
against the act of suicide:
[fjirst, everything naturally loves itself, and 
it is for this reason that everything naturally 
seeks to keep itself in being and to resist 
hostile forces. So suicide runs counter to one's 
natural inclination, and also to that charity by 
which one ought to cherish oneself... Second, 
every part belongs to the whole in virtue of what 
it is. But every man is part of the community, so
which could not be transgressed.13 Secondly, he adapted
13 Silving, (1957, pp.81-82), notes that it was this 
argument which influenced the attitude of common law to 
suicide:
[u]p to this day, we do not know what crime 
suicide constituted, whether a crime sui 
generis or a particular instance of murder, 
the better view being that it was the 
latter. Another interesting feature of that
crime is the manner in which it was
formulated. In the case of all other
offences, the common law defines the crime 
itself ('larceny is the felonious taking';
'murder is the unlawful killing'). But in 
suicide, not the crime but the criminal is 
defined: 'felo de se is he who kills'.
Obviously, as was Christian doctrine, so was 
the common law struggling with the dilemma 
of a crime m  which the aggressor and the 
object of aggression are united in one
person.
14 See further, Augustine, (1972, pp.26-39).
15 See, Aquinas, (1975, question 64, article 5, 
pp.31-37).
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that he belongs to the community in virtue of 
what he is. Suicide therefore involves damaging 
the community... Third, life is a gift made to 
man by God... Therefore a person who takes his 
own life sins against God.16
This view of suicide was to be challenged in David
Hume's important essay on the topic.17 Hume argues that the
religious critique of suicide is inadequate. The essay
opens in the following sceptical tone:
[o]ne considerable advantage that arises from 
philosophy consists in the sovereign antidote 
which it affords to superstition and false 
religion. All other remedies against that 
pestilent distemper are vain, or at least 
uncertain. Plain good sense, and the practice of 
the world, which alone serve most purposes of 
life, are here found ineffectual.18
Hume proceeds to address the Thomistic critique of
suicide.19 Hume claims that even if one accepts the
16 Aquinas, (1975, question 64, article 5, p.33).
17 See, Hume, (1965b, p.151). "On Suicide" was first 
published in English in 1777. For a fuller account of the 
historical circumstances surrounding the publication of the 
essay, see, MacDonald and Murphy, (1990, pp.160-164).
18 Hume,. (1965b, p. 151).
19 It is to be noted that nowhere in his essay does 
Hume mention Aquinas. However, as has been observed by 
Beauchamp, (1976, pp.75-76):
the arguments he attacks are recognizably 
[Thomistic]... My evidence that Hume's essay 
is a point by point response to Aquinas is 
entirely internal and uncomplicated: (1)
Hume individually attacks the three 
arguments advanced by Aquinas and only those 
three arguments; and (2) no other historical 
source known to me uses these three and only 
these three arguments against suicide. For 
example, Augustine relies on arguments from 
the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill', from 
the fact that suicide removes the 
possibility of repentance, and from 
cowardice. Overlapping arguments are used by 
Locke and by Hume's clerical enemy, William
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not impose a duty not to take one's own life. He writes:
[i]n order to govern the material world, the 
almighty Creator has established general and 
immutable laws, by which all bodies... are 
maintained in their proper sphere and function.
To govern the animal world, he has endowed all 
living creatures with bodily and mental powers... 
by which they are impelled or regulated m  that 
course of life to which they are destined. These 
two distinct principles of the material and 
animal world continually encroach upon each 
other, and mutually retard or forward each 
other's operation. The powers of men and of all 
other animals are restrained and directed by the 
nature and qualities of the surrounding bodies, 
and the modifications and actions of these bodies 
are incessantly altered by the operation of all 
animals.20
Hume advances the thesis that since whatever occurs in
the world is determined by God, then if a human being
commits suicide, this is God acting through that person. If
one is to accept the view that God can do no wrong then
that act of suicide cannot be wrong as it is ultimately
determined by God. As Hume states:
[t]he providence of the Deity appears not 
immediately in any operation, but governs 
everything by those general and immutable laws 
which have been established from the beginning of 
time. All events, in one sense, must be 
pronounced the action of the Almighty; they all 
proceed from those powers with which he has 
endowed his creatures.21
The Thomistic view that life belongs to God alone and 
it is for Him to take it is challenged by Hume in the
existence of a monotheistic deity, this, in itself, does
Warburton - as well as by numerous other 
philosophical and theological figures. But 
only Aquinas uses the set of arguments 
attacked by Hume and only those arguments.
20 Hume, (1965b, p. 153).
21 Ibid.
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[s]hall we assert that the Almighty has reserved 
to himself... the disposal of the lives of men, 
and has not submitted that event, in common with 
others, to the general laws by which the universe 
is governed? This is plainly false: the lives of 
men depend upon the same laws as the lives of all 
other animals.22
Here Hume is stating that humans tend to die of natural
causes which are distinct from the intervention of a divine
power. As Beauchamp explains, Hume appears to be saying
that:
since persons die of natural causes - as in the 
cases of being poisoned or swept away by a flood 
- it is gratuitous to maintain that there is an 
additional, non-natural divine cause.23
Hume then proceeds to attack the contention that in
committing suicide one is diverting the course of nature.
He argues inter alia that:
it would be equally criminal to act for the 
preservation of human life as for its 
destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is 
falling on my head, I alter the course of 
nature.24
In like vein, he states:
[i]t would be no crime in me to divert the Nile 
or Danube from its course, were I able to effect 
such purposes. Where then is the crime of 
shedding a few ounces of blood from their natural 
channel?25
However, some commentators on Hume's essay are of the 
opinion that he is not entirely successful in demonstrating
following terms:
22 Ibid., p. 154.
23 Beauchamp, (1976, p.77).
24 Hume, (1965b, p.155).
25 Ibid.
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that suicide is not morally wrong. As MacDonald and Murphy 
state:
[h]is arguments cannot be said to constitute a 
coherent defence of suicide. They are instead a 
series of answers to objections that were 
commonplace in the early eighteenth century.26
Yandell in his study on Hume's attitude to religion sums up
the argument on suicide thus:
[n]othing in Hume's essay has shown suicide not 
to be wrong. Nor are the only alternatives that 
suicide be always forbidden and suicide be 
sometimes a duty. Suppose that suicide is wrong 
unless one knows upon competent medical testimony 
confirmed by a second and independent opinion, 
that one's life is going to be short and what is 
left of it will be filled with agonizing pain too 
powerful to be much mitigated by drugs. It might 
then be that suicide was permissible but not 
obligatory. Hume's argument regarding suicide as 
a duty requires that only being a duty to and
being a duty not to are possible moral
situations, and being permissible to and being
permissible not to is an impossible moral
situation.27
Hume, however, does not lack supporters. Beauchamp
after a thorough analysis of the essay concludes that
Hume's argument, taken as an argument against Aquinas, is
a valid one. However, Beauchamp notes that even though
Aquinas offers:
no conceptual analysis of the term 'suicide', it 
is not implausible to suppose that for him this 
and related concepts contain an irreducible moral 
component: an act qualifies as suicide only if it 
is an instance of unjustified killing where the 
agent deliberately aims at taking his own life.
Hume, however, makes no similar conceptual
26 MacDonald and Murphy, (1990, p.161). For an 
analysis of the debate on suicide in the eighteenth century 
see, Crocker, (1952, pp.47-72). It would be far from fair 
to claim that Hume's argument is universally rejected. For 
a modern variant see, Brandt, (1975, pp.61-76).
27 Yandell, (1990, p.293).
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assumption. Suicide for him is intentional 
killing of the self and may or may not be morally 
justified. Since their understandings of suicide 
differ, it might be argued that Hume and Aquinas 
have only a conceptual dispute, and not a moral 
one, because cases of justified self-killing for 
Hume are extensionally equivalent with cases of 
justified self-killing for Aquinas. It might be 
argued by a Thomist for example, that Hume's case 
of the pliable spy, and indeed all of his 
convincing cases of justified suicide involve 
persons who lay down their lives for the sake of 
others, in which case Aquinas would not regard 
the act as suicide, strictly speaking. Since the 
suicide's motive is other-regarding rather than 
self-regarding, and so does not aim at the taking 
of his own life, his act is morally acceptable.
It therefore could not as a matter of logic be a 
case of suicide. If this is a correct 
interpretation... then Hume arguably does not 
refute him; rather Hume simply adopts a different 
(and stipulative) use of the term 'suicide'.28
In another sense, Hume was adding another dimension to the
debate on suicide. As well as arguing against the Thomistic
spiritual argument against suicide, he was also arguing
against the criminality of the act.
As well as being invalid to view suicide as being
morally wrong, it was also incorrect to condemn the act as
being criminal. He was thus following in a tradition of
Enlightenment writers who had encouraged a more secular
debate on the topic.
Foremost amongst such writers were Montesquieu,29 and
Voltaire.30 Indeed, as Seidler notes, the arguments of such
writers influenced the official attitude towards suicide
leading to its eventual decriminalization in 1790 by the
28 Beauchamp, (1976, p.91).
29 Montesquieu, Baron de la Brede et de, (1973, 
Lettres 76 and 77, pp.191-193).
30 Voltaire, (Arouet, F-M.), (1878, p.95).
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French National Assembly.31 As Silvmg32 has noted, 
Napoleon's Penal Code 1810 makes no mention of suicide, 
consolidating the earlier resolution of the National 
Assembly.
This shift of the debate to a more rational and
secular plane, did not lead to an overwhelming consensus in
favour of suicide. One of the most important opponents of
suicide was Immanuel Kant. Kant's argument was an
adaptation and refinement of the earlier natural law
arguments against suicide. As Seidler has observed:
Kant transformed the weaker, more hypothetical 
natural law argumentation into a stronger 
individualism focusing on personal freedom and 
reason as the autonomous source of morality.33
In this model, the act of suicide is seen to be wrong
because as Kant argued:
it fails to respect the self-legislating moral 
subject who is the most valuable entity in the 
world, and whose individual conduct helps to 
constitute that very moral order within which 
ethical questions about suicide can initially be 
raised.34
Kant, in essence, believed that the individual had a 
duty to himself. This duty encompassed the duty not to take 
his own life. Kant35 was of the view that:
31 See, Seidler, (1983, p.439, footnote 37). For a full 
account see, Crocker, (1952, pp.47-72).
32 Silving, (1957, p.84).
33 Seidler, (1983, p.443).
34 Ibid.
35 See, Kant, (1972, pp.91-92). See for further 
commentary, Ross, (1978, pp.10-28) and Wolff, (1986, pp.2- 
14).
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the man who contemplates suicide will ask 'Can my 
action be compatible with the idea of humanity as 
an end in itself?' If he does away with himself 
in order to escape from a painful situation, he 
is making use of a person merely as a means to 
maintain a tolerable state of affairs till the 
end of his life. But man is not a thing - not 
something to be used merely as a means: he must 
always in all his actions be regarded as an end 
in himself. Hence I cannot dispose of man in my 
person by maiming, spoiling, or killing.36
As a natural being, according to Kant, man's first
duty is that of self-preservation. To commit suicide,
therefore, is to eliminate the very condition for the
existence of the self. It is, in effect, treating life as
a means rather than an end in itself. Kant developed a form
of morality which was apparently internal and at the same
time universal. He saw autonomy or free-will as a major
component of existence. If one kills oneself then one, by
implication, is no longer able to exercise free-will. As
Kant notes:
[b]ut in taking his life he does not preserve his 
person; he disposes of his person... he robs 
himself of his person. This is contrary to the 
highest duty we have towards ourselves, for it 
annuls the condition of all other duties; it goes 
beyond the limits of the use of free-will, for 
this use is possible only through the existence 
of the subject.37
Feinberg refers to this form of autonomy thus:
[w]e are enjoined by Kant to respect, not the 
deliberate choices of persons whatever they may 
be, but the 'humanity' in each person; not the 
voluntariness of decisions as such, but their 
'rationality'; not a uniquely concrete being, but 
some abstraction within him; not a personal 
dignity, but the alien dignity of some extra­
personal source. Kant's language implies that we
36 Kant, (1972, pp.91-92).
37 Kant, (1930, p.149) .
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must cherish and protect a person's choice, not 
because it is his. simply, but because of 
something within him, quite independent of his 
will, a kind of internal Vatican City not subject 
to his sovereign control.38
The practical implications of Kant's model of autonomy 
in the field of thanatology is that acts such as assisted 
suicide or active euthanasia would be ruled out as being 
antithetical to the Kantian model of autonomy. This 
argument could be employed independently of Thomistic 
natural law arguments against these practices.39
6.2 The Legal Formalization of Suicide.
The earliest references to suicide in the context of
the common law are to be found in the writings of de
Bracton in the thirteenth century.40 As Silving points out,
the influence of Roman law on the early common law approach
to suicide was clear. She asserts that:
the common law crime of suicide developed from 
the Roman rule providing for the punishment of 
suicide committed to avoid trial or conviction... 
punishment was originally imposed not upon the 
act of suicide itself but rather upon another 
capital crime to which the suicide was related.
Since in both laws, a man accused of a capital 
crime would not forfeit his estate until judgment 
was rendered, an accused or convicted person 
could save his estate for his heirs by committing 
suicide. Hence the frequency of suicides in cases 
of conviction and the introduction into the law 
of a rebuttable presumption that suicide implies 
confession of the crime charged, carrying with
38 Feinberg, (1986, p.94).
39 For a critique of the Kantian model see, Feinberg, 
(1986, pp.94-97).
40 See, Bracton, de, (1968, pp.423-424).
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it, - in the absence of rebuttal - confiscation 
of property.41
However, de Bracton did include an exemption from
punishment in the case of those who were found to be non
compos mentis.42 He set out in the following terms the
legal consequences of the act of suicide:
[t]he land should never return to the lord, 
unless there has been a conviction of felony in 
some way or other, as if he be hung or outlawed, 
or has acknowledged the felony and has abjured 
the realm, and such like. But if he has died 
before a conviction of felony, in whatever 
manner, the inheritance shall descend to his 
heirs, unless it should happen, that conscious of 
his crime and afraid of being hanged or of some 
other punishment, he has slain himself, and the 
inheritance shall be an escheat of the lord's.
But if he has through phrensy or impatience of 
grief or by misadventure, it shall be 
otherwise.43
Mikell, in his study of this aspect of the criminal 
law, has concluded that Bracton obtained more than a little 
help from Roman law.44
Indeed the only aspect of de Bracton's model which 
departed from the practice in Roman law was the holding 
that those who committed suicide through what he termed 
"weariness of life or impatience of sickness" would be 
subject to forfeiture of their goods. In Roman law this 
type of suicide escaped punishment. Later the law on 
suicide was widened to include within its scope the actual
41 Silving, (1957, p.81).
42 See Bracton, de, (1968, pp.423-424).
43 The above extract is to be found cited in Mikell, 
(1903, p.379).
44 Ibid.
act of suicide rather than the crime which the suicide had 
tried to escape through killing himself.45
In addition to the forfeiture of property, another 
form of punishment was exacted on the body of the suicide. 
The body of the suicide was to be deprived of a Christian 
burial and was instead to be buried at a crossroads upon 
the order of the presiding coroner with a stake to be 
driven through his body.46 This idea of punishing the 
cadaver of a suicide can be found even in ancient Greece. 
Thus, it was the practice in Athens to chop off the hand of 
a suicide, preferably the one with which he had committed
45 See further, Pollock and Maitland, (1968, p.488).
46 Forbes, (1971, pp.164-165), cites the following 
extract from a coroner's inquest held in St. Botolph's 
Church in 1590, which includes the form of the burial of a 
suicide:
she had cast a cord abowte a beam in her 
sayd chamber Fastninge it to the sayd beame 
and puttinge the same with slydinge knott 
abowte her neck as it appeared standinge 
upon a three Footed stoole which with one of 
her feete she had thrust from her and so 
hanged her selfe her feet standinge Bent 
upon the flower or borde of the sayd chamber 
and being fownde by the Jurie of Crowners 
quest that she Fallinge from god had hanged 
or murthered her selfe, Where opon Judgment 
was given... by the sayd crowner that she 
should be carried from her sayd house to 
cross way near the townes end and theare 
that should ha[ve a] stake dreven thorowgh 
her brest and so be buried with the stake to 
be seene for a memoryall that otheres goinge 
by seeinge the same myght take heede from 
comittinge the lyke faite. And the sayd Amy 
Stokes was so buried in the crossway Beyond 
sparrowes corner neare to the place wheare 
the owld cross ded stand the sayd vijth Day 
of September ano 1590 abowte the owere of 
v n j  or ix of the clocke at nyght she was 
abowte three skore yeares owld.
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the act.
those who committed suicide by hanging were denied burial.
Forbes has noted the origins of the burial of suicides at
a crossroads as follows:
[t]he early Teutonic tribes performed human 
sacrifices on altars that many times were built 
at crossroads. Often the victims were criminals; 
their remains were buried on the spot. From this 
grew the practice of public executions at 
crossroads and of the burial of the criminals and 
the equally abhorred suicides at the site... Such 
a triple branching or fork constituted the 
ancient Latin triviumf the three ways. Hecate, 
the mysterious goddess of darkness, terror and 
witchcraft, haunted graveyards and crossroads.47
Under the Roman pontifical law of the Pontifex Maximus
MacDonald and Murphy point out that even though such 
punishments were available in theory, in practice the 
medieval coroner and the coroner's jury tended to be lax in 
their execution of these procedures. They claim that 
"juries very seldom returned verdicts of felo de se prior 
to 1500".48
They attribute this phenomenon, in large measure, to
a sense of community solidarity and feeling, towards both
the suicide and the suicide's family. Indeed, even on those
rare occasions when a verdict of felo de se was returned:
medieval juries seem often to have undervalued 
the goods of self-murderers, as they did those of 
other felons. Enforcement of the law was thus 
left largely in the hands of a local official and 
a jury of local men. However much they may have 
abhorred suicide itself, they usually preferred 
to acquit self-killers, rather than to deprive
47 Ibid., pp.167-168.
48 MacDonald and Murphy, (1990, p.23).
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However, the law and practice in relation to suicide 
was to become increasingly harsh. The problem of the lax 
coroner was to be rectified by the Coroners Act 1487. This 
statute provided for the holding of an inquest into every 
violent or suspicious death in the coroner's district. In 
addition, it provided a regulatory framework for the 
performance of the duties of coroner. This regulatory 
framework was consolidated by the Coroners Act 1509, 
whereby a regular procedure for the returning of 
inquisitions to the court of King's Bench and a recording 
of their verdicts was established. This legislative reform 
provided for the payment of the coroner. Moreover, the 
coroner was obliged to return copies of his inquests at the 
meetings of the assizes in his county. The clerk of the 
assize then returned them to the court of King's Bench for 
review. The court of King's Bench thus acted as a form of
their heirs, possibly impoverishing a family.49
49 Ibid. For further detailed analysis of this aspect 
of legal history see Hanawalt, (1979, pp.101-104) and 
Hunnisett, (1961, pp.1-20). It is also interesting to note 
that there was often a tension between the Crown and the 
local community in relation to the outcome of inquests into 
alleged suicides. The interest of the Crown was obviously 
m  obtaining a verdict of felo de se as the property of the 
suicide would then go to the Crown on escheat. This 
conflicted with the interest of the community in preventing 
the impoverishment of the suicide's family. MacDonald and 
Murphy, (1990, p.22), note that:
[r]oyal interest in felo de se deepened in 
the fourteenth century, when the Crown 
realized that it could yield windfalls that 
were an attractive kind of patronage. ,
Richard II gave part of the property of a 
number of suicides to courtiers, and like 
other medieval monarchs he also granted away 
the rights to the goods of felons of 
themselves to noblemen and lesser landlords.
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The official into whose hands the chattels of the
suicide were delivered was the king's almoner who was
usually a cleric. The almoner in addition to recourse to
the court of King's Bench was also enabled to sue in the
court of Star Chamber.50 This provided for a further
monitoring of the activities of the coroner and as
MacDonald and Murphy note, it:
served as the ultimate deterrent to evasion and 
fraud, a blunderbuss the almoner could point in 
the direction of anyone bold enough or clever 
enough to defy King's Bench.51
The law continued to require that the suicide be 
buried in the public highway and that a stake be driven 
through his heart until 1823. By a law entitled An Act to
Alter and Amend the Law Relating to the Internment of the
Remains of any Person Found Felo de Se 1823, the suicide 
was no longer to be buried in such a manner, but it was to 
remain the case that a suicide was to be denied a Christian 
burial. The Burial Act 1880 and the Internments (Felo de 
Se) Act 1882 provided for the performance of a religious 
service at the burial of a suicide.52
Suicide, however, remained a crime until 1961 in 
England and Wales. By the Suicide Act 1961, the act of
watchdog over the activities of the coroner.
50 It appears that he obtained this right to sue in the 
court of Star Chamber in or about 1540. See further, Guy,
(1985) and MacDonald and Murphy, (1990, pp.25-26).
51 Ibid., p.26.
52 For a fuller account of the background to this 
reform see, Anderson, (1987, pp.263-311).
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suicide was decriminalized.53 Notwithstanding this reform, 
it continued to be a crime punishable by a maximum sentence 
of fourteen years imprisonment to aid, abet, counsel or 
procure the suicide of another.54 It is this aspect of the 
modern law in relation to assisted suicide which prevents 
the practice of physician-assisted suicide.
t
6.3 Assisting Suicide.
In the case of Attorney-General v Able.55 Woolf J. 
stated that it was not necessary to allege that the 
defendant had done any one of the four activities (aid,
abet, counsel or procure). Rather, the words were to be
"seen as a whole".56 The case involved the distribution by 
the Voluntary Euthanasia Society of a booklet entitled A 
Guide to Self-deliverance. The booklet purported to 
overcome the fear of dying and to reduce the incidence of 
unsuccessful suicides. Methods of successfully committing 
suicide were set out in the booklet.
The Attorney-General, in making the application, 
believed that the distribution of such a booklet amounted
to an offence under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961.
However, he did not wish to prosecute the members of the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society's executive committee as he
53 Section l.
54 Section 2(1).
55 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277.
56 Ibid. , p.285.
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believed them to be respectable persons who had issued the
booklet out of genuine and strongly-held beliefs. Instead,
he applied in civil proceedings for declarations that the
future supply of the booklet to persons who were known to
be, or were likely to be, considering or intending to
commit suicide constituted the offence of aiding, abetting,
counselling or procuring the suicide of another, contrary
to section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, if after reading
the booklet such a person committed or attempted to commit
suicide. In addition, the Attorney-General contended that
it constituted an attempt to commit an offence under
section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, where a person with
such inclinations, after reading the booklet, did not
commit or attempt to commit suicide.
In his judgment, Woolf J. stated in relation to
section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, that to aid, abet,
counsel or procure the suicide of another, or an attempt to
commit suicide can be an offence even if the person
concerned does not attempt to commit suicide.57 In addition
those who aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of
another are to retain the liability of an accessory at or
before the fact at common law.58 Woolf J. summarized the
issue for decision in the following terms:
the issue can be confined to considering whether 
distributing the booklet to someone who commits 
suicide or attempts to commit suicide makes the 
distributor 'an accessory before the fact' to the
57 Referring to the case of R v McShane (1977) 66 Cr. 
App. R. 97 and section 3 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
58 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277, p.285.
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suicide or attempted suicide, the position so far 
as the distributor is concerned being exactly the 
same as it would be if either suicide or 
attempted suicide was still a criminal offence.59
Having referred to the historical origins of the 
phrases aid, abet, counsel and procure,60 Woolf J. came to 
the conclusion that in deciding whether or not an offence 
has been committed, it is preferable to consider 'aids, 
abets, counsels or procures' as a whole.61 Woolf J. then 
proceeded to outline the test to be applied in such cases. 
Thus, to be regarded as an accessory before the fact, three 
criteria must be fulfilled.
The actions of the alleged accessory should indicate 
three things. First, that he knew that the act in question 
was contemplated. Second, that he assented to such act. 
Third, that his attitude in respect of the act encouraged 
the principal to perform or attempt to perform the act.62 
In applying this test to the instant case, Woolf J. found 
that the recipients fulfilled these criteria.
However, Woolf J. then added that if, for example, the 
person seeking the booklet did not specify to the 
distributor the purpose for which he required the booklet, 
so that it might be required for research or general 
information rather than to commit suicide, or where the 
booklet was unconnected to the person's subsequent suicide
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., and see further, Smith, (1991, pp.30-34).
61 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277, p.285.
62 Ibid.
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or suicide attempt, because it may have occurred a long
time after he received the booklet, the distributor would
then lack the necessary intent to commit the offence under
section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. As a result the
declaration sought by the Attorney-General was refused.
Authority on this issue is scant in Ireland. Given the
fact that the wording of the equivalent section in the
Irish Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 is almost identical
it would appear that a similar stance may be taken by Irish
courts on the issue. Section 2(2) of the Criminal Law
(Suicide) Act 1993 states that:
[a] person who aids, abets, counsels or procures 
the suicide of another, or an attempt by another 
to commit suicide, shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall be liable on conviction on indictment 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen 
years.
This wording almost mirrors that found in the English 
Suicide Act 1961 except that the English statute does not 
contain the words "shall be guilty of an offence and". 
Given this similarity, it would be logical to assume that 
the interpretation of the section by Irish courts would be 
similar to that of previous English decisions in this area. 
However, the area remains uncertain even in English law. In 
the absence of an authoritative statement of the law on 
this issue, uncertainty persists as to who may be 
successfully prosecuted, and in what circumstances. As 
K.J.M. Smith has remarked m  commenting on the case of 
Attorney-General v Able63:
63 [1984] 1 All E.R. 277.
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[w]hether sleeping dogs will be allowed to lie 
for any length of time before a prosecution is 
brought will turn partly on the Attorney- 
General 's interpretation of Able and on the 
general social view of the activities of those 
who assist suicide. The underlying difficulty is 
that the potential range of motivation of such 
parties is, of course, almost infinite, running 
from the deeply humane and laudable to the 
avaricious and strongly repellent. In particular, 
it was concern over imaginable cases of 
impatiently rapacious heirs and manipulable 
relatives which was in good measure responsible 
for the continuation of criminal liability for 
complicity in another's suicide.64
Thus, the legislative solution to this dilemma both in 
Ireland and England was to view both the humane and 
repellent acts similarly. This is hardly an equitable 
solution. To treat, for example, a doctor who has aided a 
patient in the final stages of a terminal illness to commit 
suicide in the same manner as an avaricious relative is 
quite absurd. The most equitable solution is to introduce 
legislation which would allow doctors to comply with the 
wishes of seriously ill patients without being branded as 
criminals as a result. In recent years, such an approach 
has been mooted m  a number of American states with varying 
degrees of success. These developments shall now be 
examined in order to provide a model for future Irish 
legislative intervention in this area of medical practice.
64 Smith, (1983, p.586) .
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6.4 Physician-Assisted Suicide.
Introduction.
To begin with, one must distinguish between the term 
physician-assisted suicide and the term active euthanasia. 
This is an important, if obvious, requirement, as the two 
distinct concepts are often fused.65 In the case of 
physician-assisted suicide, the doctor furnishes the 
patient with the means to terminate his life but does not 
act positively to terminate that patient's life, for 
example, when he writes a prescription for a lethal dose of 
barbiturates, or, as in the case of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, 
when he sets up a suicide machine in a patient's home, 
leaving the patient to carry out the act of releasing the 
lethal gas fumes which will bring about his death. Rather, 
it is the patient who brings about his own death by 
purchasing those pills and ingesting them or by bringing 
about the emission of lethal gas. Active euthanasia
65 However, some commentators insist that there is 
essentially no difference between the two concepts. See for 
example, Fletcher, (1954, p.176), where he claims that l t 
is not possible to separate the issue of active voluntary 
euthanasia from suicide and goes so far as to say that it 
is a form of suicide. Barrington, (1969, p.162), argues as 
follows "that voluntary euthanasia is in fact assisted 
suicide is no doubt clear to most people". Gillon, (1969, 
pp.173-174), claims that "voluntary euthanasia is in fact 
a form of suicide, involving the assistance of others". 
Rachels, (1986, pp.86-87), contends that:
the permissibility of euthanasia follows 
from the permissibility of suicide - a 
result that probably will not surprise any 
thoughtful person.
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acting as the agent who brings about the patient's death,
as for example in the case of a doctor who administers a
lethal dose of a pain-killing injection to a patient who
has given valid consent. Quill, Cassel and Meier have
pointed out the more democratic nature of the former as a
means of giving legal validity to a right to die:
the balance of power between doctor and patient 
is more nearly equal in physician-assisted 
suicide than in euthanasia. The physician is 
counsellor and witness and makes the means 
available, but ultimately the patient must be the 
one to act or not. In voluntary euthanasia, the 
physician both provides the means and carries out 
the final act, with greatly amplified power over 
the patient and an increased risk of error, 
coercion or abuse.66
This approach neatly counters the twin pillars of the 
traditional anti-euthanasia argument, namely, the slippery 
slope and abuse arguments, and respects both the individual 
autonomy of the patient and the doctor's professional 
integrity. Perhaps it is this model which Irish legislators 
should consider when the hoary old issue of euthanasia 
comes on to the constitutional and policy agenda, which is 
ineluctable given both demographic and health policy 
trends. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine the 
varying legal models which would give legal effect to the 
act of physician-assisted suicide.
involves the doctor in supplying the means of death and
66 Quill, cassel and Meier, (1994, pp.190-191).
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Washington and Initiative 119.
Washington is one of almost twenty-five American
states which provide for the introduction of legislation by
direct vote on an initiative petition. In 1991 the Hemlock
Society put forward an initiative petition relating to
physician-assisted' suicide. Initiative 119, as it was
called provided for what was termed 'physician aid in
dying' by means of an amendment to Washington's Natural
Death Act 1979.67 The framers of the initiative defined the
term 'physician aid in dying' as:
a medical service, provided in person by a 
physician, that will end the life of a conscious 
and mentally competent qualified patient in a 
dignified, painless and humane manner, when 
requested voluntarily by the patient through a 
written directive.68
The difficulty with such wording was that it did not 
adequately distinguish between the practice of physician- 
assisted suicide and the practice of active euthanasia. The 
voters were, as a result, unsure of the exact nature of the 
practice for which they were voting, and were easily swayed 
by the hyperbole of anti-euthanasia campaigners. The 
initiative was defeated with fifty-four per cent of those 
who voted, voting against the initiative, and forty-six per 
cent voting for the initiative.
Legislative Initiatives.
67 Revised Code of Washington Annotated sections 
70.122.100 - .905 (1992).
68 Quoted in Annas, (1994, p.1240).
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As a result of this experience a pressure group, 
Compassion in Dying, which provides support and counselling 
for mentally competent, terminally ill adults considering 
suicide, initiated a legal challenge to Washington's law 
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide in the case of 
terminally ill persons.69 This law provides that those who 
assist another to commit suicide shall be guilty of a 
felony. This offence is punishable by imprisonment for a 
maximum of five years and a fine of up to ten thousand 
dollars.
The pressure group was joined in the action by three 
terminally ill patients and four physicians who are 
involved in the care of the terminally ill. The three 
patients wanted to be enabled to obtain prescriptions for 
lethal doses of drugs from their doctors, arguing that they 
had a constitutionally protected interest guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to commit suicide 
with the aid of a doctor. The physicians also alleged that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects their right to practice 
medicine consistent with their best professional judgment, 
including the right to assist competent, terminally ill 
adult patients to hasten death, by prescribing suitable 
medication for self-administration by the patient. 
Compassion in Dying for their part, claimed that competent, 
terminally ill adults have the right to request assistance 
from its staff members, which would include both
69 Compassion in Dying v Washington 850 F.Supp. 1454 
(D.C. Wash.) (1994).
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counselling and the delivering or mixing of the drugs to be 
used.
Lawyers on behalf of the state argued that laws 
outlawing assisted suicide were required in order to 
protect vulnerable members of society who, through undue 
influence, may be persuaded to commit suicide. Moreover, 
the state argued, if the practice of physician-assisted 
suicide were to be legalized, those other than the 
terminally ill may be persuaded to avail of it, another 
variant on the slippery slope argument.
It was held by the Washington Federal District Court 
judge that the statute was unconstitutional, as it denied 
equal protection under the law to competent terminally ill 
patients who had no life-sustaining treatment to refuse. 
This was due to the provisions in Washington's Natural 
Death Act 1979 which allowed terminally ill patients to use 
advance directives to order the withholding or withdrawal 
of treatment in the case of terminal illness or in the case 
of their entering a state of permanent unconsciousness. 
This could be seen as treating different classes of persons 
in an unequal manner.
In speaking of the constitutionally protected liberty 
interest, Rothstein J. referred to previous Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the issue. In particular, she referred to 
the case of Planned Parenthood v Casey.70 In Planned 
Parenthood v Casey the liberty interest involved was a 
woman's right to choose abortion. Rothstein J., while
70 112 S.Ct 2791 (1992).
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different in substance from the instant case, found the
reasoning in that case to be of particular relevance. She
stated that even though Planned Parenthood v Casey:
involved a woman's right to choose abortion, and 
thus did not address the question of what liberty 
interest may inhere in a terminally ill person's 
choice to commit suicide... this court finds the 
reasoning in Casey highly instructive and almost 
prescriptive on the latter issue. Like the 
abortion decision, the decision of a terminally 
ill person to end his or her life 'involves the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime' and constitutes a 'choice 
central to personal dignity and autonomy'.71
The judge then compared the issues of abortion and
physician-assisted suicide in terms of the moral
divisiveness engendered by both issues. She stressed the
need to avoid imposing moral standards on such issues in
the place of legal analysis. She cited the following
passage from Planned Parenthood v Casey as a basis for her
analysis of the issue:
[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying 
constitutional issue is whether the [s]tate can 
resolve these philosophic questions in such a 
definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in 
the matter.72
In applying the reasoning in Planned Parenthood v Casey to
the instant case, Rothstein J. was of the opinion that:
the suffering of a terminally ill person cannot 
be deemed any less intimate or personal, or any 
less deserving of protection from unwarranted 
governmental interference, than that of a
stating that the decision in Planned Parenthood v Casev was
71 Compassion in Dying v Washington 850 F.Supp. 1454 
(D.C. Wash.) (1994), pp.1459-1460.
72 Planned Parenthood v Casey 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), 
p.2806.
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;pregnant woman, Thus, consonant with the 
reasoning in Casey P such an intimate personal 
decision falls within the realm of the liberties 
constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.73
Rothstein J. also adverted to the Supreme Court
decision in Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of
Health74 in her judgment. Cruzan v Director. Missouri
Department of Health was concerned with the related but
distinct issue of refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment.75 In Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of
Health the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected right to
refuse artificial hydration and nutrition. Rothstein J. in
the instant case was confident that:
squarely faced with the issue, the Supreme Court 
would reaffirm Rehnquist J.'s tentative 
conclusion in Cruzan that a competent person has 
a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment, even when that treatment is 
life-sustaining and refusal or withdrawal of the 
treatment would mean certain death. The question 
then becomes whether a constitutional distinction 
can be drawn between refusal or withdrawal of 
medical treatment which results in death, and the 
situation in this case involving competent, 
terminally ill individuals who wish to hasten 
death by self-administering drugs prescribed by 
a physician.76
Rothstein J. was of the opinion that there was no 
appreciable difference between the liberty interest 
protected in both instances. She stated that the liberty
73 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994), p.1460.
74 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
75 For an analysis of this issue see Chapter Four of 
this thesis, pp.273-296.
76 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994), p.1461.
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is the freedom to make choices according to one's 
individual conscience about those matters which 
are essential to personal autonomy and basic 
human dignity. There is no more profoundly 
personal decision, nor one which is closer to the 
heart of personal liberty, than the choice which 
a terminally ill person makes to end his or her 
suffering and hasten an inevitable death. From a 
constitutional perspective, the court does not 
believe that a distinction can be drawn between 
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and 
physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, 
mentally competent, terminally ill adult.77
On the question of equal protection, Rothstein J.
supported the plaintiffs' contention that the statute in
question violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause provides that all those
who are similarly situated should be treated alike. When a
state law is found to violate the constitutionally
protected rights of certain individuals but not of others
in a similar situation then such a law may be subjected to
what is termed 'strict scrutiny' and will only be upheld if
it can be demonstrated that such a state of affairs serves
a compelling state interest.78
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
77 Ibid.
78 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was 
ratified in 1868. The Equal Protection Clause is to be found 
in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It provides that 
no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws".
The traditional test used by the courts in analyzing 
statutes which appeared to treat similarly situated groups 
differently was the so-called 'rational basis' test. This 
test was first articulated by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Gulf. C.. and S.F.R. Co. v Ellis 165 U.S. 150 (1897). 
Under this test, it must be demonstrated that the purpose 
of the challenged discrimination is a legitimate state 
objective and that the means employed by the state are
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In this case, the two similarly situated groups were,
on the one hand, mentally competent, terminally ill adults
whose condition involves the use of life-sustaining
equipment and who may lawfully obtain medical assistance in
terminating such treatment and, on the other hand, mentally
competent, terminally ill adults whose treatment does not
involve the use of life support systems and who are denied
the opportunity of hastening death with medical assistance.
On the point of the unequal treatment afforded both
groups, the judge recognized the governmental interest in
preventing suicide as being a compelling state interest,
but observed that both the Washington Natural Death Act
1979 and Washington case-law had created an exception for
terminally ill patients and those in a permanent
unconscious state wishing to terminate life support.79
Rothstein J. was thus of the view that the state had
already recognized that its interest in preventing suicide
did not require an absolute ban. She went on to state that:
Washington law, by creating an exception for 
those patients on life support, yet not 
permitting competent, terminally ill adult 
patients such as plaintiffs the equivalent option 
of exercising their rights to hasten their deaths 
with medical assistance, creates a situation in
rationally related to the achievement of its objective. The 
doctrine of 'strict scrutiny' later emerged in cases such 
as Hirabayashi v United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and
Korematsu v United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This test 
holds that certain forms of discrimination are suspect and 
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, the 
state must demonstrate that such statutes are necessary to 
the achievement of a compelling interest.
79 See for example, In Re Guardianship of Bowman 617 
P.2d 731 (1980); Re Grant 747 P.2d 445 (1987) and Re Hamlin 
689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
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which the fundamental rights of one group are 
burdened while those of a similarly situated 
group are not. Therefore, this court finds that 
[the Washington statute forbidding assisted 
suicide] violates the equal protection guarantee 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.80
As regards the standard of review to be applied in the 
instant case, Rothstein J. was of the opinion that the 
standard laid down in Planned Parenthood v Casey should be 
applicable. In Planned Parenthood v Casey the Supreme Court 
held that, in order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality 
of a state statute, the plaintiffs had to show that it 
would operate as a substantial obstacle to the exercise of 
a constitutional right, and would, as a result, constitute 
an undue burden.81 In applying this standard to the instant 
case, Rothstein J. first looked at the interests of the 
state in upholding the statute.
The interests were twofold. Firstly, the statute 
purported to further the interest of preventing suicide, 
and secondly, it purported to protect those at risk of 
suicide from undue influence from others who would aid them 
in that act. In answer to the first contention, it was held 
that:
[t]he state's interest in preventing suicide by 
prohibiting any manner of assisted suicide in 
actuality arises out of its apprehension of the 
'slippery slope7 problem. The [s]tate is 
concerned that allowing any exception to a total 
ban will encourage the gradual development of a 
more permissive attitude toward suicide... 
However, that is not a sufficient excuse for 
precluding entirely the exercise of a 
constitutional right. The court has no doubt that
80 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994), pp.1466-1467.
81 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), p.2830.
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the legislature can devise regulations which will 
define the appropriate boundaries of physician- 
assisted suicide for terminally ill individuals, 
and at the same time give due recognition to the 
important public policy concerns regarding the 
prevention of suicide.82
In relation to the state's contention pertaining to
undue influence and duress in assisted suicide cases, it
was held that:
it is undisputed that plaintiffs in this case are 
mentally competent individuals who have reached 
a decision to commit physician-assisted suicide 
free of any undue influence. Thus, the plaintiffs 
and others who make knowing and voluntary choices 
to commit physician-assisted suicide by 
definition fall outside the realm of the 
[s]tate's concern.83
Moreover, the judge observed that Washington law already
permitted an individual to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, in the event of terminal illness or entering a
state of permanent unconsciousness. In those cases, the
judge pointed out, the potential risk of abuse was also
present. Rothstein J. concluded that it would be possible
for the legislature to:
devise regulations which would set up a mechanism 
for ensuring that people who decide to commit 
physician-assisted suicide are not acting 
pursuant to abuse, coercion or undue influence 
from third parties.84
The decision of the Washington Federal District Court is
currently under appeal.
82 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994), p.1465.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 1466.
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California and Proposition 161.
In 1992, the group Californians against Human
Suffering sponsored an initiative measure known as
Proposition 161. This proposed statute included a clearer
definition of the term 'aid-in-dying7 which encompassed
both active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The
term was defined as referring to:
a medical procedure that will terminate the life 
of the qualified patient in a painless, humane, 
and dignified manner whether administered by the 
physician at the patient's choice or direction or 
whether the physician provides means to the 
patient for self-administration.85
The term 'qualified patient7 is defined in the initiative
statute as:
a mentally competent adult patient who has 
voluntarily executed a currently valid revocable 
Directive as defined in this section, who has 
been diagnosed and certified in writing by two 
physicians to be afflicted with a terminal 
condition, and who has requested an enduring 
request for aid-in-dying. One of said physicians 
shall be the attending physician as defined in 
subdivision (a). Both physicians shall have 
personally examined the patient.86
85 California Proposition 161: Phvsician-Assisted Death 
- Terminal Condition - Initiative Statute 1992 section
2525.2 (k).
86 Ibid., section 2525.2 (h). The valid revocable
Directive referred to in subsection (h) is defined in
section 2525.2 (b) as:
a revocable written document voluntarily 
executed by the declarant in accordance with 
the requirements of section 2525.3 in
substantially the form set forth in section 
2525.24.
Section 2525.3 sets out the safeguards in relation to the 
making of the Directive as follows:
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patients who, in the opinion of two certifying physicians
exercising reasonable medical judgment, had six months or
less to live.87 Moreover, patients in skilled nursing
facilities were given additional protection from abuse of
the statute because as the initiative statute stated:
some patients in skilled nursing facilities may 
be so insulated from a voluntary decision-making 
role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their 
care, as to require special assurance that they 
are capable of willingly and voluntarily 
executing a Directive.88
It was therefore stipulated in the initiative statute that
This initiative statute applied only to terminally ill
[t]he Directive shall be signed by the 
declarant and witnessed by two adults who at 
the time of witnessing, meet the following 
requirements:
(a) [a]re not related to the declarant by 
blood or marriage, or adoption;
(b) [a]re not entitled to any portion of the 
estate of the declarant upon his or her 
death under any will of the declarant or 
codicil thereto then existing, or, at the 
time of the Directive, by operation of law 
then existing;
(c) [h]ave no creditor's claim against the 
declarant, or anticipate making such claim 
against any portion of the estate of the 
declarant upon his or her death;
(d) [a]re not the attending physician, an 
employee of the attending physician, a 
health care provider, or an employee of a 
health care provider;
(e) [a]re not the operator of a community 
care facility or an employee of a community 
care facility.
The term 'attending physician' as referred to m  
subdivision (h) is defined in subdivision (a) as:
the physician selected by, or assigned to, 
the patient who has primary responsibility 
for the treatment and care of the patient.
87 Section 2525.2 (h) and (k).
88 Section 2525.4.
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a Directive executed by such a patient would be deemed 
invalid unless one of the witnesses to the Directive was a 
Patient Advocate or Ombudsman appointed by the Department 
of Aging.
A further safeguard built into the statute was the 
requirement that hospitals and other health care providers 
keep records of the number of such 'aid-in-dying' cases and 
report them on an annual basis to the State Department of 
Health Services.89
Moreover, those health care professionals who acted in 
accordance with the provisions of the 'aid-in-dying' 
statute were to be immune from civil, criminal and 
administrative liability.90 Section 2525.8 provided that no 
physician or health care professional would be required to 
participate in administering 'aid-in-dying' if he was 
opposed to the practice on religious, ethical or moral 
grounds. Similarly, this section provided that privately 
owned hospitals would not be required to administer 'aid-in 
dying', if the ethos of such an institution precluded it on 
moral, religious or ethical grounds from so doing.
Despite the various safeguards and limitations 
included in the initiative statute, the Californian 
electorate rejected it by a vote of fifty-four per cent 
to forty-six per cent.
89 Section 2525.21.
90 Section 2525.9.
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came to decide on a death with dignity initiative statute,
Ballot Measure 16.91 This initiative was less ambiguously
worded than either the Washington or California proposals.
The Oregon measure stated clearly that it was only the
practice of physician-assisted suicide which would be
legalized if voted for by the electorate. The aim of the
statute was phrased in the following terms:
[a]n adult who is capable, is a resident of 
Oregon, and has been determined by the attending 
physician and consulting physician to be 
suffering from a terminal disease, and has 
voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may 
make a written request for medication for the 
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner in accordance with this act.92
For the procedure to be valid the statute requires that the
patient make two oral requests to terminate his or her
life. The second request must come no less than fifteen
days after the first. Only then can the required written
request by the patient for a drug prescription be accepted.
The actual prescription may not be furnished less than
forty-eight hours after the written request.
The familiar safeguards are also present in this
statute. Thus, the request must be signed in the presence
of two independent witnesses. The patient must be referred
to a psychiatrist or psychologist if a psychiatric or
91 Ballot Measure 16: Death with Dignity Act - 
Initiative Statute 1994.
92 Cited in Annas, (1994, p.1241).
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psychological disorder is suspected. In addition, records 
of each case must be maintained by the health care 
provider, and such records are to be examined annually by 
the Health Division of the state of Oregon.
A pre-emptive strike was made against this proposed 
statute in the form of a court challenge to the wording of 
the initiative measure in the case of Kane v Kulonaoski .93 
The court rejected the challenge to the wording of the 
initiative statute, allowing the referendum on the issue to 
proceed. On this occasion, the death with dignity lobby was 
successful. The Oregon electorate voted in favour of the 
measure by a margin of fifty-three per cent to forty-seven 
per cent. Ballot Measure 16 was due to become law on 8 
December 1994, but the constitutionality of this statute 
has been challenged in the courts. This challenge is 
pending.
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan.
The peculiar history of physician-assisted suicide in 
the state of Michigan is dominated by one particular 
character, Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Pessimists among us who 
believe that individuals cannot influence legal policy to 
any material degree need look no further than the case of 
Dr. Kevorkian to be confounded.
It was Dr. Kevorkian's belief that the laws of 
Michigan contained no restrictions ori the practice of
93 318 Ore. 593 (1994).
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assisted suicide which led him to undertake his 'medicide' 
campaign.94 Kevorkian's belief was grounded in his 
interpretation of two Michigan court decisions dating from 
1920 and 1983 respectively.
In the first case, People v Robertsf95 the defendant 
was accused of murder for killing his terminally ill wife. 
His wife suffered from multiple sclerosis and was unable to 
live a rewarding life. As a result, she asked her husband 
to aid her in hastening her death. He did this by preparing 
a drink, which contained an arsenic based poison called 
Paris green. He then placed the drink within reach of his 
wife and she drank it of her own accord. At trial, the 
defendant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to 
life imprisonment.
However, Roberts subsequently appealed, on the basis 
that, since suicide was not considered to be a crime in 
Michigan, there could be no crime of being an accessory 
before the fact to suicide. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
the state of Michigan held that if there is no crime of 
suicide then there can be no crime of being an accessory to 
suicide. However, this did not aid the appellant in this 
particular case, as he had been charged with murder, to 
which he had pleaded guilty, and not with being an 
accessory to suicide. As a result, Roberts was unsuccessful 
in his appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court was satisfied 
that the facts of the case supported a finding of guilty of
94 See, Kevorkian, (1991, pp.l-10).
95 178 N.W. 690 (1920) .
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The second case on which Kevorkian based his argument 
was that of People v Campbell.96 Campbell was charged with 
murder in connection with the suicide of Kevin Basnaw. On 
the night of his suicide Basnaw had been drinking with the 
defendant. Basnaw talked about committing suicide but said 
that he did not have a gun, whereupon the defendant offered 
to sell him one. Two weeks prior to this meeting, the 
defendant had discovered his wife and Basnaw in flagrante 
delicto, which must have driven a wedge between their 
friendship, and perhaps contributed to Basnaw's state of 
mind. At the end of the night's drinking, the men drove to 
the home of the parents of the defendant in order to 
collect a gun. After doing so, the defendant drove Basnaw 
home. The following morning Basnaw was found dead with an 
apparently self-inflicted bullet wound to the head. The 
prosecution relied on the decision in People v Roberts to 
support a charge of murder in the first degree against the 
defendant. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the 
instant case could not be distinguished from People v 
Roberts but that People v Roberts was no longer good law. 
The Court of Appeals found that the term suicide excludes, 
by definition, a homicide and that in this case the 
defendant did not kill another person.
The defendant's indictment on the murder charge was as 
a result dismissed. The Court of Appeals went on to invite 
the Michigan legislature to pass a statute against the type
murder by poison.
96 335 N . W. 2d 27 (Mich. App. 1983).
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Kevorkian first employed his 'suicide machine7 in the 
case of Janet Adkins in June 1990. The 'suicide machine7 
consists of three bottles which are connected to an 
intravenous line. When the line is connected to the first 
bottle, it delivers a saline solution. The patient who 
desires to hasten his death pushes a button which releases 
the contents of the second bottle, the sedative thiopental. 
This, in turn, leads to the third bottle, filled with 
potassium chloride, being activated automatically at a 
later point, by means of a timer, eventually resulting m  
the patient's death.
After the death of Janet Adkins, Kevorkian was charged 
with her murder. In the subsequent trial, the judge ruled, 
relying on the previous decision in People v Campbell, that 
Janet Adkins had caused her own death, and that, in fact, 
there was no specific piece of legislation in Michigan 
which criminalized assisted suicide.97 In 1991 a permanent 
injunction was issued against the use of the 'suicide 
machine7. This was soon to be followed by the revocation of 
Kevorkian7s licence to practise medicine in both Michigan 
and California. This, however, did not force Kevorkian to 
cease to assist in the suicides of the terminally ill.
Kevorkian continued to assist those patients who 
requested his particular service. However, his modus 
operandi changed. Instead of relying on his by now infamous
of conduct which was the basis of this case.
97 For further commentary on this case see, Annas, 
(1991, pp.33-35).
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'suicide machine', he turned to the use of carbon monoxide 
gas. Under this method, Kevorkian connects the supply of 
the gas to the patient by means of a gas mask. It is the 
patient who initiates the flow of the gas.
As a result of Kevorkian's activities, the Michigan 
legislature introduced legislation which had as its objects 
the establishment of a state-wide Commission on Death and 
Dying, and the creation of a new crime of criminal 
assistance to suicide.98 The Act defined as felonious the 
act of an individual who:
(a) [p]rovides the physical means by which the
other person attempts or commits suicide.
(b) Participates in a physical act by which the
other person attempts or commits suicide.99
The Commission on Death and Dying was made up of 
twenty-two members who were nominated by twenty-two 
separate interest groups ranging from the Hemlock Society, 
through medical bodies to right to life groups. The 
Commission was given a period of fifteen months in which to 
produce legislative recommendations in relation to the 
question of assisted suicide. The criminal sanctions 
contained in the Act were temporary in nature and would be 
automatically repealed six months after the Commission on 
Death and Dying made its recommendations to the Michigan 
legislature. Ironically, when the Commission reported in 
May 1994, it recommended, by a majority of nine votes to 
seven, that Michigan should legalize physician-assisted
98 Act of 25 February 1993, Public Act 3 of 1993, 
Michigan Compiled Laws section 752.1027 (1993).
99 Ibid., section 7.
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suicide. The Commission included certain criteria for such 
legislation. Those eligible must be eighteen years of age 
or over, and suffer from a terminal condition likely to 
cause death within six months. Moreover, the patient should 
be in a state of "subjectively unbearable and unacceptable 
suffering". In addition, before the assisted suicide can 
take place the individual must be examined by an 
independent panel made up of a medical practitioner, a 
psychiatrist, a pain specialist, a psychologist and a 
social worker.100
On 10 May 1994, the Michigan Court of Appeals gave its 
ruling on the constitutionality of the Michigan statute on 
physician-assisted suicide.101 This decision came at the 
end of the consolidated appeals in three separate cases. 
The first case was an appeal in relation to a previous 
decision of Wayne County Court in a suit brought by the 
American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of two terminally 
ill patients.102 The lower court had ruled that the statute 
was unconstitutional, in that it violated Article 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Michigan 1963. The second case 
related to a previous ruling of the Wayne County Court in
100 See, Horton, (1994, p. 1153).
101 Hobbins v Attorney-General and Michigan Catholic 
Conference. Wayne County Prosecutorr Michigan Right to Life 
and Certain Members of Michigan Legislature. Amici Curiae 
518 N.W.2d 487 (1994).
102 Hobbins v Attorney General and Michigan Catholic 
Conference. Wayne County Prosecutor. Michigan Right to Life 
and Certain Members of Michigan Legislature. Amici Curiae 
No.93-306-178 CZ (Michigan Circuit Court, Wayne County) 
(1993) .
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December 1993 in which Kaufman J. held that a ban on 
assisted suicide is over-broad, because, in some instances, 
a person has a constitutional right to commit suicide.103 
This litigation related to one of Dr. Kevorkian's cases of 
assisted suicide. As a result, in this case the charge of 
assisted suicide against Kevorkian was dismissed.
The third appeal related to the order of an Oakland 
County Circuit Court judge of January 1994 to the effect 
that the criminal provision contained in the Michigan 
assisted suicide statute was unconstitutional for violating 
Article 4 of the Constitution of the State of Michigan 
1963, thus allowing for the dismissal of the charges 
against Kevorkian in that case also.104
In the first and third cases, the plaintiffs contended 
that the Michigan assisted suicide statute was 
unconstitutional as being in violation of Article 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Michigan 1963. Article 4 
states that "[n]o law shall embrace more than one object, 
which shall be expressed in its title".
The origins of the assisted suicide statute lay in 
House Bill number 4501 which was first introduced on 7 
March, 1991. The objective of this Bill was to create a 
statute to establish a Commission on Death and Dying.105
103 People v Kevorkian No. 93-11482 (Michigan Circuit 
Court, Wayne County) (1993).
104 People v Kevorkian No. 94-172399 (Michigan Circuit 
Court, Oakland County) (1994).
105 The Bill had the following title:
A Bill to create the Michigan Commission on
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pending before the House Judiciary Committee.
These bills, Senate Bill number 32 and House Bill
number 4038, related to the amendment of Michigan law to
prohibit the practice of assisting suicide. The provisions
of House Bill number 4501 were amended after the second
reading to include the substance of Senate Bill number 32
in relation to the criminalizing of the practice of
assisted suicide.
It was this amended Bill which was to become the
Michigan statute on assisted suicide. Thus, the Act as it
stood appeared to contain two distinct objectives which on
the face of it violated the Constitution of the State of
Michigan 1963. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed that
this indeed was the case, stating that:
[t]he one-object provision may not be 
circumvented by creating a title that includes 
different legislative objects. We find, 
therefore, that [the statute] as enacted has two 
distinct objects that, although encompassing the 
same 'subject',are not germane to each other, are 
directed toward different purposes and, when 
grouped together in one act, offend the 
constitutional one-object provision.106
The Court of Appeals also addressed the argument
raised by counsel for Ms. Hobbins, that the Michigan
assisted suicide legislation interfered with a
constitutional liberty interest protected by the Due
At the time of its introduction, two separate bills were
Death and Dying; to prescribe its 
membership, powers, and duties; and to 
provide for the development of legislative 
recommendations concerning certain issues 
related to death and dying.
106 518 N.W. 2d 487 (1994), p.491.
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States Constitution.107 The assertion on the part of Ms.
Hobbins was that the protection of the Constitution
extended to a right to commit suicide. However, in
reviewing the constitutional jurisprudence on the issue of
individual liberty, the Court of Appeals could find no
support for this contention.108 The majority opinion,
delivered by Fitzgerald J., viewed the issue in the
following terms:
[t]he scope of rights encompassed by the concept 
of ordered liberty does not include the right to 
commit suicide, much less the right to assisted 
suicide. The 'guarantee of personal privacy7 has 
been extended to activities relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
and child rearing and education. Judicial 
discovery of a right to terminate one's life is 
not a logical extension of this catalogue of 
rights. Liberty and justice will not cease to 
exist if a right to suicide is not 
recognized.109
However, the dissenting judgment of Shelton J. in this 
appeal provides another possible interpretation of the 
liberty interests protected by the Constitution. In his 
analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence on the issue, 
Shelton J. came to quite a different conclusion. He 
concentrated on the anomaly whereby courts have found it 
constitutionally permissible to refrain from accepting
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
107 The Due Process clause provides "nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law".
108 See, Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of 
Health 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990); Planned Parenthood v Casey 112 
S.ct. 2791 (1992) and Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 
35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
109 518 N. W. 2d 487 (1994), p.493.
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steps to end one's life:
[i]f a terminally ill person can lawfully end her 
life by disconnecting a life-sustaining machine 
(Cruzan), why cannot she end that same life by 
connecting a life-ending machine? If a healthy 
woman can lawfully terminate a healthy foetus 
(Roe, Casey), does not that same woman who is 
later terminally and painfully ill have a right 
to terminate her own life? Does that state have 
a right to totally prevent a terminally ill 
person from ending her life by charging the 
doctor who assists her with a felony punishable 
by four years' imprisonment, or even with murder?
If a doctor... can lawfully end a patient's life 
by disconnecting a life-sustaining machine 
(Cruzan), why cannot a doctor do the same by 
connecting a life-ending machine? If a healthy 
woman has a right to have a doctor assist (and 
indeed can only use a doctor to assist) to 
lawfully terminate a healthy foetus (Roe, Casey), 
does not that same woman who is later terminally 
and painfully ill have a right to have a doctor 
assist to terminate her own life?xl°
Shelton J. noted the similar conclusion arrived at in 
the case of Compassion in Dying v Washington111 where the 
Washington Federal District Court recognized a 
constitutionally protected right to die in cases of 
assisted suicide. Moreover, Shelton J. queried the 
majority's use of the Cruzan v Director. Missouri 
Department of Health112 decision to draw a distinction 
between the active and passive nature of the assistance 
which makes one intervention lawful and another not. He 
relied on a passage from Scalia J.'s concurrence m  Cruzan 
v Director. Missouri Department of Health which referred to
life-sustaining medical treatment, but not to take positive
110 Ibid., p.499.
111 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994).
112 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
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this distinction:
[s]uicide, it is said, consists of an affirmative 
act to end one's life; refusing treatment is not 
an affirmative act 'causing' death, but merely a 
passive acceptance of the natural process of 
dying... It would not make much sense to say that 
one may not kill oneself by walking into the sea, 
but may sit on the beach until submerged by the 
incoming tide; or that one may not intentionally 
lock oneself into a cold storage locker, but may 
refrain from coming indoors when the temperature 
drops below freezing... Starving oneself to death 
is no different from putting a gun to one's 
temple as far as the common-law definition of 
suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both 
cases is the suicide's conscious decision to 'put 
an end to his own existence'.113
Shelton J. concluded, on this basis, that if the active-
passive distinction were to have any meaning, then it would
not be in situations such as was the subject of the instant
appeal. He reasoned that:
[t]he third person who turns off the life- 
supporting machine must perforce affirmatively do 
so. Here the assistant [that is to say, 
Kevorkian] places the means within the control of 
the patient and allows the patient to take the 
final active step.114
"Individualized Decision-Making11 - The Case of Dr. Timothy Quill.
In a 1991 article, Dr. Timothy Quill, a New York 
oncologist, related how he had assisted a patient to commit 
suicide.115 The patient was terminally ill and wished to 
hasten her death to prevent further suffering.
113 Ibid., pp.296-297.
114 518 N.W. 2d 487 (1994), p.501.
115 See, Quill, (1991, pp.691-694).
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After discussing the matter with her family and 
agreeing to meet with Dr. Quill prior to taking an overdose 
of barbiturates, he agreed to write a prescription for 
barbiturates. She eventually arrived at a point where she 
wished to end her life. She discussed the matter with her 
family and with Dr. Quill, after which she took an overdose 
of barbiturates and died. As a result of this 'confession' 
Dr. Quill became the subject of a criminal investigation.
This resulted from the fact that assisted suicide is 
deemed to be a felony in New York. Section 125.15(3) of the 
New York Penal Law 1881116 provides that a person shall be 
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree if he 
intentionally aids another person to commit suicide. In 
addition, section 120.30 provides that a person shall be 
guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally 
aids another person to attempt suicide. Dr. Quill was 
obliged to appear before a grand jury but the grand jury 
did not indict.
Subsequently, Dr. Quill attempted to seek a 
preliminary injunction in a New York District Court against 
the enforcement of sections 125.15(3) and 120.30 of the New 
York Penal Law 1881 to the extent that they apply to 
physicians who give the kind of assistance that Dr. Quill 
gave to his patient.117 This was based on the argument that 
such statutory provisions violated the rights of the 
terminally ill and physicians under the Due Process and
116 Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated (1967).
117 Quill v Koppel 870 F.Supp. 78 (1994).
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Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. The New York District Court did not accept 
this argument and refused to grant the preliminary 
injunction.
The uncertainty raised by the fact that three separate 
state courts, one in Washington, one in Michigan, and one 
in New York have given antithetical rulings on the 
substantive issue of a right to die in the case of assisted 
suicide needs to be resolved, both from the point of view 
of personal autonomy and legal certainty. As in previous 
issues pertaining to individual liberty, this issue will 
ineluctably come before the United States Supreme Court for 
adjudication. The question one must now answer is how is 
the Supreme Court, in the light of previous cases, likely 
to rule on the issue?
6.5 The Constitutional Dimension of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide in the United States.
Currently the constitutional right to die extends only 
to cases of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment.118 The right has riot yet been extended to the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide, as can be seen from 
the cases on the issue to date, with the exception of
118 See for example, Bartling v Superior Court 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 220 (1984); Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of 
Health 110 S.ct. 2841 (1990); In Re Farrell 529 A.2d 404 
(1987); In Re Quinlan 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976) and Satz 
v Perlmutter 379 So.2d 359 (1980). See further, the detailed 
discussion of this aspect of the right to die m  Chapter 
Four of this thesis, pp.272-298.
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Initially, the courts supported a right to die in 
cases of treatment withdrawal on the basis of the 
constitutional right to privacy. This was first expressly 
stated in the case of In Re Quinlan120 where the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that the right of privacy as 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States121 
was :
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to 
decline medical treatment under certain 
circumstances, in much the same way as it is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to 
terminate pregnancy.122
Since the decision in In Re Quinlan, numerous state 
courts have relied on the constitutional right to privacy 
as the basis for allowing the refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment.123
More often than not, courts have relied on the privacy 
basis in tandem with the common law right to autonomy as
Compassion in Dying v Washington.119
119 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994).
120 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976).
121 See, Eisenstadt v Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v Wade
410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
122 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (1976), p.663.
123 See, for example, Bartling v Superior Court 209 
Cal.Rptr. 220 (1984); Corbett v D'Alessandro 487 So.2d 368 
(1986); Foody v Manchester Memorial Hospital 482 A.2d 713 
(1984); Gray v Romero 697 F.Supp. 580 (DRI) (1988);
Rasmussen v Fleming 741 P.2d 674 (1987) and Satz v
Perlmutter 379 So.2d 359 (1980).
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as Meisel has observed, this trend has fallen out of favour
in later cases. He contends that the reliance on the right
to privacy is lessening, and states that courts have moved
to a position of:
relying either exclusively on the common law 
right of autonomy or on that right with 
additional references to the constitutional right 
of privacy. A recent and significant convert to 
this position is the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which based its Quinlan decision on a 
constitutional right to privacy but declined to 
do so in In Re Conroy [486 A.2d 1209 (1985)] '... 
since the right to decline medical treatment is, 
in any event, embraced within the common law 
right to self-determination'.125
The right to die issue did not present itself to the
Supreme Court of the United States until 1990 when the case
of Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of Health126 came
to be decided. Unfortunately, the decision in Cruzan v
Director. Missouri Department of Health was not a
definitive one and leaves many questions unanswered in
relation to the scope of the right to die. Evidence of this
lack of clarity can be found in the conflicting judgments
which have been handed down in the above discussed cases on
physician-assisted suicide.
The subject of this case, Nancy Cruzan, was in a
persistent vegetative state. It had been established that
there was no prospect of recovery and a return to a
expressed in the doctrine of informed consent.124 However,
124 See for example, Bouvia v Superior Court fGlenchur) 
179 Cal.App.3d 1127 (1986) and Brophy v New England Sinai 
Hospital. Inc. 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
125 Meisel, (1989, p.53).
126 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
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'normal' life.127 Cruzan's parents had requested that
treatment be discontinued and that she be allowed to die.
However, the hospital refused this request, whereupon the
parents sought a court order directing cessation of the
treatment. This order was granted at first instance but was
reversed on appeal to the Missouri State Supreme Court.128
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court was upheld by a
majority of five to four.
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that Nancy
Cruzan's constitutional liberty interest did not encompass
the cessation of her treatment. In the majority opinion
delivered by Rehnquist C.J., the Supreme Court
acknowledged, but did not overtly hold, that a competent
patient could have a constitutional right to refuse life-
saving treatment. This can be seen in Rehnquist C.J.'s
observation that the:
principle that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be 
inferred from our prior decisions.129
However, this general liberty interest was not absolute and
was to be subject to qualification:
the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of 
such treatment would inform the inquiry as to 
whether the deprivation of that interest is
127 Cruzan suffered from anoxia of the brain leaving her 
quadriplegic and unaware of her surroundings. However, her 
life could be maintained for at least another thirty years 
with the aid of artificial hydration and nutrition.
128 Cruzan v Harmon 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.) (1988).
129 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990), p.2851.
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constitutionally permissible. But for the 
purposes of this case, we assume that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent 
person a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.130
In this case, the patient was not competent and
therefore not capable of refusing or accepting such
treatment. As a result, the decision would have to be made
by a surrogate. The law in the state of Missouri in
relation to surrogate decision-making required that before
a surrogate could exercise the right to refuse continuance
of life-saving treatment, clear and convincing proof of the
patient's desire, while competent, to refuse life-saving
treatment in such circumstances be supplied.131 This
evidence was not forthcoming in the instant case.
The case raises the wider question of if, albeit
obliquely, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a competent
person may refuse life-saving treatment in specified
circumstances, is it possible to extend this constitutional
protection to the competent patient who wishes to end his
or her life through assisted suicide? In other words is
there a rational basis for allowing a patient to choose his
death by treatment refusal and not allowing a similarly
situated patient to choose his death by assisted suicide?
If the Supreme Court were to decide this issue how would it
decide? Would it, as in Cruzan v Director. Missouri
Department of Health, reach a decision which was less than
130 |bidt, p.2852.
131 Under tfte Missouri Uniform Rights of the Terminally 
111 Acfc 1986, tyispouri Revised Statutes section 459.010(3)
(1986), ' 1
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definitive, and betrayed the ideological tension which 
simmers below the surface of Supreme Court decision-making 
on such life and death issues,132 or, would it extend the 
boundaries of the right to die as the Washington Federal 
District Court did in the case of Compassion in Dying v 
Washington?133
The reasons why the Supreme Court might decline to 
extend the right to die further are twofold. Firstly, it 
might choose to rely on the distinction which is accorded 
in law to acts and omissions. Secondly, the extension of 
constitutional protection to the act of physician-assisted 
suicide might be rejected on wider policy grounds in that 
the Supreme Court might be seen as accepting the active 
intervention of one party to cause the death of another.
Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to view the 
second argument as a subset of the first. In other words, 
in trying to further a particular policy agenda, in this 
case a global prohibition on killing, a tenuous distinction 
is advanced to cloak such an agenda in the apparent 
objectivity of legal rhetoric. Is there any identifiable 
difference between the act of removing a nutrition or 
hydration tube from the body of a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state leading inexorably to his death and the 
act of prescribing a lethal dose of barbiturates for a 
terminally ill patient leading inexorably to his death? The
132 As to which see the discussion in Chapter Three of
this thesis, pp.185-191.
133 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994).
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absurdity of such a distinction was drawn by one of the 
concurring justices in Cruzan v Director, Missouri 
Department of Health. Scalia J. when he stated, albeit with
a deep sense of irony:
[i]t would not make much sense to say that one 
may not kill oneself by walking into the sea, but 
may sit on the beach until submerged by the 
incoming tide; or that one may not intentionally 
lock oneself into a cold storage locker, but may 
refrain from coming indoors when the temperature 
drops below freezing... Starving oneself to death 
is no different from putting a gun to one's 
temple as far as the common law definition of 
suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both 
cases is the suicide's conscious decision to 'put 
an end to his own existence'...
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
early cases considering the claimed right to 
refuse medical treatment dismissed as specious 
the nice distinction between passively submitting 
to death and actively seeking it. The distinction 
may be merely verbal, as it would be if an adult 
sought death by starvation instead of a drug.134
Indeed, in the case of Satz v Perlmutter135 the Florida
District Appeals Court in discussing the distinction
between withholding treatment and withdrawing treatment
found that the withdrawal of treatment "appears more
drastic because affirmatively, a mechanical device must be
disconnected, as distinct from mere inaction".136
The right to die with assistance is increasingly being
premised on equal treatment arguments. This is evident in
the decisions of the various state courts on the issue.
However, to date as has been seen, only one court has
actually accepted this argument. What is the constitutional
134 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990), p.2861.
135 379 So.2d 359 (1980) .
136 Ibid. , p. 163.
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basis of this argument? Is it valid? Could it be upheld by 
the Supreme Court?
Equality and the Constitution.
The equality provisions in American constitutional law 
are to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. The amendment was ratified in 1868 and was 
originally inserted to provide equality of treatment for 
the newly liberated African-American slaves. However, the 
wording is broad enough to apply to all groups in society.
A distinction is made between the various protections 
afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment. Different forms of 
protection are afforded by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause,137 the Due Process Clause138 and the Equal 
Protection Clause. It is the Equal Protection Clause which 
is of relevance to the constitutional debate in relation to
137 See, for example, The Slaughterhouse Cases 83 U.S. 
394 (1873). The phrase "privileges and immunities" also 
appears in Article 4, section 2 of the Constitution in the 
following terms:"[t]he [c]itizens of each [s]tate shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states".
Simply put, the provision in Article 4 section 2 
required that the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the 
citizens of a particular state should be accorded to the 
citizens of other states in equal measure. In The 
Slaughterhouse Cases the Supreme Court held the provisions 
in Article 4 and in the Fourteenth Amendment to have 
distinct meanings. Thus, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment was deemed not to have 
changed the fact that fundamental rights were still 
primarily a matter of state jurisdiction and only became a 
matter for national jurisdiction when states failed to meet 
their responsibilities.
138 See further, Wilkinson, (1992, pp.235-251).
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the issue of physician-assisted suicide. The Equal 
Protection Clause states that no state shall "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws".
The Equal Protection Clause addresses the actions of 
state governments only. Thus, it is only applicable if some 
policy or legislative initiative of a state government 
leads to a situation in which a particular group is 
prevented from exercising a right which similarly situated 
groups are free to exercise. Initially, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at 
guaranteeing equality for all ethnic groupings, but has 
gradually been extended to cover inequality of treatment in 
areas other than race.139
This expansion of the protections afforded by the 
Equal Protection Clause has led to the development of a 
multi-layered approach to its interpretation. 
Traditionally, the test used by the courts in determining 
whether a challenged piece of legislation was 
constitutional, was the 'rational basis7 test.140
Under this test, the state in question merely has to 
demonstrate that the purpose of the challenged 
discriminatory provision in the legislation is a legitimate 
state objective and that the means used by the state are
139 See for example, Mississippi University for Women 
V Hogan 458 U.S. 718 (1982) and Shapiro v Thompson 394 U.S. 
618 (1969).
140 See, Gulf. C.. and S.F.R. Co. v Ellis 165 U.S. 150 
(1897).
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rationally related to the achievement of this objective.
However, in the nineteen sixties the Supreme Court was 
to develop a two-tiered approach to the question of equal 
protection. The first tier was similar to the previous 
'rational basis' test and was applied particularly to 
questions of economic regulation. This lower tier required 
that the state involved only had to prove that the 
discriminatory provisions m  the challenged legislation 
were rational. The second and higher tier of scrutiny was 
referred to as the 'strict scrutiny test'. Under this test, 
the discriminatory legislative provision would be struck 
down unless it could be justified on the basis of a 
compelling state interest.
This tier was, in turn, divided into two separate 
parts. First, certain forms of discrimination were 
considered to be 'suspect' and were therefore to be 
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Race is seen as 
falling into this 'suspect' class.141 Secondly, there were 
those cases where the discriminatory provisions of a piece 
of legislation were seen to come into conflict with a 
fundamental constitutional right.142
In terms of equality the answer seems clear. A 
competent terminally ill patient who has expressed a desire 
to accelerate his death cannot do so because the means to
141 See, Brown v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
and Green v County School Board 391 U.S. 430 (1954).
142 Such fundamental rights included the right to vote 
m  Reynolds v Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and the right of 
interstate travel in Shapiro v Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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be employed in bringing about this death are active. 
However, an incurable patient in a persistent vegetative 
state who has left clear and convincing evidence of his 
wish to refuse life-sustaining treatment is allowed to 
exercise this wish because the means used to bring about 
the death are passive rather than active, that is to say, 
it is the underlying condition, not the doctor which causes 
the death.
This is a palpable case of treating similarly situated 
individuals differently. However, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court will follow the enlightened opinion of 
Rothstein J. in Compassion in Dying v Washington.143 for 
policy reasons. By doing so, the Supreme Court would 
endorse an exception to the principle of the sanctity of 
life which would create even more controversy than the 
decision in Roe v Wade.144 Indeed, the likelihood is that 
in broaching this topic an approach similar to that taken 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Re Rodriguez 
and Attorney-General of British Columbia et al.; British 
Columbia Coalition of People with Disabilities et al.: 
Interveners145 would be adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court.
143 850 F.Supp. 1454 (D.C. Wash.) (1994).
144 4 1 0 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
145 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342.
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6.6 Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Common Law Principle 
of Self-Determination.
As Meisel has noted, it is not unknown for courts to 
base decisions in the area of treatment withdrawal on the 
common law right to self-determination, as expressed in the 
doctrine of informed consent, rather than on the 
constitutional right of privacy.146 He cites as authority 
for this assertion the decision of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in the case of In Re Conroy147 where it was concluded 
that the right to decline life-saving treatment was part of 
the common law right of self-determination. In the earlier 
case of In Re Eichner148 at first instance,149 it was held 
that the state's interest in preserving human life was not 
sufficient to prevent the disconnection of a respirator 
attached to an eighty-three year old victim of a cardiac 
arrest, citing as support for this conclusion the common 
law right to self-determination and not the right to 
privacy.150 The court contended that by using the right to 
privacy as a justificatory basis for its decision, it would 
lead to unrestrained applications of the privacy right.151
On appeal, the decision of the court of first instance
146 Meisel, (1989, p.53).
147 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
148 4 2 3 N. Y. S. 2d 580 (1979); 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); 
438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
149 4 2 3 N. Y.S. 2d 580 (1979).
150 Ibid., pp.593-594.
151 Ibid., p. 591.
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constitutional right to privacy could be viewed as a valid
means of upholding the right to treatment refusal. It was
of the opinion that the right to privacy:
encompasses the freedom of the terminally ill but 
competent individual to choose for himself 
whether or not to decline medical treatment...
[and it] is virtually inconceivable that the 
right of privacy would not apply.152
On a further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the lower court but did not broach 
the question of the validity of extending the privacy right 
to cover such a situation. This was a consolidated appeal 
of both the case of In Re Eichner and the case of In Re 
Storar153 which concerned John Storar, a fifty-two year old 
mentally retarded man who had never been competent. The 
decision in In Re Eichner was affirmed with the New York 
Court of Appeals relying on the common law right to self- 
determination .154
However in the the case of Mr. Storar, it was held 
that treatment could not be discontinued because the 
patient was not capable of making known his preferences in 
relation to treatment withdrawal. On the self-determination 
basis the right to refuse treatment could not be accorded 
as the patient was incapable of either refusing or 
accepting treatment. This, it may be argued betrays the 
conceptual inadequacy of the common law right to self-
152 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), p.539.
153 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1980).
154 438 N. Y.S. 2d 266 (1981), pp.272-273.
was upheld but the appellate court added that the
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For the purposes of physician-assisted suicide, this 
flaw may not be relevant, as the patient who wishes to seek 
assistance in dying is competent and therefore it would not 
be possible to utilise such an argument. Again the 
arguments advanced in opposition to such a right would be 
of the act-omission variety, the slippery slope argument 
and the risk of abuse argument.
6.7 Assisted Suicide and the Irish Constitution.
In Ireland, the practice of assisted suicide is
prohibited by section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide)
Act 1993 which states that:
A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures 
the suicide of another, or an attempt by another 
to commit suicide, shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall be liable on conviction on indictment 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen 
years.
Thus, the physician in Ireland who felt compelled to act in 
a manner similar to either Jack Kevorkian or Timothy Quill 
would satisfy the requirements for such an offence.
However, the question must be asked, as it was in 
America, whether one could successfully argue that the 
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide violated an 
individual's constitutional rights, particularly the right 
to privacy and the right to equal treatment. As the Supreme 
Court of the United States has not yet decided on the 
constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide, guidance 
may be had from a jurisdiction quite similar in many
determination in this instance.
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respects to ours and with a constitutional document at its 
legal apex: that jurisdiction is Canada.
The Canadian Model.
In Canada, the right to physician-assisted suicide is
impeded by the presence in the Canadian Criminal Code 1892
of section 241(b) which prohibits the aiding and abetting
of suicide. Section 241 provides that anyone who counsels,
aids or abets another to commit suicide shall be guilty of
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding fourteen years.
This provision is similar to the provision to be found
in section 2(2) of the Irish Criminal Law ( Suicide1) Act
1993, which provides that any person who aids, abets,
counsels or procures the suicide of another shall be liable
on conviction on indictment for a term not exceeding
fourteen years.
It is interesting therefore, to examine the law in
relation to physician-assisted suicide in Canada, a country
with a comparable common law and constitutional tradition,
with a view to predicting the likely alternatives open to
the Irish judiciary and legislature in this area.
In 1982, the Law Reform Commission of Canada tried to
rationalise the presence of the section 241 prohibition on
aiding suicide in the following terms:
[w]hat of the person who takes advantage of 
another's depressed state to encourage him to 
commit suicide, for his own financial benefit?
What of the person who, knowing an adolescent's
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suicidal tendencies, provides him with large 
enough quantities of drugs to kill him? The 
'accomplice' in these cases cannot be morally 
blameless. Nor can one conclude that the criminal 
law should not punish such conduct. To 
decriminalize completely the act of aiding, 
abetting or counselling suicide would therefore 
not be a valid legislative policy.155
The Commission went on to consider the question of assisted
suicide for the terminally ill:
[t]he probable reason why legislation has not 
made an exception for the terminally ill is the 
fear of the excesses or abuses to which 
liberalization of the existing law could lead. As 
in the case of 'compassionate murder', 
decriminalization of aiding suicide would be 
based on the humanitarian nature of the motive 
leading the person to provide such aid, counsel 
or encouragement. As in the case of compassionate 
murder, moreover, the law may legitimately fear 
the difficulties involved in determining the true 
motivation of the person committing the act.
Aiding or counselling a person to commit 
suicide, on the one hand, and homicide, on the 
other, are sometimes extremely closely related. 
Consider, for example, the doctor who holds the 
glass of poison and pours the contents into the 
patient's mouth. Is he aiding him to commit 
suicide? Or is he committing homicide, since the 
victim's willingness to die is legally 
immaterial? There is reason to fear that homicide 
of the terminally ill for ignoble motives may 
readily be disguised as aiding suicide.156
In the Report157 which followed the Working Paper, the Law
Reform Commission rejected the idea of decriminalizing or
legalizing active voluntary euthanasia.
The aforementioned provisions of the Criminal Code
1892 were later to be challenged on constitutional grounds
in the case of Re Rodriguez and Attorney-General of British
155 Law Reform Commission of Canada, The, (1982, p.53).
156 Ibid., p.54.
1B7 see, Law Reform Commission of Canada, The, (1983, 
pp.29-35).
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Columbia et al.: British Columbia Coalition of People with 
Disabilities et al.: Interveners.158 In this case the
appellant was a forty-two year old woman who suffered from 
Lou Gehrig's disease.159
The appellant, knowing of the prognosis, had expressed 
a wish to die, when, as a result of the disease, the 
quality of her life substantially deteriorated. At that 
point, she would be unable to end her own life and would 
require the assistance of a medical practitioner to do so. 
Mrs. Rodriguez, therefore, applied to the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia for an order stating that section 241(b) 
of the Criminal Code 1892 be declared invalid, pursuant to 
section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982, on the basis that it violated the rights 
enunciated in sections 7, 12 and 15(1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.160
158 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342.
159 A condition also known as amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, which leaves the sufferer unable to speak, 
swallow, walk or move her body without assistance. In the 
later stages of the disease, the sufferer loses the ability 
to breathe without the aid of a respirator or to eat without 
the aid of a gastronomy tube.
160 Section 7 provides:
[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice.
Section 12 provides:
[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected 
to any cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment.
Section 15(1) provides:
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the order sought by the appellant. Melvin J. was of the
opinion that the appellant's:
fundamental decisions concerning her life are not 
restricted by the state. Her illness may restrict 
her ability to implement her decisions but, in my 
opinion, that does not amount to an infringement 
of a right to life, liberty or security of the 
person by the state. The interests she seeks to 
protect pursuant to section 7 are not those which 
determine the means by which she may be brought 
before or within the justice system.161
The trial judge believed that to interpret section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982:
so as to include a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to take one's own life as an exercise in 
freedom of choice is inconsistent, in my opinion, 
with life, liberty and the security of the 
person.162
The argument based on section 12 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms 1982 was rejected on the grounds that 
it was the illness from which the appellant suffered, and 
not the state justice system, which had prevented her from 
determining the time and manner of her death. The appellant 
also argued that because it is not unlawful to refuse life- 
saving or life-prolonging medical treatment, or to commit 
suicide, or to accelerate death through therapeutic doses 
of pain relievers, to make physician-assisted suicide
The Supreme Court of British Columbia refused to grant
[e]very individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
161 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.351.
162 Ibid.
459
unlawful discriminates against physically disabled people.
This argument was also rejected:
section 241 does not, in my opinion, single out 
the physically disabled. It is designed to
protect, not discriminate; consequently, in my 
opinion, there has been no violation of that 
section of the Charter.163
The decision was appealed to the British Columbia
Court of Appeals, which court dismissed the appeal by a
majority of two to one. Hollinrake J.A. for the majority
held that:
[w]hile there may be only a fine line between 
physician-assisted suicide and palliative care 
from the viewpoint of medicine (not necessarily 
the profession as opposed to the science) I think 
that from a historical and philosophical 
viewpoint, the difference between palliative care 
and physician-assisted suicide is a marked and 
significant one.164
The Court of Appeals was also of the opinion that the
proper forum to address a matter of such moral and social
complexity was Parliament. In the words of Proudfoot J.A.
for the majority:
the broad religious, ethical, moral and social 
issues implicit in the merits of this case are 
not suited to resolution by a court on affidavit 
evidence at the instance of a single individual.
On the material available to us, we are in no 
position to assess the consensus in Canada with 
respect to assisted suicide... I would leave to 
Parliament the responsibility of taking the pulse 
of the nation.165
The appellant, as a result, decided to appeal the 
decision to the Canadian Supreme Court. The constitutional
163 Ibid., p.352.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., p. 356.
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questions were stated as follows:
1. [d]oes section 241(b) of the Criminal Code of 
Canada infringe or deny, in whole or in part, the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 7, 12 
and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms?
2. If so, is it justified by section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
therefore not inconsistent with the Constitution 
Act 198 2?166
The appeal was dismissed by a majority of five to four
in the Supreme Court. The majority was of the opinion that,
despite section 241(b) of the Criminal Code 1892 having the
effect of interfering with the appellant's autonomy over
her person, causing her physical pain and psychological
stress in a manner which impinged on the security of her
person, it was neither arbitrary nor unfair and was
grounded in the state interest in protecting life.
Thus, respect for the sanctity of life was the
justification for limiting personal autonomy in this
instance. In the words of Sopinka J. for the majority:
[t]o the extent that there is a consensus, it is 
that human life must be respected and we must be 
careful not to undermine the institutions that 
protect it.
This consensus finds legal expression in our 
legal system which prohibits capital punishment.
This prohibition is supported, in part, on the 
basis that allowing the state to kill will 
cheapen the value of human life and thus the
state will serve in a sense as a role model for
individuals m  society. The prohibition against 
assisted suicide serves a similar purpose. In 
upholding the respect for life, it may discourage 
those who consider that life is unbearable at a 
particular moment, or who perceive themselves to 
be a burden upon others, from committing suicide.
To permit a physician to lawfully participate in 
taking life would send a signal that there are
166 Ibid., p.358.
461
circumstances in which the state approves of 
suicide...
Given the concerns about abuse that have 
been expressed and the great difficulty in 
creating appropriate safeguards to prevent these, 
it cannot be said that the blanket prohibition on 
assisted suicide is arbitrary or unfair, or that 
it is not reflective of fundamental values at 
play in our society. I am thus unable to find 
that any principle of fundamental justice is 
violated by section 241(b).167
Despite this defence of the value which is to be
placed on life as a moral good, the Supreme Court did not
appear to object to the practice of treatment withdrawal or
passive euthanasia, which is legally permissible in
Canada.168 Sopinka J. for the majority provided the
following rationale for the differential treatment of
active intervention to end life and treatment withdrawal:
[w]hether or not one agrees that the active 
versus passive distinction is maintainable, 
however, the fact remains that under our common 
law, the physician has no choice but to accept 
the patient's instructions to discontinue 
treatment. To continue to treat the patient when 
the patient has withdrawn consent to that
treatment constitutes battery... The doctor is, 
therefore, not required to make a choice which 
will result in the patient's death as he would if 
he chose to assist a suicide or to perform active 
euthanasia.169
However, is this sufficient justification for 
restricting the autonomy of the patient who wishes to die 
by active means? It could be argued that the legislative 
and judicial framework which is imposed on the relationship
167 Ibid., p.406.
168 See, Ciarlariello v Schacter (1993) 100 D.L.R. (4th) 
609; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321 and Nancy 
B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 D.L.R. (4th) 285.
169 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.405.
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another example of legal rhetoric restricting individual
rights. Is not the law in relation to murder but a social
and cultural construct which merely reflects a particular
idea of social reality and organisation? Such a view is
manifest in the classical theory of natural law.170 This
deontological view sees acts as being either good or evil
in a very general sense regardless of the surrounding
circumstances and the motivations of the individual actors.
Thus, killing is deemed to be wrong except in certain
specified circumstances, such as, for example, in time of
war or in the case of capital punishment.171 Applying this
model to the particular fact situation of taking life, the
act is looked at in an entirely objective sense, that is A
acts with the intention of bringing about B's death and in
fact brings about the death of B. This is killing, and
killing is wrong. The surrounding circumstances of the case
are not examined. A may represent a bank robber who kills
B, a bank assistant, in the course of a robbery or A may be
a doctor who wants to ease the suffering of B, a cancer-
ridden patient who consents to this intervention. The
question must be asked, is the criminal law too blunt an
instrument to be used in such cases? As Silving has noted:
the use of legal technicalities in [the] 
acquittal of [mercy killers] tends to give laymen 
the impression that the law is a magic formula 
rather than an honest tool for meting out
170 See for example, Grisez, (1970, pp.64-96).
171 See further discussion of this topic m  Chapter One 
of this thesis, pp.7-29.
between individual actors in such a situation is yet
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justice. Public confidence in the administration 
of criminal justice is hardly strengthened when 
moral issues are shifted instead of being solved, 
or when the law relegates to juries the function 
of correcting its inequities.172
Thus, the legal fiction of creating a legally
significant difference between acts of commission and acts
of omission places a barrier in the way of justice rather
than contributing towards a system of criminal justice
which is fair to all. In this instance, the rules of the
criminal law tend to cause injustice in the sense of
unfairness, in that the doctor who actively intervenes to
ease the suffering of the patient with the patient's
consent is deemed to be both morally and legally culpable
whereas the doctor who indirectly brings about the death of
the patient through, for example, the disconnecting of a
life-support machine is not similarly treated under the
rhetoric of criminal justice. How is one to square this
anomaly with the aspiration of equal justice for all?
Moreover, the autonomy of the patient who voluntarily
requests that the doctor administer a lethal dose of a drug
is not respected. Thus, Sue Rodriguez who was unable to end
her own suffering due to the physical barrier caused by her
illness was to be denied her right to decide her own fate.
In the words of Steven Wolhandler:
[i]t is legally inconsistent to honour a terminal 
patient's request that life support equipment be 
removed, but to deny a similarly situated 
patient's request for an immediate and painless 
end merely because a second party's active 
assistance is needed to implement the latter 
request. Prohibiting a second party from helping
172 Silving, (1954, p.354).
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a patient commit self-euthanasia by imposing 
legal sanctions on that party is effectively 
equivalent to denying the patient the right to 
make that decision in the first place.173
The dissenting judges in Re Rodriguez and Attorney-General
of British Columbia et al.: British Columbia Coalition of
People with Disabilities et al.: Interveners tended to a
broadly similar view. McLachlin J. was of the opinion that
section 241(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code 1892
interfered with the appellant's right to privacy under
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1982 in that it denied her the choice of ending her life
because she was physically unable to do so. McLachlin J.
continued:
the law draws a distinction between suicide and 
assisted suicide. The latter is criminal, the 
former is not. The effect of the distinction is 
to prevent people like Sue Rodriguez from 
exercising the autonomy over their bodies 
available to other people. The distinction... is 
arbitrary. The objective that motivates the 
legislative scheme that Parliament has enacted to 
treat suicide is not reflected in its treatment 
of assisted suicide. It follows that the section 
241(b) prohibition violates the fundamental 
principles of justice and that section 7 is 
breached.174
Lamer C.J.C. in his dissenting judgment emphasised the 
discriminatory element of legislation which prevented a 
certain class of persons from exercising their autonomy. He 
believed that section 241(b) of the Criminal Code 1892 was 
repugnant to the equality provisions contained in section 
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.
173 Wolhandler, (1984, p. 369).
174 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.420.
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Lamer C.J.C. stated that section 241(b) of the Criminal 
Code 1892 infringes the principle of equality, in that it 
prevents, those who are physically disabled, from choosing 
suicide, when that option is in principle available to 
other members of the public. This inequality is imposed on 
persons unable to end their lives unassisted, solely 
because of a physical disability, a personal characteristic 
which is one of the grounds of discrimination listed in 
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982. Moreover, the minority was also of the 
opinion that the violations of the rights of privacy and 
equality brought about by section 241(b) of the Criminal 
Code 1892 could not be justified under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. Section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 provides 
a mechanism whereby a law which appears to be repugnant to 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 may be 
saved if it can be proven that the infringement is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic country. 
The criteria which must be satisfied to discharge this onus 
are twofold.
These criteria were articulated in the case of R. v 
Oakes.175 The first part of the test considers the validity 
of the legislative objective and the second part considers 
the validity of the means chosen to achieve that objective. 
Lamer C.J.C. was satisfied that section 241(b) satisfied 
the first branch of the test in R. v Oakes, stating that:
175 (1986) 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
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the objective of section 241(b) of the Code may 
properly be characterized as the protection of 
vulnerable people, whether they are consenting or 
not, from the intervention of others in decisions 
respecting the planning and commission of the act 
of suicide. Underlying this legislative purpose 
is the principle of preservation of life. Section 
241(b) has, therefore a clearly pressing and 
substantial legislative objective.176
However, he was not of the opinion that section 241(b) of
the Criminal Code 1892 satisfied the second branch of the
test in R. v Oakes. The second branch of the test considers
whether a reasonable balance has been struck between the
legislative objective and the means chosen to achieve that
objective. This branch of the test is made up of three
components.
Firstly, the means chosen to achieve the objective 
must be rational and fair and not arbitrary. Lamer C.J.C. 
found that the prohibition of assisted suicide was 
rationally connected to the objective of protecting 
vulnerable persons who may be contemplating taking their 
own life.
The second component of the test requires that the 
means impair as minimally as is reasonably possible the 
right in question.
Lamer C.J.C. found that section 241(b) of the Criminal 
Code 1892 did not comply with this requirement, in that 
speculation that subtle and overt pressures may be brought 
to bear on vulnerable persons, if assisted suicide is 
decriminalized, is not sufficient to justify depriving a 
disadvantaged group of the right to equality. He stated
176 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.378.
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fthat an absolute prohibition that is indifferent to the 
individual or the circumstances m  question cannot satisfy 
the constitutional duty on the government to impair the 
rights of persons with physical disabilities as little as 
is reasonably possible. The third component of this branch 
of the test in R. v Oakes requires the assessment of 
whether the infringement on the right is sufficiently 
proportional to the importance of the objective that is 
sought to be achieved. In the view of Lamer C.J.C., the 
fact that section 241(b) of the Criminal Code 1892 failed 
the second component of the second branch of the test in R. 
v Oakes, meant that there was no need for him to proceed to 
the third component of the test. Thus, he found that the 
infringement of the equality provisions of section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 by the 
impugned section of the Criminal Code 1892 could not be 
saved under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982.
Lamer C.J.C. then considered the question of the most 
appropriate remedy for this infringement. He was of the 
opinion that the most appropriate remedy in the 
circumstances was a declaration of invalidity of the 
impugned section. However, that declaration should be 
suspended for a period of one year "so as to allow 
Parliament to address this most difficult issue".177
During this period, however, those such as the 
appellant would be entitled to a personal remedy in the
177 Ibid.
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form of a constitutional exemption. Lamer C.J.C. laid down 
the boundaries within which this constitutional exemption 
would operate:
(1) the constitutional exemption may only be 
sought by application to a superior court;
(2) the applicant must be certified by a treating 
physician and independent psychiatrist, in the 
manner and at the time suggested by McEachern 
C. J. B. C.,178 to be competent to make the 
decision to end her own life, and the physicians 
must certify that the applicant's decision has 
been made freely and voluntarily, and at least 
one of the physicians must be present with the 
applicant at the time the applicant commits 
assisted suicide;
(3) the physicians must also certify:
(i) that the applicant is or will become 
physically incapable of committing suicide 
unassisted, and
(ii) that they have informed him or her, and that 
he or she understands, that he or she has a 
continuing right to change his or her mind about 
terminating his or her life;
(4) notice and access must be given to the 
Regional Coroner at the time and in the manner 
described by McEachern C.J.B.C.;179
(5) the applicant must be examined daily by one 
of the certifying physicians at the time and in
178 McEachern C.J.B.C. (dissenting) in the hearing of 
the case before the Court of Appeals of British Columbia, 
(1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.355, stated that:
competence must be certified in writing by 
a treating physician and by an independent 
psychiatrist who has examined her not more 
than twenty-four hours before arrangements 
are put in place which will permit the 
appellant to actually terminate her life.
179 Not less than three clear days before any 
psychiatrist examines the appellant for the purposes of the 
aforesaid, notice must be given to the regional coroner. 
((1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.355).
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(6) the constitutional exemption will expire 
according to the time limits set by McEachern 
C.J.B.C. ;181 and
(7) the act causing the death of the applicant 
must be that of the applicant him or herself, and 
not of anyone else.182
This proposed solution to the problem, whilst far from
ideal, at least recognises the autonomy of a patient in the
appellant's position as well as the dilemma in which the
criminalization of assisted suicide places the medical
practitioner. The fear remains that the minority approach
was an example of judicial law-making by any other name.
John Keown, commenting on the case claimed that the
minority's reasoning was:
misconceived, their assessment of the risks of 
abuse complacent and their 'guidelines' vague.
Yet they almost established a constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide; a right 
arguably going beyond, in the words of Sopinka J.
'any serious proposal for reform in the western 
world', and a right whose extension to able 
bodied euthanasia consistency would inexorably 
have required.183
This argument is typical of the slippery slope
the manner outlined by MacEachern C.J.B.C.;180
180 One of the physicians giving any certificate as 
aforesaid, must re-examine the appellant each day after the 
above-mentioned arrangements are put in place to ensure that 
she does not evidence any change in her intention to end her 
life. ((1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.356).
181 No one may assist the appellant to attempt to commit 
suicide or to commit suicide after the expiration of thirty 
one days from the date of the first-mentioned certificate, 
and, upon the expiration of that period, any arrangements 
made to assist the appellant to end her life must 
immediately be made inoperative and discontinued. ((1994) 
107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, p.356).
182 (1994) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, pp.384-385.
183 See, Keown, (1994, pp.234-236).
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argument. The two pillars of the argument are represented 
here; firstly, the risk of abuse of the practice and 
secondly, the danger of its extension to other groups in 
society. Keown goes on to state that the decision of the 
minority in Re Rodriguez and Attorney-General of British 
Columbia et al.: British Columbia Coalition of People with 
Disabilities et al.: Interveners and the decision of the 
majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of 
Morgentaler. Smolling and Scott v The Queen184 to the 
effect that laws restricting access to pregnancy 
termination services infringed individual rights under 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1982 raise "profound questions about the role of the 
judiciary in a democratic society".186
This statement raises yet again the question of the 
compatibility of the power of an unelected judiciary to 
engage in the review and modification of the policies of 
democratically elected bodies.186
However, one must look to the opposing view of 
judicial power as a break on the untrammelled power of the 
executive. Is it any more democratic to have a 
constitutional arrangement where the executive has sole and 
unimpeded power than to have an arrangement as one has m
184 (1988) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 and see discussion of 
this case in Chapter Three of this thesis, pp.215-229.
185 Keown, (1994, p.236).
186 See generally, Cox, (1987, pp.2-12); Ely, (1980, 
pp.1-14); Monahan, (1987, pp.5-20); Wolfe, (1986, pp.6-17) 
and see the discussion of this issue in Chapter Three of 
this thesis, pp.172-178.
471
checks may be placed on government power by the judiciary
in the interests of individual rights?
As Dworkin has noted, a state which allows judges to
check legislative power in the interests of the rights of
the citizens:
is not undemocratic. On the contrary, it is a 
precondition of legitimate democracy that
government is required to treat individual 
citizens as equals, and to respect their 
fundamental liberties and dignity. Unless those 
conditions are met, there can be no genuine 
democracy, because unless they are met, the 
majority has no legitimate title to govern.187
Implications for the Irish Model.
Before we in Ireland can argue that the
criminalization of physician-assisted suicide is contrary
to the equality provisions of the Constitution, it must
first be clearly established either at common law or by the 
legislature that a right to refuse treatment leading to 
death exists. In Chapter Four the thesis argued that at 
common law the right arguably exists based on the English 
precedents of Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland188 and Re T 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment^.189 That such an
argument was well founded appears from the decision in Re
the United States, Canada, or Ireland, for example, where
187 Dworkin, (1993, p. 123).
188 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
189 [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
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Given the cautious manner in which both the courts and 
the legislature operate in the area of issues affecting the 
sanctity of life, it is submitted that the Irish Supreme 
Court would, if presented with such a case as that of Sue 
Rodriguez, adopt a similar position to that of the majority 
in that case. As for the argument based on the right of 
privacy, the assumption is that the Irish Supreme Court 
would not depart radically from its previous decisions in 
this area and declare that there is indeed a right to die 
by assistance. Such a radical departure would not be in 
accord with the way in which the right to life is currently 
conceptualized in Irish constitutional discourse. The 
reluctance of the Supreme Court to erode the value of life 
coupled with the argument which Costello J.191 has made in 
distinguishing explicitly between active and passive 
euthanasia would seem to preclude such a development. 
Moreover, the impact of such a move would affect the extant 
criminal legislation in relation to assisted suicide, which 
again for policy reasons a Supreme Court would be loath to 
do.
C (Ward of Court 1190 discussed in that chapter.
190 High Court, Unreported, 5 May 1995, Lynch J.
191 See, Costello, (1986, pp. 35-46).
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)Each man is master of his own death, 
and all that we can do when the time 
comes is to help him die without fear 
of pain.1
7.0 Introduction.
In this chapter, the thesis analyzes the arguments 
made in the previous chapters. It examines whether the 
traditional constitutional model of the right to life may 
be sucessfully applied to complex fact situations in the 
medical context. The thesis then investigates alternative 
legal models of the right to life and suggests possible 
areas of reform.
7.1 Review.
As the title of the thesis suggests, albeit obliquely, 
there is a choice to be made as to the model which will 
form the basis for the potential right to die jurisprudence 
in Ireland. On the one hand, one can choose the model of 
the natural death. This model is rooted in deontological 
ideas about the intrinsic value of life as an abstract 
ideal. The natural death model is the offspring of the 
sanctity of life model and is thus absolutist and 
impersonal. The sanctity of life model has been the 
dominant model in Irish legal discourse on the topic of the
CHAPTER SEVEN: REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS.
1 Garcia Marquez, (1988, p.14).
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right to life to date. This model rather than being a 
flexible one, adapting to the needs of an evolving societal 
framework, is absolutist and literalist. In other words, it 
fits into Ronald Dworkin's model of the 'constitution of 
detail7.2 This model is hardly the model which would fit 
very easily into the medical law context. Medical law is 
concerned with often quite complex fact situations 
involving, inter alia, important questions of personal 
autonomy. As a result, the wishes and desires of the 
individual patient must be taken into account, not in a 
perfunctory manner, but in a manner which best serves the 
autonomy of the patient, while not forgetting the interests 
of the health care provider. Applying a deontological model 
to this scenario may serve the purpose of upholding the 
ideal of the sanctity of life, but it does not uphold the 
equally important ideal of patient autonomy.
That this model poorly serves individual autonomy can 
be seen in the manner in which both the courts and the 
legislature have dealt with issues in the sphere of medical 
practice. Thus, the issue of abortion clearly demonstrated 
the important practical ramifications of applying a 
deontological model to a question of individual autonomy. 
The patient and doctor, the central actors in this 
therapeutic relationship have, within this model been 
relegated to the status of mere bit-players, performing 
roles which are neither respectful of individual autonomy 
nor dignity of the person.
2 Dworkin, (1993, p.119).
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In recent years, this deontological model has been 
subject to challenge from another model which appears to 
offer more in terms of respecting individual autonomy. 
Thus, having witnessed the case of Attorney-General v X and 
Others3 and its aftermath, one could argue that Irish law 
in the zone of individual rights, may be commencing to 
question the previous paradigm of the sanctity of life in 
more vehement terms than heretofore.
Like Irish society, Irish law in this zone, it could 
be argued, is undergoing a difficult metamorphosis from the 
paradigm of the natural to that of the post-natural. What 
the post-natural phase of Irish individual rights 
jurisprudence holds will be dependent on individuals rather 
than on the moral collectivity. It is to be hoped that the 
transition will lead to a new autonomy, this time personal 
rather than political.
What then is this alternative model which I have 
referred to rather grandiloquently as the death of the 
natural. It is a model which has much in common with the 
rights model as defined by Dworkin4 and interpreted by 
Brock5 in the medical context. In constitutional terms this 
model would fit into Dworkin's model of the 'constitution 
of principle'.6 This model, it is submitted, leads in 
practical terms to a more equitable resolution of the
3 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
4 Dworkin, (1984, p.171).
5 Brock, (1993, pp.95-122).
6 Dworkin, (1993, p.119).
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That it is important to identify a model which will 
underpin any future Irish jurisprudence on death has been 
demonstrated in the body of the thesis.
Chapter One outlined the phenomenon of the legal
appropriation of death, a societal reality from which
Ireland is not immune. In the face of the very real policy 
and personal ramifications of the issues which arise from 
this phenomenon, how have legal and policy actors in
Ireland reacted? It has to be said not very well. The
country has, in effect, no policy framework within which to 
resolve the complex dilemmas in this area of medical 
practice.
The basis of a legislative framework in this area, a 
determination of death statute is absent from our statute 
books. Without such a statute we are ill-equipped, as 
Chapter Two demonstrated, to deal with the connected issues 
of organ transplantation and the treatment of the 
permanently unconscious. Chapter Three analyzed the 
difficulties posed for future development in the field of 
medical treatment of retaining the traditional model, by 
demonstrating the inadequacy of such a model in terms of 
personal autonomy in the case of abortion.
Chapter Four explained the need for a legislative 
response to the question of treatment withdrawal, by 
examining the all too real legal and ethical dilemmas which 
arise in this aspect of medical practice. The reactions of 
other common law jurisdictions to this issue were examined
dilemmas in the area of thanatology.
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in an effort to discover a workable model for Irish law in 
this area. That policy of some sort is urgently required 
will become all too real when Irish courts are faced with 
a scenario such as that presented in Airedale N.H.S. Trust 
v Bland7 or Cruzan v Director. Missouri Department of 
Health.8 Guidance on the issue is crucial, both for the 
patient and for the health care professional who is daily 
faced with such dilemmas.
Chapters Five and Six discussed an even more 
controversial topic, active intervention to end life in the 
medical context. This issue seems for many to be beyond the 
pale. The sanctity of life or natural model would not allow 
of such a development. However, the Netherlands has 
accepted as part of medical practice active euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. This is reflective of an 
alternative conception of the sanctity of life which 
accepts that a time will come in the lives of many when the 
greatest respect which can be accorded them is to respect 
their wish to die, "to help them die without fear of pain".
7.2 Conclusions.
Irish medical jurisprudence is currently in a 
developmental phase. The way in which those who shape 
policy confront this topic will affect all parties to the
7 [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316.
8 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
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therapeutic relationship. If we choose to do nothing, and
wait until the dilemmas present themselves before the
courts, then the result is uncertainty, both for the
patient who is unaware of his rights in the therapeutic
relationship and for the doctor who is unsure of the limits
of his duties. The most logical and, indeed, equitable
solution to this problem is to provide a legislative
solution. This would clearly delineate the rights and
responsibilities of all parties to the relationship.
How is such legislation to be informed? Is it to be
informed by a deontological natural model which would
hardly accommodate patient or professional autonomy, or is
it to informed by a model based on individual rights? The
most equitable basis for such legislation is a rights
model. This model would respect the autonomy of both doctor
and patient. Moreover, unlike the deontological model it is
unhindered by the difficulty of imposing absolutist models
on rapidly advancing and complex fact situations.
The alternative model would facilitate a shift from a
societal paradigm, where, as Outram has explained:
the body appears... as a place where the ability 
to control is overwhelmingly made manifest. Such 
a control - until very recently - has made 
attitudes to the body a touchstone of social 
conformity.9
to a paradigm where policy would uphold:
the dignity and identity of all human beings and 
guarantee everyone, without discrimination, 
respect for their integrity and other rights and 
fundamental freedoms with regard to the
9 Outram, (1986, p.47).
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application of biology and medicine.10
7.3 Envoi.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Re Article 26 and
the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State
for Termination of Pregnancies1) Billf 199511 was delivered
on 12 May 1995. Though this case was heard after this
thesis was submitted, it must be said that it exemplifies
the shift in the attitude with which the work is concerned.
In this case, the Supreme Court refused to accept that
natural law is anterior and superordinate to the provisions
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court decided that the
Bill in question was not repugnant to the Constitution, and
in reaching this decision held that:
[t]he Court in interpreting the Constitution and 
in ascertaining and declaring what are the 
personal rights which are guaranteed by the 
Constitution and in determining, where necessary, 
the rights which are imprescriptible or 
inalienable, must act in accordance with the 
aforesaid guidelines as laid down in the 
Constitution and must interpret them in 
accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice 
and charity.12
In so finding, the Supreme Court has given recognition 
to the development of a stream of authority, commencing
10 Council of Europe, Draft Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Bioethics Convention 1994, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Directorate of Legal of Affairs, Article 1.
11 Supreme Court, Unreported, 12 May 1995.
12 Ibid.
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with Byrne v Ireland.13 In the ground-breaking decision of
McGee v Attorney-General14 Walsh J. held that:
[i]n a pluralist society such as ours, the Courts 
cannot (sic) as a matter of constitutional law be 
asked to choose between the differing views, 
where they exist, of experts on the 
interpretation by the religious denominations of 
either the nature or extent of these natural 
rights as they are to be found in the natural 
law. The same considerations apply also to the 
question of ascertaining the nature and extent of 
the duties which flow from natural law... in this 
country it falls to the judges finally to 
interpret the Constitution and in so doing to 
determine, where necessary, the rights which are 
superior or antecedent to positive law or which 
are imprescriptible or inalienable... The judges 
must, therefore, as best they can from their 
training and their experience interpret these 
rights in accordance with their ideas of 
prudence, justice and charity... the prevailing 
ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the 
passage of time: no interpretation of the
Constitution is intended to be final for all 
time. It is given in the light of prevailing 
ideas and concepts.15
This passage was approved by 0'Higgins C.J. in the 
course of his judgment in The State (Healvl v Donoahue.16 
and impliedly by Finlay C.J. in his judgment in Attorney- 
General v X and Others.17
This stream of authority has culminated in the 
decision in Re Article 26 and the Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies’)
13 [1972] I.R. 241.
14 [1974] I.R. 284.
15 Ibid., p.318.
16 [1976] I.R. 326.
17 [1992] 1 I.R. 1.
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unapproved judgment that:
[t]he Courts, as they were and are bound to, 
recognise the Constitution as the fundamental law 
of the State to which the organs of the State 
were subject and at no stage recognised the 
provisions of the natural law as superior to the 
Constitution.
In holding that the Bill was not repugnant to the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
Oireachtas is entitled to balance the interests of the 
unborn against the interests of the woman seeking 
information on pregnancy termination services and in its 
allocation of legislatively protected rights, was acting 
within its Constitutional remit. This is despite the fact 
that the net effect of this judgment is to permit women in 
Ireland to have access to information about pregnancy 
terminations available in jurisdictions where these are not 
prohibited by law.
The judgment does not recognise any incompatibility 
between the proscription of abortion in Ireland, and the 
right to information about abortions available outside the 
state in jurisdictions where such procedures are legal.
Until an approved version of this judgment is 
circulated, it may be unwise to attempt to define the 
precise gradation of the shift described in this thesis. 
All that can be said, is that insofar as this thesis has 
described a shift, the recent decision appears to confirm 
that the researcher is indeed correct.
Bill. 1995.18 Hamilton C.J. stated at page 58 of the
18 Supreme Court, Unreported, 12 May 1995.
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